Darrin Louis McArthur v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-00975-COA
DARRIN LOUIS MCARTHUR
APPELLANT
v.
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
7/6/2002
HON. KATHY KING JACKSON
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENNIS L. HORN
SHIRLEY PAYNE
ALTON HALL
BOBBY J. DELISE
RICHARD P. SALLOUM
TRACI M. CASTILLE
KENNETH RAYMOND FLOTTMAN
CIVIL - OTHER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.
AFFIRMED - 03/30/2004
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., IRVING AND MYERS, JJ.
MCMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Circuit Court of Jackson County granted summary judgment against Darrin Louis McArthur
in his negligence claim for injuries arising out of a work-related accident. The claim was asserted against
McArthur’s employer under the Jones Act. The circuit court determined that there was no genuine
disputed issue of fact regarding McArthur’s status as a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act. The
court concluded that, as a matter of law, McArthur was not a seaman and could not, therefore, pursue a
Jones Act claim. Rather, the court found that his sole remedy was under the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act. McArthur has appealed, asserting that his status as a seaman was a disputed
issue of fact that could only be decided by a jury after hearing evidence on the issue. For that reason,
McArthur contends, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Based upon our de novo review
of the record, we do not find error in the trial court’s decision and, for that reason, we affirm the grant of
summary judgment.
I.
Facts
¶2.
The case presents a straightforward question that can be framed adequately without a detailed initial
recitation of the facts. McArthur worked in the Ingalls Shipyards as a diver engaged primarily in making
underwater repairs to the shipyard’s dry docks. To facilitate the carrying out of repair work, McArthur
and other divers worked a substantial part of the time from a floating platform that could be moved along
the dry dock to the particular work site. The platform was not independently powered. Instead, it was
pushed from one work site to another by a skiff powered by an outboard motor.
¶3.
In the course of making a dive, McArthur was injured in a mishap alleged to have been caused
when a fellow workman mistakenly opened a underwater vent in the dry dock, which caused McArthur
to be sucked into the opening. In the action that is now before this Court, McArthur sought damages
against his employer sounding in negligence under the Jones Act. The proper outcome of this case turns
on the issue of whether or not McArthur was performing the duties of a seaman within the meaning of that
term in the Jones Act at the time of his injury. For purposes of our analysis, the issue can be further refined
2
to the question of whether McArthur was performing his duties as a member of a crew on a vessel in
navigation.
¶4.
The circuit court determined that the platform from which McArthur was diving was not a vessel
in navigation within the meaning of the Jones Act, thus necessarily denying McArthur the status of a seaman
authorized to pursue a negligence claim against his employer under that statute. It is from that determination
that McArthur has brought this appeal.
II.
General Discussion
¶5.
When called upon to review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, an appellate court
affords no deference to the trial court’s decision, but rather conducts a de novo review of the same
information considered by the trial court to determine whether, in the view of the appellate court, the
summary judgment was properly entered. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss. 1991) (citing
Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 65 (Miss. 1988)). The court must consider
the available evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg’l Med.
Ctr., Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss. 1990). Further, the law suggests the need to err on the side of
caution and permit a full development of the facts through trial in those instances where the propriety of
summary judgment appears a close question. E.g., Roebuck v. McDade, 760 So.2d 12 (¶9) (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999). Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate in those instances where it can be
demonstrated satisfactorily that there is no dispute concerning any material fact pertaining to the case and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c); Williamson ex rel.
Williamson v. Keith, 786 So.2d 390 (¶10) (Miss. 2001).
3
¶6.
Jones Act cases have their basis in federal legislation appearing in 46 U.S.C. § 688 but may be
brought in state courts. King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., 697 So.2d 439 (¶12) (Miss. 1997). However,
though the action may be maintained in the state courts, the Mississippi Supreme Court has noted that “state
courts are required to apply the substantive federal law” as to such cases. Id. Even more directly, in that
same case, the supreme court found that “a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point” would be
considered to be “controlling with regard to the . . . issue of federal law.” Id. at (¶4).
¶7.
With that background in mind, we turn to the specific issue before us as to whether, at the time of
his injury, McArthur could arguably be classified as a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act.
III.
Jones Act Seaman Status
¶8.
“The key to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation.”
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (emphasis added). There is substantial
authority for the proposition that whether a particular individual is a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act
is a mixed question of law and fact that, in only the rarest of cases, ought to be decided by the court rather
than the jury sitting as finders of fact. Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1990); Coulter
v. Texaco, Inc., 714 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1983).
¶9.
Despite these generally-applicable pronouncements, there has been a substantial amount of litigation
over whether certain floating structures serving some purpose in the maritime service fail, as a matter of law,
to qualify as a “vessel in navigation” for purposes of the Jones Act. This is a matter of critical concern
since the test of who qualifies as a seaman involves not only the nature of the duties being carried out by
the individual but necessarily includes the requirement that those duties be undertaken in connection with
a vessel in navigation. Thus, it is entirely possible that one of two individuals involved in maritime-related
4
activities and routinely performing essentially the same tasks could qualify as a seaman while the other did
not based solely on the question of whether the individual in question was sufficiently associated with a
vessel in navigation.
¶10.
Out of that litigation, the Fifth Circuit has developed what appears to be a bright-line test for certain
floating rigs that simply, as a matter of law, fail to qualify as a vessel in navigation. The contention by Ingalls
before the trial court, which is now reasserted on appeal, is that the floating barge from which McArthur
conducted his diving activities meets in all respects the test for “non-vessel” status under the Fifth Circuit
decisions, which are binding on this court. The test as developed by the Fifth Circuit was set out succinctly
by that court in Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co. when it said:
Since Cook we have, despite our reluctance to take Jones Act claims from the trier of fact,
affirmed findings that, as a matter of law, other floating work platforms are not vessels. A
review of these decisions indicates three factors common to them: (1) the structures
involved were constructed and used primarily as work platforms; (2) they were moored
or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and (3) although they were capable of
movement and were sometime moved across navigable waters in the course of normal
operations, any transportation function they performed was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of serving as work platforms.
Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 841 (5th Cir. 1984).
¶11.
The floating device in the case before us, based on the undisputed evidence appearing in the record
in regard to the summary judgment motion, was a floating platform that had no independent source of
power. It did not possess any of the typical physical attributes normally associated with a vessel engaged
in navigation. It had no running lights save for a set of portable battery-operated running lights that were
stored on the platform. It had no crew quarters or galley or other accommodations for a crew other than
a cold water shower. Its only recurring transportation use was that some of the divers’ equipment was
stored on the platform and would, thus, be moved from one work location to another when the platform
5
was pushed to a new work site by a motor-powered skiff. There was no indication that the platform
served any purpose associated with maritime activities other than as a platform for divers to work at their
tasks related to performing repair work on the dry dock. The platform remained moored essentially all of
the time except when it was being moved to a different location along the dock. The platform was moored
and not underway at the time of the accident that injured McArthur.
¶12.
In that circumstance, this Court concludes that, as a matter of law under existing binding precedent,
there is no justiciable issue in dispute to be resolved by the trier of fact as to whether this platform could
arguably be found to be a vessel in navigation. For that reason, we do not find that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment against McArthur.
IV.
Alternative Argument
¶13.
McArthur advances the alternative argument that, by virtue of the fact that he was working as a
diver at the time of his injury, he was a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act without regard to
whether he had the necessary nexus at the time to a vessel in navigation. McArthur cites Wallace v.
Oceaneering International in support of this contention, which held that “a diver’s work necessarily
involves exposure to numerous marine perils, and is inherently maritime . . . .” Wallace v. Oceaneering
Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 436 (5th Cir. 1984).
¶14.
We find this alternate contention to be without merit. The Wallace case goes on to state that “a
commercial diver . . . has the legal protections of a seaman when a substantial part of his duties are
performed on vessels.” Id. (emphasis added). It is not the nature of McArthur’s duties as a diver that
deprives him of seaman status. It is our determination that, as a matter of binding precedent set down by
6
the Fifth Circuit on an issue of substantive federal law, McArthur did not have the necessary connection
to a vessel in navigation that is an essential part of the definition of a Jones Act seaman.
¶15.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment
in favor of Ingalls and, on that basis, we affirm.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
