Anthony G. Sassar v. City of Richland, Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-KM-01641-COA
ANTHONY G. SASSER
APPELLANT
v.
CITY OF RICHLAND, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
9/9/2002
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM P. FEATHERSTON
JAY MAX KILPATRICK
PAUL B. HENDERSON
RICHARD MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, FIRST
OFFENSE: SENTENCED TO FORTY-EIGHT
HOURS IN RANKIN COUNTY JAIL,
SUSPENDED/MASEP/VIRS, FINED $749.50
PLUS COURT COSTS OF $177.50
AFFIRMED - 07/15/03
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
MCMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Anthony Sasser was found guilty in Richland City Court of driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, first offense. He appealed to the County Court of Rankin County and was found guilty in a de novo
bench trial. Sasser then perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court of Rankin County. That court affirmed
the conviction. Thereafter, Sasser obtained permission to further appeal his conviction to this Court under
authority of Section 11-51-81 of the Mississippi Code, contending that the appeal necessarily raised a
constitutional issue; namely, that the roadblock set up by the City of Richland Police Department which
resulted in his arrest constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Constitution of the State of
Mississippi. Sasser also seeks to raise two additional issues that do not give rise to constitutional issues.
We are unconvinced that the roadblock in question was conducted in violation of Sasser’s rights arising
under the applicable provisions of this state’s constitution and decline to reverse his conviction on that basis.
We also find that the remaining issues are not properly before us. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
Sasser’s conviction and judgment of sentence.
I.
Facts
¶2.
At approximately midnight on June 18, 2000, Sasser passed through a fixed safety checkpoint that
had been set up by the City of Richland Police Department. The officer charged with checking the validity
of Sasser’s operator’s license became concerned that Sasser may have been drinking alcoholic beverages.
Ultimately, Sasser was given an intoxilyzer test that indicated his blood alcohol content exceeded the
amount allowed by the statute on impaired drivers. As a result, he was charged with driving under the
influence. The proceedings outlined in the initial paragraph ensued, resulting in the matter now coming
before this Court.
II.
The Roadblock
¶3.
In his first issue, Sasser contends that the checkpoint set up by the City of Richland Police
Department was conducted in violation of protections afforded him under Article 3, Section 23 of the
Constitution of the State of Mississippi, which provides as follows:
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The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from
unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.
¶4.
At the trial in county court, the only time Sasser sought to deal with the matter of the roadblock was
at the close of the evidence when he sought to have the charge dismissed as follows:
I also want to move for basically a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the initial stop
was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .
¶5.
This Court, relying on the case of Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990),
has previously held that roadblocks of this nature do not violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Briggs v. State, 741 So. 2d 986, 989-90 (¶¶ 8-10) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). That
case, as we observed in Briggs, dealt with the distinction between fixed roadblocks where all motorists are
subjected to a brief stop and roving roadblocks that are nothing more than random incidents of pulling over
individual motorists. Briggs, 741 So. 2d at 989 (¶ 8). Although defense counsel, in cross-examining the
arresting officer, was able to elicit an affirmative response to his inquiry as to whether the roadblock in
question was, in essence, a “roving roadblock,” it is not clear that the officer was versed in the distinctions
made by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz and we do not conclude that the State is bound by that
purported “admission.” Rather, the facts of the roadblock were established by proof showing it to be at
a fixed location involving at least four law enforcement vehicles, all of which had their blue lights activated,
and at which all vehicles approaching from both directions were subjected to at least a brief stop. In terms
of searching for a Fourth Amendment violation in these circumstances, we are unable to distinguish this case
from Briggs.
¶6.
This requires the Court to confront Sasser’s assertion on appeal that the stop violated heightened
protections afforded him under the above-quoted section of the Mississippi Constitution. There can be no
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doubt that this issue as framed in Sasser’s appeal is different from that presented to the trial court in
Sasser’s motion for judgment of acquittal. It is a well-accepted principle in this state that an appellate
court’s function is to consider claims of error committed at the trial level and that matters not presented to
the trial court for ruling may not normally be raised for the first time on appeal. Robinson v. State, 758
So. 2d 480, 490 (¶ 45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). For that reason, we find the issue as framed to be
procedurally barred.
¶7.
Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we observe that Sasser cites the Court to no authority
indicating that the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the relevant language of the Mississippi
Constitution affords a higher level of insulation from searches and seizures than those afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, he cites to decisions in two other states–Michigan and Indiana–that have found their
state constitutions to guarantee more expansive protection to the motoring public than that extended under
the Fourth Amendment. State of Indiana v. Gerschoffer, 738 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. 2000); Sitz v. Dept.
of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993). In view of the striking similarities between the Fourth
Amendment and Article 3, Section 23, of the Mississippi Constitution and the lack of a history of
differentiation between the two by the Mississippi Supreme Court, we do not find a tenable basis to accept
Sasser’s contention, even were we inclined to overlook the procedural bar. We note that, in a somewhat
similar situation involving the privilege against self-incrimination, the supreme court said:
[W]e believe it wise to begin with the presumption that similar sections of the United States
Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution ought to be construed similarly. As a general
rule, the imposition of two different standards would introduce unnecessary confusion
among lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officers throughout the state.
McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897, 900 (Miss. 1977). We see no reason in this case to disregard the
presumption described in McCrory.
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¶8.
Sasser sought to raise two additional issues in this appeal. The issues relate to alleged errors in the
trial court’s rulings on evidentiary matters and do not invoke constitutional considerations. This Court,
deriving its jurisdiction to consider Sasser’s appeal from Section 11-51-81 of the Mississippi Code, is
limited to issues that involve constitutional questions. Goforth v. City of Ridgeland, 603 So. 2d 323, 326
(Miss. 1992); Davis v. City of Biloxi, 797 So. 2d 1036, 1036-37 (¶ 4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). We are,
therefore, procedurally barred from reaching the merits of these two issues.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, FIRST OFFENSE, AND
SENTENCE OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS IN THE RANKIN COUNTY JAIL, SUSPENDED,
AND FINE OF $749.50, IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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