Paul Elvis Crawford v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-01345-COA
PAUL ELVIS CRAWFORD
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
4/24/2001
HON. JERRY O. TERRY, SR.
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LISA D. COLLUMS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
CONO A. CARANNA, II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY OF A
DWELLING; SENTENCED TO SERVE TWENTYFIVE YEARS WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF
PAROLE
AFFIRMED - 3/11/2003
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE AND MYERS, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Paul Crawford was convicted of burglary by a circuit court jury. On appeal, Crawford argues that
evidence of his intent upon entering the victim’s home was inadequate to support the conviction, and that
more generally, the verdict did not respond to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Finally, Crawford
contends that his defense was marred by ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no merit to these
arguments and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
On the morning of September 21, 2000, Patrick Hamlin left the home he shared with his ailing
mother and two others, and made his way to work. Approximately two hours later, Hamlin returned to
check on his mother. He noticed that the wooden back door that he had previously closed was now
slightly ajar. Hamlin entered the house and went into the kitchen. Seeing a shadow moving in the periphery
of his vision, Hamlin went to the front of the house. There he saw Paul Crawford, who stared at him while
frantically attempting to unlock the front door. After Crawford was finally able to open the door and exit
the house, Hamlin chased him briefly down the street before returning to assure his mother's safety and to
contact law enforcement.
¶3.
A description of the intruder was radioed to area police. Though police pointed out a possible
suspect, Hamlin stated that it was not the man he had just confronted. Meanwhile, several blocks away,
Detective Sergeant Kenneth Brown observed suspicious behavior from a man matching the intruder's
description. Brown stopped the man, Crawford, who agreed to be escorted back to the scene. There,
Hamlin immediately and positively identified Crawford as the perpetrator.
DISCUSSION
1. Intent
¶4.
One of the elements necessary to prove burglary is the intent to commit a crime after breaking and
entering. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-23 (Rev. 2000). Crawford argues that the evidence failed to
demonstrate any proof of his intentions. There was no evidence that any items of value had yet been taken
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or even disturbed, such as electronics and jewelry. Only a single duffle bag had been rifled through before
Hamlin's arrival.
¶5.
Since those committing burglary usually have no occasion to announce their intentions, evidence
of the required intent usually arises only from inferences:
Some presumptions are to be indulged in against one who enters a building unbidden at a
late hour of night, else the burglar caught without booty might escape the penalties of the
law. People are not accustomed in the nighttime to enter homes of others, when asleep,
with innocent purposes. The usual object is theft; and this is the inference ordinarily to be
drawn in the absence of explanation from breaking and entering at night accompanied by
flight when discovered, even though nothing has been taken.
Brown v. State, 799 So. 2d 870, 872 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Nichols v. State, 207 Miss. 291, 296-97,
42 So. 2d 201, 202-03 (1949)).
¶6.
Therefore, an inference of the intent to steal may arise from proof of the breaking and entering.
Gillum v. State, 468 So. 2d 856, 859 (Miss. 1985). Crawford is permitted to counter this evidence
which arises from an inference, just as he may counter other kinds of evidence presented to prove his guilt.
The State met its burden of presenting evidence on each element of burglary.
2. Weight and sufficiency of the evidence
¶7.
Crawford next claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for directed verdict. In
reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court is to consider all evidence
and the inferences arising from it in a light most favorable to the verdict reached. We may enter an
acquittal only if we are convinced that no reasonable, hypothetical juror would find guilt. Tait v. State, 669
So. 2d 85, 88 (Miss. 1996). Crawford contends that the prosecution's identification testimony and the lack
of physical evidence fail the test of sufficiency.
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¶8.
Crawford urges us to consider the factors for identification set forth by the United States Supreme
Court. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). However, this case has no serious issue
regarding identification. Crawford, unable to open the front door as Hamlin approached him, was fully
on view for a meaningful length of time. Hamlin’s verbal description of the intruder given to law
enforcement officers was nearly identical to Crawford's physical characteristics. When Crawford was
returned to the scene within the hour, Hamlin identified him with certainty.
¶9.
As to the alleged absence of physical evidence, the eyewitness testimony of Crawford’s presence
in the home was more than sufficient.
¶10.
Failing on this argument, Crawford also seeks a new trial through his contention that the verdict
went against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We may order a new trial only if allowing the
verdict to stand would constitute an "unconscionable injustice." Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297, 300
(Miss. 1983). Here, the evidence weighs against Crawford, and we cannot find it unjust to allow the
verdict to stand.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶11.
In addition, Crawford filed a pro se supplemental brief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
He did not seek leave to file the brief and therefore we need not consider it. M.R.A.P. 28 (c) (further
briefs from an appellant besides an initial and reply brief must receive leave of court). We find that the brief
is particularly inappropriate since the issue raised is ineffective assistance of counsel. That is a matter
usually better suited for post-conviction relief because insufficient evidence is in the record of the trial and
related matters to evaluate the claim. Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 837 (Miss. 1983). We find no
obvious inadequacy by counsel in the claims raised in the pro se brief. Consequently, we do not consider
the issue.
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¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF BURGLARY OF A DWELLING
AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS OF APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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