Donovan A. Luedke v. Audubon Insurance Company
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-01825-COA
DONOVAN A. LUEDKE AND BARBARA L. LUEDKE
APPELLANTS
v.
AUDUBON INSURANCE COMPANY, KENNETH
FOLEY AND MISSISSIPPI WINDSTORM
UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
10/18/2002
HON. DALE HARKEY
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JUDY M. GUICE
EUGENE M. HARLOW
CHARLES G. COPELAND
WILLIAM E. WHITFIELD
BEAU A. STEWART
LESLIE PETTIS BARRY
REBECCA SUZANNE BLUNDEN
CIVIL - INSURANCE
AUDUBON INS. CO., MS WINDSTORM
UNDERWRITING ASSOC., AND KENNETH
FOLEY'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT GRANTED, AND FINAL
JUDGMENT ENTERED.
AFFIRMED-06/08/2004
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND MYERS, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Donovan and Barbara Luedke sued Audubon Insurance Company, Kenneth Foley, and
Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (MWUA) for damages suffered by them when their home
was damaged by a hurricane four months after their insurance policy allegedly was cancelled without notice
to them. Audubon, Foley, and MWUA filed separate motions for summary judgment, and the trial judge
granted each motion, finding that the insurance policy was not cancelled but that it lapsed by its own terms
because the Luedkes failed to pay the renewal premium. The trial judge further found that neither the
contract documents nor the statutory law imposed upon Audubon, Foley or MWUA a duty to notify the
Luedkes of the expiration of the policy since the policy unambiguously stated that the period of coverage
was for one year.
¶2.
Aggrieved by the judge’s decision, the Luedkes now appeal asserting the following issues: (1) a
renewal notice was required prior to the policy’s expiration, and (2) a cancellation notice was required after
termination of the policy.
¶3.
We find no error; therefore, we affirm the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of each
defendant.
FACTS
¶4.
Donovan and Barbara Luedke applied for a windstorm and hail damage insurance policy for their
home in April 1995. The application was submitted to Kenneth Foley, a licensed insurance agent, who in
turn submitted the application to the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association.1
MWUA
determined that the Luedkes' property was insurable and caused a one-year policy of insurance to be
issued by Audubon, a servicing insurer for MWUA. The policy had an effective date of May 19, 1995,
and an expiration date of May 19, 1996. Prior to the policy’s expiration on May 19, 1996, Audubon
1
Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association, formally Mississippi Insurance Underwriting
Association, was created by the legislature in 1970 to provide property insurance for coverage against
windstorms and hail to residents of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 83-34-1 to 84-34-29
(Rev. 2002). MWUA operates according to a plan of operation and is authorized by the legislature to
promulgate rules for implementation, subject to the approval of the insurance commissioner.
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mailed an expiration and renewal notice to the Luedkes informing them that their policy would expire unless
it was renewed by a payment of the premium before the specified due date. The Luedkes renewed their
insurance and the policy was reissued for another year beginning May 19, 1996, and expiring May 19,
1997. A notice of expiration and renewal was again sent prior to the policy’s expiration, and the policy
was renewed for an additional one-year term from May 23, 1997 to May 23, 1998.
¶5.
On March 5, 1998, which was prior to the expiration of the 1997-1998 policy, MWUA claims
it mailed a notice of expiration and renewal to the Luedkes, their mortgage company, and Foley. 2
However, the Luedkes maintain that they never received the notice of expiration. It is undisputed that they
failed to pay the required premium for renewal of the policy which expired on May 23, 1998. On
September 28, 1998, approximately four months after the expiration date of the policy, the Luedkes'
property was severely damaged by a hurricane. Shortly thereafter, they contacted Foley to process a claim
and was told that they no longer had coverage because their policy had expired. Additional facts will be
related during our discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶6.
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56 (c). “All that is
required of an opposing party to survive a motion for summary judgment is to establish a genuine issue of
material fact by the means available under the rule.” Lowery v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Company,
2
It is undisputed that Foley received a copy and that he did not notify the Luedkes. Although the
Luedkes claim that their mortgage company did not receive the notice, the record does not conclusively
indicate whether or not the mortgagee received a copy. Further, this fact is immaterial to this discussion.
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592 So. 2d 79, 81 (Miss. 1991). “In determining whether the entry of summary judgment is appropriate,
[the appellate court] reviews the judgment de novo, making its own determination on the motion, separate
and apart from that of the trial court.” Id. “The evidentiary matters are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Id. “If after this examination, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is affirmed, but if after
examining the evidentiary matters there is a genuine issue of material fact, the grant of summary judgment
is reversed.” Id.
(1) Expiration and Renewal Notice
¶7.
The Luedkes first contend that MWUA’s written procedures required a notice of expiration and
renewal be sent to them prior to the expiration of their policy. The Luedkes rely on the following provision
in MWUA’s manual of rules and procedures in support of their argument that a notice of renewal was
required:
Policies will not be automatically renewed. A renewal notice on form prescribed by
MWUA must be submitted. Notice for renewal, complete with all data required by this
Manual, received by the MWUA on or before the expiration date will be renewed without
a lapse in coverage. Notices received after the date of expiration will be reinstated
effective 12:01 a.m., Standard time, on the day following the date all data required by this
Manual is received by the MWUA, provided there is no designated Hurricane in the Gulf
of Mexico as outlined in this Manual.
A minimum of thirty (30) days advanced notice of expiration will be given to the insured
and his representative.
The Luedkes also argue that MWUA had a long-standing custom and practice of sending its customers
written notice prior to the expiration of their policy and that the standard practice in the industry is to
provide written notice of termination before a policy expires.
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¶8.
MWUA, on the other hand, argues that the provision in its Manual of Rules and Procedures is "an
internal document that is neither a part of the insurance contract, a statute, nor a document that is required
by statute." Therefore, notwithstanding this provision in the manual, MWUA submits that it was not
required to give the Luedkes a notice of expiration. MWUA further argues that, by statute, its policies are
issued for terms of one-year, renewable annually upon application therefor and that since the Luedkes
submitted neither a renewal application nor premium for the renewal of the policy which expired in May
1998, their coverage lapsed. See Miss. Code Ann. § 83-34-15 (Rev. 1999). Finally, MWUA argues that
the Luedkes failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; therefore, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction to hear the Luedkes' complaint. MWUA urges the jurisdictional defect as an alternative basis
for affirming the trial court's dismissal of the Luedkes's complaint.3
¶9.
Although we agree with MWUA that a litigant is required to exhaust his administrative remedies
before seeking judicial review, we decline to decide this appeal on the Luedkes' failure to exhaust their
administrative remedies. We refuse to proceed along the exhaustion route because we find that the
Luedkes' policy had expired, and they had not submitted an application for renewal. Consequently, we
are not persuaded that they were either an "applicant" or an "insured" within the meaning of section VIII
of MWUA's "Plan of Operation" which provides for appeals, by applicants or insureds, first to the board
of MWUA and then to the Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Mississippi.
3
Section VIII of MWUA's "Plan of Operation," permits "[a]ny applicant for insurance and any
person insured under the "Plan of Operation" to appeal to the board of directors any final ruling or decision
of the association. Thereafter, an appeal may be taken to the Insurance Commissioner of the State of
Mississippi. If the applicant or the insured is aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner a further
appeal, "as provided by the insurance laws of the State of Mississippi," may be taken. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 83-34-19 (Rev. 1999).
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¶10.
MWUA properly advances that “absent a statutory requirement or policy provision, an insurer has
no duty to provide notice of the termination of a policy.” Lowery, 592 So. 2d at 83. However, when a
duty exists, “[actual] receipt [of the notice] may be presumed by proof of ordinary mailing, but this
presumption may be rebutted by the insured who contends that he or she did not actually receive the
notice.” Carter v. Allstate Indemnity Company, 592 So. 2d 66, 75 (Miss. 1991). “Mere denial of
receipt is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact.” Id.
¶11.
The Luedkes rely heavily on Mississippi Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Maenza, 413 So. 2d 1384
(Miss. 1982) in support of their proposition. In Maenza, appellants received a notice of renewal from their
insurance company before the expiration of their policy. Id. Two days before the expiration date,
appellants mailed their premium payments for the renewal of the policy, but the payments were not received
by the insurance company until the day after the coverage expired. Id. The insurance company treated
the payment as an application for new coverage, and not a renewal of the original policy. Id. Shortly
thereafter, appellants’ property was destroyed by a hurricane, but the insurance company denied coverage
and claimed the original policy had lapsed because the payment was not received on or before the
expiration date. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the renewal was effective when the premium
policy was deposited in the mail, as long as it was deposited in time to reach the insurer on or before the
expiration date. Id. The court noted that since the insurance company had adopted the postal service as
its agent, the failure of the premium to reach the insurance company until one day past the due date did not
defeat coverage. Id.
¶12.
Maenza is inapplicable to the case at bar. Unlike the policy in Maenza, the policy in the case sub
judice expired by its own terms due to the Luedkes' failure to pay the required yearly premium necessary
to renew their coverage for the following year. Here, the policy began on May 23, 1997 and ran until May
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23, 1998. In order to effectively renew the policy, the Luedkes were obligated to pay the premium by the
specified due date set forth in the policy. The Luedkes failed to do this, and thus the policy, by its express
terms expired on May 23, 1998. “When the period of an insurance policy expires, in the absence of
specific language to the contrary, the contract between the parties terminates.” Krebs v. Strange, 419 So.
2d 178, 182 (Miss. 1982). Therefore, upon the expiration of the policy, the contract for insurance between
the Luedkes and MWUA terminated, and the policy ceased to exist.
¶13.
The Luedkes’ next argument that MWUA’s custom and practice was to send a notice of expiration
and renewal to its customers is similarly without merit.
¶14.
We note that several jurisdictions have held that “the requirement of an insurer to give notice of the
amount and date on which a premium is due may be based upon past practice or usage of the particular
insurer.” Security Ins. Agency, Inc., v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 196 (Miss. 1974) citing Minnick v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 174 A. 2d 706, 713 (Del. 1961). However, we find no evidence
here of a course of dealing between the parties which could have caused the Luedkes to believe that their
policy would continue beyond the policy’s expiration date if no notice of expiration or renewal was
received by them.
¶15.
The record reflects that, according to MWUA, a notice of expiration and renewal was mailed to
the Luedkes prior to the expiration of the policy in May 1998. The Luedkes, however, deny receiving the
notice. It is not disputed that MWUA sent, and the Luedkes received, a notice of expiration and renewal
in prior years. But in this regard, we note that the effective date of the policy, which was renewed in May
1997, was May 23, 1997, although the policy that was being renewed had expired on May 19, not May
23, 1997. This difference in dates is indicative of the fact that the Luedkes knew or should have known
that coverage terminated on the expiration date listed on the declaration page of each renewed policy unless
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the policy was renewed prior to the expiration date. Obviously, the renewal premium for the policy
expiring May 19, 1997, was not received prior to May 19, thus explaining why the effective date of the
renewed policy was May 23 instead of May 19.
¶16.
We find no merit in the Luedkes' contention that MWUA's mailing them a notice of expiration and
renewal in the prior year is sufficient to establish a course of conduct between the two parties. As we have
already observed, there is nothing about the past notices which would suggest that coverage was being
provided beyond the date of expiration listed on the declaration page of policy.
(2) Cancellation Notice
¶17.
The Luedkes next argue that MWUA and Audubon should have notified them of the cancellation
of their policy since their policy was cancelled for non-payment of premium. They rely on language
contained in Audubon’s insurance policy and MWUA’s plan of operation. The Audubon policy provided
that the policy could be cancelled at any time by giving to the insured five days’ written notice. Similarly,
a provision in MWUA’s plan of operation states that:
1. No policy issued under this Plan of Operation shall be cancelled by a servicing insurer
without prior approval of the Association. Grounds for such cancellation shall be limited
to:
a. Non-payment of premium; or. . . .
2. Notice of cancellation, together with a statement of the reason therefor, shall be sent to
the insured and a copy sent to the agent or broker and the association. Such notice shall
be accompanied by a statement explaining that the insured has a right of appeal as
hereinafter provided.
MWUA, however, maintains that since the policy expired pursuant to its own terms, the cancellation
provision did not apply to the Luedkes.
¶18.
Although the Luedkes use the terms “cancellation” and “termination or expiration” interchangeably
throughout their pleadings, the two terms are not synonymous. “Cancellation as used in insurance law,
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means termination of a policy prior to the expiration of the policy period by an act of one or all of the
parties.” Waynesville Security Bank v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 499 S. W. 218, 220 ( Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
In contrast, “termination refers to the expiration of the policy by lapse of the policy period.” Id.
¶19.
Since the existence of the policy in the case at hand was contingent upon yearly payments, and not
monthly installment payments, we find that the phrase “cancellation due to non payment of premium” in the
plan of operation likely referred to midterm cancellation for actions taken on the part of MWUA and not
the Luedkes. Thus, “non-payment of premium” as grounds for cancellation in the instant case would apply
in instances such as where a cancellation is for non-payment of premiums in policies with installment plans,
and not in policies with yearly premiums as in the Luedkes' policy. As a result, we find that the Luedkes'
policy was not cancelled during its term, but instead expired by a lapse of the policy period. As previously
stated, when the policy expired, the contract between MWUA and the Luedkes terminated. “When
termination of the contract occur[red], [MWUA] had nothing to cancel.” Krebs, 419 So. 2d at 182.
Likewise, several jurisdictions have held that “when an insurance policy expires because of nonpayment
of the renewal premium, the insurer has no duty to send notice of cancellation to the insured.” Legier v.
Cmty. Plasma Ctr., 649 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1994). For the forgoing reason, the Luedkes'
argument on this issue lacks merit.
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., LEE, MYERS, CHANDLER AND
GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. THOMAS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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