Michael L. Griffin v. Jefferson C. McKenney
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-00353-COA
MICHAEL L. GRIFFIN AND ANGELA GRIFFIN
APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES
v.
JEFFERSON C. MCKENNEY, M.D.
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT
10/15/2001
HON. ROBERT H. WALKER
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT W. SMITH
J. D. LEE
HARRY R. ALLEN
MARGARET P. MCARTHUR
CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF JEFFERSON C.
MCKENNEY, M.D.
AFFIRMED - 10/14/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
In this medical malpractice action, Michael and Angela Griffin sued Dr. Jefferson C. McKenney
in the Circuit Court of Harrison County. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. McKenney and judgment was
entered accordingly. The Griffins appeal and argue that the trial court committed three evidentiary errors,
improperly granted three of the defendant’s jury instructions, made an erroneous statement of law to the
jury, and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Griffins contend that
the errors entitle them to a new trial. Dr. McKenney has cross-appealed, and argues that the trial court
erred when it found that his counsel impermissibly engaged in ex parte contact with two of Michael’s
treating physicians.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm. As we affirm the judgment for the appellee/Dr. McKenney it is
unnecessary to address the error cited by the appellee/Dr. McKenney on cross-appeal and, therefore, we
decline to do so.
FACTS
¶3.
The following facts are taken from the trial testimony. In the spring of 1999, Michael Griffin began
experiencing heartburn and nausea. His family doctor diagnosed him with gallstones, and opined that he
should see a surgeon to discuss the possibility of having his gallbladder removed. Michael consulted Dr.
McKenney, a general surgeon who had performed surgery on Michael to correct a bowel obstruction in
1992. Michael consented to have Dr. McKenney perform a laparoscopic cholysystectomy, a surgical
procedure for removing the gallbladder. The procedure involved several small abdominal incisions through
which tools were inserted along with a camera for viewing. Dr. McKenney performed the surgery in the
morning of April 1, 1999, at Biloxi Regional Medical Center. During the surgery, in addition to removing
Michael's gallbladder, Dr. McKenney lysed adhesions on Michael’s bowel and performed a small bowel
resection. Lyse is defined as “[t]o break up, to disintegrate, to affect lysis.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary
1011 (26th ed.1995). Dr. McKenney also placed two drains in Michael's abdomen.
¶4.
Post-operatively, blood appeared in Michael’s abdominal drains, and he had a fever. Hospital staff
was unable to contact Dr. McKenney until that night. Dr. McKenney transferred Michael to the intensive
care unit, where he remained for approximately two days. Michael was given two units of blood during
his stay in the intensive care unit.
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¶5.
Michael remained under Dr. McKenney’s care once he was returned to his hospital room.
Michael’s fever persisted. He had elevated white blood cell counts and he was medicated for pain over
the next several days. His bowel was not functioning. On April 5, a nurse changed a dressing on one of
the incisions and noted a small amount of green drainage on the old dressing. On April 6, Michael’s bowel
began functioning again. A nurse noted purulent drainage in one of the drains. On April 7, Michael had
three bowel movements. Nurses noted white and yellow drainage in the drains. On April 8, Michael was
complaining of pain and cramps. Dr. McKenney noted that Michael looked well. That afternoon, a nurse
removed one of the drains. She noted purulent drainage and a foul odor upon removal of the drain.
¶6.
On April 9, Dr. Adkins, a member of Dr. McKenney’s surgical group, was on call for Dr.
McKenney. Dr. Adkins examined Michael and determined that he had an “acute abdomen,” indicating a
bowel problem. A CT scan of Michael’s abdomen revealed an abscess. Dr. Adkins performed open
surgery on Michael that afternoon, and discovered a large amount of small bowel content that had spread
throughout the abdomen and was leaking from two perforations in Michael’s bowel. Michael’s abdominal
cavity was riddled with abscesses, and he had a large blood clot near the site of the gallbladder removal.
Dr. Adkins suctioned out the small bowel content, treated the abscesses, and performed a small bowel
resection in which he removed the perforated area and reconnected the bowel.
¶7.
After this surgery, Michael was placed on a respirator in the intensive care unit. Over the next
month, Dr. Adkins had to perform four surgeries to control the infection and abscesses that had been
caused by the bowel leakage. Michael developed pneumonia in his right lung. On April 26, elevated
enzyme levels indicated that Michael had developed pancreatitis, an inflammation of the pancreatic glands.
Michael was allowed to go home on April 28, but was readmitted to the hospital on May 2 for the fourth
surgery. He remained hospitalized for ten days. He continued to have trouble with pancreatitis and
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returned to Dr. Adkins for treatment several times over the next few months. He also experienced
shortness of breath and inflammation of the lining of the lungs from the pneumonia.
¶8.
Michael and Angela sued Dr. McKenney for malpractice. The Griffins alleged that Dr. McKenney
negligently perforated the bowel during the April 1 surgery, or that injuries he caused during that surgery
lead to the perforations. Additionally and alternatively, they argued that Dr. McKenney rendered negligent
post-operative care that exacerbated Michael’s injuries. They further argued that Dr. McKenney
performed bowel surgery without Michael’s informed consent. Angela asserted a claim for loss of
consortium.
¶9.
At trial, Michael testified about the pain and suffering he experienced after Dr. McKenney’s surgery
and during his course of recovery with Dr. Adkins. After Michael’s discharge from the hospital, his
recovery was slow and marked by fatigue that affected his activity level. He testified that he was still having
trouble with fatigue at the time of trial. He was left with permanent abdominal scars from the multiple
surgeries. He incurred $263,377.97 in medical bills and missed four months of work. Angela Griffin
testified that she missed work to be with Michael in the hospital and then to care for him at home. She
testified that the couple’s marital relations had deteriorated due to Michael’s fatigue.
¶10.
At trial, Carmen Nicholson, a nurse who held the camera during Michael's surgery, testified that
Dr. McKenney perforated Michael's bowel during the laparoscopic cholysystectomy. She stated that the
reason that Dr. McKenney performed the small bowel resection was to repair the perforated area. Dr.
McKenney's post-operative report did not state that he perforated the bowel, and he denied doing so. No
other operative personnel recalled that Dr. McKenney caused a perforation. Nurse Nicholson stated that
she witnessed Dr. McKenney repair the perforation by resecting the bowel.
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¶11.
The Griffins offered the expert testimony of Drs. Bagnato and Gordon. Those experts opined that
Dr. McKenney breached the standard of care of a minimally competent, reasonably prudent general
surgeon under the same or similar circumstances. Dr. Bagnato testified that a bowel perforation is one of
the risks of a laparoscopic cholysystectomy because the bowel is delicate and may be accidentally
perforated when the surgeon attempts to reach the gallbladder from the incision site. When a perforation
occurs, the surgeon must perform a bowel resection, a procedure in which the perforated area is removed
and the bowel reconnected. Dr. Bagnato opined that, based on his review of the medical records, Dr.
McKenney accidentally perforated or injured Michael’s bowel during the laparoscopic cholysystectomy
and failed to notice and repair the injuries or perforations prior to closing the abdomen.
¶12.
Dr. McKenney’s post-operative report indicated that Dr. McKenney lysed, or removed, bowel
adhesions in Michael’s lower abdomen. A bowel adhesion is a section of bowel that, due to scar tissue
or other cause, is adherent to other intestines or to the inside of the abdominal cavity. Dr. Bagnato testified
that lysing adhesions poses a risk of bowel perforation. Dr. Bagnato testified that, during a laparoscopic
cholysystectomy, a reasonably prudent general surgeon must occasionally lyse bowel adhesions in order
to reach the gallbladder, but should not lyse adhesions in the areas unnecessary to the gallbladder surgery
because of the risk of injuring the bowel. Dr. Bagnato testified that Dr. McKenney’s lysis of adhesions in
the lower abdomen, away from the operative field, was unnecessary to the gallbladder surgery and
breached the standard of care.
¶13.
Dr. McKenney’s post-operative report also indicated that he performed a small bowel resection
because he encountered an area of bowel that “would most prudently be resected” due to a partial small
bowel obstruction. Dr. Bagnato testified that a bowel obstruction cannot be diagnosed by simply examining
the bowel in the absence of clinical evidence that the bowel is not functioning and symptoms such as
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abdominal pain. He further testified that the pathology report on the section of bowel that Dr. McKenney
removed indicated that the bowel had not been obstructed. Therefore, Dr. Bagnato concluded, Dr.
McKenney’s decision to resect the bowel due to a bowel obstruction was a misdiagnosis that breached
the standard of care.
¶14.
Dr. Bagnato testified that the bowel could have been perforated during the April 1 surgery but not
have begun to seriously leak for several days. He testified that the perforations could have been very tiny
and become larger due to pressure caused when Michael’s bowel resumed functioning five days after the
surgery. He testified that another area of bowel or abdominal tissue could have sealed the perforations until
the resumed bowel function caused serious leakage. He stated that the fact that Michael had bowel
movements did not preclude the presence of perforations. Dr. Bagnato testified that Michael’s fever, white
blood cell count, and green drainage after the surgery indicated possible infection, should have alerted Dr.
McKenney to a possible bowel problem, and should have prompted him to order a CT scan. Dr. Bagnato
stated that a CT scan would have revealed any bowel perforations.
¶15.
Dr. Gordon opined that Dr. McKenney perforated or injured the bowel during the laparoscopic
cholysystectomy. He opined that, upon encountering dense bowel adhesions, Dr. McKenney should have
converted from laparoscopy to open surgery, which would have decreased the risk of undetected injury
to the bowel.
¶16.
Dr. Gordon opined that Michael’s post-operative bleeding came from bowel injuries. He opined
that Dr. McKenney breached the standard of care by dissecting adhesions with the laparoscope. He
testified that if Dr. McKenney had done a CT scan with contrast before April 9, he would have discovered
the perforations when the contrast leaked from the bowel. Dr. Gordon testified that the abscesses
discovered by Dr. Adkins on April 9 were old and well formed. He stated that it was impossible for
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pancreatitis to cause the abscesses to form. He stated that the pathology report on the perforated section
of bowel revealed dead tissue, acute inflammation and granular tissue, which were consistent with the
conclusion that perforations were eight days old. He stated that, because there is varying air within the
bowel, the fact that no air was present on the April 9 CT scan did not mean that there were no perforations
present at that time.
¶17.
Two experts for Dr. McKenney opined that he did not breach the standard of care. Dr. Avery
testified that a doctor does not breach the standard of care by lysing bowel adhesions during a laparoscopic
cholysystectomy if necessary to perform the surgery. He opined that Dr. McKenney's lysis of adhesions
was necessary to perform the surgery because the adhesions were in the operative field. Dr. Avery testified
that bowel injuries do not cause substantial bleeding, and that Michael's post-operative bleeding most
probably originated at the site of the gallbladder removal. He testified that a partial small bowel obstruction
could be diagnosed by examining the bowel laparoscopically.
¶18.
Dr. Avery further testified that the bowel could not have been perforated during the April 1 surgery
because Michael did not exhibit any symptoms of a bowel perforation. He testified that, if there was a
perforation on April 1, Michael immediately would have developed an acute abdomen, in other words, an
abdomen that is severely distended, hard, and extremely sensitive. He testified that Michael did not have
an acute abdomen until April 9, when he was operated upon by Dr. Adkins. Dr. Avery testified that
Michael's post-surgical symptoms were not of the sort that would have alerted a prudent physician to
conduct a CT scan to check for bowel perforations before April 9.
¶19.
Dr. Whigham averred that Dr. McKenney did not breach the standard of care. He stated that
Michael's post-operative bleeding most probably came from the site of the gallbladder removal. He stated
that Michael's post-operative condition was not symptomatic of a bowel perforation. He opined that
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Michael's bowel movements were a sign that he was recovering. He testified that the CT scan on April 9
would have shown free air in the abdomen if there had been a perforation. He testified that, because the
CT scan did not show a perforation, the perforations probably did not occur until sometime after the CT
scan. Dr. Whigham stated that the earliest the perforations could have occurred was on April 8. He stated
that, had the perforations existed on April 1 and gone untreated until April 9, Michael would have become
extremely ill and might have died.
¶20.
Dr. Whigham testified that the bowel perforations were most probably caused by Michael's
abdominal distension. He testified that the bowel may become distended to the point that the blood supply
is cut off to a section of bowel. He testified that when the blood supply is cut off, the bowel tissue dies and
perforations can occur. He stated that the pathology report on the perforated section of bowel showed
dead tissue and, therefore, supported this theory of causation. He admitted that this process is extremely
uncommon, but stated that it had been the cause of bowel perforations in two of his patients.
¶21.
Dr Whigham testified that Michael's abscesses were most probably caused by pancreatitis, which
causes abdominal inflammation and can be a recurrent condition. He testified that Michael had developed
pancreatitis after his 1992 bowel surgery. He stated that Michael's enzyme levels three weeks before the
April 1 surgery indicated to a degree of medical probability that Michael suffered from pancreatitis that
continued after the surgery and caused the abscesses to develop. Dr. Whigham stated that the
complications Michael suffered were inherent risks of the gallbladder surgery.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE OF DR. MCKENNEY'S USE AND ABUSE OF ALCOHOL RELEVANT,
PROBATIVE AND ADMISSIBLE?
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¶22.
The Griffin’s first three arguments attack the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence. On
appeal, we review a trial court’s admission or exclusion evidence for abuse of discretion. Terrain
Enterprises v. Mockbee, 654 So. 2d 1122, 1131 (Miss. 1995). In assessing the trial court’s exercise of
discretion, we first inquire whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard. Pierce v. Heritage
Properties, Inc., 688 So. 2d 1385, 1388 (Miss. 1997). If the lower court applied the correct legal
standard, we must affirm absent “a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error
of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors.” Id. We will affirm if the trial
court’s decision was one of several reasonable decisions that could have been made. Id. Further, if we
find that an abuse of discretion occurred, we may reverse only if the error affected a substantial right of a
party. M.R.E. 103.
¶23.
The Griffins’ first evidentiary argument is that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Dr.
McKenney’s alcohol use. During discovery, the Griffins amended their complaint to allege that Dr.
McKenney’s judgment and skills were affected by alcoholism during his care of Michael. Dr. McKenney
filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of his alcohol use.
¶24.
In their response to Dr. McKenney’s motion in limine, the Griffins itemized the evidence of Dr.
McKenney’s alcohol use. In his deposition, Michael asserted that he smelled alcohol on Dr. McKenney’s
breath at the pre-operative consultation. In her deposition, Angela testified that she smelled alcohol on Dr.
McKenney when she spoke with him outside Michael’s room on the night of the surgery.
¶25.
In his deposition, Dr. McKenney stated that he received inpatient treatment for alcohol addiction
in September 1999. He stated that before his alcoholism was treated, he would go long periods without
drinking in an effort to control the problem. He admitted to having been an untreated alcoholic during the
9
period of Michael’s treatment and care, but he asserted that he consumed no alcohol during that period.
Dr. McKenney stated he has never treated patients or performed surgery under the influence of alcohol.
¶26.
Dr. McKenney admitted that, in September 1999, he was prevented from performing surgery at
an Ocean Springs hospital when a nurse smelled alcohol on his breath and reported his condition to an
administrator. He admitted that he lost his medical privileges at Ocean Springs due to that incident. He
testified that Biloxi Regional Medical Center also suspended his medical privileges because of that incident.
An administrator at Ocean Springs averred in an affidavit that he had been told by a Biloxi Regional
administrator that Dr. McKenney's suspension from Biloxi Regional was due to a separate incident
involving alcohol.
¶27.
Dr. McKenney testified that the Ocean Springs incident led him to seek inpatient rehabilitative
treatment for alcohol addiction, and that his privileges at both hospitals were reinstated once he completed
the treatment. His explanation for the Griffins’ detection of alcohol on his breath was that they might have
smelled ketones. Dr. McKenney explained that ketones were chemicals produced by a low-carbohydrate
diet he was on at the time that cause the breath to smell like alcohol.
¶28.
The Griffins stated that their general surgery experts, Drs. Bagnato and Gordon, would testify that
Dr. McKenney’s alcoholism affected his professional skill and judgment in treating Michael. In his
deposition, Dr. Gordon testified that Dr. McKenney’s suspension and treatment for alcoholism in
September 1999, along with the other evidence, indicated it was probable that Dr. McKenney had a
serious problem with alcohol in April 1999. He stated that alcohol addiction does not develop overnight,
and that Dr. McKenney’s addiction probably built up over time until the Ocean Springs incident forced him
to seek treatment. Dr. Gordon thought that the fact that Dr. McKenney could not be reached until
nighttime on the day of the surgery raised a question of whether he was drinking after the surgery.
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¶29.
Dr. Bagnato stated that he “did not really focus” on whether any breach of the standard of care by
Dr. McKenney was caused by his alcohol addiction. Dr. Bagnato stated that a decision to lyse adhesions
outside the operative field during gallbladder surgery “might be impaired judgment.” The Griffins also cited
deposition testimony by the Dr. McKenney’s expert, Dr. Whigham, who stated that he did not think alcohol
and the practice of medicine were compatible. He also stated that he had no knowledge of Dr.
McKenney’s alcohol addiction.
¶30.
At a hearing prior to trial, the Griffins proffered the evidence of Dr. McKenney’s alcohol use. In
addition to the evidence related above, they proffered that two witnesses would testify that Dr. McKenney
was prevented from treating one witness at Ocean Springs Hospital when the witness’s husband smelled
alcohol on Dr. McKenney and intervened. This incident occurred subsequent to Dr. McKenney’s treatment
of Michael.
¶31.
In his motion in limine, Dr. McKenney presented corroborating evidence that he was not drinking
during Michael’s care. Carmen Nicholson testified that she did not smell alcohol on Dr. McKenney during
the surgery. She stated that if she had detected that Dr. McKenney was under the influence of a substance
she had a duty to report that fact to her superiors and would have done so. Another nurse, Mary Corley,
testified that Dr. McKenney did not appear impaired in any way during the surgery. Novaline Dodson, also
a nurse, testified that she had not detected alcohol on Dr. McKenney’s breath during the surgery. Willard
Gowdy, who administered Michael’s anesthesia, testified that he did not smell alcohol on Dr. McKenney
at the surgery. He testified that there was a reporting procedure that he would have followed had he
perceived that Dr. McKenney was impaired. These witnesses also testified that they had never observed
Dr. McKenney impaired at any time prior to the surgery.
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¶32.
At completion of discovery, the trial court granted Dr. McKenney’s motion in limine in part. The
court admitted all evidence that Dr. McKenney used alcohol when he consulted with, examined, or treated
Michael. The court excluded any evidence of Dr. McKenney’s alcohol use after his treatment of Michael
and which occurred in a different city and at a different hospital. The court’s reason for excluding the
evidence was that it was irrelevant to Dr. McKenney’s treatment of Michael, or, alternatively, that it was
more prejudicial than probative because it would invite the jury to speculate from Dr. McKenney’s
subsequent acts that he acted improperly in Michael’s case.
¶33.
The Griffins filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the evidence that Dr. McKenney admittedly
suffered from the disease of alcoholism during his care of Michael should have been admissible under the
court’s order because the alcohol addiction existed during the doctor’s care of Michael. In its order, the
trial court held that the fact of Dr. McKenney’s alcohol addiction during his care of Michael was not
relevant because there was insufficient proof that Dr. McKenney was actually drinking during that period.
The court alternatively held that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The result of the order
was that the only admissible evidence of Dr. McKenney’s alcohol use was Michael and Angela’s assertions
that they smelled alcohol on Dr. McKenney. The Griffins argue that the trial court’s exclusion of the other
evidence of Dr. McKenney’s alcohol addiction was erroneous because the evidence was relevant and
more probative than prejudicial.
¶34.
We begin by addressing the trial court’s relevancy determination. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401
provides, "'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." In the instant case, the Griffins argue that the fact that Dr. McKenney was
admittedly addicted to alcohol during Michael's treatment was a fact of consequence because it tended to
12
show that Dr. McKenney was impaired during the treatment and rendered negligent care. They also argue
that they should have been able to use the evidence for impeachment purposes.
¶35.
The trial court determined that the evidence of Dr. McKenney's alcoholism was irrelevant because
it found insufficient proof that Dr. McKenney was actually drinking during Michael's care. This evidence
was the deposition testimony of the operative staff who failed to detect any signs that Dr. McKenney was
impaired, and the testimony of Dr. McKenney himself that he was not drinking in April. The court
apparently decided that the evidence of the subsequent alcohol-related incidents did not tend to show that
Dr. McKenney was drinking during Michael's care.
¶36.
Our supreme court addressed the issue of admissibility of evidence of a doctor's substance abuse
to show a breach of the standard of care and for impeachment purposes in the malpractice case of
Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981). In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
physician negligently failed to diagnose a baby's post-delivery illness that resulted in the baby's death. Id.
at 1315. When the plaintiffs deposed Dr. Sheffield, they discovered that he had a prior history of drug
abuse. Id. Dr. Sheffield filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence of his drug problem. Id. After
a hearing, the court reserved its ruling on the issue but, at trial, it allowed the plaintiffs to thoroughly crossexamine Dr. Sheffield about his drug use. Id. at 1316. The testimony revealed that Dr. Sheffield had been
abusing prescription drugs for several years prior to treating the baby. Id. He had received treatment for
drug addiction, but later resumed abusing drugs. Id. Dr. Sheffield testified that he did not take drugs when
he was treating the baby, and that he had not taken drugs for a month and a half prior to treating the baby.
Id. There was testimony that another doctor complained to the state board about Dr. Sheffield's drug use,
but that the complaint was not based on his treatment of the baby. Id.
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¶37.
The supreme court held that the trial court's admission of testimony about Dr. Sheffield's drug
problem was error. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs had never amended their complaint to charge
that Dr. Sheffield was under the influence of drugs when he was treating the baby. Id. The court held that,
since the drug abuse issue had not been stated in the complaint, the defendant should not have had to
combat it at trial. Id.
¶38.
The court also based its holding on the fact that there was no direct evidence that Dr. Sheffield was
under the influence of drugs during his treatment of the baby. Id. The court stated that the evidence that
Dr. Sheffield was not using drugs during the baby's treatment was uncontradicted. Id. The court cited
Hundley v. St Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1958). Id. In that case, evidence was
properly admitted that the defendant doctor had been abusing narcotics before and after the treatment
period, and that his ability to operate was impaired. Id. at 1316-17. Distinguishing Hundley, the Sheffield
court stated, "[w]e think [Dr. Sheffield's] previous history of drug abuse problems is too remote and
disconnected with the negligence issue to be properly presented to the jury in this case, therefore, retrial
must be ordered." Id. at 1317. The court recognized that Dr. Sheffield properly could have been
impeached by any evidence that he was using drugs during the baby' s treatment or at the time he was
testifying, had such evidence existed. Id.
¶39.
While the Sheffield court stated that the plaintiff's case would have been in a better posture had
they amended their complaint, the court's focus on the admissibility of the drug abuse evidence centered
upon the tendency of the evidence to show that the defendant physician was actually impaired during his
treatment of the plaintiff's baby. The court used the same approach in the recent case of Watson v.
Chapman, 540 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). In Watson, the Watsons alleged that the defendant
doctor negligently delivered their baby prematurely, resulting in respiratory distress disorder. Id. at 486.
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They alleged in their complaint that Dr. Chapman's negligent care resulted from his substance abuse. Id.
¶40.
The evidence showed that Dr. Chapman had been treated for alcohol dependency before he
delivered the baby, and was readmitted for treatment less than one month after the baby's delivery. Id. at
487. Dr. Chapman admitted that he habitually drank on the weekends, and that he was drinking on the
weekend prior to his delivery of the baby, but maintained that he was not drinking during his care of the
baby. Id. He stated that his partners ousted him from the practice less than a month after the delivery
because they were unhappy with "recent events." Id. Mr. Watson testified that Dr. Chapman appeared
"enormously happy" during the delivery, and his sister-in-law, who worked with drug and alcohol addicts,
testified that Dr. Chapman "acted like he was on drugs" at the hospital one or two days after the delivery.
Id. at 488. Six witnesses who were in the operating room during the delivery testified on behalf of Dr.
Chapman that he did not appear impaired at that time. Id.
¶41.
The trial court found from the totality of the evidence that all the evidence of Dr. Chapman's alcohol
addiction was relevant. Id. at 489. In its order, the trial court noted that, not only was Dr. Chapman
treated for alcoholism, he admitted that he relapsed and drank the weekend before the delivery, and he was
readmitted for inpatient treatment twenty-seven days after the delivery. Id. The Court of Appeals of South
Carolina agreed, finding that the Watsons had presented sufficient evidence that Dr. Chapman was
impaired at the time of the delivery to create a jury question. Id. at 487-88. The court also agreed with
the trial court's holding that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Id.
¶42.
As in Watson, in the instant case there was evidence that the defendant doctor was an alcoholic
during the treatment period, and conflicting testimonial evidence of whether the doctor was actually drinking
during the treatment. Unlike in Sheffield, in this case there was contradictory evidence on the question
15
of whether or not the doctor was drinking during the plaintiff's treatment. We find that the evidence that
Dr. McKenney was admitted for inpatient alcohol treatment and of subsequent incidents involving his
attempted treatment of patients while under the influence of alcohol was certainly relevant. The evidence
tended to show that Dr. McKenney was drinking during his treatment of the plaintiff, and along with the
other evidence created a jury question. Therefore, the trial court's contrary finding was error.
¶43.
We now turn to the trial court's alternative holding that the evidence was more prejudicial than
probative under Rule 403. To exclude relevant evidence under the rule, the trial court must find that
potential prejudice to a party substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Miss. Power and
Light v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721, 732-33 (¶ 55) (Miss.1998). The trial court must conduct on the record
balancing of probative value and prejudice. Hageney v. Jackson Furniture of Danville, Inc., 746 So.2d
912, 920 (¶ 34) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). On appellate review of a lower court's application of Rule 403,
we do not "engage anew in the 403 balancing process." Our review is limited to determining "whether the
trial court abused its discretion in weighing the factors and admitting or excluding the evidence." Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So.2d 310, 314 (Miss.1992).
¶44.
In this case, the trial court found that, without more evidence that Dr. McKenney was drinking
during Michael's treatment, the evidence of his alcoholism, subsequent rehabilitation and attempts to treat
patients while under the influence of alcohol was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court found that
the evidence would mislead the jury by inviting it to speculate from Dr. McKenney’s subsequent acts that
he acted improperly in Michael’s treatment. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in so
finding, though we may have held otherwise had there been more evidence that Dr. McKenney was
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drinking during Michael's treatment.1 We recognize that the court did admit all of the direct evidence that
Dr. McKenney was drinking during Michael's treatment.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOW DR. MCKENNEY TO GIVE EXPERT
TESTIMONY?
¶45.
Dr. McKenney was designated as an expert witness pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 (b)(4). On April 16, 2001, McKenney's attorneys filed a notice of withdrawal of Dr.
McKenney's expert designation. At trial, Dr. McKenney testified as a lay witness, and the plaintiffs
objected to some of his testimony on the ground that it was expert testimony. On appeal, the Griffins argue
that Dr. McKenney's testimony was impermissible expert testimony by a lay witness.
¶46.
The reason for the different standards for lay and expert testimony is that expert testimony is subject
to special discovery rules to "allow the opposing party ample opportunity to challenge the witness'
qualifications to render such opinion before the question soliciting opinion is posed in front of the jury."
Sample v. State, 643 So. 2d 524, 530 (Miss. 1994). To give expert testimony, a witness must be
qualified and tendered as an expert. Roberson v. State, 569 So. 2d 691, 696 (Miss.1990). At the time
of trial, Rule 702 provided the following standard for admission of expert testimony. "If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."2 Rule 701 states the standard
for admission of lay opinions: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and
1
The Griffins posit a compelling argument that the fact of Dr. McKenney's contemporaneous
alcohol addiction, without more, was relevant because alcoholism is a disease that generally impacts
veracity and judgment; however, the argument lacks merit because it was unsupported by testimony of
a qualified expert on alcohol addiction. M.R.E. 702.
2
Rule 702 has been amended effective May 29, 2003.
17
(b) helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." It has been
stated that, "where, in order to express the opinion, the witness must possess some experience or expertise
beyond that of the average, randomly selected adult, it is a Rule 702 opinion and not a Rule 701 opinion.
Sample, 643 So. 2d at 529-30.
¶47.
The trial court held a bench conference after the plaintiffs objected to Dr. McKenney's testimony.
The record reveals some confusion between the parties and the court as to what constituted expert
testimony. The parties agreed that Dr. McKenney had been withdrawn as an expert witness and, therefore,
could properly render lay testimony only. Dr. McKenney's counsel understood the permissible range of
Dr. McKenney's testimony to include facts about his care and treatment of Michael, including the ability
to explain why he rendered certain treatment. Counsel for Dr. McKenney understood that Dr. McKenney
could not render opinions on the standard of care or whether his conduct met the standard of care. The
Griffins argued that explanation of why certain treatments were rendered was expert testimony. The trial
court agreed with the interpretation of Dr. McKenney's counsel, and limited his testimony accordingly. The
Griffins objected to the trial court's interpretation of Rule 702.
¶48.
On appeal, the Griffins contend that Dr. McKenney's testimony strayed into the area of expert
testimony numerous times. The Griffins' first complaint is that the trial court allowed Dr. McKenney to list
his educational background, training and experience as a general surgeon. Then, the Griffins cite seventeen
instances of testimony that they consider expert. For example, they complain that Dr. McKenney
described how the bowel goes to sleep for numerous reasons, described pancreatitis, elaborated on the
risks of laparoscopic surgery, used medical drawings to illustrate Michael's surgery, described instruments
used during the surgery, discussed reconnection of the bowel, described certain tests to detect blood in
urine, discussed medicine to enhance bowel activity after surgery, explained the meaning of nurses' notes,
18
and discussed the pros and cons of CT scans. The Griffins argue that they were prejudiced by this
testimony because they had already dismissed the expert witnesses who could have rebutted the testimony.
¶49.
Rule 702 states that expert testimony may be in the form of "opinion or otherwise." Therefore,
expert testimony can include facts that are "scientific, technical or specialized knowledge" that "will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." A review of Dr. McKenney's
testimony reveals that the testimony of which the Griffins complain was comprised of technical knowledge
outside the range of knowledge of an ordinary layperson. However, Dr. McKenney was testifying as a
treating physician who is also a party to the case. All the testimony of which the Griffins complain was part
of Dr. McKenney's description of the surgery and of his care of Michael and was limited to that context.
Dr. McKenney never offered an opinion on the standard of care.
¶50.
We review the precedent on the situation where a treating physician, also a party, testifies as a lay
witness. In Scafidel v. Crawford, 486 So. 2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1986), the court held that a treating
physician could testify as a lay witness about the facts and circumstances surrounding the care and
treatment of the patient. A treating physician may also describe what his records about the patient reveal.
Id. The court also allowed a treating physician to state opinions on what conditions the patient was
suffering from if the opinion was acquired during the care and treatment of the patient, and if no evidence
was presented to the jury of the significance of the condition. Id. This was because the lay jurors lacked
medical training to assess how a medical condition may have been significant to the case. Id. In Foster
v. Noel, 715 So. 2d 174, 183 (¶ 53) (Miss. 1998), the court followed Scafidel. In Foster, the court held
that a treating physician rendered improper expert testimony when he opined that the patient's condition
of depression was exacerbated by the defendant's alleged false arrest. Id. at (¶ 54). That testimony was
improper because it informed the jury of the significance of the condition to the case. Id. Also pertinent
19
is Langston v. Kidder, 670 So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 1995), where the court held that it was error for a party,
not designated as an expert witness, to testify to industry standards and whether the defendant met those
standards.
¶51.
The aforementioned precedent indicates that the testimony complained of by the Griffins was
permissible lay testimony by a treating physician who is a party to the case. The testimony was solely
explanatory of Dr. McKenney's treatment of Michael and of his records and nursing records about
Michael's care. However, some of Dr. McKenney's testimony on redirect examination is troublesome:
Q. All right. If there had been two perforations caused by you during your surgery of
April 1st and you closed without repairing those two perforations, what kind of hospital
course would you have expected to find during the time between April 1st and April 8th?
A. I would have expected to Mr. Griffin, first of all, very early to be putting out a lot of
succus entericus, that is, bowel content, as well as blood from his drains. I would have
expected an acute abdomen very early in the course.
Q. What is an acute abdomen?
A. An acute abdomen is an abdomen that is showing irritation of the peritoneal lining from
a number of things. And the signs that are seen with irritation of the peritoneal lining are
a rigid board-like abdomen, pain that cannot be - cannot be reduced with pain medication,
before you get the patient lower than stage two, stage three in anesthesia, that is, they can't
talk to you. As long as they're talking to you, their pain hasn't been reduced. Percussive
tenderness. That is tenderness anywhere and everywhere on the abdomen as you tap on
it. The patient can't possibly get up and walk around with an acute abdomen. In addition
to a number of things, other physical findings of tachycardia. And that's an acute abdomen.
The things that cause acute abdomen, things like gunshot wounds, perforation of an
abscess. Acute appendicitis does in a localized area, in the right lower quadrant. Those
are all things that are very evident, that are - that are obvious.
If Mr. Griffin had had two holes in his bowel that were left at the time I did the
operation, he would have very early on, in the first couple of days after surgery, have been
draining contents of his intestines out into the peritoneal cavity. He would have a complete
ileus. His bowel would stop moving. He would have an absolutely quiet abdomen that
was rigid, that had pain that could not be relieved. This wouldn't - this is not a subtle
finding. That is, everyone, anyone, certainly myself, would have been able to tell you that
he had an acute abdomen.
20
¶52.
Dr. McKenney went on to testify that Michael's white blood count would have been double what
is normal. He opined that, if bowel content had been draining into the abdomen, Michael most probably
could not have had bowel movements on April 7. He opined that Michael had no symptoms of developing
abscesses and stated what those symptoms would have been.
¶53.
Though Dr. McKenney never opined as to the standard of care, the above testimony was clearly
impermissible expert testimony under Scafidel and Foster. A major issue in this case was when and how
Michael's bowel was perforated. The trial court allowed Dr. McKenney, a lay witness, to opine as to the
symptoms Michael would have presented had the bowel been perforated during the April 1 surgery. Those
opinions were within the ambit of Rule 702. Other testimony revealed that Michael did not present the
symptoms described by Dr. McKenney and, therefore, Dr. McKenney's impermissible expert testimony
assisted the defense. The Griffins had preserved an objection to Dr. McKenney's testimony. The trial
court erred by allowing Dr. McKenney's testimony to stray into the realm of expert testimony.
¶54.
We have held that strict compliance to the requirements of expert discovery is necessary "to
prevent trials from being tainted with surprise and unfair advantage." Nonetheless, we find that the error
in this case does not warrant reversal. Dr. McKenney's expert testimony was largely cumulative of that
of his expert witnesses, Drs. Avery and Whigham. See Scafidel, 486 So. 2d at 372. As Dr. McKenney's
testimony presented no new information, we cannot envision how the Griffins would have altered their
approach to the trial had Dr. McKenney been properly designated as an expert. See Foster, 715 So. 2d
at (¶ 54). Dr. McKenney's testimony did not substantially prejudice the Griffins. Therefore, this issue is
not grounds for reversal. M.R.E. 103.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING A STATEMENT BY DR. ADKINS?
21
¶55.
Nurse Carmen Nicholson, in addition to assisting in Michael's April 1 surgery by Dr. McKenney,
assisted in the April 9 surgery when Dr. Adkins discovered Michael's bowel perforations and numerous
abscesses. In her deposition, Nurse Nicholson stated that when Dr. Adkins discovered bowel content
leaking into Michael's abdominal cavity Dr. Adkins exclaimed, "that stupid son-of-a-bitch!" in reference
to Dr. McKenney. Dr. McKenney filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Adkins' statement on the ground
that it was impermissible hearsay. The Griffins argued the statement was excepted from the hearsay rule
either as an excited utterance or as a present sense impression. The trial court granted the motion. The
Griffins contend the ruling was prejudicial error because "it would have been of considerable weight for the
jury to know that Dr. McKenney's own partner was critical of his handiwork."
¶56.
The record reveals that the trial court's exclusion of the statement was based on two alternative
grounds. Firstly, the court found that the statement constituted impermissible hearsay. Secondly, the court
found that admission of the statement would violate the court's order barring expert testimony from Dr.
Adkins because of a discovery violation committed by Dr. McKenney's counsel.
¶57.
We review a trial court's exclusion of evidence based on its ruling on a discovery violation for abuse
of discretion. During discovery, the Griffins moved for a protective order, alleging that counsel for Dr.
McKenney engaged in improper ex parte contact with Dr. Adkins, one of Michael's treating physicians.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion. The Griffins argued that, under the rule articulated in Scott v.
Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1004-05 (Miss. 1996), defense counsel should not communicate ex parte with the
plaintiff's treating physician because of the danger that the treating physician would inadvertently disclose
information protected by the patient-physician privilege, a privilege that can only be waived by the patient.
Counsel for Dr. McKenney confessed that further ex parte communication with Dr. Adkins would be
22
improper under Scott, and the court entered a protective order prohibiting ex parte communication with
Michael's treating physicians.3
¶58.
Later, the Griffins moved for enforcement of the protective order. The Griffins complained that,
prior to their deposition of Dr. Adkins, Dr. McKenney's counsel sent Dr. Adkins a letter with a copy of
Dr. McKenney's deposition and of Dr. McKenney's expert designation. The Griffins asserted that the
communication influenced the deposition testimony of Dr. Adkins, who was a member of Dr. McKenney's
surgical group and shared the same malpractice insurer. At a hearing on the matter, the trial court reserved
ruling due to the absence of counsel for Dr. McKenney, but barred defense counsel from communicating
ex parte with Michael's treating physicians pending resolution of the issue. A few days later, defense
counsel sent information to Dr. Martin, another of Michael's treating physicians.
¶59.
The court held that defense counsel had violated the protective order. The court therefore
prohibited the parties from eliciting the opinions of Dr. Adkins and Dr. Martin on whether or not Dr.
McKenney's conduct breached the standard of care. The court further held that, if the plaintiffs elicited
expert testimony from the doctors at trial, they would open the door to standard of care questions by
defense counsel.
¶60.
At trial, the Griffins proffered that Nurse Nicholson would testify that Dr. Adkins exclaimed "that
stupid son-of-a-bitch!" when he opened Michael's abdomen, and that the statement referred to Dr.
McKenney. The trial court stated that it considered the proffer "an attempt to basically back door expert
testimony," and noted that the Griffins had expressly refused to elicit expert testimony from Dr. Adkins
during his earlier testimony. On appeal, the Griffins admit that the "stupid son-of-a-bitch" statement
3
We express no opinion on the parties' reading of Scott, which in fact states that a defendant is
not prohibited from speaking ex parte with a plaintiff's physician without the plaintiff's consent, but that
information divulged by such communication is inadmissible. Scott, 704 So. 2d at 1006.
23
expressed Dr. Adkins' opinion on the quality of care rendered by Dr. McKenney. Thus, they admit that
the statement constituted Dr. Adkins' expert opinion. The trial court acted within its discretion in excluding
the statement based on its prior ruling excluding expert testimony by Dr. Adkins, and on the plaintiff's
declination to open the door to expert testimony by Dr. Adkins. As we find that the court acted well within
its discretion in excluding Dr. Adkins' statement on this ground, we do not address the hearsay question.
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING JURY INSTRUCTION D-4(A)(M)(2)
REGARDING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE?
¶61.
The Griffins aver that they are entitled to a new trial because of three erroneous jury instructions.
The first instruction challenged by the Griffins instruction stated that, before the Griffins could establish
medical negligence against the Dr. McKenney, they must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
that the Defendant McKenney committed medical negligence in the manner in which he
performed surgery upon Mr. Griffin or by deciding to perform lysis of abdominal adhesions
during the gall bladder surgery on Michael Griffin of April 1, 1999, to a greater extent than
was reasonably necessary within the standard of care, which proximately caused or
contributed to perforations in the Plaintiff's bowel, and that such medical negligence, if any,
proximately caused or contributed to disease or damage to the Plaintiff's bowel, requiring
surgery by Dr. Adkins on April 9, 1999 and subsequent medical treatment. If the Plaintiff
fails to establish either of the foregoing, then you are instructed as a matter of law that the
Plaintiff has not established liability against the Defendant based upon such allegations of
medical negligence.
The Griffins argue that the trial court erred by granting one of Dr. McKenney’s negligence instructions
because the instruction failed to state that the Griffins could establish negligence by proving that Dr.
McKenney negligently rendered post-operative care.
¶62.
On review of the trial court's grant or denial of jury instructions, we read the instructions actually
given as a whole to determine whether the jury has been incorrectly instructed. Haggerty v. Foster, 838
24
So. 2d 948, 953 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2002). If the instructions, read as a whole, fairly announce the law of the
case and create no injustice, there is no reversible error. Id.
¶63.
Examining the jury instructions given, we find that another instruction stated that if the jury found
by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. McKenney was negligent in regard to "failing to discover and
repair bowel perforations during the surgery and in failing to properly follow-up, diagnose and treat bowel
perforations and infection in the days following surgery," and that the negligence proximately caused
Michael's injuries, it could find for the Griffins. Viewing the instructions as a whole, the jury was properly
instructed that it could find for the Griffins on the ground that Dr. McKenney rendered negligent postoperative care. This issue is without merit.
V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING JURY INSTRUCTION D-5(A)(M) REGARDING
CAUSATION OF THE BOWEL PERFORATIONS AND ABSCESSES?
¶64.
Another jury instruction stated, in part, that if the jury found that the abscesses and perforations
discovered on April 9 were the result of a disease process and were not caused by medical negligence of
Dr. McKenney, then Dr. McKenney was not guilty of medical negligence in having caused the abscesses
and perforations. The Griffins argue that the instruction was error because there was no evidence that
Michael's perforations and abscesses were caused by a disease process. Dr. Whigham, testifying for Dr.
McKenney, stated that Michael's abscesses were most probably caused by "the disease of pancreatitis,"
and that his bowel perforations were caused by a process whereby the bowel "undergoes necrosis and
gangrene and perforation" when its blood supply is restricted. We find that the instruction was supported
by the evidence and was not erroneous.
VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING JURY INSTRUCTION D-13(M) REGARDING
INFORMED CONSENT?
25
¶65.
The Griffins next argue that Dr. McKenney’s informed consent instruction was an improper
statement of law. The Griffins also instructed the jury on informed consent. The Dr. McKenney’s
instruction stated:
The Court instructs the jury that the Plaintiffs have charged that the Defendant was
negligent in the lack of informed consent to the Plaintiff Michael Griffin for surgery. If you
find from the evidence that the Defendant McKenney, prior to surgery, in his discussions
with the Plaintiff and in the consent for surgery signed by the Plaintiff prior to surgery,
reasonably advised the plaintiff of the risks of bowel injury and the possibility of
unanticipated surgery which would have been material to a prudent patient in determining
whether or not to undergo the surgery identified in the "informed consent for surgery" form,
then in that event, the Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Defendant was negligent for
lack of informed consent of Plaintiff Griffin for surgery.
¶66.
The evidence of informed consent was that, on March 31, Michael signed an "informed consent
for surgery form" authorizing Dr. McKenney to perform a laparoscopic cholysystectomy. The form
acknowledged that the physician had advised the patient of the risks and complications of the procedure.
The form also authorized "the performance of such additional surgeries and procedures (whether or not
arising from presently unforeseen conditions) considered necessary or desirable in the judgment of my
doctor or those of the hospital's medical staff who serve me." Dr. McKenney testified that during a presurgical consultation with the Griffins he informed them that the surgery entailed a risk of injury to the
intestine, and that he would repair any intestinal injuries during the surgery. He further testified that his office
note from the date of the consultation stated that he informed Michael of the risks, alternatives and possible
complications of the surgery. Michael testified that he did not recall that Dr. McKenney mentioned any
risks of laparoscopic cholysystectomy during the consultation.
¶67.
The Griffins argue the informed consent instruction was erroneous because it allowed the jury to
consider whether Michael was advised of the risks of bowel injury through the "informed consent to
surgery" form. The Griffins contend that, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-41-7 (Rev. 2001),
26
the form's authorization clause for "the performance of such additional surgeries and procedures . . .
considered necessary or desirable" in fact authorizes only those procedures the physician considers
immediately necessary due to an emergency situation. The Griffins argue that the authorization clause did
not constitute consent to allow Dr. McKenney to lyse adhesions or perform the bowel resection because
no emergency situation arose during the surgery.
¶68.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-41-7 (Rev. 2001) provides:
In addition to any other instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law, a
consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures, suggested, recommended,
prescribed or directed by a duly licensed physician, will be implied where an emergency
exists if there has been no protest or refusal of consent by a person authorized and
empowered to consent or, if so, there has been a subsequent change in the condition of the
person affected that is material and morbid, and there is no one immediately available who
is authorized, empowered, willing and capacitated to consent. For the purposes hereof, an
emergency is defined as a situation wherein, in competent medical judgment, the proposed
surgical or medical treatment or procedures are immediately or imminently necessary and
any delay occasioned by an attempt to obtain a consent would reasonably jeopardize the
life, health or limb of the person affected, or would reasonably result in disfigurement or
impairment of faculties.
¶69.
The Griffins are incorrect that section 41-41-7 renders an informed consent clause ineffective
absent an emergency situation. The statute states that consent will be implied in emergency situations "in
addition to any other instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law." In Mississippi, consent
to a medical procedure may be implied when a patient is fully informed of the known risks that would be
material to a prudent patient in determining whether to undergo the proposed treatment. Herrington v.
Spell, 692 So. 2d 93, 98 (Miss. 1997). Thus, for consent, no emergency need exist as long as the patient
was informed that the procedure was a known risk of the proposed treatment. Dr. McKenney presented
expert testimony that injury to the bowel and the necessity of performing a bowel resection are known risks
of a laparoscopic cholysystectomy. Dr. McKenney testified that he informed Michael of these risks, and
27
Michael signed the informed consent form. The informed consent instruction did not misstate the law, and
it was supported by the evidence.
VII. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN INFORMING THE JURY THAT A PHYSICIAN IS NOT
LIABLE FOR A MERE ERROR OF JUDGMENT?
¶70.
During voir dire, the trial court informed the jury panel that this was a medical malpractice case and
noted several characteristics of a medical malpractice claim. Among the court's remarks was the statement,
"[a] competent physician is not automatically liable for a mere error of judgment, mistake in diagnosis, or
the occurrence of an undesirable result." It is undisputed that Mississippi no longer adheres to the "mere
error of judgment" standard and that the trial court misstated the law. See Day v. Morrison, 657 So. 2d
808 , 815 (Miss. 1995). In fact, the parties immediately brought the error to the court's attention and a
bench conference was held.
¶71.
After the bench conference, the trial court informed the panel that the court's remarks "were simply
general instructions for you" and that the "exact law, through jury instructions, will be given to you at the
conclusion of the case." The court stated that at the conclusion of trial the jury instructions would be read
aloud and that the jury would be allowed to take them into the jury room during deliberations. The court
then asked the panel if it understood and agreed to follow the instructions of law that would be given at the
conclusion of the case, and not the general instructions that the court had read. The transcript indicates that
the panel nodded in agreement.
¶72.
The Griffins argue that the trial court's mistake erroneously instructed the jury and that they are
entitled to a new trial. We find that this issue is without merit. In Day, the supreme court held that a jury
instruction articulating the "mere error of judgment" standard misstates the law and constitutes reversible
error. Id. at 815. Unlike in Day, in the instant case, the court communicated the erroneous standard as
28
part of voir dire remarks, not through a formal jury instruction. Further, moments after the mistake was
made, the court specifically instructed the jury to disregard all of its voir dire comments on the law and to
rely solely on the formal jury instructions. The jury indicated that it understood. Most importantly, the
formal jury instructions, taken as a whole, properly stated the law of this case. "An instructional error will
not warrant reversal if the jury was fairly and fully instructed by other instructions." Coleman v. State, 804
So. 2d 1032, 1038 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2002) (quoting Collins v. State, 594 So. 2d 29, 35 (Miss. 1992)). The
trial court's error does not demand reversal.
VIII. WAS THE VERDICT AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?
¶73.
The Griffins filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Griffins assert that there was a
failure of evidence supporting the defense theories of causation. They argue that they are entitled to a new
trial.
¶74.
The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion.
Green v. Grant, 641 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Miss. 1994). On appeal, we may reverse only when the trial
court has abused its discretion. Id. In evaluating the trial court's decision, we review the credible evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and generally take the credible evidence supporting the
claims or defenses of the non-moving party as true. Id. When the evidence is so viewed, we will reverse
only when, upon review of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that the verdict,
if allowed to stand, would work a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1207-08.
¶75.
We note that, in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the
defendant physician breached the standard of care. In McCaffrey v. Puckett, 784 So. 2d 197, 206 (¶
33) (Miss. 2001), the court stated, "[t]o prove a prima facie case of medical malpractice, the plaintiff (1)
29
after establishing the doctor-patient relationship and its attendant duty, is generally required to present
expert testimony (2) identifying and articulating the requisite standard of care and (3) establishing that the
defendant physician failed to conform to the standard of care. In addition, (4) the plaintiff must prove the
physician's noncompliance with the standard of care caused the plaintiff's injury, as well as proving (5) the
extent of the plaintiff's damages."
¶76.
The Griffins argue that the evidence and expert testimony was such that the jury could only find that
Dr. McKenney caused Michael's bowel injuries because he breached the standard of care. We disagree.
The Griffins' general surgery experts testified to a reasonable degree of medical probability that on April
1, Dr. McKenney perforated or injured the bowel such that perforations developed. They testified that,
while a physician does not breach the standard of care by accidentally perforating the bowel during
gallbladder surgery, a physician does breach the standard by lysing adhesions outside the operative field,
thus creating an unnecessary risk of perforation, or by failing to notice and repair any perforations caused
prior to closing the surgery. They also testified that Michael's post-surgical symptoms would have alerted
a reasonably prudent, minimally competent physician to the probability of bowel perforations.
¶77.
Dr. McKenney's general surgery experts testified to a reasonable degree of medical probability that
the perforations could not have occurred before April 8 or 9. The experts testified that Dr. McKenney
lysed only those bowel adhesions that were in the operative field and necessary to perform the gallbladder
surgery. Dr. Avery stated that Michael would have exhibited an acute abdomen before April 9 had the
perforations been caused on April 1. Dr. Gordon testified that Michael would have been dangerously ill
or dead by April 9 had the perforations been caused on April 1. Dr. Whigham testified that it was
medically probable that the perforations were caused when, due to intestinal distension, the blood supply
to the bowel was cut off and the bowel tissue died. Dr. Whigham further testified that Michael had
30
pancreatitis during the post-operative period that probably caused the abdominal abscesses that were wellformed by April 9.
Both experts opined that Michael's post-surgical symptoms were largely
inconsequential and would not have led a reasonably prudent, minimally competent physician to suspect
bowel perforations.
¶78.
It is the province of the jury to weigh the evidence. Dr. McKenney's experts testified that Dr.
McKenney did not breach the standard of care, and offered theories based on a reasonable degree of
medical probability as to how Michael's injuries developed. We find that the evidence was such that the
jury could reasonably find that the Griffins failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr.
McKenney damaged Michael's bowel. This issue is without merit.
¶79. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES AS TO THE DIRECT APPEAL. THE ISSUES ON
CROSS-APPEAL ARE RENDERED MOOT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
31
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