Christopher Virece McDonald v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-00176-COA
CHRISTOPHER VIRECE MCDONALD
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
12/18/2000
HON. KOSTA N. VLAHOS
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GLENN F. RISHEL JR.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
CONO A. CARANNA II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF TOUCHING OF A CHILD FOR
LUSTFUL PURPOSES AND SENTENCED TO FOUR
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED - 05/14/2002
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
6/4/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND BRANTLEY, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Harrison County Circuit Court jury convicted Christopher McDonald of touching a child for lustful
purposes, and he was sentenced to serve four years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. McDonald now appeals his conviction to this Court, asserting two issues: 1) the State failed to
introduce evidence tending to show he touched the victim with lustful, licentious sexual desire; and 2) the
circuit court erred in denying a requested jury instruction. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. The appellant, Christopher McDonald, was dating the victim's seventeen year old sister, Beverly, at the
time of the incident at issue. The victim, KMW, was twelve years old, and McDonald was twenty years
old. On the night of October 12, 1999, after the family went to bed, Beverly let McDonald into her
bedroom so he could spend the night with her, despite instructions from the girls' mother, Michelle, to both
Beverly and McDonald that he was not to be in the house late at night. KMW testified that sometime during
the night, she awakened to find McDonald in her bedroom. McDonald told KMW not to scream, and
asked if he could get into the bed. She refused him permission, but he got into the bed anyway. He touched
her stomach and legs and rubbed her genital area from outside her panties. McDonald then left the
bedroom.
¶3. KMW testified she could not go back to sleep. She tried to telephone another sister, Amy, who lived in
Hattiesburg, but could not reach her. She then dressed and rode her bike to a friend's house, and told her
friend what McDonald had done. She and her friend did not confide in any adult at that time. After school
the next day, KMW confided in her sister, Beverly. Beverly and KMW then telephoned their sister, Amy,
and Amy and her husband, Chris, drove to Michelle's house where they told Michelle.
¶4. Looking to the testimony at trial, Amy testified that her caller ID recorded that she had received a
telephone call from Michelle's house at about the time KMW said she had tried to call. Chris testified that
he had spoken with McDonald on the telephone, and McDonald told him that he spent the night with
Beverly, but had left the bedroom for about fifteen minutes to go to the bathroom. The house's layout was
such that to get from Beverly's room to the bathroom, it was necessary to walk down a hall and pass
KMW's bedroom door. He also said he left the house at approximately 4:30 a.m. Beverly testified that she
was awakened by her alarm clock at around 3:30 or 4:30 a.m. She had set the alarm to be sure to awaken
McDonald so he could leave the house before Michelle awakened. Beverly testified that she awakened
McDonald, and he left in the early morning hours. At trial, McDonald admitted to being in the house and to
leaving in the early morning hours, but he denied being in KMW's bedroom and molesting her.
ANALYSIS
I. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
¶5. McDonald asserts that the circuit court erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict or, in the
alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). A sufficiency of the evidence argument is a
question of pure law and is directed to the trial court's denial of a post-trial motion for JNOV, while an
argument that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is directed to the trial court's
denial of a motion for a new trial and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. May v. State,
460 So. 2d 778, 780-81 (Miss. 1984).
¶6. McDonald argues that KMW testified that after McDonald molested her, she did not do what a twelve
year old child would reasonably be expected to do, so her accusation of him must have been false. KMW
testified that after the molestation she did not immediately tell her mother. Her immediate reaction was that
she could not get back to sleep, so she tried to telephone her eldest sister who lived in Hattiesburg, and
unable to reach that sister, she went to a friend's house to wait for her school bus, and she confided in her
friend. She only talked to her mother after she had already confided in her sisters. McDonald asserts that
based on that testimony the State failed to put forth evidence tending to prove that he molested KMW, and
the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from KMW's testimony was that she did not testify
truthfully.
¶7. Determinations of witness credibility are left to the jury. Collier v. State, 711 So. 2d 458, 462 (¶18)
(Miss. 1998). We find that KMW's account of events is not so far-fetched so as to strain notions of
credibility. Reasonable jurors could believe that she chose to first confide in her friend and sisters because
she was not only naturally shocked by being molested, but also faced with a dilemma that if she confided in
her mother, she would inevitably have to betray Beverly's secret that Beverly had disobeyed their mother
by letting McDonald into the house. Thus, we find KMW's behavior was consistent with her account of
events. Moreover, the uncorroborated testimony of a sex crime victim is legally sufficient evidence upon
which to base a conviction. Id. In this case, the evidence was sufficient for the jurors to return a guilty
verdict, and nothing in the record indicates that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a
new trial.
¶8. Additionally, to any degree that McDonald's argument to this Court may be that while he did in fact
touch KMW, the State failed to put forth any evidence tending to show a " lustful, licentious sexual desire,"
this too would be without merit. Criminal intent may be inferred by a jury from behavior a witness
describes. Brown v. State, 799 So. 2d 870, 872 (¶8) (Miss. 2001). There is no merit to this assignment of
error going to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
II. JURY INSTRUCTION
¶9. McDonald contends that the circuit court erred in denying jury instruction D-5. This instruction would
have provided:
The court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt of guilt may arise either from the evidence or the
lack of evidence or a conflict of evidence, and if, upon consideration of the evidence in the case, or
the lack of it, or the conflict of it, such reasonable doubt does exist, then it is your sworn duty as
jurors to return a verdict of not guilty.
The circuit court stated that it felt that the proposed instruction improperly defined reasonable doubt and
asked if any case law supported the instruction being given. McDonald's counsel stated he had none, but in
his brief to this Court, he notes that at least one case approved of such an instruction. Conner v. State,
632 So. 2d 1239, 1257 (Miss. 1993)(reversed on other grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d
158, 162 (¶ 13) (Miss. 1999)). Regardless of whether McDonald's proposed jury instruction D-5 was a
proper statement of the law going to burden of proof, so long as the jury was properly charged upon this
issue with another jury instruction, no error could occur. See Coleman v. State, 804 So. 2d 1032 (¶24)
(Miss. 2002). We find that the jury was adequately charged upon this issue by jury instruction C-3, which
provided:
[t]he law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This
presumption places upon the State of Mississippi the burden of proving the defendant guilty of every
material element of the crime with which he is charged. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty.
The presumption of innocence attends that Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close
unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
McDonald's assertion that the circuit court erred in refusing jury instruction D-5 is without merit.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF TOUCHING OF A CHILD FOR LUSTFUL PURPOSES AND SENTENCE
OF FOUR YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
HARRISON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
