Amos Stephen Watkins, Jr. v. Susan Marie Watkins
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-01553-COA
AMOS STEPHEN WATKINS, JR.
v.
SUSAN MARIE WATKINS
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
09/11/2000
HON. SARAH P. SPRINGER
CLARKE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
LAWRENCE PRIMEAUX
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COMPLAINT FOR CHILD SUPPORT DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION
AFFIRMED - 12/18/01
1/8/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Amos Watkins, after receiving a divorce from Susan Marie Watkins in the State of Georgia in August
1998, moved to Mississippi with the two minor children of the marriage. Mr. Watkins had received custody
of the children in the Georgia divorce. The Georgia judgment of divorce further provided that Mrs. Watkins
would pay no child support because of a finding of "special circumstances" within the meaning of the
applicable Georgia statute, Section 19-6-15 of the Georgia Code Annotated. This statute provided
presumptively-adequate amounts of child support based on the parent's income, but permitted variations
from the guidelines on a finding that special circumstances suggested the inappropriateness of a strict
application of those percentages. The judgment did, however, require Mrs. Watkins to be responsible for
one-half of all future medical expenses for the minor children.
¶2. After moving to Clarke County with the two children, Mr. Watkins initiated a proceeding in the Clarke
County Chancery Court in which he sought an order from that court compelling Mrs. Watkins to pay a
reasonable sum of periodic child support and to cite Mrs. Watkins for contempt for her alleged failure to
pay her pro rata share of certain medical expenses for the children. Mrs. Watkins was personally served
with a summons in Mississippi when she was in the state on a visit.
¶3. Mrs. Watkins then filed a motion to dismiss the Clarke County proceeding based on lack of jurisdiction.
The chancellor, finding that exclusive jurisdiction regarding matters for the support and maintenance of the
minor children of the parties remained in the State of Georgia, granted Mrs. Watkins's motion and
dismissed the proceeding. Mr. Watkins thereupon perfected this appeal in which he raises the issue that the
chancellor was manifestly in error in failing to assume jurisdiction of the matter. The question of jurisdiction
actually gives rise to two distinct questions: (a) Did the chancellor have authority to order Mrs. Watkins to
begin to pay child support, and (b) did the chancellor have jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against
Mrs. Watkins for her alleged nonpayment of accrued medical expenses for the children?
¶4. Finding no error in the chancellor's determination, we affirm.
I.
Child Support
¶5. In order to resolve the issue of the courts of this state to enforce a child support obligation created by a
court of another state, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act as enacted in Mississippi must be
consulted. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-25-1 to 93-25-117 (Supp. 2001). That law provides, in part, that "[a]
tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which
has issued a child support order pursuant to this chapter or to a law substantially similar to this chapter."
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-17(4) (Supp. 2001). Georgia has enacted the same uniform act, which provides,
in part, that [a] tribunal in Georgia issuing a support order consistent with the law of Georgia has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order "[a]s long as Georgia remains the residence of the obligor,
the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued . . . ." Ga. Code. Ann. § 1911-114 (2001).
¶6. In this case the evidence is undisputed that Mrs. Watkins, the obligor in regard to child support, remains
a resident of the State of Georgia. Thus, any authority to alter or amend the judgment in regard to child
support necessarily remains in the judicial system of that state. The chancellor's determination that she
lacked jurisdiction finds specific support in the holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court in the case of
Thrift v. Thrift, 760 So. 2d 732, 735-36 (¶13-14) (Miss. 2000).
¶7. Mr. Watkins seeks to take this case outside the uniform act by contending that the Georgia court, by
entering a judgment omitting any requirement for periodic child support from Mrs. Watkins, had not
assumed the necessary jurisdiction over the issue and that his proceeding in Clarke County was an original
action permitted by Section 93-11-65 of the Mississippi Code. We reject that argument. By specifically
addressing the issue of child support and finding that, due to special circumstances arising under Georgia
law, no present amount of child support would be required of Mrs. Watkins, we conclude that the Georgia
court effectively took jurisdiction of the issue of support. Additionally, we note that, by statutory definition,
a "support order" includes "a judgment . . . for the benefit of a child . . . which provides for monetary
support, health care, arrearages or reimbursement. . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-3(u) (Supp. 2001)
(emphasis supplied). The provision of the Georgia judgment obligating Mrs. Watkins to contribute toward
the health care costs of the children is, in itself, sufficient to characterize the Georgia judgment as one of
those adjudications that, under the present factual situation, may only be altered by the courts of that state.
II.
Enforcement in Mississippi of the Medical Bills
¶8. Mr. Watkins alleges that, by registering the Georgia judgment in Mississippi under the uniform act, and
by personally serving Mrs. Watkins with process in this state, he has succeeded in vesting the chancery
court with the power to enforce accrued obligations whether or not the court has the power to alter any
provisions of the foreign judgment. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-85 (Supp. 2001) ("A registered order
issued in another state is enforceable in the same manner . . . as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.").
Clearly, the provisions of the uniform act relating to registering support judgments from foreign jurisdictions
were intended to cover those situations where the obligor has removed herself to another jurisdiction and
made enforcement of the judgment difficult without the benefit of the judicial enforcement mechanisms of the
courts of the obligor's new domicile. Even if we concede that a purely technical application of the statute's
language would vest the chancellor with authority to enforce the Georgia judgment against a Georgia
resident who happened to be personally served with process while temporarily in the state, we find ample
authority for the chancellor to decline to exercise such an obviously-strained application of the law in the
provisions of Section 93-25-37 of the Mississippi Code. This section provides as follows:
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, it shall
forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal in this state or another
state and notify the petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-37 (Supp. 2001).
¶9. In this case, the chancellor did not specifically comply with the provisions of this section in declining to
consider Mr. Watkins's claim for past due medical bills; however, in the order of dismissal, the chancellor
took specific note of the fact that the parties were already involved in litigation in the State of Georgia over
a number of post-divorce issues. The obvious message to Mr. Watkins of those findings was the
chancellor's determination - which we find well within the exercise of her discretionary powers - that the
State of Georgia was a more appropriate forum to resolve the dispute over the unpaid medical bills. The
chancellor's failure to comply with the purely ministerial provisions of Section 93-25-37 does not, in the
view of this Court, provide adequate ground to set aside the entirely appropriate underlying conclusion of
the chancellor that the Chancery Court of Clarke County was "an inappropriate forum" to try this dispute.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-37 (Supp. 2001).
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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