Lorann Coleman v. Christopher Smith
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-00618-COA
LORANN COLEMAN
APPELLANT
v.
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, GRAND CASINOS, INC., BL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND PARK
PLACE ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEES
2/22/2002
HON. ALBERT B. SMITH, III
TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LUCIUS EDWARDS
SAMMYE S. THARP
JOHN H. DUNBAR
WALTER ALAN DAVIS
CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART;
REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART 04/01/2003
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE AND MYERS, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1.
On March 16, 1999, Lorann Coleman was arrested by security personnel at the Grand Casino in
Tunica, Mississippi, her place of employment. Coleman was charged with embezzlement and, on June 21,
2000, she was exonerated in the Tunica County Justice Court. On June 20, 2001, Coleman filed a
complaint in the Tunica County Circuit Court accusing Christopher Smith, Grand Casino, Inc., B.L.
Development Corporation, and Park Place Entertainment Corporation ("Smith") of false and malicious
arrest. On September 9, 2001, process was served on Smith. Smith filed an answer to the complaint on
October 19, 2001, and a motion for summary judgment was filed on October 24, 2001, alleging that
Coleman's claims were time barred by the one year statute of limitations for false arrest. On November
2, 2001, Coleman filed a motion to amend her original complaint to include as additional claims negligence
in causing her arrest, negligent infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.
After a hearing on both motions on December 13, 2001, the trial court issued a final order on February
22, 2002, granting Smith's motion for summary judgment and denying Coleman's motion to amend her
complaint. Coleman appeals this ruling raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in
granting Smith's motion for summary judgment, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying her motion
to amend her complaint. Finding merit to both issues, we reverse and remand on the first issue and reverse
and render on the second issue.
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SMITH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT?
¶2.
With her first issue, Coleman contends that the trial court should have denied Smith's motion for
summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs a de novo standard.
If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions, together with any affidavits, show
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
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summary judgment should be entered for the movant. Boyles v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 832
So. 2d 503 (¶5) (Miss. 2002).
¶3.
Coleman contends that it was her intention to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
Although the term "malicious prosecution" was not explicitly stated, the style of her complaint was taken
directly from the section of the Mississippi Legal Forms book dealing with malicious prosecution, as
follows:
1. On or about the _____day of _____, 20____, defendant, maliciously
, and without probable cause therefor, cause the plaintiff to be arrested
under a warrant issued by ______, a justice court judge, on a charge of
(as the case may be).
2. Before the commencement of this action, this charge was judicially investigated,
the prosecution ended, and the plaintiff discharged.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the sum of
_____dollars and cents.
Mississippi Legal Forms, § 4-42. Although the form is somewhat confusing since it uses the word
"malicious" to describe "arrest," we cannot fault Coleman for relying on this form when we can logically infer
that her intent was to allege malicious prosecution.
¶4.
A claim for malicious prosecution falls under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev. 1995), which sets
out the one year statute of limitations for intentional torts. According to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
a cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues on the day the criminal proceedings are terminated in
the favor of the plaintiff. City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So. 2d 1212, 1217 (Miss. 1990).
Coleman was exonerated on June 21, 2000, and filed her complaint on June 20, 2001, just one day before
her malicious prosecution claim would have expired. We find that the trial court was in error in granting
Smith's motion for summary judgment and, therefore, we reverse and remand.
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II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING COLEMAN'S MOTION TO AMEND
HER COMPLAINT?
¶5.
With her second issue, Coleman contends that her original complaint should be amended to include
the additional claims of negligence in causing her arrest, negligent infliction of emotional distress, malicious
prosecution, and abuse of process. According to the Mississippi Supreme Court, motions to amend are
within the discretion of the trial court, and absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be reversed. Estes
v. Starnes, 732 So. 2d 251 (¶4) (Miss. 1999). "In practice, an amendment should be denied only if the
amendment would cause actual prejudice to the opposite party." M.R.C.P. 15 cmts; Beverly v. Powers,
666 So. 2d 806, 809 (Miss. 1995). Here, Coleman filed her motion to amend just fourteen days after
Smith filed his answer and nine days after Smith filed his motion for summary judgment. This was well
within the normal period for discovery and prior to the case being anywhere near ready for trial. On these
facts we cannot find any actual prejudice to Smith; thus, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Coleman's motion to amend her pleadings, we reverse and render.
¶6.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART AND REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART. COSTS OF
THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEES.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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