Charles Glen Pickett v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CA-01407-COA
CHARLES GLEN PICKETT
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
5/18/2001
HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON, JR.
FRANKLIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOSEPH A. FERNALD
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
RONNIE LEE HARPER
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION DENIED
AFFIRMED - 07/15/03
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND IRVING, JJ.
MCMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Charles Glen Pickett has appealed from an order of the Franklin County Circuit Court denying his
motion for post-conviction relief. Pickett sought to have has guilty plea entered to one count of murder set
aside on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
I.
Background
¶2.
Pickett pled guilty in April 1999 to murder in the shooting death of David Keith Chisholm. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment and two other charges of robbery and a drug-related crime were dismissed.
On November 12, 1999, Pickett moved to set aside his plea of guilty, claiming he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, that he did not knowingly and willingly enter a plea of guilty, and that there was a lack
of factual basis to support his guilty plea. Though not styled as a post-conviction relief motion, the trial
court determined that such a proceeding was the only manner by which Pickett could raise those issues and
the court proceeded to resolve the assertions of the pleading on that basis.
¶3.
The court, in furtherance of its duty to examine the motion and related supporting information as
required by Section 99-39-11(1) of the Mississippi Code, permitted Pickett to present witnesses at a
preliminary inquiry. The court concluded that a summary dismissal of the motion was not warranted and,
therefore, ordered the State to file an answer to the motion under Section 99-39-11(3). The State filed
an answer that included the supporting affidavits of the Franklin County Sheriff and Leonard Rosenthal,
Pickett's defense attorney during his plea hearing and sentencing.
¶4.
The court reviewed all evidence before it and concluded that a hearing was not necessary. The
court concluded that "[Pickett] did kill and murder the victim, gave numerous false and conflicting accidental
versions of the killing and finally confessed to the murder and voluntarily and intelligently entered a plea of
guilty, with the assistance of counsel." The court went on to find no merit in the various complaints raised
by Pickett to the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea.
¶5.
Pickett has now appealed from that order, alleging: (1) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel; (2) that his plea of guilty was involuntarily given, and (3) there was a lack of factual basis to
support his plea of guilty.
II.
Facts
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¶6.
On March 12, 1999, Thomas Chisholm, brother of the victim, reported to the Franklin County
Sheriff that his brother had been missing for several days. The ensuing investigation revealed that Pickett
had telephoned the victim shortly before he disappeared. As a result, Pickett was sought for questioning
and was located on March 19. Pickett told Sheriff Newman that he had received threats against his person
and that, as a result, he was in despair to the point he was considering suicide. Investigating officers
discovered a suicide note in Pickett’s truck. Pickett consented to going with the officers to the county jail
to be further interviewed. Before he was questioned, he was informed of his Miranda rights. He signed
a waiver of those rights and answered questions that centered primarily on the alleged threats on his life.
The next day, Pickett signed a written statement indicating that he agreed to remain in protective custody
at the Franklin County Jail "[d]ue to the investigation of the disappearance of Keith Chisholm and threat
on my life."
¶7.
Over the next few days, investigating officers questioned Pickett concerning his knowledge of Keith
Chisholm's disappearance.
Pickett's statements concerning the disappearance grew increasingly
contradictory until, on March 23, Pickett submitted a written statement along with a signed waiver of his
Miranda rights in which he claimed that he had accidentally shot Chisholm in the back of his head while
aiming at a deer. Pickett said in his statement that, at that point, he "got scared and hid the body."
¶8.
Pickett led officers to the body where it was hidden in a wooded area. The body had been
burned. Chisholm’s wallet was not found on his person and Pickett claimed that he had taken it and a pistol
possessed by Chisholm and thrown them into a creek; however, a thorough search did not lead to a
discovery of these items.
¶9.
Pickett later changed his story to say that he had accidentally shot Chisholm when he had pointed
the gun at Chisholm and pulled the trigger, thinking that the gun was not cocked and ready to fire.
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¶10.
Based on the evidence gathered and Pickett’s statements, law enforcement officers obtained a
warrant for Pickett's arrest. On March 30, Pickett was appointed an attorney. On April 6, Pickett was
indicted for murder, armed robbery and conspiracy to transfer a controlled substance. Pickett entered his
guilty plea to murder that same day.
III.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶11.
Pickett contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He relies on three alleged
deficiencies to support this claim. First, Pickett argues that his counsel failed to expend adequate time in
investigating the strength of the State’s case before allowing Pickett to enter a guilty plea. He points to the
fact that his attorney's bill claimed a total of only thirteen and one-half hours of work. Secondly, Pickett
states that his attorney failed to interview potential witnesses, failed to investigate the crime scene, failed
to review the victim's autopsy report and failed to demand psychological testing for Pickett. Finally, Pickett
argues that his counsel failed to discuss any defense strategies or to explore other options available to
Pickett to resolve the charges.
¶12.
All of these claims raise essentially the same issue, which is that counsel was ineffective in aiding
Pickett in his defense by not insisting that Pickett delay the entry of his guilty plea until after the strength of
the State’s case could be tested in various ways.
¶13.
The standard by which this Court reviews a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel was set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The
Strickland standard requires that the defendant show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that he was denied a fair trial. Id. at 687. The
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defendant must overcome the strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the "broad
range of reasonable professional assistance." McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990).
¶14.
A claim based on nothing more than an assertion that the attorney spent insufficient time on the case
is insufficient to show an entitlement to relief. Harveston v. State, 597 So. 2d 641, 642 (Miss.1992). The
defendant must also prove that, but for this alleged deficiency, he would not have entered a plea of guilty.
Id. Pickett makes a number of broad complaints concerning counsel’s failure to visit the crime scene or
interview witnesses, but he makes no contention as to what such efforts could reasonably have been
expected to produce in terms of evidence or information helpful to Pickett’s defense. He suggests that
there was some duty on defense counsel’s part to seek to suppress Pickett’s confession, but points out no
basis for the proposition that such an effort had a reasonable expectation of success. Pickett faults his
attorney for not seeking psychological testing, but does not inform the Court as to what benefit might have
been gained other than asserting that his attorney had a duty to ensure that he was emotionally stable at the
time. He also points to counsel’s failure to obtain a copy of the autopsy report but fails to articulate how
he was prejudiced by that failure.
¶15.
During Pickett’s plea hearing, the judge went to some length to ensure that Pickett was making an
informed and intelligent decision to enter his plea of guilty. In the order denying Pickett’s post-conviction
relief motion, the trial court concluded that the relatively short time between the commission of the crime
and Pickett’s guilty plea arose, not out of defense counsel’s failure to properly perform his duties, but upon
Pickett’s own sense of remorse and desire to spare his family any further difficulty by admitting his
complicity in the victim’s death and thereby bring the matter to an end. In that situation, we do not find
defense counsel's failure to insist on further delay to be the sort of deficient performance that would warrant
relief.
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¶16.
Pickett also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to
discuss any defense strategies or explore other options to resolve the criminal charges favorably to the
defendant. Specifically, Pickett contends that his counsel devoted his entire time to discussing possible plea
bargains rather than potential defense strategies. One such strategy appears to be Pickett’s suggestion that
he might have gone to trial in hopes that he could be convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter. Again,
as to this assertion and any others advanced in his brief, Pickett fails to show the basis for the conclusion
that any such alternate courses of action had a reasonable chance of producing a result more favorable to
him. In the absence of such a showing, we find that Pickett’s assertions in this regard fail the second prong
of the Strickland test. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.
¶17.
In his last issue, Pickett contends that there was an insufficient factual basis to support his plea of
guilty. The record indicates that, prior to the proceedings to accept his guilty plea, Pickett had made a
statement to law enforcement officers of his involvement in Chisholm’s death under circumstances that
would support a charge of murder. Pickett makes no contention in his post-conviction relief motion that
those admissions were untrue or for any other reason would not be admissible in any subsequent
proceeding to determine his complicity in the death. The trial court specifically found that there was a
factual basis for Pickett’s plea and, under these circumstances, we hold that finding is supported by the
record. Based on evidence in the record, we determine that there was sufficient foundation for the circuit
court to conclude that Pickett's conduct was within "the ambit of that defined as criminal." See Lott v.
State, 597 So. 2d 627, 628 (Miss. 1992). Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
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KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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