James R. Mayo v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-KA-01927-COA
JAMES R. MAYO A/K/A JAMES RICKY MAYO
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
9/24/2002
HON. LARRY EUGENE ROBERTS
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
BILBO MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
GUILTY OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCED TO
TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MDOC
AFFIRMED - 05/11/2004
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE AND CHANDLER, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
James Mayo was convicted of robbery by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury. On appeal,
he claims the following as error: introduction of evidence of his prior criminal record and that Mayo used
the money from this robbery to buy cocaine; mention of a "strong arm robbery" by a witness; permitting
leading questions on direct examination of the victim; and the giving of allegedly conflicting jury instructions.
Mayo also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the verdict was not supported
by evidence. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On August 6, 2001, Charles and Adell Morgan were in their home. Mr. Morgan was eighty-one
years old, while his wife was seventy-seven. Around 8:00 p.m., Mr. Morgan answered a knock at the
door. A person whom he knew as "Mayo," who worked across the street at the Salvation Army, asked
to borrow jumper cables. Mr. Morgan went to put on his shoes before retrieving the cables from his truck.
Mayo followed him into the back of the house. At some point, Mayo asked if Mr. Morgan had any money;
Morgan said that he did not. Then Mayo asked for his wallet, but Mr. Morgan replied that he did not have
one. Mayo insisted.
¶3.
Upon hearing this exchange, Mrs. Morgan came from another room and asked Mayo to leave the
house or she would call the police. She tried to retrieve a portable telephone from the basket of her
walker, but Mayo grabbed the telephone. Mayo then held Mr. Morgan by his belt and the back of his
pants while leading him around the house. Mr. Morgan decided to give Mayo his wallet. Mayo then
demanded Mrs. Morgan's wallet, but she denied having one. Mayo left the house with the telephone and
$30-$40 from Mr. Morgan's wallet.
¶4.
Mr. Morgan used another telephone to call the police. He went outside and learned from a security
guard at a nearby business the direction that Mayo had gone. Mr. Morgan gave the investigating officer
this information, including the name of "Mayo."
¶5.
Recalling that he was familiar with a person named Mayo, one of the officers went to the police
station and prepared a photographic lineup for Mr. Morgan to view. Mr. Morgan immediately identified
2
Mayo's photograph. The police officer then patrolled the neighborhood and found Mayo sitting on the
porch of a home. Mayo was arrested.
¶6.
Trial was held in August 2002. Mayo was found guilty of robbery and was sentenced to ten years
in prison and ordered to pay restitution, fines, and court costs. Mayo appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Evidence of extraneous matters
¶7.
Mayo claims that statements made by the prosecutor and the investigating officer improperly
revealed that he had a criminal record. This issue was not raised at trial and is therefore waived on appeal.
Cavett v. State, 717 So. 2d 722, 726 (Miss. 1998).
¶8.
Mayo also argues that the admission of a statement that he made to an investigating officer was
reversible error. In the statement, Mayo summarized the crime, then said that he used the money to buy
crack cocaine. In deciding to admit this statement, the trial court found that the probative value of the
statement was not greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. M.R.E. 403. The trial court ruled that this
statement was admissible as proof of motive. We find no error.
2. Mis-identifying crime
¶9.
Mayo argues that two detectives should not have been allowed to identify the crime to which they
were responding. Both men reported that the radio dispatch that they heard indicated that a strong arm
robbery had occurred. The defense objection was overruled. There was no explanation to jurors of the
meaning of "strong arm robbery."
¶10.
Mayo alleges that reversal is required because of a precedent in which an officer was allowed to
give his opinion as to the crime that had occurred. Holliday v. State, 758 So. 2d 1078, 1080-81 (Miss.
3
Ct. App. 2000). No one gave an opinion that what Mayo committed was a strong arm robbery. The
officers were merely recounting what caused them to go to the Morgan residence.
¶11.
This explanation of events did not prejudice the defense.
3. Leading questions
¶12.
The State's direct examination of one of the victims included several leading questions. Mr. Morgan
was eighty-two years old at the time of trial. The State is given latitude in the use of leading questions
during direct examination of an elderly witness. Price v. State, 749 So. 2d 166, 167 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999). The defense objected to leading questions only one time, and it was overruled. We find the
questions here to have been appropriate.
4. Jury Instructions
¶13.
Mayo claims that two jury instructions were conflicting. Jury instruction C-8, also known as S-1,
was the instruction on the elements of the crime of robbery. The record reveals that the trial judge asked
whether or not there was any objection to this instruction. The reply by Mayo's attorney was "No, sir."
Jury Instruction C-10 as originally proposed was collaboratively revised by the State and Mayo's attorney.
The final result was a lesser-included offense instruction, D-3(a). The trial judge asked whether there was
any objection to the instruction. Mayo's attorney had none.
¶14.
The absence of trial-level objections means that these issues were not preserved for appellate
review. Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 924 (Miss. 2002).
5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶15.
Mayo argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the following areas: (1) inadequate
jury instructions; (2) failure to prove that Mayo owned a car; (3) failure to object to leading questions; (4)
4
agreeing with facts as presented by the State in opening statement; and (5) failure to file motion for speedy
trial. We address the first four together.
¶16.
In determining whether Mayo received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that
his attorney's performance was defective and that this deficiency deprived him of a fair trial. Moore v.
State, 676 So. 2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1996). The burden is on Mayo to demonstrate both. McQuarter v.
State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990). A high degree of deference is given to the performance of the
attorney when there is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson v. State, 815 So. 2d 1196,
1200 (Miss. 2002). There is a rebuttable presumption that the performance of the attorney was competent
and was well within the broad range of reasonableness. Id. We find nothing in these allegations to suggest
meaningful deficiencies by the attorney.
¶17.
Mayo also claims that his attorney should have pursued the possibility of statutory and constitutional
speedy trial violations. Statutory speedy trial claims are measured from the date of arraignment. Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev. 2000). If a defendant waives arraignment, that date is considered day one
on the speedy trial calendar. Poole v. State, 826 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Miss. 2002). Mayo waived
arraignment on December 7, 2001, and was tried 263 days later on August 27, 2002. Mayo's statutory
right to be tried within 270 days was not violated.
¶18.
As to the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, four factors are to be considered in measuring for
possible violations. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). We examine each.
¶19.
Length of Delay. Here, the pertinent time began to run from the date Mayo was arrested on
August 6, 2001. Moore v. State, 837 So. 2d 794, 798 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). From this date until trial,
386 days passed. The Supreme Court has held that a delay of at least eight months is "presumptively
prejudicial." Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989).
5
¶20.
Reason for Delay. The record does not indicate the reason for delay of about three months
between arrest and indictment. Less than one month elapsed between the time of indictment on November
16, 2001, until the plea on December 7, 2001. Initially, trial was set for February 26, 2002. A total of
182 days was granted in continuances. These continuances were granted for good cause including illness
of judge, plea negotiations, and the deployment of a witness in active military duty. Two continuances were
granted because of a crowded trial docket which required the judge to attend to other trials. Polk v. State,
612 So. 2d 381, 387 (Miss. 1992). We find no error here.
¶21.
Assertion of Right. Mayo never asserted a right to a speedy trial by properly filing a motion.
Instead, we find an instance on February 26, 2002, where Mayo signed an order resetting the case which
included a statement that he waived his right to a speedy trial.
¶22.
Prejudice. There are no assertions by Mayo of prejudice. Because there is no indication of
deliberate delay and no discernable prejudice, the balance is in favor of rejecting the speedy trial claim.
Rhymes v. State, 638 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Miss. 1994). We do.
Issue 6: Guilty Verdict
¶23.
Mayo claims that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence do not support a guilty verdict. It was
reasonable for the jury, upon the evidence at trial, to conclude that Mayo robbed Mr. Morgan. There was
evidence on every element of the crime, and the weight of that incriminating evidence was not
counterbalanced by overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PAY FINE OF $2,500 AND
RESTITUTION OF $65 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
6
KING, C.J., BRIDGES, P.J., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER AND
GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
