Fritz James Garcia v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-00478-COA
FRITZ JAMES GARCIA
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
2/15/2001
HON. JERRY O. TERRY, SR.
HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
THOMAS D. BERRY
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
BILLY L. GORE
CONO A. CARANNA, II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
JURY VERDICT MURDER: LIFE IMPRISONMENT
AFFIRMED - 10/22/2002
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., THOMAS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
THOMAS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Fritz Garcia was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Aggrieved he asserts the following on appeal:
I. THE LOWER COURT IMPEDED APPELLANT IN HIS EFFORT TO PROVE
INSANITY DEFENSE.
II. IT WAS ERROR NOT TO SUPPRESS THE ENTIRE STATEMENT GIVEN BY
APPELLANT BEFORE HIS ATTORNEY WAS PRESENT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS S-3 AND S-9.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Fritz Garcia was arrested in Pascagoula, Mississippi and charged with the murder of Ruth Tuller on
March 12, 1997. Garcia was brought to Hancock County, at which time his Miranda rights were read and
he was interviewed by Sheriff Peterson and Deputy Nathan Hoda regarding various aspects of the facts
surrounding the murder which was audibly recorded.
¶3. Garcia lived with Tuller since his release from prison the preceding year. Garcia has been in and out of
State institutions since 1975 when he was first admitted to the Mississippi State Hospital. At trial, Garcia
admitted to the killing of Ruth Tuller. Garcia's claims of innocence emanate from his contention that he was
legally insane at the time of the murder.
¶4. On March 11, 1997, Deputy Hoda was called to the residence of Ruth Tuller after inquiries were made
to the police from concerned friends. Upon reaching the front of the house Hoda found a note on the
doorstep which read, "Gone Fishing, be back around noon," with blood stains on it. He then looked
through the window of the house and saw that the interior was in complete disarray so he entered the
house. In the bathroom he discovered the body of Ruth Tuller stabbed eighty-eight times with a knife
embedded in her rectum. The body was in a pool of blood with oil poured upon it and a crucifix and a
book on menopause laying atop her body. The official cause of death was described as extensive bleeding
due to multiple stab and slash wounds to her body. A videotape of the crime scene was taken, which
showed notes scattered throughout the house, blood everywhere and human feces on the floor.
¶5. The defense called Officer Kenny Hurt and Officer Matt Karl who both testified to matters regarding
the crime scene such as the number of persons walking through the crime scene and when evidence was
secured from the crime scene. Dr. Reb McMichael from the Mississippi State Hospital was called as an
expert witness regarding Garcia's mental state. Dr. McMichael defined schizophrenia and described the
various types. Dr. McMichael, Garcia's expert witness, testified that he felt the acts of Garcia were not the
acts of a man who had lost touch with reality and did not know right from wrong. He testified that Garcia
was capable on the day of the homicide of distinguishing right from wrong. Dr. McMichael described
Garcia's condition as anti-social personality disorder. He also stated that Garcia is a sociopath. Dr. Maggio
was called as a state's expert witness and testified that Garcia acted logically in his actions after the murder
and that he was not legally insane at the time of the murder.
I. DID THE LOWER COURT IMPED APPELLANT IN HIS EFFORT TO PROVE
INSANITY DEFENSE?
¶6. Garcia argues that the trial judge restricted his ability to provide evidence in support of his insanity
defense. Garcia contends that these restrictions on his procuring testimony from witnesses regarding his
insanity were not consistent with the law, and that due to these restrictions the jury was unable to have all
the necessary evidence in deciding whether he was legally insane. Garcia contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by abating his right to question fully the witnesses on such matters as mental history,
past diagnosis and alcohol and drug abuse.
¶7. The admissibility and relevancy of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and, absent an
abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Reynolds v. State, 784
So. 2d 929, 932(¶7)(Miss. 2001). "As long as the trial court remains within the confines of the Mississippi
Rules of Evidence, its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be accorded a high degree of deference."
Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990). Additionally, "the admission or exclusion of
evidence must result in prejudice or harm, if a cause is to be reversed on that account." Jackson v. State,
594 So. 2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1992).
¶8. It is a well established rule that redirect examination of a witness is generally limited to matters which
were brought out on cross-examination of that witness. Lloyd v. State, 755 So. 2d 12,14(¶9) (Miss. Ct.
App.1999); West v. State, 463 So. 2d 1048, 1055 (Miss. 1985). The trial court has broad discretion
when ruling on matters brought forth on redirect. Id. This Court may not disturb the lower court's rulings
regarding matters concerning redirect examination unless there was a "clear abuse of discretion." Lloyd, 755
So.2d at 14(¶9).
¶9. Garcia claims that the trial court hampered his ability to establish a defense of insanity by limiting his
cross-examination of witnesses, which in Mississippi, the rule is clearly one of wide open cross-examination
of a witness. By doing this Garcia attempts to attack the trial court's determination of relevancy and
admissibility protected by an abuse of discretion standard. In actuality though the bulk of Garcia's claims
arise from the trial courts limitations on his re-direct of his own expert witness.
¶10. The limitations Garcia alludes to in his argument refer to the direct and redirect examination of his own
expert witness Dr. McMichael. Forty-three pages of direct and redirect examination of Dr. McMichael was
taken by Garcia's attorney. The excerpts regarding the sustained objections on direct examination are as
follows:
Q. Would someone smear feces on their body to keep from being sexually assaulted?
STATE. Objection.
COURT. Sustained.
Q. Do you have any record of him being sexually assaulted?
STATE. Objection.
COURT. Sustained.
Q. If this happened early in the morning during breakfast time, would you expect Fritz Garcia to be
under the influence of alcohol at that time?
STATE. Objection. There has been no evidence to support the time as breakfast.
COURT. Sustained.
Q. You don't have anything about him attempting suicide?
STATE. Judge, I'd object to the suicide issue.
COURT. Sustained.
STATE. They are not relevant to sanity.
Q. And you can't conclude it was done as a result of a madman?
A. No, sir; I can not.
STATE. Objection to that characterization.
COURT. Sustained. The jury will disregard the characterization of a mad man.
The excerpts regarding the sustained objections on redirect examination are as follows:
Q. All right. Now, someone that has an alcohol and drug problem, would you expect them to be
recommended for alcohol and drug treatment?
STATE. Objection. That is outside the scope of redirect.
COURT. Sustained.
The court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections as to these matters as they were either not
relevant or not within the scope of redirect.
¶11. In Mississippi, the M'Naghten test is used to determine legal insanity. Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d
713, 720 (Miss. 1984); Westbrook v. State, 658 So. 2d 847, 850 (Miss. 1995); Tyler v. State, 618 So.
2d 1306, 1309 (Miss. 1993); Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Miss. 1990); Davis v. State,
551 So. 2d 165, 173 (Miss. 1989). The Supreme Court in Harvey v. State, 207 So. 2d 108, 118 (Miss.
1968), stated that it "will continue to adhere to the M'Naghten rule as a test of criminal responsibility by
reason of insanity." The function of the M'Naghten test for insanity is to determine if the defendant was
unable to distinguish right from wrong when the criminal act in question was committed. Roundtree, 568
So. 2d at 1181. In order to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at
the time the act was committed, "the accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the
mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or (2) if he did know it, that he did
not know that what he was doing was wrong." Id. See Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Miss.
1986). The issue of insanity is left up to the jury to decide. Yarbrough v. State, 528 So. 2d 1130, 1130
(Miss. 1988); Hunter v. State, 489 So. 2d 1086, 1090 (Miss. 1986); Gill v. State, 488 So. 2d 801, 802
(Miss. 1986); Gerlach v. State, 466 So. 2d 75, 79 (Miss. 1985); Frost v. State, 453 So. 2d 695, 698
(Miss. 1984). In Laney, this Court stated that even though in the record it is uncontradicted that "Laney
suffers from the mental disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia type," that "does not in itself make him
M'Naghten insane." Laney, 486 So. 2d at 1245.
¶12. In the case sub judice, Garcia seems to be attempting to establish a diminished capacity defense by
claiming that the court erred in not allowing testimony that he may have been under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, which substantially impaired his ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct. In Mississippi, diminished capacity is not a defense to a criminal
charge. Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 720 (Miss. 1984).
¶13. It is uncontroverted that the sanity of the accused is a matter for the jury to decide. In the case sub
judice the jury heard testimony from two doctors regarding the legal sanity of Garcia. Both doctors, one of
which was Garcia's expert witness, testified that Garcia knew the nature of his actions and he knew they
were wrong. Garcia was not impeded in his effort to prove an insanity defense.
¶14. We find that the trial court did not err and that Garcia was not prejudiced or harmed. This issue is
without merit.
II. WAS IT ERROR NOT TO SUPPRESS THE ENTIRE STATEMENT GIVEN BY
APPELLANT BEFORE HIS ATTORNEY WAS PRESENT?
¶15. Garcia argues that the entire statement made to the officers should be suppressed on two main
grounds. He claims that due to his lack of mental capacity he was unable to understand the nature of his
actions and therefore did not effectively waive his right to have an attorney present during questioning. He
also claims that even if he is declared to have requisite capacity required for waiver the waiver was induced
by fraud and trickery. He states the lack of a signed waiver evidences this.
¶16. The applicable standard of review regarding the admissibility of evidence is as follows: whether or not
the trial court abused its discretion. McIlwain v. State, 700 So. 2d 586, 590 (Miss. 1997). This Court's
standard of review as to the relevance and admissibility of evidence during trial is well established. "The
relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and reversal may be
had only where that discretion has been abused." Weaver v. State, 713 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1997).
The trial court's discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and
reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs.
Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 473, 475(¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
¶17. In determining if a statement is voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently given, the trial court must act as a
fact finder, and this Court is very limited in its scope of review. Wimberly v. State, 760 So. 2d 800,
802(¶6)(Miss. Ct. App. 2000). We are to reverse only where the findings of the trial court are clearly
erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Dancer v. State, 721 So. 2d 583,
587(¶18) (Miss. 1998). The fact that Garcia did not waive his rights in writing is of little consequence since
the lack of a written waiver does not invalidate the waiver. Moore v. State, 493 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Miss.
1986). A Miranda waiver does not have to be in writing. Francis v. State, 791 So. 2d 904, 907(¶5)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2001)(citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, (1979)). A statement is admissible
as long as the accused has been afforded the protection of the Miranda warning and then knowingly and
intelligently waives his rights and freely and voluntarily makes the statement. Moore v. State, 493 So. 2d
1301, 1303 (Miss. 1986) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9, (1981). Whether or not a
Miranda waiver is valid is a question of fact that is to be decided by the trial court based on the totality of
the circumstances. Hemmingway v. State, 483 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (Miss. 1986) (citing Neal v. State,
451 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1984)). The trial court's decision in this regard will not be set aside unless there is
an abuse of discretion. Francis v. State, 791 So. 2d 904, 907(¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
¶18. The trial court concluded that the first nineteen pages of the taped interview with Garcia would be
allowed into evidence as Garcia was read his rights numerous times and understood the rights as they were
read to him. The trial court also concluded that information from page nineteen to page thirty were obtained
in violation of Garcia's Miranda rights and would be suppressed as illegally obtained evidence. The officers
asked Garcia if he wanted to stop the conversation and he replied he did. This was the first time he gave
any indication of not wanting to speak with the officers. It was at this time that the trial court determined
Garcia invoked his Fifth Amendment protection. The trial court suppressed the interview from this point on.
The trial court determined at the suppression hearing which part of the statement violated the rules of
admissibility and this court agrees with the trial court's determination. This issue is without merit.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS S-3 AND S-9.
¶19. Garcia contends that these jury instructions do not correctly state the law and if they do that they
should not have been given as they do not apply to the facts of the case.
¶20. The Supreme Court has held specifically that "errors based on the granting of an instruction will not be
considered on appeal unless specific objections stating the grounds are made in the trial court." Oates v.
State, 421 So. 2d 1025, 1030 (Miss. 1982) (citing Collins v. State, 368 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1979)). A
trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision. Gray v. State, 728 So.
2d 36, 70(¶169) (Miss. 1998); Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 389
(Miss. 1994). Garcia relies upon Duvall v. State, 634 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1994), for the argument that the
failure of his attorney in the case at bar to object to the instruction does not prevent this Court from
reversing the conviction. In Duvall, we held that the trial court erroneously granted State's Instruction S-2,
which provided that deliberate design can originate "at the very moment of the act of violence." Id. at 525.
We held this to be reversible error, despite the fact that defense counsel failed to object. In the case sub
judice there was no error with the deliberate design instruction the jury was given. "It has long been the
case law of this state, that malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design all mean the
same thing." Jones v. State, 710 So. 2d 870, 876(¶21) (Miss. 1998). Moreover, "deliberate design may
be formed very quickly, and perhaps only moments before the act of consummating the intent." Id. at
877(¶30).
¶21. Garcia is procedurally barred from asserting instruction S-3 was in error. He did not preserve this
issue for appeal because he stated the instruction was acceptable upon the judge allowing another
instruction, which was done. That being stated, had the issue not been barred it still lacks merit as it is a
proper description of the law especially when taken as a whole with the other instructions. Jury instruction
S-3 is written as follows:
The Court instructs the Jury that design to kill is all that is required by Mississippi Law to make a
homicide a Murder. Deliberate design means intent to kill, without authority of law and not being
legally justifiable, legally excusable or under circumstances that would reduce the act to a lesser crime.
Error if any was harmless regarding instruction S-3.
¶22. Garcia argues that instruction S-9 is abstract and while it might correctly state a principal of law it does
not require the jury to apply it to this case. We disagree.
¶23. The Supreme Court has held that giving an abstract instruction is not reversible error unless the jury is
misled, Kitchens v. State, 300 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. 1974), and if there is no substantial basis for an
inference of prejudice when the instructions are read together as a whole, there is no reversible error,
Mosley v. State, 396 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Miss. 1981). See also Whittington v. State, 523 So. 2d 966,
978 (Miss. 1988); Ruffin v. State, 447 So. 2d 113, 119 (Miss. 1984); Pickett v. State, 443 So. 2d 796,
800 (Miss. 1983). Jury instructions are to be read as a whole and no one instruction is to be taken out of
context of the whole. Jackson v. Griffin, 390 So. 2d 287, 290 (Miss. 1980); Alexander v. State, 250
So. 2d 629, 632 (Miss. 1971); see also Murphy v. State, 566 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Miss. 1990).
Additionally, the mere fact that an instruction is abstract or lacks specificity is not ground for reversal. See
Ruffin v. State, 447 So. 2d 113, 119 (Miss. 1984). Likewise, a jury instruction is proper and there is no
reversible error in it when the instruction is tailored specifically to the facts of the case. Fairley v. State,
467 So. 2d 894, 901 (Miss. 1985).
¶24. Instruction S-9 is written as follows:
If a defendant, when sober, is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and the defendant
voluntarily deprives himself of the ability to distinguish between right and wrong by reason of
becoming intoxicated and commits an offense while in that condition, he is criminally responsible for
such acts.
¶25. Garcia's extended drug and alcohol abuse was an issue in the case and was alluded to numerous time
throughout the trial. He also submitted in his defense a lengthy dossier of medical records showing his
extended drug and alcohol abuse. There was certainly enough evidence to lead a reasonable fair minded
juror to believe that Garcia's intoxication was the cause of his behavior.
¶26. When read in harmony with the other jury instructions both S-3 and S-9 correctly state the proper
principal of law. The granting of S-3 and S-9 were appropriate. This issue lacks merit.
¶27. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANCOCK COUNTY ON CHANGE
OF VENUE TO RANKIN COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF
THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HANCOCK COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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