Frankie Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-KA-00750-COA
FRANKIE JONES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
5/9/2002
HON. MARCUS D. GORDON
LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
EDMUND J. PHILLIPS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CHARLES W. MARIS
KEN TURNER
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF AUTO BURGLARY.
SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF SIX
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
AFFIRMED - 11/18/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Frankie Jones was convicted of burglary of an automobile by a Leake County Circuit Court jury
and was sentenced to serve a term of six years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of corrections.
He has appealed his conviction and sentence alleging that the trial court erred in admitting his statements
and confessions. Finding no reversible error, this Court affirms his conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2.
Gerald Crimm thought he hit something while driving his pickup truck on Pilgrim Rest Road in
Leake County well after dark on the evening of April 1, 2001. When he pulled his vehicle to the side of
the road to check for damage, the truck became mired and he was forced to leave it until morning when
he could arrange to have it pulled free. Crimm testified at trial that when he left the scene the truck was
secured and had no visible damage.
¶3.
Crimm returned to the location at 8:00 a.m. the next morning to discover that the truck had been
towed by the sheriff's department. When he went to the lot where it was being stored he saw that a section
of the sliding rear window in the truck had been broken and his stereo equipment had been removed. Prior
to Crimm's return to the location the following day, Harvey Morgan, who lived on Pilgrim Rest Road near
the location of the truck, had telephoned the sheriff's department to report the burglary of the truck.
Morgan testified at trial that on the morning of the burglary he heard an unusual noise from outside and
when he looked out of his kitchen window he saw someone remove items, including a stereo speaker, from
the pickup truck and take them into a nearby wooded area. He said that the individual left the scene riding
a bicycle.
¶4.
After Morgan's call to the sheriff's department, Leake County Sheriff's Deputies Wesley Carson
and Willie Perry went to the scene to investigate. According to Deputy Carson, Deputy Perry arrived on
the scene first and spoke with Morgan and some of his neighbors. (Deputy Perry did not testify at trial as
he had passed away sometime prior to the trial.) Deputy Carson testified that by the time he arrived on
the scene Deputy Perry had learned that Morgan had witnessed the burglary and had seen the burglar
leave on a bicycle. Other witnesses had identified Jones as the only individual seen riding a bicycle that
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morning. Those same witnesses had indicated that Jones had gone in the direction of one of his relative's
residence on Pepper Ridge Road.
¶5.
Carson and Perry proceeded to the Pepper Ridge Road location where they saw Jones sitting in
a car in the backyard of the residence. As soon as Jones saw the deputies he ran away. After a brief foot
chase, Carson was able to apprehend him rather quickly. Following Jones's apprehension, the deputies
found an amplifier which had been taken from the burglarized vehicle in the car in which Jones had been
sitting when they arrived. The deputies read Jones the Miranda warning, after which, he confessed to the
crime and led the deputies to the remaining items that had been hidden in the wooded area near Morgan's
home. Later, Jones signed a written confession to the crime.
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
Did the trial court err in admitting Jones's oral and written confessions?
¶6.
Jones contends that Carson's apprehension of him after he ran away constituted an arrest without
probable cause and that any statements he made after his arrest were the "fruit" of the illegal arrest, even
if the statements are shown to be voluntary. He argues that such statements are inadmissible unless the taint
of the illegality has been removed by some occurrence intervening between the arrest and the statement.
He concludes that his first incriminating statement immediately followed his arrest; therefore, no intervening
occurrence was possible.
¶7.
The entire foundation of Jones's argument rests on the false premise that his arrest was without
probable cause. The deputies were in search of him because he had been seen in the area where a burglary
had just been committed using the same mode of transportation that the burglar had used to leave the scene.
¶8.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the test for probable cause is the totality of the
circumstances. Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1235 (Miss.1994). It has also defined probable cause
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as a "practical, nontechnical concept, based upon the conventional considerations of every day life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act. It arises when the facts and circumstances within
an officer's knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves
to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular
individual committed it." Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.1980) (quoting Strode v. State,
231 So.2d 779 (Miss.1970)) . Under the circumstances of this case, the information that the deputies had
received was sufficient in itself to justify a person of average caution to believe that a crime had been
committed and that Jones had committed it.
¶9.
Additionally, once Jones fled from the deputies, who already possessed reasonable suspicion, the
deputies then had probable cause. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968). The Supreme Court
held in Sibron that "deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are
strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the
suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an
arrest." Id.
¶10.
There was probable cause to arrest Jones. His statements were admissible. The issue has no
merit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEAKE COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY OF AN AUTOMOBILE AND SENTENCE OF SIX YEARS
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEAKE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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