Christopher Baldwin v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-00016-COA
CHRISTOPHER BALDWIN
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/9/2003
HON. MICHAEL R. EUBANKS
PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHRISTOPHER BALDWIN (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
CLAIBORNE MCDONALD
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED.
AFFIRMED - 11/02/2004
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1.
Christopher Baldwin pled guilty on December 21, 1999, in the Pearl River County Circuit Court
to the charge of wire fraud. In May of 2000, Baldwin was sentenced to serve five years; however, the
entire period was suspended pending the successful completion of five years of probation. Baldwin was
also ordered to pay restitution and court costs.
¶2.
On September 21, 2001, after Baldwin had violated certain conditions of his probation, the trial
court signed an amendment to the order of conviction requiring that Baldwin report to the restitution center.
In May of 2002, Baldwin was ordered to leave the restitution center for violent behavior. After a hearing
on the matter, the trial court ordered the revocation of Baldwin's probation. However, the trial court held
the order of revocation in abeyance pending Baldwin's ability to maintain employment and make monthly
payments on his restitution. The trial court further stated that if Baldwin failed, then his probation would
be automatically revoked by the order. In order for the probation to be revoked the trial court required
the probation officer to file an affidavit with the court.
¶3.
An affidavit was filed on November 23, 2002, stating that Baldwin failed to meet the conditions
of his probation. Baldwin had been fired from his job for misusing the company credit card and cell phone
in the amount of $5,446.76. Baldwin was then arrested and ordered to serve his sentence in the custody
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
¶4.
Baldwin filed his motion for post-conviction collateral relief on September 8, 2003. The trial court
denied Baldwin's motion. Baldwin now appeals to this Court asserting that the trial court erred in failing
to make sufficient inquiry into the reason for his failure to make restitution payments; the trial court failed
to orally inform him of the terms and conditions in the order of revocation; and the trial court erred in
addressing him at his revocation hearing without an attorney present.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, our standard of review is well stated.
We will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However,
where questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo. Pace v. State, 770 So.
2d 1052 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
2
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT INQUIRY INTO
THE REASON FOR BALDWIN'S FAILURE TO MAKE RESTITUTION PAYMENTS?
¶6.
In his first issue, Baldwin argues that the trial court erred in failing to make sufficient inquiry into the
reason for his failure to make restitution payments. Specifically, Baldwin states that the trial court erred by
not inquiring into why he was unable to pay his restitution during November 2002. Baldwin says he was
indigent during that month and was unable to make his payment. Baldwin cites to Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 99-19-20 (Rev. 2000), to support his argument. Section 99-19-20 states, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(2) The defendant may be imprisoned until the fine is paid if the defendant is financially able
to pay a fine and the court so finds, subject to the limitations hereinafter set out. The
defendant shall not be imprisoned if the defendant is financially unable to pay a fine and so
states to the court in writing, under oath, after sentence is pronounced, and the court so
finds, except if the defendant is financially unable to pay a fine and such defendant failed
or refused to comply with a prior sentence as specified in subsection (1) of this section, the
defendant may be imprisoned.
¶7.
Baldwin was "indigent" because he had recently been fired from his job for accruing more than
$5,000 in cell phone and company credit card charges in violation of company policy. Furthermore, this
was Baldwin's third probation violation. In September 2001, Baldwin, after committing various probation
violations, was ordered to attend the restitution center. In May 2002, Baldwin was kicked out of the
restitution center for violent behavior. The trial court, in its order revoking Baldwin's probation, specifically
stated that the revocation was a result of Baldwin's violent behavior while at the restitution center.
However, the trial court held the revocation order in abeyance, giving Baldwin yet another opportunity to
remain out of jail. Baldwin failed to follow the terms of probation and was incarcerated.
3
¶8.
During the revocation hearing in May 2002, Baldwin never testified that he was indigent. In fact,
Baldwin stated that a former employer was going to rehire him. Baldwin offered to have his wages
garnished. Baldwin also stated that he gets anywhere from $2,000 and $3,000 back after taxes through
earned income credit and would use that money for restitution.
¶9.
We cannot find that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in determining
whether or not Baldwin could make his restitution payments. This issue is without merit.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT FAIL TO ORALLY INFORM BALDWIN OF THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF THE ORDER OF REVOCATION?
¶10.
In his second issue, Baldwin argues that due process requires that the trial judge orally inform a
defendant of the terms and conditions of probation before revoking probation for a violation of those terms
and conditions.
¶11.
At his sentencing hearing, Baldwin was informed that part of his sentence was to make full
restitution. Later, through a court order which included Baldwin's signature, Baldwin was again informed
that he was to make monthly payments as part of his restitution. The order stated that Baldwin was to pay
$300 per month for the first year of probation, $400 per month for the second year, and $500 per month
for the third, fourth and fifth years. As Baldwin was clearly aware of the amount of his restitution and what
the consequences would be if he failed to make his monthly payments, we find no merit to this issue.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADDRESSING BALDWIN AT THE HEARING
WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY PRESENT?
¶12.
In his last issue, Baldwin argues that he should have had an attorney present at his revocation
hearing. Unlike many other proceedings involving those caught up in the criminal justice system, there is
no automatic right to counsel at hearings for the revocation of probation. Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206,
4
1209 (Miss. 1990). A probationer has the right to appointed counsel at a revocation hearing when the
issues are complex or otherwise difficult to develop. Id.
¶13.
The issues in this case were neither complex nor difficult to develop. Furthermore, Baldwin only
addresses this issue for the first time in this appeal. We cannot find that there was any error.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO
PEARL RIVER COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES, P.J., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
