John Marr, Jr. v. Darnay Marr Adair
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CA-01723-COA
JOHN MARR, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
DARNAY MARR ADAIR
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/2/2001
HON. WALTER WESLEY TEEL
HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
KELLY MICHAEL RAYBURN
DARNAY MARR ADAIR (PRO SE)
CIVIL - CUSTODY
GRANTED MOTION TO SET ASIDE ALL
ORDERS PROMULGATED UNDER ITS
AUTHORITY AND DISMISSED CASE FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION
REVERSED AND REMANDED-04/08/2003
EN BANC
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
John Marr appeals from a judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court relinquishing the
jurisdiction which it had assumed over child custody and support matters emanating from a Louisiana
judgment of divorce. John argues in his appeal that the chancery court erred when it relinquished
jurisdiction and vacated previously-entered orders relating to matters of custody. John also argues that the
chancery court erred in dismissing several of his motions dealing with issues of contempt and custody due
to Darnay's failure to comply with prior orders of the court. John argues further that the chancery court
erred in finding that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdictional Act, the State of Louisiana was the
more appropriate forum to consider the issues regarding custody of the minor children.
FACTS
¶2.
John and Darnay Marr Adair were divorced on March 8, 1996, by a judgment of the 22nd Judicial
District Court of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. The court ordered John to pay Darnay $400 per month
in child support. Pursuant to a joint stipulation, both parents received joint custody of their three children,
Kristina, Kayla, and Christopher, with primary custody being awarded to Darnay. Approximately three
years after the parties’ divorce, John, now a resident of Mississippi, filed a motion for contempt and
custody and a motion to enroll the Louisiana judgment in the Chancery Court of Harrison County,
Mississippi. The motions alleged that Darnay was denying John visitation with his children, as well as
violating other provisions of the Louisiana judgment of divorce. John further claimed that the children were
neglected in the care of their mother and living in an unstable environment. At the time these motions were
filed, Darnay had relocated to Texas.
¶3.
On March 22, 1999, the chancery court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the
custody matters involved, presumably because the children did not reside in Mississippi at the time. A
ruling was issued from the bench; however, no written order was entered.
¶4.
On January 10, 2000, John and Darnay executed a document entitled “Consent Judgment”
whereby they agreed to share joint legal custody of the three minor children, with John having primary
custody of the two girls, Kristina and Kayla, and Darnay retaining custody of Christopher. Although the
document is styled as a Consent Judgment of the 22nd Judicial District Court of St. Tammany Parish,
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Louisiana, it was not signed by a judge, nor was it filed of record with that court. It appears, however, that
John assumed custody of the two girls pursuant to this agreement and brought them to Mississippi.
¶5.
On September 1, 2000, after Kristina and Kayla had lived with him in Mississippi for
approximately eight months, John again petitioned the Harrison County Chancery Court to enroll the
Louisiana judgment and to ask the Louisiana trial court to release its jurisdiction over the case. Although
custody was a part of the relief requested, John did not file until August 31, 2001, the affidavit required by
Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-23-17 (Rev. 1994). Also, on September 1, 2000, John filed a
petition for an ex parte temporary restraining order seeking custody and asking that Darnay be enjoined
from coming within 500 yards of him, his wife, or the girls. The court granted John temporary custody of
the minor children, and Darnay was enjoined from contacting them pending further order from the chancery
court.
¶6.
On September 13, 2000, Darnay, proceeding pro se, filed motions with the chancery court
opposing the enrollment of the Louisiana judgment in Mississippi, challenging the restraining order, and
contesting the court’s jurisdiction.
¶7.
After the filing of Darnay's motions and responses to John's motions, the chancery court, on
September 13, 2000, proceeded to hear the pending motions. However, during the hearing, the parties
reached a settlement which essentially reflected the terms and provisions of the “Consent Judgment” that
they had executed in January of 2000. The settlement agreement gave custody of Kristina and Kayla to
John and custody of Christopher to Darnay. The parties further agreed that the Harrison County Chancery
Court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter involved. The terms of the settlement agreement
were read into the record on the date of the hearing, and both John and Darnay verbally acknowledged
that the agreement read in open court accurately reflected the terms and conditions of the settlement
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agreement reached by them. However, the judgment encompassing the terms and conditions of the
settlement agreement was not entered until February 19, 2001. Neither John nor Darnay signed the
judgment.
¶8.
On February 20, 2001, John filed a motion for contempt alleging that Darnay had taken the girls
for weekend visitation and refused to return them. A hearing was held on March 7, 2001, and based on
evidence adduced at the hearing, the court entered an order awarding temporary custody of Kristina and
Kayla to the Harrison County Youth Court/Shelter. John, as the girls’ primary custodian, was directed to
make appointments for them to receive counseling through the Gulf Coast Mental Health Center.
¶9.
On March 15, 2001, the chancery court entered an order finding Darnay in contempt of the court’s
February 19, 2001 judgment for failing to return the children to John following visitation.
She was
sentenced to six months' incarceration, suspended, and ordered to pay attorney’s fees.
¶10.
On March 30, 2001, Darnay filed a motion to set aside the court's March 15, 2001 contempt
order. She also sought an order of dismissal of the case, along with an order setting aside all previous
orders on the basis that Harrison County Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction over the ongoing custody
dispute between the parties. At this point, Darnay had retained the services of an attorney.
¶11.
On April 4, 2001, the court entered an order releasing Kristina and Kayla from the care of the
youth shelter to the temporary custody of Darnay. On August 3, 2001, John filed another motion for
contempt, a petition for an ex parte injunction and a temporary restraining order. On August 9, 2001, John
filed a motion seeking a modification of the court's April 4, 2001 order which granted temporary custody
to Darnay.
¶12.
Sensing a possibility of conflicting jurisdiction, the chancery court contacted the 22nd Judicial
District Court of St. Tammany, Louisiana, to inquire as to the existence of any proceedings pending in that
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court. It was discovered that all the while the Mississippi chancery court had proceeded, a Louisiana
district attorney had been pursuing a non-payment action against John in Louisiana for failure to pay child
support. That action had commenced on July 21, 1999, and was set for hearing in November of 2001.
It was also discovered that a motion by John contesting the Louisiana court's jurisdiction was also pending
in the Louisiana court while proceedings were moving forward in the Mississippi chancery court.
¶13.
On October 2, 2001, the Harrison County Chancery Court entered an order setting aside all
previously-entered orders on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction over the ongoing custody dispute between
the parties. Excepted from this vacation of orders was the chancery court's March 15, 2001 order of
contempt against Darnay. The chancery court also found that it would be capable of exercising jurisdiction
over the parties’ custody dispute consistent with the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdictional Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (KPA). However, the chancery
court expressed concern over John’s failure to timely file a UCCJA affidavit and the effect of that omission
on the court's power to assert jurisdiction over the case. The court further enunciated that it could not find
that Darnay waived the UCCJA affidavit requirement. Moreover, it acknowledged that Louisiana was the
more convenient forum in which to hear the parties' custody dispute. Nevertheless, the chancery court saw
fit to allow its March 15, 2001 order finding Darnay in contempt of court to stand.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14.
In domestic relations cases, our scope of review is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error
rule. Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So. 2d 85, 88 (¶10) (Miss. 2002) (citing Magee v. Magee, 661
So. 2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1995)). This Court may reverse a chancellor’s findings of fact only when there
is no “substantial credible evidence in the record” to justify his finding. Id. (citing Henderson v .
Henderson, 757 So. 2d 285, 289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000)). “Our scope of review in domestic relations
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matters is limited under the familiar rule that this Court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings unless
manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or unless the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard.” Id.
(citing Johnson v. Johnson, 605 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. 1994)).
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶15.
The core issue raised by John is whether the chancery court acted properly in relinquishing
jurisdiction of the Louisiana domestic relations judgment after initially assuming jurisdiction and deciding
attendant issues of custody and support. Therefore, we combine his two issues in a singular discussion.
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to
make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of
commencement of proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state
within six (6) months before commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a
person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person
acting as a parent continues to live in this state; or
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents or the child and at least
one contestant has a significant connection with the state, and (ii) there is
available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training and personal relationships . . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-23-5(1) (Rev. 1994).
¶16.
In deciding whether it should proceed in a child custody matter under the UCCJA, the chancery
court must undertake a three- step process:
A court must first determine if it has authority, or jurisdiction, to act following the
guidelines of § 93-23-5. If a court determines that it does not have jurisdiction, the
process stops there. However, if that hurdle is cleared, a determination is made as to
which court is the most appropriate or convenient forum. If the court accepts jurisdiction
as the more convenient, the court must determine if the action to be taken is foreclosed by
an order or judgment by the other state court.
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Jundoosing, 826 So. 2d at 89 (¶13) (citing In re Z.J., 804 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (¶19) (Miss. 2002)).
¶17.
As previously noted, the chancery court in effect concluded that the filing of the affidavit required
by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-23-17 was indispensable to its jurisdiction. The relevant section
of this statute requires that:
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding, in his first pleading or in an affidavit attached to
that pleading, shall give information under oath as to the child’s present address, the places
where the child has lived within the last five (5) years, and the names and present
addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. In this pleading
or affidavit every party shall further declare under oath whether:
(a) He has participated (as a party, witness or in any other capacity), in
any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any
other state;
(b) He has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child
pending in a court of this or any other state; and
(c) He knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has
physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights
with respect to the child.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-23-17 (Rev. 1994).
¶18.
It is undisputed that John failed to include the required information in his first pleading or in an
affidavit attached to the pleading. Darnay argues that this failure to timely file the information with the initial
motion prevented the chancery court from exercising jurisdiction to determine custody of the parties’
children. John counters that, while his first pleading did not contain all of the information required to be
disclosed by section 93-23-17, the relevant information was known to Darnay at the time of John's initial
filing. According to John, this fact is borne out by the affidavit which Darnay attached to her motion to set
aside the chancery court's judgment.
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¶19.
We have examined Darnay's affidavit, which was filed on March 30, 2001, and agree with John
that it does contain all of the relevant information required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-2317 (Rev. 1994). Moreover, it is undisputed that John filed a UCCJA affidavit in this cause on August 31,
2001.
¶20.
According to Darnay's affidavit, the minor children lived in Mississippi with their father from January
20, 2000, to February 2001, although Darnay claims that John's custody of the children was against her
will during the period from May 20, 2000 until February 2001. However, this allegation belies the oral
agreement which Darnay made in open court on September 13, 2000, as well as the never-filed consent
judgment executed by Darnay on January 10, 2000. In the consent judgment that was not filed in the
Louisiana court, Darnay agreed that John would have custody of the parties' two girls.
In the oral
agreement which Darnay entered into in the Harrison County Chancery Court, she also agreed that John
would have paramount physical custody of the parties' two daughters.
¶21.
The initial question then is whether the Harrison County Chancery Court properly assumed
jurisdiction in light of (1) the fact that the minor children had lived continuously in Mississippi from January
2000 until February 9, 2001, (2) Darnay's September 13, 2000 agreement that the Harrison County
Chancery Court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, (3) Darnay's March 30, 2001 affidavit
which satisfied the UCCJA's informational requirements for initial custody pleadings, and (4) John's August
31, 2001 affidavit which also satisfied the UCCJA's informational requirements. If the answer to the initial
question is in the affirmative, then the follow-up and ultimate question is whether the chancery court
properly relinquished jurisdiction. As already observed, the chancery court determined that the timely filing
of the UCCJA affidavit was jurisdictional and that the State of Louisiana was a more convenient forum for
determining the custody dispute.
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¶22.
The issue we face here has not been addressed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. However, in
Robison v. Lanford, 822 So.2d 1034, 1041 (¶¶31-32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), this Court addressed the
issue and held that because the appellant failed to object at the chancery court level to the non-disclosure
of the information required by section 93-23-17, he had waived the issue, at least in the absence of a
showing of existing proceedings in another jurisdiction that the chancellor needed to consider.1
¶23.
Courts which have addressed the issue in other jurisdictions are divided. Having no precedence
to follow in our state, we consider the case law of other states. Two out-of-state cases construing the
UCCJA disclosure requirements provide some guidance, although not the answer to the specific issue
before us. The first case, Breaux v. Mays, 746 P.2d 708 (Okla. Ct. App.1987), overruled on other
grounds by G.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65 (Okla.1990), held that a petitioning party's failure to initially
provide the chancery court with the disclosure information required by the UCCJA, either by pleading or
affidavit, was not jurisdictional but rather was merely procedural and that the initial failure to provide the
information could be cured by amendment. The second case, Cook v. Court of Common Pleas of
Marion County, 502 N. E. 2d 245 (Ohio 1986), held that the UCCJA affidavit is a jurisdictional
requirement in a child custody proceeding but that the requirement that it be filed with the complaint is
considered directory, not mandatory.
¶24.
It may be concluded from the above cases that timely compliance with the UCCJA disclosure
provision upon filing the initial complaint is essential to facilitate a proper determination of the court's
jurisdiction but that failure to do so will not necessarily impair the court's exercise of jurisdiction if
appropriately cured by a timely amendment. Thus, a court may nevertheless validly exercise its jurisdiction
1
We note that the Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lanford on September 26,
2002, but has not yet rendered a decision. We further note that four justices voted to grant certiorari while
five justices voted against granting it.
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if the omitted information is timely supplied by amendment of the pleading or by affidavit annexed to a
motion to amend.
¶25.
Here, the record indicates, as we have already observed, that John did not file the necessary
disclosures with his initial pleadings. However, he subsequently filed a UCCJA affidavit with all pertinent
information on August 31, 2001. The information which he disclosed, as well as the information obtained
by the chancellor from the 22nd Judicial District Court of St. Tammany, Louisiana, revealed no pending
litigation in any other state concerning custody of the minor children, even though there was on-going
litigation in Louisiana concerning back child support.
¶26.
We find that based on the specific facts of this case, the Harrison County Chancery Court acted
properly in assuming jurisdiction and erred in ultimately concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because of
John's failure to attach by affidavit, or include in his initial pleading, the information required by Mississippi
Code Annotated section 93-23-17 (Rev. 1994). This information had been provided by John
approximately two months prior to the order of dismissal. While it is true that the Louisiana court, as the
court issuing the original judgment, would normally have continuing jurisdiction to modify its judgment, we
note that Darnay did not reside continually in Louisiana following the grant of the divorce. She moved to
and resided in the State of Texas for a period of time, although it is unclear from the record as to how long
she remained a resident of that state. John and the two girls had lived in Mississippi for approximately eight
months prior to the enrollment of the Louisiana judgment and approximately fifteen months prior to the
court's transferring custody of the girls to Darnay who had relocated to the State of Louisiana.
¶27.
We next consider whether the chancery court erred in determining that Louisiana was a more
appropriate forum to resolve the custody matters. In reaching this determination, the chancery court
stated:
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Although the children in question lived in Mississippi for a little over one year, they have
spent the majority of their lives in Louisiana. They are presently residing in Louisiana with
their mother. They are enrolled in school in Louisiana. The majority of the evidence
necessary for a custody determination lies in Louisiana. There is a child support action
pending in Louisiana and scheduled for hearing in just over a month’s time.
¶28.
The UCCJA allows a court competent to decide child custody matters to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that the court of another state is more appropriate.
The applicable statutory provision reads as follows:
(1)
A court which has jurisdiction under [the UCCJA] to make an initial or
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making
a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination
under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum.
(2)
A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own
motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other
representative of the child.
(3)
In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it
is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose
it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a)
If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(b)
If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the
child and one or more of the contestants;
(c)
If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training and personal relationships is more readily available in another state;
(d)
If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less
appropriate; and
(e)
If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would
contravene any of the provisions of this chapter.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-23-13 (Rev. 1994).
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¶29.
We first observe that the chancery court's order granting Darnay's motion to dismiss is a bit
ambiguous. The chancellor seems to say at one point that Darnay did not waive the disclosure
requirements of the UCCJA and that her oral consent – that jurisdiction was proper in the Harrison County
Chancery Court – was ineffective because a party cannot confer jurisdiction.
¶30.
Given the fact that the chancellor treated the disclosure requirements as jurisdictional, a finding that
Darnay did not waive them, coupled with the fact that jurisdiction cannot be waived, would mean that the
court never acquired jurisdiction. However, at another point, the chancery court said that it was declining
to exercise further jurisdiction. Perhaps all the court meant is that it was ceasing to assume jurisdiction
which it belatedly concluded it never had.
¶31.
We next observe that the statutory scheme permits the chancery court to decline to exercise
jurisdiction "at any time before making a decree." In our case, the chancery court not only assumed
jurisdiction but issued several orders. In fact the chancery court assumed jurisdiction, which we have found
to be proper, in September 2000 and did not relinquish it until October 2001, issuing several orders in the
interim. Further, as part of its reasoning for relinquishing, as opposed to declining jurisdiction, the chancery
court found that the children were living in Louisiana. However, we point out that the girls were in
Louisiana only because the chancery court, when it admittedly had jurisdiction, changed its custody order
for no apparent reason and granted custody of the girls to Darnay. In other words, the chancery court
facilitated the very fact upon which it would later rely to justify terminating its jurisdiction.
¶32.
In any event, based on the specific facts here, we find that the chancery court erred in relinquishing
its jurisdiction and dismissing the case because we cannot discern how it was in the interest of the children
that the Louisiana court assume jurisdiction after all the water that had flowed under the bridge since
Darnay and the children first left Louisiana. They resided in Texas, then the girls resided in Mississippi for
12
more than a year. Darnay twice, by sworn agreement, consented to John, a resident of Mississippi, having
custody of the girls. Pursuant to one of the sworn agreements, John brought the girls to live with him in
Mississippi and enrolled them in school here. The original judgment was properly enrolled in Mississippi,
and Darnay consented to jurisdiction in Mississippi although her consent, on the facts of this case, was
probably not necessary. In our judgment, these facts compel the conclusion that the chancery court
committed reversible error in relinquishing jurisdiction and dismissing the case. Consequently, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
REVERSED AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
THE APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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