Randall W. Rice v. Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-WC-01684-COA
RANDALL W. RICE
APPELLANT
v.
BURLINGTON MOTOR CARRIERS, INC. AND THE
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
9/24/2001
HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER, III
PONTOTOC COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOE M. DAVIS
WILLIAM O. RUTLEDGE
FRANKLIN WILLIAMS
CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CLAIMANT WAS DENIED BENEFITS UNDER
THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
ACT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
AFFIRMED - 03/11/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
MCMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Randall W. Rice filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers' Compensation
Commission seeking disability benefits after he suffered an injury to his back while in the course of his
employment with Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc. (hereafter “Burlington”). The Commission dismissed
Rice’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Rice appealed to the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County and that
court affirmed the Commission’s decision. Rice has now appealed the circuit court’s decision to this Court.
There is no dispute as to the operative facts of the case. The issue of jurisdiction thus becomes a pure
question of law. After a de novo review of the issue of law decided by the Commission, we find no error
and, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Rice’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.
¶2.
In 1997, Rice was a resident of Pontotoc County when he enrolled in a truck driver training school
located in Nashville, Tennessee. During the course of his training, Rice was conditionally offered
employment by Burlington; the conditions being that he satisfactorily complete the training regimen in
Tennessee and report to Burlington’s facility in Indiana for a physical examination and additional training.
After passing the physical exam and completing the supplemental training, Rice was dispatched by
Burlington on actual trucking runs under the supervision of a more experienced driver referred to by Rice
as his “trainer.” Rice completed the first trip that originated in Indiana, and was dispatched from the same
location on a second trip for a delivery in Pennsylvania. It was during this second trip that Rice suffered
the back injury that is the subject of this claim. The injury occurred in the State of Pennsylvania. After
several days of unsatisfactory recuperation, Rice returned to Mississippi where he underwent extensive
medical treatment including back surgery. Rice never returned to his duties with Burlington.
¶3.
Burlington contested the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission to
award compensation benefits under the facts of this case, arguing that there was an insufficient nexus
between this state and the circumstances of both Rice’s employment and his work-related injury to permit
the Commission to determine Rice’s claim. The Commission agreed and dismissed Rice’s petition on that
basis without reaching the underlying merits of his claim for benefits.
¶4.
Because the injury in this case occurred outside the geographical boundaries of this state, the only
manner in which Mississippi’s Compensation Commission could obtain jurisdiction of Rice’s claim is found
in Section 71-3-109(1) of the Mississippi Code. That section provides, in part, as follows:
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If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment while temporarily
employed outside of this state, he or his dependents in case of his death shall be entitled
to compensation according to the law of this state.
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-109(1) (Rev. 2000).
¶5.
In the case now before us, it is uncontradicted that Rice was offered employment by Burlington
while he was in Tennessee attending a driver's training course and that he was ultimately hired in the state
of Indiana. In fact, as a part of the hiring process, Rice signed an agreement that, if hired, he agreed “to
be bound by the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act for any and all injuries . . . which I may claim are
related to my employment with Burlington Motor Carriers.” There is no contention that, during the brief
course of his employment at Burlington, Rice was “regularly employed” in the state of Mississippi. In fact,
there is no evidence that he entered the state while performing his duties during his brief tenure as an
employee of Burlington. The only connection between this state and the duties of Rice’s employment
consisted of his assertion of two things. First was Rice’s testimony that officials of Burlington had told him
that he was to be based in Atlanta once he became a fully qualified driver and would be dispatched out of
that location, but that he would be permitted to take his truck home with him to Pontotoc between driving
assignments. Secondly, Rice reported that job-related correspondence including salary checks were
mailed to his home address in Pontotoc County.
¶6.
Rice places reliance on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham Van Service, Inc.
v. Dependents of Moore in support of his contention that Mississippi’s Compensation Commission may
determine his claim for benefits. Burnham Van Service, Inc. v. Dependents of Moore, 164 So. 2d 733
(Miss. 1964). In that case, the evidence showed that Moore, a resident of Gulfport, operated a truck used
in moving furniture that was leased to Robert Bates, a resident of Long Beach engaged in household
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furniture moving. Burnham, 164 So. 2d at 735. Bates was engaged in both local hauling and longdistance hauling. Id. Because Bates was not licensed to operate in interstate commerce, he sub-leased
the rig to Burnham Van Lines under a contract executed in Mississippi so that the business could legally
pursue long-distance hauling. Id. at 736. Moore was the principal operator of the rig while engaged in
interstate transportation and was dispatched on those trips by Burnham with the understanding that he
would return after every such trip to his home in Harrison County to await additional assignments. Id. at
739. It was during one such trip that Moore, while in the state of Ohio, was shot and killed under
unexplained circumstances. Id. at 737. The case presented two crucial issues; one being whether, under
the facts, Moore was an employee of Burnham or of Bates. The other was whether the Mississippi
Workers’ Compensation Commission had jurisdiction of a claim by Moore’s heirs for job-related death
benefits. The supreme court decided both issues in favor of the claimants. In addressing the issue of
Mississippi jurisdiction, the court noted that the contract of lease was executed in Mississippi, that Moore
was a resident of Mississippi, and that all parties understood that Gulfport was the base of operations for
the truck. Id. at 739.
¶7.
In the case before us, none of the contractual documents relating to Rice’s employment originated
in Mississippi or had any relation to this state. Rice was recruited as a prospective employee while a
student in Tennessee and was offered a contract of employment while in the state of Indiana. By his own
testimony, it was contemplated that, after his initial on-the-job training under the supervision of an
experienced “trainer,” his duties would consist of hauls originating at Burlington’s operation in Atlanta,
Georgia. Even accepting as true Rice’s assertion that Burlington was going to permit him to take his rig to
his home in Pontotoc County between driving assignments, that appears nothing more than a personal
accommodation to Rice and is not the equivalent of an agreement that Pontotoc County would serve as
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the base of operations for Rice’s activities similar to the arrangement between Moore and Burnham in the
Burnham Van Lines case.
¶8.
This case, in the view of the Court, is more closely akin to the facts in L. & A. Const. Co. v.
McCharen, in which McCharen, a Mississippi resident, went to Tennessee and was hired to work on a
bridge construction project in that state by L. & A. Construction Company, an enterprise that was
domiciled in Hattiesburg. L. & A. Const. Co. v. McCharen, 198 So. 2d 240, 241 (Miss. 1967). Upon
a finding that the contract of employment was entered into in Tennessee, that all work under the
employment contract was envisioned to be performed in Tennessee, that the injury occurred in Tennessee,
and that McCharen performed no duties for his employer in Mississippi, the Commission found that it
lacked jurisdiction of McCharen’s claim for compensation benefits, even though both the employer and the
employee were domiciled in this state. Id. at 242.
¶9.
In the case before us, the negotiations ultimately resulting in Rice’s contract of employment with
Burlington began in Tennessee and were ultimately completed in Indiana. All work under the contract was
performed in Indiana and such other states as Rice and his “trainer” entered in the course of completing
their assigned hauling duties, none of which were shown by the evidence to include Mississippi. Rice’s
injury occurred while he was performing his employment duties in the state of Pennsylvania. No duties of
employment were performed by Rice in Mississippi, nor does it appear from the evidence that there was
any likelihood that Mississippi would become the focus of any of Rice’s duties for Burlington. To the
contrary, it is uncontradicted that Rice’s contemplated base of operations was to be Atlanta, Georgia, from
which he would be dispatched to various delivery points with nothing other than chance determining
whether any such destination might, on occasion, be within the borders of this state.
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¶10.
Rice argues that L. & A. Construction no longer serves as authority on the question of jurisdiction
because the supreme court, in deciding the issue, relied in part on an early version of the Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, which stated that “if neither the harm occurred nor the contract of employment was made
in the state” then no recovery was permitted under that state’s compensation law. Rice suggests that the
Mississippi Supreme Court has, since its decision in L. & A. Construction, generally abandoned the
Restatement (First) in favor of the revised Restatement (Second), which proposes a different test.
According to Rice, the supreme court began as early as 1968 to apply the “center of gravity” test described
in the Restatement (Second) in determining conflict of law questions in various areas of the law. However,
we note that, in deciding the question of jurisdiction in L. & A. Construction, the supreme court engaged
in a lengthy analysis of the issue and discussed supporting authority besides the Restatement. We also
observe that the supreme court itself has continued to rely on the authority of L. & A. Construction to
determine jurisdictional questions in workers' compensation cases long after publication of the Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws. See, e.g., White v. Malone Properties, Inc., 494 So. 2d 576, 578 (Miss.
1986). If some modification in the means of answering jurisdictional questions in workers' compensation
cases involving out-of-state injuries is warranted, such modification will have to be undertaken by the
Mississippi Supreme Court and not this Court, which is bound by existing precedent as announced in the
L. & A. Construction case and subsequently followed in White. In that light, we cannot discover any error
in the reasoning of the Commission that would suggest the necessity of this Court intervening to direct a
different outcome.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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