Clifford Williams v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CP-01154-COA
CLIFFORD WILLIAMS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
06/21/2001
HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAMS, PRO SE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY JR.
DOUG EVANS
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF
AFFIRMED - 04/23/2002
5/13/2002; denied 7/16/2002
8/6/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND BRANTLEY, JJ.
BRANTLEY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Clifford Williams, pro se, appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Grenada County, Mississippi denying
his petition for post-conviction relief as frivolous. He alleges that his guilty plea to the charges of sale or
transfer of cocaine was not voluntarily given, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his
motion was not frivolous. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On January 20, 1998, Williams pled guilty to two counts of sale or transfer of cocaine. In Count I,
Williams was sentenced to serve a term of twenty years, six years suspended for a period of five years, the
remaining fourteen years to serve. The sentence of Count II was identical to Count I and was ordered to
run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count I.
¶3. On November 22, 2000, Williams filed a motion for post-conviction relief. On February 16, 2001,
Williams filed a motion for reconsideration and reduction of sentence. Williams also filed a motion to amend
his original post-conviction relief motion on March 14, 2001. Without granting a hearing, on June 21, 2001,
the circuit court denied Williams's post-conviction relief motion for being frivolous. The motion for
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 2001, because the court did not have the authority to reduce,
suspend, or modify Williams's sentences.
ANALYSIS
¶4. "If a prisoner is seeking post-conviction relief and is proceeding pro se, in the court's discretion, we will
'credit not so well pleaded allegations so that a prisoner's meritorious complaint may not be lost because
inartfully drafted.'" Retherford v. State, 749 So. 2d 269, 272 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
I. Whether Williams's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
¶5. Williams's first assertion of error is that he did not enter an intelligent and voluntary plea because he
allegedly lacked the requisite understanding of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of
entering a plea based on his minimum education (sixth grade education) and the influence of drugs that still
lingered in his system. In determining whether the entry of a plea of guilty was properly accepted by the trial
court, we are bound by the rule that the plea must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Goss v. State,
730 So. 2d 568, 573 (¶20) (Miss. 1998). The defendant must be advised of the nature of the crime
charged and the consequences of the guilty plea. Id.
¶6. "When the record contains pleadings that are in direct conflict with the transcript derived from the guilty
plea hearing, a petition for post-conviction relief is properly dismissed." Martin v. State, 749 So. 2d 375,
378 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Based on the transcript of the plea hearing, it is clear that Williams's entry
of a guilty plea was done in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner. Williams advised the court that he
was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He also offered no support for this argument that the effects
of the drugs lingered in his system. The court advised Williams that at any time during the proceedings if he
did not understand something, that he should let the court know, and the court would go over with him what
he did not understand, until he was in complete understanding of the proceedings. Williams's attorney
responded to questions from the court that he had prepared the petition to the guilty plea, that he had gone
over the petition with Williams, and that he was satisfied that Williams understood his rights and the nature
and consequences of the plea. The court advised Williams of his rights and the effect upon those rights
resulting from a guilty plea. Williams confirmed that he understood his constitutional rights, that he
understood the range of punishment available, and that he had not received any promises or suggestions of
leniency in exchange for his guilty plea.
¶7. Review of the entire record did not expose any fact that would call into question the findings of the trial
court. Williams had a rational mind and was in complete understanding of every matter that he was advised
of by the court. This assignment of error is without merit.
II. Whether Williams received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶8. In determining whether Williams received ineffective assistance, he must prove his attorney's
performance was defective and the deficiency deprived him of a fair trial. Hiter v. State, 660 So. 2d 961,
965 (Miss. 1995). This deficiency is assessed by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id. There is
also a strong presumption the attorney's conduct fell within the wide realm of reasonable professional
assistance, and this review is highly deferential to the attorney. Id.
¶9. As part of his motion for relief, Williams alleged that his counsel allowed him to enter a guilty plea that
he did not understand, coerced him into pleading guilty, failed to pursue an alibi defense, and failed to
object to alleged defects in the indictment. As to his claims of misunderstanding and coercion, Williams's
sworn statements in both his petition to enter a guilty plea and during the plea colloquy are to the contrary.
For post-conviction relief, an inmate does not provide sufficient factual support for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel by offering only his own affidavit. Vielee v. State, 653 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1995)
. The only evidence of these first two assertions by Williams was in his own pleadings. Williams has not met
his burden and these claims of error are without merit.
a) Alibi Defense
¶10. Williams contends that his attorney's performance was deficient by not further investigating his alibi. He
alleges that he was at work the day of the crime. Over three years after Williams petitioned the court to
accept his guilty plea and three months after Williams's original post-conviction relief motion, Williams's
brother, Archie, filed an affidavit stating that Williams was working on August 1, 1996, the date of the
crime.
¶11. One role of an attorney is to explain the options the client has and then to pursue the options the client
wants to take. During the plea hearing, Williams confirmed his counsel's statements that they discussed any
possible defenses. In Blanch v. State, this Court stated that it could not find fault when an attorney had a
candid discussion with his client where the attorney encouraged the client to plead guilty. Blanch v. State,
760 So. 2d 820, 825 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The attorney's representation would have been
deficient if the attorney had not discussed this with his client. Id. Williams also confirmed that he was
totally satisfied in all respects with the representation of his attorney. Thus, it is not the attorney's fault
Williams decided pleading guilty would better serve his interests than a trial would.
¶12. The only evidence Williams offered to prove deficiencies in his counsel's performance is the affidavit of
his brother. However, this affidavit directly contradicts Williams's sworn testimony during the plea hearing
and his statements in the plea petition. Without more, Williams's sworn statements made during the plea
hearing must be presumed to be valid and, as such, those contrary assertions contained in his motion and
Archie's affidavit are merely a sham. Taylor v. State, 682 So. 2d 359, 364 (Miss. 1996).
¶13. We find Archie Williams's affidavit supposedly establishing Williams's alibi defense less than
satisfactory. Even if accepted as true, this statement does almost nothing to establish an alibi defense to a
criminal charge based on an incident occurring on the same specific date. Williams could have committed
the crime and worked on the same date. This evidence, in our view, was not of such weight and worth as to
convince us that the trial court erred in denying Williams relief based on a claim that his attorney's
performance was deficient in pursuing his alibi. This issue is without merit.
b) Defective indictment
¶14. Williams claims that his counsel's performance was inadequate because he failed to object to two
alleged deficiencies in the indictment, an incorrect date and an unspecified amount of drugs. Williams's first
claim is without merit. Failure to state the correct date of the alleged offense will not render an indictment
insufficient. Davis v. State, 760 So. 2d 55, 60 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
¶15. Williams's second claim, that the indictment did not provide a specified amount of cocaine, was
asserted as an amendment to his original motion and was not specifically addressed by the trial court.
Williams contends that the sentencing guidelines specify that the quantity of drugs must be defined. He
alleges that his counsel, by not objecting, subjected him to an excessive sentence because the indictment
stated that Williams transferred, sold a "quantity"of cocaine instead of a specific amount.
¶16. The indictment was not defective. Williams's interpretation of the statute is misplaced because Miss.
Code Ann. Section 41-29-139(a)(1)(b)(1) (Rev. 2001) does not provide for any specified amount of
cocaine for the sentencing of a schedule II, cocaine violator, unless you are charged with "trafficking," which
carries a greater penalty. The only other amounts specified for sentencing a seller are for a marihuana
violator. He was informed of the correct maximum sentence, thirty years on each count and a one million
dollar fine. Williams benefitted from his attorney's performance because he received concurrent sentences
for both counts for twenty years with six suspended and a suspended five thousand dollar fine. This
assignment of error is without merit.
III. Whether the circuit court erred in revoking sixty days of earned time credit under Miss.
Code Ann. Section 47-5-138 for the filing of a frivolous post-conviction relief motion.
¶17. The purpose of the statute is to reduce frivolous filings on the part of all those incarcerated individuals,
whether literate or illiterate, pro se or represented by counsel. Holt v. State, 757 So. 2d 1088 (¶11) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2000). After finding that the arguments were frivolous, the trial judge ordered the Mississippi
Department of Corrections to forfeit sixty days of Williams's earned time credit pursuant to Miss. Code
Ann. § 47-5-138. Williams challenges this forfeiture.
¶18. We agree with the trial court's findings that Williams's arguments in his post-conviction relief motion
and amendment are without merit. Based on this statutory provision, the trial court acted within appropriate
boundaries when ordering the forfeiture. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRENADA COUNTY DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS FRIVOLOUS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS ARE
ASSESSED TO GRENADA COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
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