Catherine L. Young v. Wendy's International, Inc.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-00273-COA
CATHERINE L. YOUNG
APPELLANT
v.
WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND WENSTAR,
INC., X, Y, Z
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
12/12/2001
HON. W. SWAN YERGER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT R. STEPHENSON
REEVE G. JACOBUS
LELAND S. SMITH
TRACY JENNIFER STIDHAM-STEEN
CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT GRANTED.
AFFIRMED: 03/18/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Catherine Young filed suit against Wendy's International, Inc. and Wenstar Inc., alleging that
Wendy's and Wenstar breached its duty to maintain the premises of a Wendy's Restaurant in a safe manner,
by permitting an unsafe and defective chair to remain in the dining room and that these aforementioned acts
constituted gross negligence on the part of the defendants. The Hinds County Circuit Court granted
Wendy's and Wenstar's summary judgment on both of these claims. The court concluded that there was
no genuine issue of material fact, thereby entitling the defendants to judgment as a matter of law. Catherine
Young appeals to this Court from that judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR WENDY'S
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND WENSTAR, INC.?
FACTS
¶2.
Catherine Young entered into a Wendy's restaurant with her granddaughter, Latonya Bonds, and
after ordering her food, Young walked over to a table and sat on a chair placed at the table. Young
claimed that as she proceeded to pull the chair towards the table the chair gave way, causing her to fall to
the floor and incur serious injury to her person. After ordering her food, Latonya walked over to the table
where Young was seated and noticed that Young "looked dazed." A Wendy's manager walked over to
where they were seated and was informed by Catherine that "the chair was wobbly." After being so
informed by Young, the manager examined and inspected the chair. Young claims that, while the manager
was testing and observing the chair, Latonya, noticed that the chair appeared to be extremely wobbly and
unstable. Later, after examining the chair herself, Latonya claims that the chair's legs were loose and not
secure, and the chair would not remain firmly in place. However, a Wendy's employee, in an affidavit,
expressly asserts that not only was the chair in question not unsteady in any manner, but as a matter of fact,
remains in use in the restaurant. In Young's deposition, she stated that she was not even certain whether
she continued to sit in the chair after the fall or not.
ANALYSIS
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR WENDY'S
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND WENSTAR, INC.?
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¶3.
When reviewing a lower court's decision to grant or deny a summary judgment motion, it is proper
to employ a de novo standard of review. Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, 794 So. 2d 999, 1002 (¶7) (Miss.
2001) (citing Russell v. Orr, 700 So. 2d 619, 622 (Miss. 1997)).
¶4.
The rule in Mississippi is that summary judgments shall be entered by a trial judge "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a law
of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c).
¶5.
It is standard practice that "summary judgment, in whole or in part, should be granted with great
caution." Brown v Credit Center Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 363 (Miss. 1983). The moving party has the
burden of proving that no triable genuine issue of fact exists, and the non-moving party is given the benefit
of reasonable doubt. Tucker v. Hinds, 558 So. 2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). However, the non-moving
party cannot just remain silent and do nothing. Newell v. Hinton, 556 So. 2d 1037, 1041(Miss. 1990).
He must bring forward "significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact."
Id. at 1042.
¶6.
Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the party charged is the party actually responsible for the
wrong, with reasonable certainty or definiteness. Berry v. Bunt, 172 So. 2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1965). Also
noted by the Berry court was that "it is not enough that this shall be left to conjecture or to inferences so
loose that it cannot be dependently told where conjecture ceases and cogent inferences begins." Id. (citing
McCain v. Wade, 181 Miss. 664,180 So. 2d 748 (1938)).
¶7.
In Brown, the court explained that while considering the motion for summary judgment, "the trial
court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Brown, 444 So. 2d at 363.
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Upon this consideration, the motion should be granted if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, otherwise it should be denied. Id.
¶8.
In the case of Downs v. Choo, 656 So. 2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995), in order for a plaintiff to recover
in a claim of negligence in a premises liability action, he must (1) show the defendants' own negligence
created a dangerous condition which caused the plaintiff's injury; or, (2) show that defendants had actual
knowledge of a condition which they did not cause, but failed to warn plaintiff of the danger she faced as
an invitee; or, (3) show that, based upon the passage of time, defendants should have known of the
dangerous condition. Id. In Douglas v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 405 So. 2d 107, 111 (Miss.
1981), the court concluded that under Mississippi premises liability law, if the plaintiff can not show that
the condition, allegedly causing injury was due to the action or inaction of the premises owner or operator,
then actual or constructive knowledge must be shown in order to prevail at trial. To establish constructive
knowledge, proof must be shown that the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that the
defendants should have known about it. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916, 917 (Miss.
1966).
¶9.
In order for Young to prove some dangerous condition existed which led to her fall, evidence must
be given. However, Young has in no way met this burden. Neither has Young presented any evidence
that either Wendy's or Wenstar had notice that a dangerous condition existed on the premises.
¶10.
In order to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate in the present case, we
examined the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits to determine
whether Young made a sufficient showing to survive Wendy's motion for summary judgment. In the present
case, Young failed to sustain her burden of proof that a genuine issue of material fact existed by failing to
produce evidence of significant and probative value that the defendants were negligent. Young even
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admitted, in her deposition, that she knew of no facts supporting her claim that the chair was defective or
showing that Wendy's had notice of any alleged instability in the chair.
¶11.
In the present case, under the applicable summary judgment standards, the record clearly supports
a shift of the burden of proof, from the defendants to the plaintiff, to present any evidence she may have
to support her allegations of negligence against Wendy's and Wenstar. The plaintiff has failed to present
such evidence and has therefore failed to meet her burden of proof.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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