Raymond Morris Davis v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-00299-COA
RAYMOND MORRIS DAVIS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
12/5/2002
HON. KOSTA N. VLAHOS
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
MICHAEL W. CROSBY
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CONO A. CARANNA, II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
MURDER-SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT
AFFIRMED - 09/14/2004
EN BANC.
BRIDGES, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Raymond Davis was convicted of murder by a Harrison County Circuit Court jury. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved
Davis asserts the following issues on appeal:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE WEATHERSBY RULE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED DR. MCGARRY
TO PROVIDE A LEGAL OPINION, AN OPINION THAT WAS OUTSIDE OF HIS AREA
OF EXPERTISE.
Upon review, we conclude that the reasons Davis advances for reversal of his conviction are not such as
would require this Court to disturb the jury's verdict, and we therefore affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On January 14, 2001, Raymond Davis and his brother Jason had an argument that resulted in
Jason's death. The brothers' verbal altercation escalated to a physical conflict. Davis armed himself with
a loaded twelve-gauge shotgun and shot Jason in the leg. A second shot to the Jason's left arm resulted
in near amputation of the limb below the elbow. A third shot struck Jason around his hip, and caused him
to fall to the floor. As Jason lay face down on the floor, Davis aimed the shotgun at Jason's head, the barrel
one foot from his scalp. Ultimately a fourth, final, and fatal shot to Jason's head would end his life. The
only living eyewitness to the argument and shooting was Davis.
¶3.
Raymond Davis was indicted for murder pursuant to Section 97-3-19(1)(a) of the Mississippi
Code. Davis claimed that Jason was enraged and armed with a knife. He argued that the first three shots
were in self-defense. However, Davis claimed that the fatal fourth shot was an accident. He contended
that Jason, prone on his stomach, suddenly raised up and bumped the gun barrel and caused the shotgun
to discharge accidentally.
¶4.
After a three-day trial, the jury returned their verdict and found Davis guilty of murder. Davis filed
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for new trial and a finding that the verdict
was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The trial court denied his post-trial motions. From
such, Davis appeals.
ANALYSIS
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE WEATHERSBY RULE?
2
¶5.
Davis asserts that the trial court erred by not applying the Weathersby rule as discussed in
Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933). The Weathersby rule operates when a
defendant is the only eyewitness to a crime. Id. In such an event, the defendant's version, if reasonable,
must be accepted as true unless substantially contradicted by a credible witness testifying for the State or
by physical facts or facts of common knowledge. Id. Davis's explanation may be contradicted either
directly or by fair inference. Kinkead v. State, 190 So. 2d 838, 839 (Miss. 1966). Weathersby is a guide
in determining if a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. Blanks v. State, 547 So. 2d 29, 34 (Miss.
1989). Thus, a Weathersby challenge is, essentially, a test of the sufficiency of the evidence. Green v.
State, 614 So. 2d 926, 931 (Miss. 1992). As such, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. Burge v. State, 472 So. 2d 392, 396 (Miss. 1985).
¶6.
Davis moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief. After the trial court
denied that motion, Davis testified and produced his mother and father to testify on his behalf. When a trial
court denies a defendant's motion for directed verdict and that defendant proceeds with his case after the
State rests, the defendant has waived appeal of the directed verdict. Simon v. State, 857 So.2d 668, 690
(¶ 54-56)(Miss. 2003). Davis did not renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence,
nor did he request a peremptory instruction on the subject matter. Davis did, however move, post-trial,
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but he made no reference to insufficiency of the evidence based
on the Weathersby rule. A motion for directed verdict and JNOV must be specific. Banks v. State, 394
So. 2d 875, 877 (Miss. 1981). Without specificity, a trial court will not err by denying the motion. While
the matter is not properly before this court, the trial court correctly denied the motion, and we affirm. The
discussion on the Weathersby rule which follows, resolves the question concerning sufficiency.
3
¶7.
Assuming that Davis had properly preserved the Weathersby issue, we are still not inclined to
reverse on appeal. A reasonable, hypothetical juror could have been convinced that physical facts
contradict Davis's claims that the shooting was in self-defense or accidentally inflicted. For example, the
jury could have found that Jason was crippled from the first three gunshot wounds and incapable of
continued attack. Further, Jason was physically unable to rise from the floor with three wounds: one to the
leg, another to his left arm, and a third to the hip. The third wound permitted Jason's bowels to protrude
through the wound. The jury also heard evidence that Davis’s version of the events was improbable. Dr.
Paul McGarry, a forensic pathologist, testified for the State and opined that the wounds would have caused
extreme bleeding and pain prohibiting Jason from doing much except writhing on the ground in "pseudoparalysis," rendering prolonged attack impossible.
¶8.
Not only that, Davis also testified that he was not sure that Jason was armed with a knife after the
first three shots. Evidence also suggested that no weapon was within Jason’s reach. A reasonable,
hypothetical juror could have been convinced that there was no need to continue aiming the shotgun at
Jason, as he presented no reasonably imminent threat in his unarmed, prone, and seriously wounded state.
It is even possible that the jury determined that Jason believed he was defending his life after being shot the
first, second, or third time. In examining such, we are sensitive to the fact that a rational, fair-minded jury
could have found Davis not guilty if they applied different weight to the evidence before them. However,
we are not inclined to substitute our view of the reasonable inferences drawn by the jury's. Burge, 472 So.
2d at 396 (quoting Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1983)). We therefore find this issue
is meritless.
4
II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED DR. MCGARRY
TO PROVIDE A LEGAL OPINION, AN OPINION THAT WAS OUTSIDE OF HIS AREA
OF EXPERTISE.
¶9.
In his second assignment of error, Davis asserts that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. McGarry
to assert an opinion beyond the scope of his expertise. During redirect examination, the State asked Dr.
McGarry whether the fourth gunshot wound was deliberate. Dr. McGarry responded "yes." However,
Davis did not make a contemporaneous objection to this testimony. He raises this issue for the first time
on appeal and relies on the "plain error" rule as the basis of his appeal.
¶10.
The plain error rule is codified within Mississippi Rules of Evidence 103(d). It provides that
nothing precludes a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting the substantial rights of a defendant,
even though they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. M.R.E. 103(d). If a party persuades
the court of the substantial injustice that would occur if the rule were not invoked, the court may invoke the
plain error rule. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975). However, the
plain error rule arises only if an error is so fundamental that it generates a miscarriage of justice. Gray v.
State, 549 So. 2d 1316, 1321 (Miss. 1989). Otherwise, a contemporaneous objection is required in
order to preserve an error for appellate review. Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473 (¶102) (Miss. 2002).
¶11.
We do not find that allowing Dr. McGarry's testimony is the type of error to which the plain error
rule applies. The error was not so fundamental that it generated a miscarriage of justice. Davis testified
that he fired the first three shots in deliberate self-defense. As discussed above, Dr. McGarry testified that
Jason was incapable of presenting a threat to Davis after the first three shots. The jury was free to consider
the testimony and physical facts and to reach a conclusion by fair inference that Davis acted deliberately,
regardless of Dr. McGarry's opinion of Davis's intent. Accordingly, although it was error to allow Dr.
McGarry's opinion on this ultimate issue, the error is harmless under the facts of this case, especially
5
considering the lack of a contemporaneous objection. As such, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, AND BARNES, JJ. CONCUR.
IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
