Pierre Haynes v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-02738-COA
PIERRE HAYNES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
1/13/2003
HON. C. E. MORGAN, III
WINSTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PIERRE HAYNES (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
DOUG EVANS
CRIMINAL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PETITION DENIED
AFFIRMED - 12/14/2004
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS AND BARNES, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Pierre Haynes appeals the denial of his first motion for post-conviction collateral relief in which he
contends that his guilty plea was involuntarily made. Finding this issue to be without merit, we affirm the
January 13, 2003, order of the Circuit Court of Winston County.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On October 30, 2002, Pierre Haynes pled guilty to the charge of armed robbery, in the Circuit
Court of Winston County, Mississippi, and received a twenty-five year sentence with five years suspended,
and five years of supervised probation upon release of incarceration. Shortly thereafter, on January 8,
2003, Haynes filed his first motion for post-conviction collateral relief with the circuit court attacking the
legitimacy of his guilty plea and conviction. Haynes claimed his plea was involuntarily entered because (1)
he was a minor, sixteen years of age, at the time his plea was entered and his parents were not present at
the court proceedings, and (2) he had been misled as to the length of the sentence he would receive if he
pled guilty. In an order dated January 13, 2003, and filed with the clerk on January 17, 2003, the circuit
court found Haynes's claims to be without merit and denied his motion for post-conviction collateral relief.
¶3.
Haynes was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Rather than appeal the denial of the trial
court's January 13, 2003 order, Haynes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the
trial court by order dated April 10, 2003. Sometime thereafter, Haynes apparently filed an application in
the supreme court for leave to proceed in the trial court; the record does not contain a copy of this
application. On November 6, 2003, the supreme court dismissed the motion without prejudice in order
for Haynes to file in the trial court. On December 8, 2003, Haynes filed a second motion for postconviction collateral relief with the Circuit Court of Winston County, Mississippi, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel and involuntary plea and conviction by use of coerced confession. Also, on
December 8, 2003, Haynes filed a notice of appeal apparently attempting to seek review of the trial court's
January 13, 2003 order.1 On January 14, 2004, the trial court ruled that the court had "heretofore ruled
on all dispositive motions concerning post-conviction relief filed in this cause that pertained to the validity
of Haynes's guilty plea and conviction of armed robbery. . . ." The court advised Haynes that the "only
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Haynes’s notice of appeal states that he is “aggrieved by the Order of this Court entered on
November 17th, 2003 . . . and does desire to appeal this decision”. No order of November 17, 2003,
appears in the record. Haynes’s designation of records, filed the same date as his notice of appeal,
clarifies that the order appealed from is the “order entered on the 17 day of January, denying Petitioner
Post Conviction Motion.”
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avenue left" was to appeal the denial of the request to this Court. No notice of appeal has been filed
seeking review of the January 14, 2004, order.
JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
¶4.
At first blush, Haynes’s appeal appears to be time-barred under our Rules of Appellate Procedure.
However, Haynes was and is under the disability of infancy which extends his time to file an appeal. Under
MississippiCode Annotated Section 1-3-21 (1972), Haynes was an infant, under the age of 21, at the time
his motion for post-conviction collateral relief was denied. Thus, Haynes has two years in which to file a
timely appeal under Rule 4(f) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states:
In the case of parties under a disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, the various
periods of time for which provision is made in this rule and within which periods of time
action must be taken shall not begin to run until the date on which the disability of any such
party shall have been removed. However, in cases where the appellant infant or person
of unsound mind was a plaintiff or complainant, and in cases where such a person was
a party defendant and there had been appointed for him or her a guardian ad litem,
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken in the manner prescribed in this rule
within two years of the entry of the judgment or order which would cause to
commence the running of the 30 day time period for all other appellants as provided in this
rule.
Miss. R. App. P. 4(f) (emphasis added). Since Haynes, the plaintiff below, was an infant on January 13,
2003, when the trial court denied his first motion for post-conviction collateral relief, his appeal of that
order, perfected less than one year thereafter, was timely.
¶5.
Haynes has not, however, filed any notice of appeal with respect to the trial court’s January 14,
2004 order effectively denying his second motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Haynes filed his
notice of appeal, apparently seeking review of the January 17, 2003, order on the same date he filed his
second motion and prior to the trial court's disposal thereof. The Court finds the right to appellate review
of the trial court’s January 14, 2004, order was never invoked. Although there are two situations under
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our Rules of Appellate Procedure for giving effect to a premature notice of appeal, Miss. R. App. P. 4(b)
(notice filed after announcement but before entry of judgment) and 4(d), (e) (notice filed while post-final
judgment motions pending), neither of these situations are present with respect to the order denying
Haynes's second motion for post-conviction collateral relief. See Cameron v. Burns, 802 So. 2d 1069
(Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Properly filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See Eades v. State, 805 So.
2d 554, 555 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, this Court has no power to review the January 14, 2004
denial of Haynes's second motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
When reviewing the denial of a post-conviction motion, this Court will not disturb a trial court's
finding of fact unless found to be clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss.
1999). In order to resolve the merits of allegations under the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, the
trial judge must review the "original motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts, and
correspondence relating to the judgment under attack." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(1) (Rev. 2000).
ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
WAS HAYNES'S PLEA VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED?
¶7.
In his first motion for post-conviction relief, Haynes argued that his plea was involuntarily and
unintelligently entered because he was only sixteen years of age at the time his plea was entered, his parents
were not present at the court proceedings, and he had been misled as to the length of the sentence he would
receive if he pled guilty.
¶8.
A plea of guilty is not binding upon a criminal defendant unless it is entered voluntarily and
intelligently. Myers v. Stat e, 583 So. 2d 174, 177 (Miss. 1991). A plea is deemed "voluntary and
intelligent" only where the defendant is advised concerning the nature of the charge against him and the
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consequences of his plea. Wilson v. State, 577 So. 2d 394, 396-97 (Miss. 1991). The defendant must
be informed that a guilty plea waives the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to protection against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Additionally,
the trial judge must "inquire and determine" that the accused understands the maximum and minimum
penalties to which he may be sentenced. URCCC 8.04(A)(4).
¶9.
Regarding Haynes's contention that his infancy affected his ability to enter a plea, the law is clear.
When a minor is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the youth court, he may enter a guilty plea in the
circuit court to an indictment charging him with a crime. Ellzey v. State, 196 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1967);
see also Rush v. State, 811 So. 2d 431, 437 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 43-21-151(1)(a) (2000 & Rev. 2004), "[a]ny act attempted or committed by a child,
which if committed by an adult would be punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment . . . will
be in the original jurisdiction of the circuit court . . . . " Since the offense of armed robbery carries a
maximum life sentence, original jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court. Brown v. State, 839 So. 2d
597, 599 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Being properly before the circuit court, Haynes's infancy did not
prevent him from entering a valid plea of guilty, and parental accompaniment was not required during the
plea process. See Rush, 811 So. 2d at 437 (¶18).
¶10.
Haynes argues that he was misled as to the length of sentence he would receive if he pled guilty.
This assertion is in direct contradiction of Haynes's own testimony. In the plea hearing, the court asked
Haynes if he understood that there was no minimum sentence but the maximum sentence for armed robbery
is life in prison. Haynes replied in the affirmative. The court then asked Haynes if he understood that he
could receive any sentence less than life. Haynes again replied in the affirmative. Thus, Haynes's argument
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that he thought he would receive a lesser sentence is unpersuasive. It is evident that Haynes was informed
of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
¶11.
Neither Haynes's age nor professed expectation of a lesser sentence are sufficient to support a
finding that his plea of guilty was involuntary. Thus, the trial court properly denied Haynes's first motion
for post-conviction collateral relief. The denial of Haynes's second motion is not properly before the Court.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WINSTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO WINSTON COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS,
AND ISHEE, JJ. CONCUR.
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