Christopher L. Smith v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CP-01111-COA
CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH A/K/A CHRISTOPHER
SMITH
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
5/13/2002
HON. MARCUS D. GORDON
LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
KEN TURNER
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED - 05/13/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND IRVING, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Appellant Christopher Smith was indicted and convicted of possession of cocaine. He was
sentenced to serve twelve years' imprisonment and pay a $1,500 fine. Smith filed a motion for postconviction relief arguing that his attorney misinformed him as to the maximum sentence he would get if he
went to trial and that, consequently, his guilty plea was not entered into intelligently. The Leake County
Circuit Court dismissed his motion, and Smith appeals to this Court arguing again that his guilty plea was
not voluntarily nor intelligently given, that his counsel was ineffective, that the search of his person was
illegal, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We review Smith's arguments and find
no merit; thus, we affirm.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I.
WAS THE APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA VOLUNTARILY AND
INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED AND WAS HIS COUNSEL EFFECTIVE?
¶2.
Smith first argues that he did not voluntarily and intelligently enter his guilty plea due to the
ineffectiveness of his counsel. "Our standard of review pertaining to voluntariness of guilty pleas is well
settled: 'this Court will not set aside findings of a trial court sitting without a jury unless such findings are
clearly erroneous.' In order to meet constitutional standards, a guilty plea must be freely and voluntarily
entered." Pleas v. State, 766 So. 2d 41 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Regarding effectiveness of counsel,
we apply the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) which requires that
we determine whether counsel's overall performance was deficient and whether or not the deficient
performance, if any, prejudiced the defense. The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove both prongs,
and the adequacy of counsel's performance as to its deficiency and prejudicial effect should be measured
by a totality of the circumstances. Ratliff v. State, 752 So. 2d 416 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
However, there is a strong, yet rebuttable, presumption that the actions by the defense counsel were
reasonable and strategic. Id.
¶3.
Smith argues that had his attorney correctly informed him of the nature of the charge and possible
penalty, he would have insisted on going to trial rather than plead guilty. Rule 8.04(3) of the Uniform Rules
of Circuit and County Court Practice states:
Before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court must determine that the plea is
voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea. A plea of
guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or improper inducements. A
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showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made must appear in the
record.
Additionally, URCCC 8.04(4) states that when the defendant is arraigned and wishes to plead guilty to the
offense charged, it is the duty of the trial court to address the defendant personally and to inquire and
determine that he is competent to understand the nature of the charge; that he understands the nature and
consequences of the plea, including the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law; and that he
understands that by pleading guilty he waives his constitutional rights of trial by jury, the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination. Further, if he is not
represented by an attorney, he must be advised that he has the right to an attorney at every stage of the
proceeding and that one will be appointed to represent him if he is indigent. Id.
¶4.
In our review of the record, we note that at the January 2000 plea hearing, the judge thoroughly
questioned Smith in compliance with Rule 8.04(4), and Smith affirmed to the court that he was pleased with
his attorney's representation of his case. Smith also told the judge that he understood the charge, the
minimum and maximum punishment, his constitutional rights, and he was not threatened or intimidated into
pleading guilty. We find no evidence that the court erred in accepting Smith's guilty plea, and we find no
evidence whatsoever that the attorney's performance was deficient as to cause Smith to suffer prejudice.
This issue has no merit.
II. WAS THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S PERSON ILLEGAL?
¶5.
Smith also argues that the police officer's search of his pants pocket violated his Fourth Amendment
right against illegal search and seizure. In King v. State, 738 So. 2d 240 (¶4) (Miss. 1999), the supreme
court noted that the defendant's post-conviction relief application raised constitutional claims, including
illegal search and seizure. However, the court stated that King's valid guilty plea constituted a waiver of
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these constitutional rights, and by pleading guilty King voluntarily gave up his right to make this constitutional
challenge. Id. at (¶5). In accordance with King, we find Smith to be barred from raising this issue on
appeal, since his guilty plea acted to waive his right to challenge this issue.
IV. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT?
¶6.
Smith finally argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. In Swift v. State, 815 So.
2d 1230 (¶13)(Miss. Ct. App. 2001), this Court stated:
The law is well settled that when properly entered and accepted, "[a] guilty plea operates
to waive the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and
cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, the right to a jury trial and the right that the
prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."
Since Smith pleaded guilty, he waived his opportunity for a jury to review the sufficiency of evidence in his
case; thus, we decline to review, as well.
¶7.
Our standard of review concerning post-conviction relief states: "Upon review of a trial court's
decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief, this Court will not disturb the trial court's factual
findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." Carr v. State, 806 So. 2d 319 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2001). We have found no clear error in the judge's dismissal of Smith's motion for post-conviction
relief; thus, we affirm.
¶8.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF DISMISSAL OF
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO LEAKE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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