Reginald Raynard Shaw v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CP-00403-COA
REGINALD RAYNARD SHAW A/K/A REGINALD R. SHAW
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
07/20/2000
HON. KOSTA N. VLAHOS
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PRO SE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY JR.
HONORABLE CONO CARANNA
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PCR DISMISSED AS TIME BARRED
AFFIRMED - 1/8/02
1/29/2002
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case comes from the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Honorable Kosta N. Vlahos presiding.
Reginald Raynard Shaw pled guilty to three different narcotic offenses in 1989. In July of 2000, Shaw filed
a motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied. Shaw has appealed the trial court's ruling and comes
now bringing one issue:
WHETHER THE DENIAL BY THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT TO ISSUE
WRIT WAS "PLAIN ERROR" WHEN APPELLANT PROVIDED EVIDENCE AND
"PROOF" THAT HIS FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED DURING HIS SENTENCING HEARING.
Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. Reginald Shaw pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of
possession of a controlled substance (less than one ounce) with intent to distribute on August 8, 1989.
Shaw was sentenced to three years for each count in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections, with each count running consecutively for a total of nine years. The trial judge suspended two
years of Shaw's sentence, leaving Shaw a total of seven years to serve.
¶3. According to assertions found within both Shaw's and the State's briefs, Shaw finished serving his
sentence, but got into more trouble in 1998, causing him to be sentenced to a federal penitentiary. His
previous conviction in the State of Mississippi was used as an enhancing factor in his federal sentence. On
March 7, 2000, Shaw filed a motion for post-conviction relief in order to have his guilty plea set aside. The
Harrison County Circuit Court denied Shaw's motion as time barred.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. "This Court reviews the denial of post-conviction relief under an abuse of discretion standard."
Andrews v. State,791 So. 2d 902 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
¶5. In dealing with the voluntariness of guilty pleas, this Court will not set aside the findings of the trial court
unless they are clearly erroneous. Pleas v. State, 766 So. 2d 41 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). In addition, a
guilty plea meets constitutional requirements when it is freely and voluntarily entered. Id. at (¶4).
ANALYSIS
WHETHER THE DENIAL BY THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT TO ISSUE
WRIT WAS "PLAIN ERROR" WHEN APPELLANT PROVIDED EVIDENCE AND
"PROOF" THAT HIS FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED DURING HIS SENTENCING HEARING.
¶6. In raising this issue, Shaw challenges his guilty plea on the grounds the trial court failed to read Shaw the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty during his plea hearing. Shaw states the trial court did not make it
clear which rights he was giving up, and therefore his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered.
Shaw argues the trial court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing in order for him to present this
issue. The State counters by pointing out Shaw's petition is time barred.
¶7. A large problem with Shaw's petition is that Shaw has already served his sentence. While this is not
expressly made clear in the record, there are assertions made within the briefs which point out Shaw is
currently serving a prison sentence for a federal crime. This Court cannot base judgments on assertions
made within briefs. Burnett v. Islam, 792 So. 2d 1016 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). However, Shaw was
sentenced in 1989, and his sentence was for nine years, two of which were suspended, leaving a total of
seven years for him to serve. Therefore, Shaw's sentence would have expired in August of 1996.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39-5 (1), which deals with the grounds for relief afforded by our
post-conviction statutes, clearly states "[a]ny prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of record of the
State of Mississippi who claims . . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (1) (Rev. 2000). This language indicates
that for someone to be able to take advantage of our post-conviction laws they must be currently
incarcerated for a crime for which they were convicted by a Mississippi court. Because it appears Shaw is
no longer incarcerated for the crimes he was convicted for in 1989, then he is unable to challenge his guilty
plea through the use of a motion for post-conviction relief. For this reason, we must affirm.
¶8. The statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief is three years after a guilty plea is
entered. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (2) (Rev. 2000). Shaw pled guilty in 1989, making 1992 the year
which marked the running of the statute. Therefore, the statute of limitations in this case has run. Shaw
argues his case falls into the exception to the statute of limitations which allows a petitioner to file after the
statute has run if a fundamental right is involved. The statute states:
Excepted from the three-year statute of limitations are those cases in which the prisoner can
demonstrate either that there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the
State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of
his conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial,
which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it
would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (2) (Rev. 2000). Shaw argues his fundamental right to enter a knowing and
intelligent guilty plea is involved because the trial court never explained to him the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty. If Shaw had filed this motion for post-conviction relief within the three-year statutory period,
and while he was still serving his sentence, then perhaps his claim would deserve more merit. However, our
post-conviction statutes are available only to those serving a sentence for the crime for which they were
convicted by a Mississippi court of record. Since Shaw is not currently incarcerated for his Mississippi drug
conviction, then the issue of whether the statute of limitations has run is moot.
¶9. It should be noted that the rules governing post-conviction relief in this State limit the number of counts a
petitioner can challenge to one count per filing. Section 99-39-9(2) states:
A motion shall be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against one (1) judgment only. If a
prisoner desires to attack the validity of other judgements under which he is in custody, he shall do so
by separate motions.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9(2) (Rev. 2000). Shaw has challenged three counts of which he was convicted
in the same petition. By statute, Shaw can only challenge one count in one petition.
CONCLUSION
¶10. Because Shaw is no longer serving a sentence for a crime for which he was convicted by a Mississippi
court of record, then this Court must dismiss his claim. Also, since Shaw has filed for post-conviction relief
for three counts in the same petition, then this Court must dismiss his motion as it does not fulfill the
statutory requirements of the Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9(2) (Rev. 2000). Therefore, we affirm the holding
of the trial court, but for a different reason as previously discussed.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
