Johnny Lee Johnson v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KP-00487-COA
JOHNNY LEE JOHNSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEE
2/21/2003
HON. R. I. PRICHARD, III
JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHNNY JOHNSON (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CLAIBORNE MCDONALD
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF SALE OF A SCHEDULE II
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, SENTENCED TO
SERVE 15 YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MDOC, WITH 7 YEARS TO SERVE AND 8
YEARS SUSPENDED UNDER POST-RELEASE
SUPERVISION; SENTENCE TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE
DEFENDANT NOW SERVING
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 06/22/2004
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A Jefferson Davis County jury convicted Johnny Johnson of selling cocaine. On appeal, he claims
that the imposition of a consecutive sentence on the eve of his completing a sentence on another crime was
vindictive, harsh, and disproportionate; and that he was denied due process of law. The only error that we
find is on the suspension of part of Johnson's sentence. Under the statute relied upon for sentencing, there
cannot be a suspension. Also, a specific term of post-release supervision must be set. We reverse and
remand for a new sentence to be entered.
FACTS
¶2.
In 1999, Johnny Johnson was arrested for the sale of 0.1 gram of cocaine to an agent and an
informant working with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics. He was indicted in July 2000. Trial was held
in February 2003. By the time of trial, Johnson was serving a sentence for a different conviction. He had
been convicted in March 2000, for a sale of controlled substances and sentenced to fifteen years, four to
serve and eleven years suspended. The sentencing order said that the suspension was subject to the rules
for post-release supervision.
¶3.
At trial for the present conviction, Johnson was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, eight years
to be suspended subject to Johnson's post-release supervision. This sentence was consecutive to the
sentence that Johnson was already serving. Johnson appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Vindictive, harsh sentence
¶4.
The trial judge has broad discretion in sentencing an offender. Davis v. State, 724 So. 2d 342,
344 (Miss. 1998). The decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed as long as it does not exceed the
maximum statutory period. Stromas v. State, 618 So. 2d 116, 122 (Miss. 1993). Here, the applicable
statute provides for a maximum of thirty years imprisonment and a maximum million dollar fine. Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(1) (Supp. 2001). During the sentencing hearing, the judge reviewed Johnson's prior
criminal record and entered orders of nolle prosequi on two other charges of sale of a controlled
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substance. Johnson was sentenced to a term of fifteen years, with seven years to serve and eight years
suspended. This sentence was well within the statutory range and was not excessive. Later we will note
an error regarding the suspension.
2. Consecutive sentence
¶5.
Johnson claims that the imposition of a consecutive sentence on the eve of completion of his initial
sentence constitutes a denial of due process. The argument is that the imposition of sentence deprived him
of earned release, or "good time" credits. The management of rehabilitation falls within the authority of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. Lattimore v. Sparkman, 858 So. 2d 936, 938 (Miss. Ct. App.
2003). The sentence in this case would not affect such credits.
3. Disproportionate sentence and improper suspension
¶6.
Johnson claims that his sentence is disproportionate when aggregated with his prior sentence. The
statutory sentencing limits were not exceeded. Proportionality analysis is not invoked simply when a trial
judge gives an arguably lengthy sentence. Eighth Amendment review is necessary only if a sentence is
"grossly disproportional" to the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), applied in
Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 538 (Miss. 1996). Perhaps grossness is in the eye of the beholder, but
we see no excessiveness here so as to require further evaluation.
¶7.
Johnson was sentenced to fifteen years, with eight years "suspended pursuant and in conformity
with the Post-Release Supervision set out and authorized in Section 47-7-34" of the Mississippi Code.
Johnson argues that this sentence is illegal because previously convicted felons may not receive suspended
sentences. The referenced statute states this:
(1) When a court imposes a sentence upon a conviction for any felony committed after
June 30, 1995, the court, in addition to any other punishment imposed if the other
punishment includes a term of incarceration in a state or local correctional facility, may
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impose a term of post-release supervision. However, the total number of years of
incarceration plus the total number of years of post-release supervision shall not exceed
the maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by law for the felony committed. The
defendant shall be placed under post-release supervision upon release from the term of
incarceration. The period of supervision shall be established by the court.
Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34 (Supp. 2003).
¶8.
This statute permits the giving of post-release supervision to a prior felon. Gaston v. State, 817
So. 2d 613, 619 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). It contains no language permitting the suspension of a sentence;
a different statute prohibits sentence suspension for prior felons. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-33 (1) (Rev.
2000); Hunt v. State, 2003-CP-00177-COA (¶¶ 6-7) (Miss. Ct. App. May 25, 2004); see also (¶¶ 1921) (Southwick, P.J., concurring). A section 47-7-34 sentence requires "a specific term of incarceration,
no suspended sentence or 'probation,' and a specific term of post-release supervision of up to five years
after incarceration, provided that the total of the two terms does not exceed the maximum sentence for the
crime." Id. at (¶30). Post-release supervision might be seen as a merger of the purposes of suspension
and probation, since the term of supervision must come out of the unserved portion of the maximum prison
term for the offense.
¶9.
The trial judge in this case could give Johnson a seven year sentence, followed by a period of not
more than five years on post-release supervision. Since the length of time on post-release supervision is
discretionary and no length is stated here, we reverse and remand so that a proper sentence can be
entered. After a sentence is reversed, the entire range of sentencing discretion reopens for the trial court,
though a more punitive sentence may not be given if it is a penalty for having appealed from the judgment.
Bush v. State, 667 So.2d 26, 28 (Miss. 1996).
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE IS AFFIRMED; THE SENTENCE IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED FOR A NEW SENTENCE TO BE IMPOSED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY.
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KING, C.J., BRIDGES, P.J., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER AND
GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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