Doris J. Davis v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CC-00757-COA
DORIS J. DAVIS
APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
COMMISSION AND DELTA REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
4/2/2002
HON. BETTY W. SANDERS
WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT E. BUCK
ALBERT B. WHITE
JOHN WESLEY GARRETT
CIVIL - OTHER
CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED THE DECISION IN
FAVOR OF THE MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY COMMISSION AND DELTA
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
REVERSED AND REMANDED: 11/04/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Doris Davis was terminated from her job as patient service representative at Delta Regional
Medical Center. Her claim for unemployment benefits was denied on the grounds that Davis was
discharged for misconduct. Davis appealed this decision. The appeals referee, the board of review, and
the circuit court affirmed the denial of benefits. Finding the record lacked sufficient evidence to support
the Commission's findings, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
¶2.
Doris Davis was employed as a patient services representative at Delta Regional Medical Center
in Greenville. Her position and job responsibilities required her to register patients for admission to the
hospital. She interviewed patients and entered their personal and insurance information into the hospital’s
computer system. If the patient had previously received services at the hospital, Davis would access the
patient’s file and make any necessary changes. If they were a new patient, Davis would create a new
computer file for the patient.
¶3.
In November of 1999, the hospital implemented a new computer system. Davis testified that she
had some trouble learning the new system. Davis received two written warnings for mistakes she made
entering patients's information. In November of 2000, Davis entered a son's information under his father's
name. Davis was warned that she needed to be more careful. In March of 2001, Davis incorrectly entered
a patient's admission under her cousin's name. After this second incident, she was told that if she had any
more of the same occurrences, she would be terminated. Following the second incident, Davis asked her
supervisor to explain how she was making the errors. After Davis's supervisor demonstrated the proper
procedure to her, Davis made no more mistakes.
¶4.
Davis was terminated in April of 2001 after the hospital discovered that she had entered a patient's
information under the name of another patient, whose name was similar. The mistake was actually made
in February of 2001, prior to her second written warning. The hospital learned of the mistake when the
wrong patient received a statement from the hospital showing that her insurance had paid a claim for
services not rendered. The person billed had not been to the hospital since 1999. She notified the hospital
of the incorrect billing and threatened to report the hospital for insurance fraud. The hospital determined
that due to the severity of the error, Davis had to be terminated.
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¶5.
Davis filed a claim with the Mississippi Employment Security Commission for benefits. Her claim
was denied on the basis that she was terminated for misconduct. This decision was upheld by the
Commission's appeal's referee, the review board, and again by the circuit court. Aggrieved, Davis has
perfected her appeal asserting the circuit court erred in not reversing the board of review because its
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
“In any judicial proceedings under this section, the findings of the board of review as to the facts,
if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court
shall be confined to questions of law.” Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-531 (Rev. 2002). The Mississippi
Supreme Court explained this standard of review in Allen v. Mississippi Employment Security
Commission, 639 So. 2d 904, 906 (Miss. 1994):
This Court’s standard of review of an administrative agency’s findings and decisions is well
established. An agency’s conclusions must remain undisturbed unless the agency’s order
1) is not supported by substantial evidence, 2) is arbitrary or capricious, 3) is beyond the
scope or power granted to the agency, or 4) violates one’s constitutional rights. A
rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the administrative agency, and the challenging
party has the burden of proving otherwise. Lastly, this Court must not reweigh the facts
of the case or insert its judgment for that of the agency.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the circuit court erred in not reversing the board of review because its
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence.
¶7.
The applicable standard of review is a rigorous one and requires appellate courts to affirm the
decision of the circuit court where there is substantial evidence to support the finding of facts and where
the application of law to the facts is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Here, Davis argues that there is no
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evidence to support the Commission's findings that she engaged in misconduct in connection with her
employment. She claims that she only made "simple errors or mistakes" while entering data into the
computer files.
¶8.
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513A (1)(b) provides the following:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(b) For the week, or fraction thereof, which immediately follows the day on which he was
discharged for misconduct connected with his work, if so found by the commission, and
for each week thereafter until he has earned remuneration for personal services performed
for an employer, as in this chapter defined, equal to not less than eight (8) times his weekly
benefit amount, as determined in each case.
¶9.
In Wheeler v. Arriola, 408 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Miss. 1982), the Mississippi Supreme Court
defined the meaning of misconduct:
The term "misconduct," as used in the unemployment compensation statute, was conduct
evincing such willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interest as is found in
deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right
to expect from his employee. Also, carelessness and negligence of such degree, or
recurrence thereof, as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, and showing
an intentional or substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties
and obligations to his employer, came within the term. Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, or
inadvertences [sic] and ordinary negligence in isolated incidents, and good faith errors in
judgment or discretion were not considered "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.
The question we must now consider is whether Davis's actions rose to the level of misconduct defined in
the statute. We find that her mistakes did not.
¶10.
To support this conclusion, we examine two Mississippi cases. In Joseph v. Mississippi
Employment Security Commission, 771 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 2000), Phadalia Joseph was fired from her
job as a bank teller due to a shortage of $2000 in her cash drawer. Id. at 411 (¶1). The Commission
determined that Joseph should be denied unemployment benefits because she was terminated for
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misconduct. Id. at 411 (¶2). The facts showed that Joseph had been over or under on her drawer
balances by one hundred dollars or less on four or five other occasions. Id. at 412 (¶8). Testimony from
the bank indicated that Joseph was not fired because of repetitive mistakes, but only for the $2000
shortage. Id.
¶11.
Following the incident, Joseph was not accused of stealing the missing money, nor were the police
asked to investigate. Id. at 412 (¶9). The incident was considered to be an honest mistake by the bank.
Id. Furthermore, Joseph was not fired for dishonesty, but rather for negligent actions consistent with an
alleged bank policy. Id. The policy was that tellers would be automatically terminated following any
occurrence of a teller's balance being off by more than $1000. Id. The bank policy did not articulate that
this type of error would be considered misconduct. Id. In reversing the decision of the Commission, the
supreme court found this to be a good faith error that did not rise to this level of misconduct within the
meaning of the statute. Id. at 414 (¶13).
¶12.
Next, inAllen v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission., 639 So. 2d 904 (Miss. 1994),
Waverly Allen was terminated from his job at Vesuvius USA Corporation for poor job performance. Id.
at 905. The Commission found that Allen was terminated for misconduct and denied benefits and the
circuit court affirmed. Id. The facts showed that Allen operated a machine that ground the surface of a
particular part that Vesuvius manufactured. Id. Allen received one verbal reprimand and one written
reprimand for grinding parts undersize. Id. at 906. The later mistake cost the company $4,000, and Allen
was demoted to a lower level job. Id. Allen was again reprimanded in writing for sending parts to the
wrong station when he finished with them. Id. And finally, Allen was verbally reprimanded and terminated
for placing parts improperly on a rack, causing them to be scratched. Id.
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¶13.
The supreme court found that Allen's acts could not, as a matter of law, constitute misconduct
because the record lacked evidence of wrongful intent or evil design. Id. at 907. Further, the court
determined that no indication in the record showed that Allen's negligence would import a wanton disregard
of his employer's interests in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. The Court found that at worst, Allen's
acts of grinding parts undersize were isolated instances of ordinary negligence. Id. The court held:
As we have stated that "failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,
or inadvertences [sic] and ordinary negligence in isolated incidents . . . [are] not considered
'misconduct' within the meaning of the statute," Allen should not be denied unemployment
benefits. Arriola, 408 So. 2d at 1383. The determination by the Commission that Allen's
actions were misconduct, so as to deny him benefits, is not supported by substantial
evidence, and, thus, is erroneous.
Id. at 908.
¶14.
Applying the facts of Joseph and Allen to the case at bar, Davis's actions may not be classified as
misconduct under the statute. Like the claimants in Joseph and Allen, at worst Davis's acts were mistakes
or isolated instances of ordinary negligence. The record shows that the hospital had implemented a new
computer system. Davis testified that she had trouble learning the new program. She testified that she did
not understand how she was making the errors until it was explained to her after her second warning.
¶15.
The mistake Davis was discharged for actually occurred before her second warning. When this
incident occurred, Davis testified she was still having trouble with the new computer system. Davis was
also unaware that she could lose her job if she made any more mistakes. The record shows that after Davis
was warned that she would be terminated if she committed any more errors of this type, she made no more
mistakes. Her behavior is not that of an employee exhibiting a willful disregard for her employer's interest.
Rather, it is that of an employee consciously making an effort to improve her performance.
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¶16.
Indeed, following the standard of review stated in Allen, we find the record lacked sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that Davis’s actions constituted “carelessness and negligence of such
degree, or recurrence thereof, as to manifest culpability” or was a showing of a “substantial disregard of
the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to [her] employer.” Wheeler, 408 So.
2d at 1383. Accordingly, we find Davis is eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Therefore the lower
court's judgment is reversed and remanded to the Commission for a determination of benefits.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY IS
REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
COMMISSION FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
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