Aberdeen Municipal School District v. Sam Blaylock
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-01402-COA
ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
APPELLANT
v.
SAM BLAYLOCK
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
7/23/2002
HON. CHARLES D. THOMAS
MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
JOHN KRISTOPHER WHITE
TACEY CLARK CLAYTON
H. J. DAVIDSON, JR.
CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
CHANCELLOR REVERSED SCHOOL BOARD
DECISION TO TERMINATE APPELLEE AND
REINSTATED HIM WITH FULL PAY AND
BENEFITS.
REVERSED AND RENDERED - 07/29/2003
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
In August 2001, the appellee, Sam Blaylock, was suspended from his teaching position with the
Aberdeen Municipal School District (school district). Blaylock also served as an assistant football coach,
and his suspension was the result of the school district's investigation into grade tampering for two football
players.
¶2.
At the next school board meeting, the board voted to terminate Blaylock, and Blaylock thereafter
requested a hearing. The hearing was held in October 2001 at which time Blaylock and other witnesses
testified in his behalf and for the school district. The hearing officer concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support the board's decision, and the board thereafter declined to reverse its previous decision
to terminate Blaylock. Blaylock thereafter appealed to the Monroe County Chancery Court which
reversed the board's decision and ordered Blaylock's reinstatement with full pay and benefits. The school
district now appeals the chancellor's decision arguing that the chancellor erred in finding Blaylock's due
process rights were violated, that any procedural defects in the termination proceedings of Blaylock were
harmless error, and that the chancellor erred by reinstating Blaylock to his previous position with the school
district. As explained herein, we reverse and render.
FACTS
¶3.
Sam Blaylock was an assistant football coach and teacher with the Aberdeen Municipal School
District. Lee Doty was the head football coach. In August 2001, superintendent Dr. Lavon Fluker-Reed
learned of an alleged grade changing incident involving Blaylock and Doty and two academically ineligible
football players. Fluker-Reed instructed the school principal to investigate further, and after doing so the
principal reported back to Fluker-Reed that the allegations were true. Both Blaylock and Doty were
suspended, and Fluker-Reed notified both coaches that at the next school board meeting she would be
recommending their termination.
¶4.
At the school board meeting, the board met in executive session. Before doing so, however,
Blaylock admitted to the board that he had changed one student's grade from failing to passing, but he had
not changed the other student's grade, as alleged. Three days later, the board convened again and voted
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to terminate Blaylock, but not Doty. Blaylock requested and was afforded a hearing, pursuant to the
Mississippi School Employment Procedures Act.
¶5.
Dolton McAlpin presided over the hearing which took place on three occasions in September and
October of 2001. Several witnesses testified for both parties, including Blaylock himself, who admitted
to changing one student's grade. In November 2001, McAlpin reported to the school board his finding that
the school administration had sustained its burden to prove by substantial evidence that Blaylock was guilty
of changing one student's grade from failing to passing for the sole purpose of making him eligible to play
football. In December 2001, the school board voted not to reverse its previous decision and upheld
Blaylock's termination.
¶6.
Blaylock appealed to the Monroe County Chancery Court, and in July 2002, the chancellor found
the board failed to comply with statute to afford Blaylock due process. The chancellor ordered Blaylock's
reinstatement with full pay and benefits.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶7.
This case involves the termination of a school employee and subsequent review procedures.
Initially, we note that Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111 (Rev. 2001), governs the process by which a
terminated employee may seek review of the proceedings. Upon request from an employee, the school
board may notify the employee of a hearing which will be set not sooner than five days nor later than thirty
days from the date of the request, unless otherwise agreed. Id. The hearing shall take place before the
board or before a hearing officer appointed for such purpose by the board. Id. Both the district and the
employee shall present evidence either in written form or through witnesses at the hearing. Id. The board
or hearing officer will review the evidence presented and conclude whether the proposed nonreemployment
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is a proper employment decision based upon a valid educational reason or noncompliance with school
district personnel policies. Id. The employee shall be notified in writing of the decision. Id.
¶8.
Upon compliance with Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111, an aggrieved employee may seek review by
the chancery court.
(3) The scope of review of the chancery court in such cases shall be limited to a review of
the record made before the school board . . . to determine if the action of the school board
is unlawful for the reason that it was:
(a) Not supported by any substantial evidence;
(b) Arbitrary or capricious; or
(c) In violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee.
(4) No relief shall be granted based upon a court's finding of harmless error by the board
in complying with the procedural requirements of sections 37-9-101 to 37-9-113.
However, in the event that there is a finding of prejudicial error in the proceedings, the
cause shall be remanded for a rehearing consistent with the findings of the court.
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-113 (Rev. 2001). After review by the chancery court, the aggrieved employee
may appeal to the supreme court, at which time our standard of review is the same as with the chancery
court review. Harris v. Canton Pub. School Bd. of Educ., 655 So. 2d 898, 901 (Miss. 1995).
I. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN FINDING THAT THE ABERDEEN
MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT VIOLATED THE PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF SAM BLAYLOCK?
¶9.
The school district argues that the chancellor erred in finding Blaylock was denied procedural due
process. The school district relies on Spradlin v. Board of Trustees of Pascagoula Municipal Separate
School District, 515 So. 2d 893 (Miss. 1987), for authority.
¶10.
In Spradlin, the employee, Spradlin, violated school policy in purchasing encyclopedias without
prior approval from his superiors or from the school board. Spradlin, 515 So. 2d at 895. The
superintendent issued a private written reprimand to Spradlin, warning that if he ever again failed to follow
procedure he would be terminated. Id. at 896. At the next board meeting, the superintendent told the
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board of Spradlin's deceptive actions, and then the superintendent resigned. Id. The board subsequently
began its own investigation into Spradlin's actions and notified Spradlin of his right to a public hearing. Id.
at 896-97. After the hearing the school board found that Spradlin's actions violated law and school board
policy and, therefore, terminated his employment. Id. at 896. Spradlin appealed, arguing that his due
process rights had been violated because the school board had already determined to dismiss him when
he was informed of his right to a public hearing. Id. at 898. The chancery court affirmed the school board's
decision, and the supreme court affirmed the finding that Spradlin's due process rights were not violated.
Id. at 894, 897.
¶11.
We find the present case distinguishable from Spradlin. In Spradlin, the employee argued not that
the statute had not been complied with, but that he had not been given a fair and impartial hearing since the
board had pre-determined to terminate him before the hearing. Id. at 898. In the present case, Blaylock
does not allege he was not afforded a fair hearing, rather, he argues that he was not afforded due process
because the timing of his notice of receipt of the hearing did not comport with statute. Also, in Spradlin,
before the decision to terminate Spradlin was made final, he was informed of his right to a hearing, which
he requested. In the present case, the board voted to terminate Blaylock before he was given notice of
his right to a hearing.
¶12.
We recognize the purpose for notice statutes is to apprize the aggrieved employee of his right to
hearing and to allow him opportunity to prepare a defense. In this case, the school board sidestepped
statutory rules in failing to properly notify Blaylock of his right to a hearing. However, Blaylock testified
and admitted to the wrongdoing, he admits that had he been given notice pursuant to statute that his defense
would not have been any different, and our reversal and remand to order a proper hearing in comport with
statute would have no different effect on Blaylock's preparation of his defense.
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¶13.
In Noxubee County Board of Education v. Overton, 483 So. 2d 301, 302 (Miss. 1985), the
school board notified the teacher that her contract would not be renewed, but failed to provide her a
hearing within thirty days of her request as required by statute. Overton appealed to the chancery court
which reversed the school board's decision, finding that the board's failure to provide Overton a timely
hearing was, "a violation of the mandatory dictates of the law," which resulted in automatic renewal of her
contract. Id. at 303. The supreme court reversed the chancellor and stated:
The thrust of the chancery court's decision directing Ms. Overton's reemployment is that
there was a failure to comply with the thirty (30) day hearing provision of Section
37-9-111(1). We find inescapable, however, that this is a "harmless error by the
Board in complying with the procedural requirements of . . . Section 37-9-111(1) . .
. [with respect to which] no relief . . . [may] be granted . . . . "
Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added).
¶14.
As cited previously, part (4) of section 37-9-113 of the Mississippi Code Annotated provides that
the court will not grant relief if harmless error results in the board's failure to comply with procedural
requirements. However, if prejudicial effect results, the cause will be reversed and remanded for rehearing.
Id. Here, the board did fail to comply with statute; however, as also occurred in Overton, since no
prejudicial effect has resulted from the board's deviation from statute, we reverse and render.
¶15.
We caution that we are in no way mandating that future school boards may intentionally bypass
statutes when they can show no prejudicial effect would result. In this unique situation, nonetheless, we find
that reversal is warranted as the chancellor's decision rested on the procedural misstep of the board without
consideration as to the lack of prejudice Blaylock suffered.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED
AND RENDERED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
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McMILLIN, C.J., KING P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING, MYERS AND GRIFFIS,
JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. CHANDLER, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
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