Ricky C. Sandlin v. Sandra Denise Sandlin
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CA-00371-COA
RICKY C. SANDLIN
APPELLANT/
CROSS- APPELLEE
v.
SANDRA DENISE SANDLIN
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT
12/11/2002
HON. JAMES S. GORE
CHICKASAW COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
J. DUDLEY WILLIAMS
TINA MARIE DUGARD SCOTT
CIVIL - CUSTODY
AWARDED CUSTODY OF MINOR FEMALE TO
THE MOTHER AND DISTRIBUTED MARITAL
ASSETS
AFFIRMED - 11/30/2004
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS AND BARNES, JJ.
BRIDGES, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Ricky C. Sandlin filed a complaint in the Chickasaw County Chancery Court by which he sought
a divorce from Sandra Denise Sandlin on the ground of adultery or, in the alternative, irreconcilable
differences. Ricky also requested permanent custody of Rikkita Caron Sandlin and Corey Lee Austin
Sandlin. Finally, Ricky asked for child support, possession of the marital home, equitable division of the
marital assets and debts, and attorney’s fees and costs. Sandra then filed an answer and "counter-
complaint"1 seeking divorce on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative,
irreconcilable differences, custody of Rikkita and Corey, child support, equitable division of the marital
assets and debts, and attorney’s fees and costs.
¶2.
Ricky and Sandra could not agree on terms for an irreconcilable differences divorce. So, after
considering the fault based grounds advanced by each party, the chancellor granted Ricky’s request for
divorce from Sandra on the ground of adultery and awarded him custody of Corey but gave Sandra
custody of Rikkita and possession of the marital home.
¶3.
Aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision, Ricky appeals and raises the following issues:
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING SANDRA
CUSTODY OF RIKKITA?
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING SANDRA
POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL HOME?
¶4.
Also aggrieved, Sandra cross-appeals and raises the following issue:
III.
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO AWARD
SANDRA ALIMONY?
FACTS
¶5.
Ricky and Sandra were married on October 24, 1980. During the marriage, they had three
children, namely, Katherine, who is emancipated, Rikkita, and Corey. Their marriage began to deteriorate
in the fall of 2001, and they ultimately separated in January of 2002, when Ricky moved out the marital
home. Shortly afterwards, Ricky filed a complaint for divorce and a motion for temporary relief in the
Chickasaw County Chancery Court. On May 22, 2002, the chancellor entered an order granting, inter
1
Rule 81(f) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure governs the proper terms for pleadings.
Accordingly, “counter-complaint” is an improper title for the pleading and should be properly titled as a
“counterclaim.”
2
alia, Ricky temporary custody of Rikkita and Corey. Corey lived with Ricky from the time of separation.
Rikkita, however, refused to live with Ricky, and Sandra did not require her to do so in violation of the
chancery court’s order.
¶6.
In October of 2002, the matter proceeded to trial. Subsequently, the chancellor ruled that Ricky
was entitled to a divorce on the ground of adultery. The chancellor further decided that (a) custody of the
children would be split, meaning Ricky received custody of Corey but Sandra got custody of Rikkita; (b)
Sandra received possession of the marital home; and (c) neither party would receive alimony.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶7.
As often noted in Mississippi jurisprudence, appellate courts “will not disturb the findings of a
chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was
manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legalstandard was applied.” Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick,
732 So.2d 876, 880 (¶13) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted).
I.
Custody
¶8.
When determining whom should be awarded custody of Rikkita and Corey, the chancellor
appropriately evaluated the facts presented at trial in conjunction with the factors enunciated in Albright
v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983), for ascertaining the best interest of the children. The
chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were accordingly entered in the judgment of the court.2
Specifically, the chancellor found that: (a) the age of Rikkita and Corey, fifteen and twelve, respectively,
favored neither parent; (b) the health and sex of Corey favored Ricky, considering the need for a strong
2
In this case, Chancellor James Gore’s findings of fact and conclusions of law could be
considered a model reference. Chancellor Gore adequately set forth his reasoning in a manner that
greatly aided this Court’s resolution of all issues advanced in this appeal and prove positive that good
findings make it easy to determine a judge’s reasoning and motivations.
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father figure to act as a role model, but the health and sex of Rikkita favored Sandra, considering the need
for her mother’s guidance and advice; (c) continuity of care for the children favored Sandra based on her
role prior to separation; (d) parenting skills were essentially equal and favored neither parent; (e) both
parents were willing and able to provide primary care for the children; (f) employment responsibilities
favored Sandra because Ricky’s were more restrictive; (g) both parents were in good mental and physical
health; (h) emotional ties were split, as Corey favored Ricky and Rikkita favored Sandra; (i) moral fitness
favored Ricky, though neither parent was unfit to have custody of the children; (j) the home, school, and
community records of the children were good; however, both children exhibited the consequences of their
parents’ breakup in their behavior; (k) Corey preferred to live with Ricky, and Rikkita preferred to live with
Sandra; (l) both parents could provide a stable home and had stable employment; and (m) the families of
both parents offered a strong support system to help rear the children. The chancellor concluded that both
Ricky and Sandra were fit and proper persons to have custody of the children, and therefore, upon
considering the totality of the circumstances, He placed Corey in Ricky’s custody and Rikkita in Sandra’s
custody.
¶9.
In his first assignment of error, Ricky contends that the chancellor misapplied the Albright factors,
and as a result, Sandra was erroneously awarded custody of Rikkita. Ricky maintains that the judgment
of the court is clearly contrary to Rikkita’s best interest, as demonstrated by the evidence presented at trial,
i.e., a dramatic change in Rikkita’s appearance, behavior, and friends; an absence of supervision and
guidance by Sandra; and Sandra’s flagrant adulterous relationship.
¶10.
Ricky, however, fails to cite any authority to support his argument. According to the Mississippi
Rules of Appellate Procedure, arguments advanced on appeal are required to “contain the contentions of
appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the
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authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” M.R.A.P. 28(a)(6) (emphasis added).
Consequently, this issue is procedurally barred. See Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass’n, 515
So.2d 916, 920 (Miss. 1987).
¶11.
Ricky’s argument also fails on the merits. As previously mentioned, the record demonstrates that
the chancellor’s decision is supported by substantial evidence so that we could not possibly find his
judgment to constitute manifest error. Regardless of what we would have held if we were the deciding
judge, so long as the chancellor had a factual basis to ground his opinion and applied the correct legal
standard we are not at liberty to intervene. Caswell v. Caswell, 763 So.2d 890, 893 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.
2000). Accordingly, this issue has no merit.
II.
Marital Home
¶12.
The doctrine of equitable distribution necessitates, as the chancellor did in the case at bar,
considering a variety of factors as set forth in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
In evaluating these factors, the chancellor found that equity demanded awarding Sandra the house, noting
that Sandra “maintained the marital home” and that “Sandra is more emotionally attached to the marital
home and property since it is near the homes of other family members and was once her grandparents’
property and was given to the parties by her father.”
¶13.
Ricky contends the chancellor’s decision to award Sandra the marital home is an affront to basic
principles of equity arguing that the aforementioned factors favoring such decision are offset by Sandra’s
admission of adultery. Sandra’s adulterous relationship was detrimental to the stability and harmony of the
their marriage and, ultimately, caused the divorce.
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¶14.
“[I]n making an equitable division of the marital property, the chancellor is not required to divide
the property equally.” Love v. Love, 687 So.2d 1229, 1232 (Miss. 1997) (citations omitted).
Regardless, our review of the record reveals that the chancellor did not fail to do so. Although Sandra was
awarded the marital home, she was also ordered to pay any indebtedness consistent with such ownership.
Furthermore, any inequity possibly suffered by Ricky is clearly offset by the fact that he was awarded sole
possession of his retirement benefits in addition to not being required to make alimony payments. As a
result, we cannot hold the chancellor’s judgment to be manifest error and, accordingly, find this issue to
have no merit.
III.
Alimony
¶15.
Sandra contends the chancellor erred in his division of the marital property because she was left
with a deficit. Moreover, Ricky’s income and earning capacity is almost three times that of Sandra’s, so
she claims that she should have been awarded alimony.
¶16.
“Alimony is considered only after the marital property has been equitably divided and the chancellor
determines one spouse has suffered a deficit.” Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843, 848 (¶13) (Miss. 2003).
However, a deficit alone is an inadequate basis on which to award alimony. The Mississippi Supreme
Court has expressed that “adultery should not stand as an absolute bar to alimony, especially...when denial
of alimony would render the wife destitute.” Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.
1992). The denial of alimony in the case sub judice certainly does not leave Sandra destitute, and the
evidence supports the chancellor’s judgment. Therefore, we find that this issue also lacks merit.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF CHICKASAW COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
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KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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