Mark H. Parker v. Mississippi Department of Human Services
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-02034-COA
MARK HENRY PARKER
APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
11/03/2000
HON. JAMES H. C. THOMAS JR.
LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
JAMES R. HAYDEN
LAURIE JOHNSON HUTCHINGS
STEPHEN C. CHAYER
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DEFENDANT ORDERED TO PAY $750 PER MONTH IN
CHILD SUPPORT AND HEALTH INSURANCE AND $21,
250 IN BACK CHILD SUPPORT.
DISPOSITION:
REMANDED - 07/16/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 8/13/2002
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/17/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., MYERS, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Mississippi Department of Human Services sued Mark Henry Parker for child support on behalf of
Darian Lane Ball. Parker was determined to be the father of Darian Ball by a paternity test. Darian's
mother, Crystal Ball, was unemployed and separated from her husband by whom she has two additional
children. Crystal's husband provides her with approximately $850 a month in support. Additionally, Crystal
receives food stamps valued at $508 per month. The chancellor found that Crystal was unable to afford
Darian's basic needs. The chancellor also found that Parker's net disposable income was $163,700. The
chancellor ordered Parker to pay child support in the amount of $750 a month and back child support in
the amount of $21,250 as well as provide health insurance for Darian. Aggrieved by this decision, Parker
appealed asserting that DHS did not provide sufficient evidence to support an award of $750 per month in
child support and that the award of back child support was not properly before the chancellor. DHS filed a
cross-appeal asserting that the chancellor's award was too low given Parker's income level and the needs
of the child.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶2. Child support awards are within the chancellor's discretion. Gray v. Gray, 745 So. 2d 234, 236 (¶10)
(Miss. 1999). The chancellor's decision will be reversed only where "the chancellor was manifestly wrong in
his findings of fact or manifestly abused his discretion." Id. With this standard in mind, we look to the issues
raised in this appeal.
1. WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CHANCELLOR'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD.
¶3. Parker first contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the chancellor's award of
child support. When reviewing child support awards, this Court examines the record to determine whether
the chancellor's award is supported by sufficient evidence. Powell v. Powell, 644 So. 2d 269, 275 (Miss.
1994). Parker asserts the trial court erred as to this issue because Crystal could not give the chancellor a
sum certain on how much it costs her to tend to Darian's needs each month. Crystal testified that she is
unable to afford the basic needs of Darian's activities. Crystal further testified that she received the
equivalent of $1,358 income per month and that she had to use that money to support herself, Darian, and
her two other children. The chancellor examined Darian's basic home, school, and activity needs as well as
Crystal's means of support and Parker's ability to earn income in determining the amount of child support
Parker would be required to pay. There was sufficient evidence presented to support the chancellor's child
support award. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding $750 per month in child support.
This issue is without merit.
2. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR PROPERLY AWARDED BACK CHILD SUPPORT.
¶4. Parker's final contention is that the chancellor erred when he awarded back child support in the amount
of $21,250 to Ball. Parker contends that DHS did not request back child support in its complaint for child
support. Regardless of whether it was requested, the chancellor is required to address the issue of back
child support in his order establishing paternity and awarding child support. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-29(2)
(Rev. 1994). Further, the chancellor is limited to assessing liability on the father for back child support to the
one year before the commencement of the action. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-11 (Rev. 1994).
¶5. The chancellor broke down the lump sum award for past child support as follows: $9,000 for the year
preceding the filing of the petition on July 20, 1999, and $11,250 for the period from the filing of the
petition to the date periodic payments were to begin on December 1, 2000. The award of $9,000 for the
year preceding the filing of the petition averages to $750 per month which we have already determined to
be reasonable. The award of $11,250 for the period running from the filing of the petition to commencement
of period payment also averages out to be less than $750 per month. We find that the chancellor did not
abuse his discretion in awarding this figure. We note, by our own motion, that the two awards when
combined total $20,250 rather than the $21,250 mandated by the chancellor. This appears to be a clerical
mistake and we remand this case for the limited purpose of the entry of an order correcting this clerical
error.
3. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN DEVIATING FROM THE CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES.
¶6. DHS contends in its cross-appeal that the chancellor erred in deviating from the child support guidelines
in awarding less than the prescribed percentage of Parker's adjusted gross income as support. Pursuant to
the statutory guidelines, the chancellor could have awarded fourteen percent of Parker's adjusted gross
income as child support for Darian. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1) (Rev. 2000). The chancellor found
that Parker's adjusted gross income was $163,700 per year. The chancellor is required in cases where the
adjusted gross income of a parent exceeds $50,000 to make written findings as to whether the application
of the statutory guidelines is reasonable. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(4) (Rev. 2000). The chancellor
made the required findings and established that application of the guidelines was unreasonable and
determined that $750 per month was sufficient to meet Darian's needs. Because the chancellor complied
with the statutory requirements, we cannot say that the deviation from the statutory guidelines was an abuse
of discretion. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶7. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding $750 per month in child support. There was
sufficient evidence to support the chancellor's award as evidenced by the record. The chancellor did not err
in deviating from the statutory guidelines. The chancellor properly addressed the issue of back child support
in his order. This case is remanded to the chancery court for correction of a clerical error in the back
support award.
¶8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAMAR COUNTY IS REMANDED
FOR THE PURPOSES DELINEATED IN THIS OPINION ON DIRECT APPEAL AND
AFFIRMED AS TO CROSS-APPEAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
EQUALLY TO THE APPELLANT AND APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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