Wanda L. Jackson Hale v. Fluor Daniel Corporation
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-WC-00092-COA
WANDA L. JACKSON HALE
APPELLANT
v.
FLUOR DANIEL CORPORATION AND CNA INSURANCE CORPORATION APPELLEES
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
12/21/2000
HON. KATHY KING JACKSON
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT E. O'DELL
MICHAEL MCELHANEY, JR.
CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION
AFFIRMED
AFFIRMED-4/30/2002
5/29/2002; denied 7/23/2002
8/21/2002
BEFORE KING, P.J., IRVING, AND BRANTLEY, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Wanda L. Hale appeals from a decision of the Circuit Court of Jackson County which affirmed the
decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that Hale did not suffer an injury
arising out of and in the course of her employment with Fluor Daniel Corporation. She asserts seven issues,
five of which are clustered around the primary issue of whether the Commission erred in its determination
that Hale did not suffer a work-related injury. Consequently, we have recast her seven issues into three
issues as follows: (1) whether the Commission erred in its finding that Hale did not suffer a work-related
injury, (2) whether the Commission erred in denying Hale's motion to allow additional evidence, and (3)
whether the Commission's procedures and findings deprived Hale of due process of law.
¶2. We find no merit in the issues raised; therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court which affirmed
the decision of the Commission.
FACTS
¶3. Wanda Hale filed a petition to controvert against Fluor Daniel Corporation and its workers'
compensation carrier, CNA Insurance Corporation, alleging that she injured her lower back at work on
February 3, 1997. Specifically, Hale alleged that she was injured when she attempted to lift, and pass to
another worker, a come-a-long off a hook on the rear wall of the tool room where she worked. She
contends that she suffered an injury to her coccyx. The employer and carrier denied that she suffered a
work-related injury. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge appointed to hear the case denied
Hale's claim for benefits and dismissed her petition. The administrative law judge determined that Hale had
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had suffered an injury arising out of and in the
course of her employment. Among other things, the administrative law judge noted that Hale's testimony
regarding the event of her injury was not corroborated by any witness, but more importantly, disputed by
every "other witness who testified at the hearing except her husband and he had no personal knowledge."
¶4. Thereafter, Hale filed with the Commission a motion to allow additional evidence. The Commission
denied the motion and affirmed the administrative law judge's decision that Hale did not suffer a workrelated injury. This appeal follows Hale's unsuccessful appeal to the Circuit Court of Jackson County of the
Commission's decision.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶5. We first observe that there was substantial uncontradicted medical testimony that Hale was suffering
from chronic low back pain and injury to her coccyx. The question is not whether she suffered an injury but
whether the injury she suffered arose out of and during the course of her employment. There was
considerable testimony regarding Hale's fall from a horse prior to the alleged injury at work. The exact time
of the fall from the horse was the subject of considerable dispute. As stated, the Commission determined
that Hale did not suffer a work-related injury.
¶6. We observe next, that the findings of an administrative agency will be binding on the appellate court so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, are not arbitrary or capricious, are not beyond the
scope or power granted to the agency, or violative of one's constitutional rights. Hedge v. Leggett &
Platt, Inc., 641 So. 2d 9, 12 (Miss. 1994); Allen v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 639 So. 2d
904, 906 (Miss. 1994). An appellate court will reverse an order of the Commission only when such order is
clearly erroneous and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Hedge, 641 So. 2d at 12.
1. The Commission's Failure to Find the Existence of a Work-related Injury
¶7. Hale properly asserts that she has the initial burden to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that she suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Fluor Daniel
and a causal connection between the injury and the death or claimed disability. Id. at 13. "[O]nce the
claimant makes out a prima-facie case of disability, the burden of proof shifts to the employer." Id. Hale
notes, and we agree, that a pre-existing disease or infirmity does not prevent an injury from "arising out of
employment" if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease to produce a
disability. Id.
¶8. As stated, the Commission affirmed the order of the administrative law judge. In determining that Hale
did not suffer any compensable injury, the administrative law judge stated:
The claimant's testimony regarding the event of her injury is not corroborated by any other witness.
This alone is not fatal to her case, because the uncorroborated testimony of a claimant can be
competent evidence to substantiate a claim, as long as it is found to be credible and trustworthy. See
Dunn, Mississippi Worker's Compensation, Section 264, pp. 320-21. And the undisputed
testimony of a claimant generally ought to be accepted as true, so long as it is not unreasonable within
the factual setting of the claim. White v. Superior Products Inc., 515 So. 2d 924, (Miss. 1987). The
claimant's problem is that her testimony regarding her injury is not merely disputed, it is disputed by
every other witness who testified at the hearing except her husband, and he has no personal
knowledge of the events of or surrounding the alleged injury. "[N]egative testimony concerning the
cause of injury may be substantial evidence upon which a claim may be denied," White v. Superior at
297, and the weight of the credible testimony here is substantially negative.
¶9. The judge also explained that Deborah Coney and Betty Wood testified that Hale had told each of
them that she had fallen from a horse the weekend preceding the date of Hale's alleged injury and there was
"nothing in the record to indicate they knew each other." The judge further explained that nothing in the
record or in each witness's testimony "indicated that either of them was an unreliable or untrustworthy
witness."
¶10. Hale contends that the administrative law judge did not follow Hedge in determining that she did not
meet her initial burden and that, "by any fair evaluation of the evidence, she clearly made out a prima facie
case." As to the injury or soreness suffered in the horseback ride, Hale argues that, in the worse case
scenario, the injury or soreness from the horseback ride should be viewed as a preexisting injury which was
aggravated by the work-related injury and that the aggravation/combination rule cited in King v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 229 Miss. 830, 92 So. 2d 209 (1957), should apply. Lastly, Hale argues that
the administrative law judge's total reliance on clearly inconsistent and uncertain testimony of Betty Wood
and Deborah Coney is incredible because being sore from a horseback ride does nothing to establish the
occurrence of any injury to the spine.
¶11. Hale asserts that a causal connection was established by Dr. Barnes' testimony when he testified, " I
feel that the injury as she described it, a lifting and twisting type injury, could cause the type of pain
syndrome that she ended up coming to me to be treated for." When asked, "Did you find anything in your
examination or treatment of Hale that was consistent with a twisting or rotating injury," Dr. Holtzman stated,
"It's common when you have a pelvic asymmetry associated with muscular spasm and muscular involvement
of the hip girdle and the lumbar paraspinals and a twisting and lifting type injury could cause those symptoms
and those findings."
¶12. Hale argues that the administrative law judge discounted all of the medical opinion evidence as to
causation solely because most coccygeal injuries occur from blows or falls. In support of her contention on
this point, Hale lifts the following quote from the administrative law judge's opinion:
But when [the doctors] were asked whether in their experience a coccygeal injury such as the
claimant's would be more likely to occur in a fall than in a lifting event, the consensus was that a fall or
other trauma would be a more likely cause.
Additionally, Hale asserts that the administrative law judge discounted all of the medical opinion evidence
because it relied on Hale's history.
¶13. On the other hand Fluor points out that Hale's testimony is directly contradicted by Mike McGrath,
Debra Coney, Betty Wood and Sue McGuire. Fluor notes that McGrath testified that he did not request a
one ton come-a-long. Also, Coney testified that Hale had told her, the weekend before the date in question,
that Hale was going horse riding. In addition, Coney testified that the Monday after the incident in question,
Hale told Coney that Hale was sore and bruised from a fall during a horse ride. Furthermore, Wood
testified that Hale told her that Hale was sore from a fall during a horse ride. McGuire testified that Hale
failed to return to work even after a release was faxed from her doctor. Further, Fluor points to the
testimony of Dr. Kevin Cooper, Hale's physician, who stated that Hale did not pinpoint the cause of the
injury on her initial visit. Lastly, Fluor notes that while the law should be liberally construed to favor the
claimant, a claimant's testimony can be contradicted and that testimony, which contradicts the claimant's
testimony, can constitute the substantial evidence on which the Commission denies the claim.
¶14. Not surprisingly, Hale disputes the value of these witnesses' testimony and the administrative law
judge's reliance there on. For example, Hale contends that Ms. Coney's testimony lacks credibility because
Carey Goff, Hale's riding partner, testified that Hale's fall from the horse occurred eleven weeks earlier in
November of 1996. Additionally, Hale argues that the administrative law judge's finding that her "testimony
regarding the event of her injury is not corroborated by any other witnesses" was absolutely erroneous. She
argues that Betty Wood corroborated her testimony during the following colloquy:
Q. What were the injuries she reported to you?
A. Well, she didn't actually report an injury. She was picking up a ton-and-a-half come-a-long for one
of the customers. I don't know who it was. And she kind of give [sic] one of those little groans like
when you're picking up something slightly heavier than what you're used to picking up. It wasn't like
a painful scream or anything. She just kind of grunted when she picked it up, and I kind of talked
to her over my shoulder and told her not to do it.
BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE BEST: Pardon me, and let me back up just a minute. Did we not
just -- did the witness not just testify that she wasn't aware of the claimant getting hurt in the tool
room?
Q: Did you understand my question? Did she ever get hurt in the tool room, to your knowledge,
in any way?
A: No.
Q: Okay. What about this grunting thing that you talked about? What was that?
A: Well, she had already stated earlier in the evening that she was sore and stoved up from an
accident with her horse, and so I thought, well, you know, you have a pulled muscle in your arm, your
leg, or whatever. When you go to pick up something heavy, it kind of puts a strain on it. So when she
grunted it was -- you know, that was what crossed my mind, and I kind of talked to her over my
shoulder and told her, you know, not to do it, that whoever wants the chain fall could come in and get
it.
(emphasis added).
¶15. Hale asserts that the colloquy set forth above proves that Woods did corroborate her testimony
regarding the injury and directs us to Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-3-3(b) (Rev. 2000) where "injury"
is defined as "accidental injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employment without
regard to fault which results from an untoward event or events, if contributed to or aggravated or
accelerated by the employment in a significant manner."
¶16. This Court cannot agree that the quoted colloquy absolutely proves clear error with respect to the
administrative law judge's finding that Hale's testimony regarding when the injury incurred was not
corroborated. This passage, as well as others already quoted, does not prove that the administrative law
judge improperly evaluated Hale's evidence in determining that she did not establish a prima facie case. It
may be that different individuals may draw different conclusions from the quoted passage. However, the
Commission is the fact finder, and we are not at liberty to substitute our views for its factual determinations.
Most notably, the two witnesses who assigned Hale's injury to falling off a horse the weekend before Hale's
alleged work-related injury were perceived by the judge as credible and trustworthy. We affirm on this
issue.
¶17. Our affirmance of the Commission's finding that Hale did not suffer a work-related injury renders moot
all of Hale's remaining issues except her assertions that she was denied due process of law and that her
motion for allowance of additional evidence should have been allowed.
2. Denial of Due Process
¶18. Hale begins her argument on this issue by quoting a principle noted in Marshall Durbin Companies
v. Warren, 633 So. 2d 1006, 1010 (Miss. 1994), that "doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of
compensation, so as to fulfill the beneficent purposes of the statute." Additionally, Hale states that even if
this case was "doubtful," a fair construction of the facts requires compensation. Further, Hale contends that
the administrative law judge failed to follow the proper procedure for the establishment of a prima facie
workers' compensation case.
¶19. We have already determined that substantial evidence exists to support the findings of the Commission
and that it employed a proper analysis in evaluating Hale's claim. Consequently, Hale was not denied due
process simply because the Commission found against her. This issue lacks merit.
3. Motion to Allow Additional Evidence
¶20. Upon appealing to the Commission, Hale filed a motion to allow additional evidence. The motion
attempted to have the testimonies of Hale's boarders corroborate that Hale had not ridden any horses the
weekend before February 3, 1997. The Commission denied this motion. Hale argues that Procedural Rule
9 allows the Commission in its discretion to admit additional evidence. Hale asserts that during the hearing,
her Rule 9 motions were not treated as additional evidence but as newly discovered evidence. Hale
contends that even though the Commission's decisions are subject to the normal deferential standards, they
must still be reasonable.
¶21. On the other hand, Fluor argues that the Commission's failure to allow the additional evidence was not
an abuse of discretion because Hale did not provide a satisfactory reason to allow the evidence. In the
alternative, Fluor contends that the Commission was in the best position to determine the credibility of the
witnesses who were present. Allowing the statement of Hale's boarders that she did not fall from a horse the
weekend before February 3, 1997, would only open new questions concerning whether she rode at a time
when her boarders were present as well as another time when they were either not present or unable to
observe all of Hale's movements.
¶22. The decision to reopen a workers' compensation case is purely discretionary with the Commission,
and the Commission's order will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Container
Gen. Corp., 559 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1990). We find no abuse here.
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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