Ricky Ryals v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-00499-COA
RICKY RYALS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
1/18/2003
HON. JESS H. DICKINSON
FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
RICKY RYALS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
JON MARK WEATHERS
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSAL OF PCR
AFFIRMED - 9/07/2004
EN BANC.
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Ricky Ryals was indicted for capital murder in the Circuit Court of Forrest County. He pled guilty
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Ryals filed a motion for post-conviction relief that was summarily
dismissed by the trial judge. Ryals now appeals to this Court and raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE PLEA BECAUSE THE
STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT
II. WHETHER THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED
III. WHETHER THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
Ryals was indicted in the Circuit Court of Forrest County for capital murder pursuant to Mississippi
Code Annotated Section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2000). He pled guilty and received a life sentence to be
served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 97-3-21(b) (Rev. 2000).
¶3.
Almost three years later, Ryals filed a motion to “vacate and set aside guilty plea” in the sentencing
court arguing that the State failed to offer any evidence of guilt. The trial court treated Ryals’ motion as a
petition for post-conviction relief and summarily dismissed it pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2000). The trial judge ruled that since the only issue was the State’s alleged
insufficiency of evidence, Ryals effectively waived this matter when he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty
to the charge. Aggrieved by this result, Ryals perfected the present appeal.
¶4.
Ryals contends that the “sole” issue was whether the State’s offer of proof was sufficient for the
court to accept his plea. However, his petition and appellate brief allude to the fact that his plea was invalid
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will
analyze all three issues.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE PLEA BECAUSE THE
STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT
¶5.
“When this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief, it will
not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.” Williams v.
2
State, 872 So. 2d 711, 712 (¶ 2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “However, where questions of law are raised
the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Id.
¶6.
With his first issue, Ryals argues that, although he pled guilty, the evidence was insufficient to
convict him. In Swift v. State, 815 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), this Court stated:
The law is well settled that when properly entered and accepted, “[a] guilty plea operates
to waive the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and crossexamine the prosecution’s witnesses, the right to a jury trial and the right that the
prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(emphasis added).
¶7.
Assuming that Ryals’ guilty plea was valid, he waived his opportunity for a jury to review the
sufficiency of evidence in his case. See Steele v. State, 845 So. 2d 758, 759 (¶ 4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003);
Smith v. State, 845 So. 2d 730, 733 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Therefore, we turn to the next issue.
II. WHETHER THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED
¶8.
Ryals alleges that when the trial court asked for his plea he stated that he did not commit the crime.
Our rules of criminal procedure require the following when a defendant is arraigned and wishes to plead
guilty:
3. Voluntariness. Before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court must
determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis
for the plea. A plea of guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or
improper inducements. A showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently
made must appear in the record.
4. Advice to the Defendant. When the defendant is arraigned and wishes to plead guilty
to the offense charged, it is the duty of the trial court to address the defendant personally
and to inquire and determine:
a. That the accused is competent to understand the nature of the charge;
b. That the accused understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and the
maximum and minimum penalties provided by law;
c. That the accused understands that by pleading guilty (s)he waives his/her constitutional
rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the
right against self-incrimination; if the accused is not represented by an attorney, that (s)he
3
is aware of his/her right to an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and that one will
be appointed to represent him/her if (s)he is indigent.
URCCC 8.04A
¶9.
“Pursuant to this rule Sutton's pleas may only be considered as having been voluntarily made if he
was properly advised by counsel and had a full understanding of the consequences of his actions.” Sutton
v. State, 873 So. 2d 120, 123 (¶ 15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
¶10.
At his plea hearing, Ryals stated that he was competent to enter a plea of guilty. Ryals also stated
that he understood the nature of the charge against him, that he did, in fact, commit capital murder, and that
he was aware of the maximum and minimum penalties that accompany it. Finally, Ryals stated that he was
aware that by pleading guilty he was giving up certain constitutional rights, such as a right to a trial by jury.
¶11.
A careful review of the record does reveal that Ryals denied killing his pregnant wife. Ryals stated
that he participated in his wife’s murder but his brother was the one who actually beat her with a bat and
slit her throat. Ryals stated that his intention was to have his wife murdered because his girlfriend wanted
her out of the picture.
¶12.
This statement, however, was made during the sentencing phase of the bifurcated hearing in an
attempt to offer mitigating evidence. The guilt phase had already been completed during which Ryals
effectively entered a guilty plea. At the sentencing phase, the trial court out of an abundance of caution,
asked Ryals if he was the same Ricky B. Ryals who had earlier that day signed the Entry of Guilty Plea and
Agreed Waiver of the Jury in which Ryals waived a jury for the purpose of sentencing, to which Ryals
answered that he was. The judge asked again if Ryals affirmed and ratified that he had signed the waiver
to be effective in the sentencing phase and Ryals said that he did. The judge then asked Ryals and his
4
attorneys if they sought a continuance of the sentencing phase and each replied that they did not. The judge
then commenced the sentencing phase.
¶13.
“In a request for post-conviction relief, a trial court is entitled to place great weight on the testimony
given at a plea hearing.” Id. at (¶ 17). This is because “[s]tatements made under oath in open court have
a strong presumption of truthfulness.” Jackson v. State, 872 So. 2d 708, 711 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App.
2004). Since Ryals is merely seeking to contradict the testimony that was given during his plea hearing,
we find no error.
III. WHETHER THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
¶14.
Ryals argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to
adequately review the State’s physical evidence against him. Ryals also argues that his attorneys told him
to plead guilty in order to avoid the death penalty.
¶15.
In analyzing this issue, we apply the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), which requires us to answer two questions. First, whether counsel’s overall performance was
deficient. Id. at 687. Second, whether or not the deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the defense.
Id. The burden of proof falls on Ryals to prove both prongs and counsel’s performance should be
measured by a totality of the circumstances. Smith, 845 So. 2d at 731 (¶ 2). Finally, “there is a strong,
yet rebuttable, presumption that the actions by the defense counsel were reasonable and strategic.” Id.
¶16.
The record reveals that defense counsel was present at the time of the plea hearing. Ryals stated
to the judge in open court that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance. In fact, there is absolutely no
evidence that would support Ryals’ theory that defense counsel was deficient or that defense counsel forced
Ryals to plead guilty. The bare allegation that defense counsel did not want a death penalty trial is
5
insufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Steen v. State, 868
So. 2d 1038, 1040 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). More importantly, there is also no evidence that the
result would have been different, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Consequently, Ryals has failed
to prove either prong under Strickland. As a result, we find no error.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FORREST COUNTY DISMISSING
THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ.,
CONCUR. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
