Adrian T. Tenner v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-01965-COA
ADRIAN T. TENNER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
3/19/2003
HON. LAMAR PICKARD
JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
MELVIN G. COOPER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
ALEXANDER C. MARTIN
CRIMINAL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 03/23/2004
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE AND CHANDLER, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Adrian Tenner entered a guilty plea to a charge of aggravated assault. Subsequently, Tenner
petitioned for post-conviction relief. The relief was denied. On appeal, Tenner argues that his plea was
not voluntarily or intelligently given and his representation by counsel was ineffective. We find no error and
affirm.
¶2.
In April 2001, Tenner was indicted for aggravated assault. He was tried in October 2001 and
found guilty. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison, with four years suspended. Tenner filed a timely
motion for a new trial, alleging that the jury verdict was tainted because the jurors were not given food after
two requests during deliberation. In May 2002, the court after a hearing ordered a new trial. At the same
hearing, Tenner withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty. This time he was sentenced to a term of eight
years' imprisonment, with four years suspended.
¶3.
In January 2003, Tenner filed for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied relief without a
hearing. On appeal, Tenner raises two issues. He claims that his guilty plea was coerced and involuntarily
and unintelligently entered. He also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective.
DISCUSSION
1. Guilty Plea
¶4.
In support of his allegation that his plea was coerced, Tenner relies upon a request that he made
to his attorney to have his mother present when the plea agreement was reviewed. He states that he was
rushed into a guilty plea when his attorney said that otherwise he would receive the maximum sentence.
Tenner offers the affidavits of his mother and himself.
¶5.
Within this argument, Tenner implies that he was incompetent to make a decision regarding entering
a plea. He offers records of attendance in a special education program and of an academic assessment
by the Jefferson County School District. The assessment was performed on March 10, 1993, when Tenner
was thirteen years old and in the eighth grade. The assessment indicates that Tenner demonstrated
significant academic or developmental deficits in the areas of reading, math, English, science, and social
studies. The assessment revealed a performance level of less than the third grade, a verbal IQ of 74, a
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performance IQ of 80, and a full scale IQ of 75. This assessment was performed almost nine years before
Tenner entered a guilty plea in May 2002.
¶6.
A plea is considered "voluntary and intelligent" if the defendant knows the elements of the charge
against him, understands the charge's relation to him, what effect the plea will have, and what sentence the
plea may bring. Alexander v. State, 605 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992). The plea petition enumerates
the rights that Tenner waived upon signing the plea. This petition was signed and sworn to by Tenner.
¶7.
At the plea hearing, the trial judge inquired at some length into Tenner's competency. The judge
informed Tenner about the rights he would be waiving if he pled guilty. He was told of the minimum and
maximum sentences that could be imposed. Tenner acknowledged that he understood. He stated that he
was not under the influence of any type of drug or alcohol and had not been offered anything to plead guilty
nor threatened into entering his plea. Statements such as these made in open court under oath are viewed
as highly credible. Gable v. State, 748 So. 2d 703, 706 (Miss. 1999). These statements along with the
plea petition contradict Tenner's claim that his plea was involuntarily and unintelligently entered. We find
no error here.
2. Competence
¶8.
The evidence of Tenner's lower than average intelligence causes us to address the issue of
competency. The competency to enter a plea of guilty is measured by the same standard as assessing
competency to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993). The State has a duty to show
that the defendant has a rational understanding of the charges against him and the ability to assist his lawyer
in designing a defense. Id. at 396.
¶9.
During the plea colloquy, Tenner assured the judge that he understood the questions. Neither he
nor his attorney raised an issue of competency. Tenner's post-conviction offering of the special education
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records and assessment from the school district does not create an issue of competency. Magee v. State,
752 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). There is no requirement that a person possess a certain
intelligence level as measured by IQ testing or have participated in a certain curriculum in order to enter a
guilty plea. Id. Instead, the determination that a plea is offered knowingly and voluntarily is an issue for
investigation in each case. We find nothing in the record to indicate that Tenner was incompetent to enter
a guilty plea.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶10.
In determining whether Tenner received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that
his attorney's performance was defective and that this deficiency deprived him of a fair trial. Moore v.
State, 676 So. 2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1996). We measure any alleged deficiency within the totality of the
circumstances. There is a wide area of reasonable professional assistance and it is presumed that the
attorney's conduct was adequate. Id.
¶11.
Tenner claims that his attorney did not advise him of his plea agreement, spent only three minutes
with him before the plea, and coerced him into pleading guilty by failing to allow his mother to participate
in discussions. Tenner offers affidavits from his mother and himself that the mother was not allowed to
participate. Tenner argues that since his motion for new trial was not contested, he would not have
voluntarily pled guilty to an eight year sentence with four years suspended where he had served time prior
to and subsequent to trial. We note that his initial sentence required that he serve eight years, and after his
guilty plea, that was cut in half to four years.
¶12.
At the May 2002 plea hearing, Tenner affirmed to the court that he was pleased with his attorney's
representation of his case. He also told the judge that his lawyer had explained all the law related to the
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aggravated assault offense and any possible defenses. Tenner affirmed that there was no problem with his
attorney and that the decision to enter a guilty plea was his.
¶13.
As to his claims of misunderstanding and coercion, Tenner's sworn statements in both his petition
to enter a guilty plea and during the plea hearing indicate otherwise. For post-conviction relief on an
argument such as this, Tenner must provide more than his own pleadings. Vielee v. State, 653 So. 2d 920,
922 (Miss. 1995). Tenner has not met his burden. The affidavits offered by Tenner and his mother, which
assert that the attorney would not permit the mother's joining the discussion between attorney and client,
do not prove constitutional deficiency.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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