Charles Alexander v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CP-01992-COA
CHARLES ALEXANDER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/15/2002
HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS
YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHARLES ALEXANDER (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
JAMES H. POWELL, III
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF DISMISSED
AFFIRMED - 7/27/2004
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Charles Alexander, pro se, appeals from the Circuit Court of Yazoo County’s dismissal of his
motion for post-conviction collateral relief as being time barred. In his appellate brief, Alexander does not
specifically indicate an issue that he raises on appeal. However, his argument focuses on whether his claim
was time barred and whether he is serving an illegal sentence. Our opinion will address these issues.
Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the dismissal of Alexander’s motion for post-conviction relief
as time barred.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
Charles Alexander was arrested and charged with seven counts of forgery by a bill of information.
On November 4, 1998, Alexander entered his guilty plea to seven counts of forgery. The trial court
sentenced him to serve ten years with the sentence suspended if Alexander successfully completed a drug
treatment program. On October 15, 2002, Alexander filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief
with the Circuit Court of Yazoo County, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39-1 (Rev.
2000). In his motion, Alexander argued that he should be granted relief because he was serving an illegal
sentence. Alexander claimed that because he was previously convicted of a felony in Warren County, the
Yazoo County Circuit Court could not order him to serve a suspended sentence pursuant to Mississippi
Code Annotated Section 47-7-33 (Rev. 2000).
¶3.
The trial court dismissed his motion for post-conviction relief as time barred and also ruled that
Alexander did not suffer any prejudice or undue burden due to the sentence. Alexander appealed the
dismissal of his motion to the supreme court. The supreme court issued an order on April 30, 2003, stating
that Alexander’s motion was a timely notice of appeal and should proceed as such. Alexander filed a
second motion for post-conviction relief with the circuit court on August 13, 2003. We now review the
trial court’s dismissal of Alexander’s motion for post-conviction relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
"When reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief, this Court
will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However,
where questions of law are raised, the applicable standard of review is de novo." Brister v. State, 858 So.
2
2d 181, 182 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Graves v. State, 822 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (¶4) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002)).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶5.
Alexander does not provide this court with any specific issues to consider; however, since he is
appealing pro se we will entertain the argument that he makes in his brief. Alexander’s argument focuses
on two issues: (1) did the trial court err by dismissing his motion as time barred and (2) is he serving an
illegal sentence? We will consider the issues in that order.
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DISMISSING HIS MOTION AS TIME BARRED?
¶6.
According to the applicable statute, Alexander had three years in which to file his motion for post-
conviction relief following his guilty plea to forgery. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (2) (Rev. 2000). The
record indicates that Alexander pled guilty to seven counts of forgery on November 4, 1998. Therefore,
in order to meet the time requirement set by statute, Alexander had to file his motion by November 4,
2001. Because Alexander waited until October 15, 2002, to file his motion for relief, the trial court
properly dismissed his motion as time barred.
¶7.
Alexander argues in his brief that our supreme court issued an order stating that his motion for post-
conviction relief was timely filed. The order states the following: “Alexander seeks to appeal the trial
court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After due consideration, the panel finds that this
motion is in the form of a timely notice of appeal and should proceed as such.” Our review of the order
reveals that the supreme court was not stating that Alexander’s motion for relief was timely, but that his
appeal from the trial court’s order of dismissal was timely filed. The supreme court never ruled on the
timeliness of Alexander’s motion for relief. As such, this Court finds that Alexander’s motion for postconviction relief filed on October 15, 2002, was time barred.
3
II. IS ALEXANDER SERVING AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE?
¶8.
Alexander argues that he should be allowed to revoke his guilty plea because his ten-year
suspended sentence is illegal. Alexander’s claim is procedurally barred; however, we will briefly address
the merits of his claim. Alexander asserts that his sentence is illegal because the trial court did not have the
authority to order him to serve a suspended sentence. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 47-7-33(1)
(Rev. 2000) states the following in pertinent part:
When it appears to the satisfaction of any circuit court or county court in the State of
Mississippi, having original jurisdiction over criminal actions, or to the judge thereof, that
the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be
served thereby, such court, in termtime or in vacation, shall have the power, after
conviction or a plea of guilty, except in a case where a death sentence or life imprisonment
is the maximum penalty which may be imposed or where the defendant has been convicted
of a felony on a previous occasion in any court or courts of the United States and of any
state or territories thereof, to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the defendant on probation as herein provided, except that the court shall not suspend the
execution of a sentence of imprisonment after the defendant shall have begun to serve such
sentence.
Alexander argues that a prior conviction in Warren County, Mississippi, disqualifies him for a suspended
sentence.
¶9.
The right to be free from an illegal sentence is a fundamental right and this Court has held that
"errors which affect fundamental constitutional rights may be excepted from procedural bars which would
otherwise prohibit their considerations." Moss v. State, 752 So. 2d 427, 430 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428, 430 (Miss. 1991)). A similar argument to Alexander’s was
addressed by this Court in McGleachie v. State, 800 So. 2d 561 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). In McGleachie,
the appellant asserted that according to § 47-7-33, he should not have been sentenced to parole because
of a prior felony conviction. Id. at 562 (¶ 3). McGleachie, like Alexander, benefitted from the leniency
4
of the trial court and then argued that the error was a violation of his fundamental rights. Id. at 563 (¶ 4).
¶10.
In McGleachie we held:
If the error in sentencing McGleachie for the June 26, 1987 conviction is, in fact, an error
at all, it is a harmless error rather than a fundamental one. It is also an error, we might add,
that benefitted McGleachie. The law that states that there is a fundamental right to be free
from an illegal sentence is interpreted to apply to sentences which cause the defendant to
endure an undue burden rather than the luxury of a lesser sentence. Therefore, the motion
for post-conviction relief is time barred.
McGleachie, 800 So. 2d at 563 (¶ 4). We hold that Alexander benefitted from the leniency of the trial
court’s ordering him to serve a ten-year suspended sentence. As the State correctly indicates, at the time
of Alexander’s crime, the maximum penalty for forgery was fifteen years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-2133 (Rev. 2000). Because Alexander was not subjected to an undue burden or prejudice but to a
significantly lesser sentence, the error by the trial court was harmless. Alexander’s motion for postconviction relief is time barred.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YAZOO COUNTY DISMISSING
THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO YAZOO COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., LEE, IRVING, CHANDLER AND
GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
