Anthony Gene Coffey v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CP-01305-COA
ANTHONY GENE COFFEY
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
7/15/2002
HON. JERRY O. TERRY, SR.
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ANTHONY G. COFFEY (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
CONO A. CARANNA, II
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED.
AFFIRMED - 06/24/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
THOMAS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Anthony Coffey, pro se, appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Harrison County denying his
petition for post-conviction relief. Aggrieved, Coffey asserts the following issues on appeal:
I.
IT WAS A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW, WHEN COFFEY UNKNOWINGLY PLED GUILTY TO
AN ESCAPE CHARGE THAT WAS NOT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
STATUTE HE WAS INDICTED UNDER.
II.
COFFEY WAS ENTITLED TO A CONCURRENT SENTENCE WHERE THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS NOT WITHIN STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION.
III.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HIS REVIEW OF COFFEY'S POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF PETITION AND MISSISSIPPI STATUTORY AND CASE LAW, THUS
DENYING APPROPRIATE RELIEF.
Finding no error, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶2.
Anthony Coffey was indicted for aggravated assault and kidnaping by a grand jury in Harrison
County, Mississippi, in March of 2000. While jailed at the Harrison County Detention Facility awaiting
trial on these charges on or about May 28, 2000, Coffey escaped custody and was later recaptured. The
grand jury indicted Coffey for jail escape in March of 2001. On December 10, 2001, Coffey entered a
petition to enter a plea of guilty to the felonies charged against him in both indictments. In his petition,
Coffey indicated that he understood that the State would recommend a sentence of seven years on both
the aggravated assault and kidnaping counts to be served concurrently, and three years on the escape count
to run consecutively with the aggravated assault and kidnaping sentences for a total of ten years. The trial
court accepted Coffey's petition and the State's recommendations as to sentence.
¶3.
On April 23, 2002, Coffey filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief, asserting that the trial
court erred in requiring the sentence imposed upon the escape conviction to be served consecutively to the
two for aggravated assault and kidnaping. On July 15, 2002, the Circuit Court of Harrison County denied
relief on Coffey's motion. Coffey then perfected an appeal to this Court.
ANALYSIS
I.
WAS IT A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW, WHEN COFFEY UNKNOWINGLY PLED GUILTY TO
AN ESCAPE CHARGE THAT WAS NOT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
STATUTE HE WAS INDICTED UNDER?
2
¶4.
Coffey asserts that he was indicted under Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-9-49(1) (Rev. 2000),
which provides:
Whoever escapes or attempts by force or violence to escape from any jail in which he is
confined, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of
the State of Mississippi by any court or judge, or from the custody of a sheriff or other
peace officer pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, upon conviction, if the confinement or custody
is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of a felony, be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years to commence at the expiration
of his former sentence, or, if the confinement or custody is by virtue of an arrest of or
charge for or conviction of a misdemeanor, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding one (1) year to commence at the expiration of the sentence which the court
has imposed or which may be imposed for the crime for which he is charged.
Coffey asserts that since he was being held as a pre-trial detainee and there was no "former sentence" as
stated in the statute, Section 97-9-49(1) can not apply and his guilty plea was therefore unknowingly given.
¶5.
Coffey failed to raise this issue before the trial court. "[T]he law is well settled 'that the failure to
raise an issue in the trial court requires [the appellate court] to impose a procedural bar on appeal.'"
Mosley v. State, 832 So. 2d 589, 593 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)(quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d
613, 638 (¶48) (Miss. 1997)). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Coffey clearly stated in his petition
to enter a plea that he knew the sentence for escape would be consecutive to the sentences for aggravated
assault and kidnaping.
¶6.
Coffey relies on the case of Williams v. State, 420 So. 2d 562 (Miss. 1982), where the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that where the defendant escaped prior to his sentencing, he was not
subject to any "former sentence" and thus the escape was not within the purview of the statute. As pointed
out by the trial court, Williams was decided on a version of the statute which is no longer in existence. In
Cressionnie v. State, 797 So. 2d 289 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), the defendant raised a similar question
arguing that his indictment for felony escape was incorrect and at the most he should have been indicted
3
for misdemeanor escape because he was being held on pending charges at the time of his escape. The
defendant also relied on Williams for his argument. In Cressionnie, this Court noted that the Mississippi
Legislature repealed Section 97-9-51 and substantially amended Section 97-9-49. Cressionnie, 797 So.
2d at 293 (¶15). The revised section provides that if a prisoner is being held on felony charges, whether
he has been convicted or not, then an escape may be punished by a term not to exceed five years in the
penitentiary. Id. (citing Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-9-49(1) (Rev. 1994)). This issue is without merit.
II.
WAS COFFEY ENTITLED TO A CONCURRENT SENTENCE WHERE THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS NOT WITHIN STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION?
¶7.
Coffey asserts that in the event his escape is subject to Section 97-9-49(1), his sentence must run
concurrently to his other sentences rather than consecutively. Coffey cites Cressionnie, 797 So. 2d at 289,
in support of his position, because this Court stated that "the logical conclusion is that a defendant convicted
of felony escape who was, at the time of his escape, not the subject of a prior sentence may simply have
his sentence for the escape begin to run immediately rather than have to await the completion of another
sentence." Id. at 294 (¶16).
¶8.
Coffey also cites Ward v. State, 708 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1998). In Ward, the defendant was given
a deal by the local sheriff where he would be released from jail in order to participate in an undercover drug
deal but was supposed to appear for trial at a designated date. Ward, 708 So. 2d at 12 (¶3). The
defendant instead left the state for four days, but was later apprehended and charged with escape. Id. He
pled guilty to escape as well as to sale of cocaine, which he was being held for at the time he was released
for the undercover operation and was sentenced to fifteen years for the sale of cocaine and five years on
the escape charge. Id. at (¶4). The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the five-year sentence on the
escape conviction because under Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-9-49(2), six months is the maximum
4
sentence for someone who is allowed to leave custody and fails to return as stipulated. Id. at (¶12-13).
¶9.
The Court included the statement that if Ward's escape sentence was valid, "it would necessarily
have to run concurrently with Ward's sentence for sale of cocaine since he was a pretrial detainee with no
original sentence at the time of escape." Id. at (¶13). The Court did not cite any prior authority for this
statement, and admitted that "further discussion is not warranted" because they held that "both convictions
were defective and that the escape sentence is illegal." Id. Instead, the Court based this statement on an
interpretation of Section 97-9-49 which appears to blend Section 97-9-49(1) with Section 97-9-49(2).
The Court states, "[i]n addition, as Section 97-9-49(1) indicates, Ward is not eligible for a consecutive
sentence because, as a pretrial detainee, he was not being confined in jail at the time of his escape under
an "original sentence" as described in the statute." Id. at (¶14). The Court follows this statement with a
direct quote from Section 97-9-49(2) which refers to an "original sentence," which is not found in the
language of Section 97-9-49(1). Id. Section 97-9-49(1) instead uses the language "to commence at the
expiration of his former sentence" and ends with "or which may be imposed for the crime for which he is
charged." Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-9-49(1) (Rev. 2001).
¶10.
Whether or not a sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively is clearly within the
discretion of the trial judge according to Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-21(1), which states:
(1) When a person is sentenced to imprisonment on two (2) or more convictions, the
imprisonment on the second, or each subsequent conviction shall, in the discretion of the
court, commence either at the termination of the imprisonment for the preceding conviction
or run concurrently with the preceding conviction.
5
Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-21(1) (Rev. 2001). When compared to the confusing dicta found in
Ward, Section 99-19-21(1) is clear. Lacking any other authority to support Coffey's position, this issue
is without merit.
III.
DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN HIS REVIEW OF COFFEY'S POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PETITION AND MISSISSIPPI STATUTORY AND CASE
LAW, THUS DENYING APPROPRIATE RELIEF?
¶11.
Coffey alleges that the trial judge erred in reviewing his petition for post-conviction relief and in
interpreting Mississippi statutory and case law. Specifically, Coffey asserts that the trial judge can not use
Section 99-19-21(1) as a "catch all" in order to sentence him to consecutive sentences and that the trial
judge erred in distinguishing Williams and Ward. Instead, it is Coffey who attempts to use his third issue
as a "catch all" to rehash the arguments he brought forth in his first two issues. As displayed in the
discussion of the issues above, this Court is not persuaded by Coffey's arguments. The trial judge
sentenced Coffey within the boundaries of Section 97-9-49(1). The sentence did not exceed the maximum
allowed by law and was not contrary to public policy. This issue is without merit.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, LEE, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
