Randy Wells v. O. Renee Wells
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-00319-COA
RANDY WELLS
v.
O. RENEE WELLS
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
02/11/2000
HON. W. HOLLIS MCGEHEE II
PIKE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
MICHAEL V. RATLIFF
JOHN GORDON ROACH JR.
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CHANCELLOR AWARDED APPELLEE CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY AND ONE-THIRD OF
APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES.
AFFIRMED - 11/27/2001
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
12/18/2001
BEFORE KING, P.J., THOMAS, AND LEE, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1. This appeal stems from a judgment of divorce and the chancellor's decision regarding details of the
divorce. Randy and Renee Wells were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences by virtue of a
February 11, 2000 order of the Pike County Chancery Court. Prior to the final judgment, Randy and
Renee reached an agreement concerning custody and visitation issues relating to their minor daughter, the
disposition of an automobile, rights to Randy's retirement account and ownership of certain real and
personal property. The chancellor was left to decide the issues of child support, responsibilities for
insurance payments, ownership of the marital home, alimony and attorney's fees, and various other issues.
¶2. In the judgment of divorce, Randy was ordered to pay $563 per month in child support, to maintain
medical and dental insurance on behalf of the minor child plus cover expenses not covered by insurance, to
provide Renee with a medical card, and to maintain a life insurance policy on himself with the child
designated the beneficiary. Renee was awarded the marital home in McComb, Mississippi, as well as
possession of the family van, with Randy being responsible to pay the tag and insurance, plus repairs over
$200. Randy had been the primary "breadwinner" for the family, and the chancellor ordered him to pay
alimony to Renee in the amount of $800 per month for three years, then $400 per month thereafter, since
the mortgage which Renee was paying was expected to be paid off in three years. Randy incurred
substantial debt while still married; however, the chancellor found those debts to have been incurred after
the couple separated. Therefore, the judge ordered Randy liable for the debts listed in his financial
declaration. The chancellor found Renee unable to pay her attorney's fees and ordered Randy to pay $3,
750, which was one-third of the fees she had already incurred. The chancellor also placed a lien on the
couple's real property known as "the camp" as security for Randy's obligation with regard to the judgment
of divorce.
¶3. Randy appeals the chancellor's judgment to this Court, raising the following issues for our review: (1)
whether the chancellor erred in his distribution of property between the parties; (2) whether the chancellor
erred in requiring Randy to pay alimony to Renee as well as in ordering him to pay Renee's attorney's fees;
and (3) whether the chancellor erred in the amount of child support he ordered Randy to pay.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN HIS DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BETWEEN
THE PARTIES?
¶4. Randy first argues that the chancellor's distribution of property was not equitable. We look to our
standard of review with regard to this issue. "This Court's scope of review in domestic relations matters is
limited. We will not disturb the findings of a Chancellor unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Carrow v. Carrow, 741 So. 2d 200 (¶9) (Miss.
1999). This Court looks to the chancellor's application of the Ferguson factors when reviewing questions
of equitable distribution. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
¶5. Randy and Renee filed a complaint for an irreconcilable differences divorce and also filed a property
settlement agreement with the court. We first review the enforceability of the property settlement agreement
and examine the binding nature of such document.
We have also historically recognized that parties may upon dissolution of their marriage have a
property settlement incorporated in the divorce decree, and such property settlement is not subject to
modification. A true and genuine property settlement agreement is no different from any other
contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a
divorce decree, does not change its character.
East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986).
This Court has stated its policy on enforcing divorce settlements as follows: In property and financial
matters between the divorcing spouses themselves, there is no question that, absent fraud or
overreaching, the parties should be allowed broad latitude. When the parties have reached agreement
and the chancery court has approved it, we ought to enforce it and take as dim a view of efforts to
modify it, as we ordinarily do when persons seek relief from their improvident contracts.
Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (Miss. 1997). On appeal, Randy argues that since,
as part of the property settlement agreement, he stipulated to a one-half division of his retirement account
with Renee, the chancellor should have awarded him some interest or equity in the marital home. In other
words, Randy implies that in exchange for stipulating in the agreement to divest himself of one-half of his
pension in Renee's favor, he is somehow entitled to the same with regard to the house. However, such
agreement was not incorporated into the settlement, and the parties left the chancellor with discretion to
decide the issue of ownership and rights to the marital home. Randy has given no reasons nor cited any
authority that would render him entitled to a share of the marital home in a "quid pro quo" sense simply
because he agreed to allow Renee a one-half interest to his retirement account. Randy agreed to the
particulars of the property settlement agreement. He has alleged no fraud or misrepresentation; thus, as with
any contract we find he is bound to the terms upon which he unequivocally agreed. We find no merit to this
argument.
¶6. We next look in the record to those assets the chancellor was left to equitably distribute between Randy
and Renee. As detailed in their property settlement, Randy and Renee settled on distribution of some items.
Specifically, Renee was given the family van, the couple each split rights fifty-fifty to Randy's retirement
plan, and Randy was vested with ownership rights in the real property known as "the camp." In addition to
receiving one-half of the retirement account, Renee was given an additional $5,000 in the retirement plan as
consideration for her turning over her rights to the "camp" property. Aside from this agreement, the
chancellor was left with the responsibility of equitably dividing the remaining property, which included the
marital home and certain personal property. Concerning this remaining personal property, Randy argues the
chancellor erred in not appointing an expert witness to value the personalty at issue. In Heigle v. Heigle,
771 So. 2d 341 (Miss. 2000), appointment of an expert was an issue, and the supreme court referred to
Rule 706 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which concerns appointment of experts.
M.R.E. 706 clearly authorizes the appointment of an expert upon the motion of a party. As the Court
of Appeals correctly noted, "[t]he appointment of an expert by the court under Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 706 is done sparingly, and then only in exceptional cases involving complex issues where the
expert's testimony would be helpful to the trier of facts."
Heigle, 771 So. 2d at (¶29). In Heigle, the "complex" valuation concerned a business partnership which
was in bankruptcy, along with other financial issues stemming from the bankruptcy proceeding. In
Ferguson, the supreme court also noted:
Property division should be based upon a determination of fair market value of the assets, and these
valuations should be the initial step before determining division. Therefore, expert testimony may be
essential to establish valuation sufficient to equitably divide property, particularly when the assets are
as diverse as those at issue in the instant case.
Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929. In Ferguson, the "diverse" assets in need of valuation included a cattle farm
operation, retirement funds and stock, and the marital home. We review the facts of this case and find that
complex issues are not involved, as compared in Heigle and Ferguson; therefore, the chancellor did not
abuse his discretion in failing to appoint his own expert to value the personal property at issue, which merely
included miscellaneous housewares. Of note, as well, is the fact that Randy conducted his valuation himself,
whereas Renee enlisted the services of an expert to valuate the same items. Beyond that, those values the
chancellor opted to assign were within his discretion and, having found no abuse, we will not reverse.
¶7. We finally address the chancellor's division of certain personal property between Randy and Renee. The
chancellor found that the total value of those assets subject to distribution was $6,025, and he awarded $2,
925 worth of this property to Renee and $3,100 worth of the property to Randy. Randy now argues that
since Renee received one-half the value of Randy's retirement, he in turn should have received some portion
of the equity accumulated in the home. We find, though, that in making such assertion Randy is attempting
to valuate the property as to make it numerically come out fifty-fifty. We have said before equitable
distribution does not necessarily mean "equal" distribution. Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302, 305 (Miss.
1993).
¶8. In our review of the chancellor's judgment, we are not to conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but are to
review the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his
discretion. In his judgment, the chancellor described his reasons for the equitable division he made. He
stated that although both parties contributed substantially to the accumulation of property, Renee clearly
made a greater contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship. Also, the
chancellor noted that Renee's needs were substantially greater than Randy's, since her job skills were
limited compared to Randy's skills. Although the chancellor did not address each and every Ferguson
factor, we note that such analysis is not necessary. "The chancellor is not required to address each and
every factor and may consider only the factors which he finds applicable to the marital property at issue."
Burnham-Steptoe v. Steptoe, 755 So. 2d 1225 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); see also Carrow, 741 So.
2d at (¶10). We find that the chancellor's analysis was sufficient and, thus, we find no clear error in his
division of the marital property in question. We affirm on this issue.
II. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN REQUIRING RANDY TO PAY ALIMONY TO
RENEE, AS WELL AS IN ORDERING RANDY TO PAY RENEE'S ATTORNEY'S
FEES?
A. Alimony
¶9. Randy complains on appeal that, based on the chancellor's division of property, he should not have
been forced to pay alimony to Renee. "Whether or not to award alimony and the amount of alimony is
largely within the discretion of the chancellor. We will not disturb the award on appeal unless it is found to
be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly in error." Parsons v. Parsons, 678 So.
2d 701, 703 (Miss. 1996) (citations omitted).
¶10. In contesting the alimony award, Randy argues that the disparity between his and Renee's estates
warrants that he should not be forced to pay alimony. Randy also claims that the chancellor erred in
concluding that he was the owner of a business called "R & M Enterprises" which manufactured catfish
callers and that the chancellor placed too much emphasis on the fact that Randy had an extramarital affair,
imposing the alimony requirement as a punishment to Randy for such behavior. Randy cites the factors set
forth in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993), which are used in determining whether
an award of alimony is proper. Those factors include:
1. The income and expenses of the parties;
2. The health and earning capacities of the parties;
3. The needs of each party;
4. The obligations and assets of each party;
5. The length of the marriage;
6. The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the
parties either pay, or personally provide, child care;
7. The age of the parties;
8. The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support
determination;
9. The tax consequences of the spousal support order;
10. Fault or misconduct;
11. Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or
12. Any other factor deemed by the court to be "just and equitable" in connection with the setting of
spousal support.
Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280. In Brennan v. Brennan, 638 So. 2d 1320 (Miss. 1994), the supreme
court described other principles with regard to alimony awards:
The right to an award of periodic alimony flows from the duty of the husband to support his wife. The
husband is required to support his wife in the manner to which she has become accustomed, to the
extent of his ability to pay. The value of the wife's assets and income should be determined in order to
ascertain her needs to maintain her position in life to which she had become accustomed, and such
value is considered by the trial court in assessing both alimony and support. In other words, in
determining the amount of alimony, if any, "[t]he chancellor should consider the reasonable needs of
the wife and the husband's right to lead a normal life with a decent standard of living."
Brennan, 638 So. 2d at 1324 (citations omitted).
¶11. We look to the chancellor's judgment and find that although he did not lay out the Armstrong factors
individually and discuss them in great detail, he did note certain factors of significance, which included the
disparity of estates, the fault element, and the abilities of each party to earn a living after the divorce. In our
review of the facts in this case, we conclude that the remaining Armstrong factors are not determinative as
would require the chancellor to review them each individually. Also, in Hoggatt v. Hoggatt, 766 So. 2d 9
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000), this Court found such detailed analysis to be unnecessary: "The chancellor must
analyze an overall combination of the listed factors, likely not highlighting a single category such as length of
marriage, prior standard of living, or ability to pay." Id. at (¶9).
¶12. Having identified the applicable legal principles, we next look to Randy's specific claims. We disagree
with Randy's allegation that the chancellor awarded Renee alimony as a means to punish Randy for his
behavior. As previously stated, the chancellor is not required to analyze each Armstrong factor individually
in his opinion, but is required to view the "overall combination" of the factors as a whole, opting to address
individual factors at his discretion. Id. The fact that the chancellor chose to comment on Randy's
extramarital affair is not automatically indicative that the chancellor placed undue emphasis on this factor.
Again, reviewing the facts of this case, we reasonably infer that the other factors not mentioned were close
to equal between the parties; thus, the chancellor only highlighted those factors which he felt supported his
decision. We find no error here.
¶13. Randy also argues that the chancellor erred in finding him to be the owner of the "R & M Enterprises"
business. In his judgment, the chancellor stated:
The Court has also considered the needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
income and earning capacity of each, which the Court finds that Randy has the ability to earn greater
income because of his expertise in a very specialized field and Renee's more limited job skills. Renee's
job capabilities have centered around secretarial jobs and substitute teaching and she is presently a
first-time legal secretary. Randy is a long-time supervisor with Halliburton Offshore and has a business
knows as "R & M Enterprises" which markets catfish callers.
¶14. The chancellor did not "focus" on R & M, as Randy claims, rather he was attempting to show that, in
contrast to Renee's limited occupational skills, Randy was an experienced supervisor in his trained
occupation and also possessed the capability and initiative to start his own business. Although the chancellor
did not go into great detail with his Armstrong analysis, we find that he was wary of the proper elements,
including the great disparity between Randy's estate and Renee's estate and each's earning capacity. For
these reasons, we find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding alimony to Renee, and we
affirm.
B. Attorney's fees
¶15. Randy claims the chancellor erred in awarding attorney's fees to Renee.
"The award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is left to the discretion of the chancellor, assuming he
follows the appropriate standards." The award of court costs is likewise entrusted to the sound
discretion of the chancellor. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that when a party is able to pay
attorney's fees, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate. However, where the record shows an
inability to pay and a disparity in the relative financial positions of the parties, there is no error in
awarding attorney's fees. The supreme court has also held that consideration of the relative worth of
the parties, standing alone, is insufficient. The record must reflect the requesting spouse's inability to
pay his or her own attorney's fees.
Bates v. Bates, 755 So. 2d 478 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). The chancellor awarded
Renee one-third of her attorney's fees, but did not enlighten us as to exactly why he chose to make such
award. The chancellor simply wrote, "Renee is found to be unable to pay her attorney fees and therefore, is
hereby awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $3,750 to be paid by Randy to Renee within six (6)
months from the date of this opinion."
¶16. The record contains financial statements and exhibits from both Randy and Renee, including itemized
lists of personal property, tax forms, and affidavits. From our review of these documents, we find that
Renee's only available liquid asset is the alimony she receives from Randy. Her financial statement shows
that her expenses substantially exceed her income each month, even with the alimony. Renee argues that she
should not be forced to liquidate her portion of Randy's retirement plan to pay attorney's fees, which would
cause her to incur tremendous tax consequences and penalties for early withdrawal.
¶17. In other cases, we have addressed whether an attorney's fees award was proper when a wife had little
or no liquid assets. In East v. East, 775 So. 2d 741 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), this Court stated:
[W]here the only liquid asset is the alimony award and the party seeking fees has otherwise
demonstrated an inability to pay the fees, a reasonable award is appropriate, providing the McKee
factors, regarding inability to pay, the skill of the attorney, the nature and novelty of the case, usual
fees for similar cases of a similar character, are satisfied, then an award of attorney's fees is
appropriate.
East, 775 So. 2d at (¶16). Also, in Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994), the court
stated the wife need not liquidate her savings account to pay her attorney's fees.
¶18. Renee only asked for one-third of her attorney's fees, and that is the amount the chancellor awarded to
her. We note that the chancellor did not review those factors described in McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d
764, 767 (Miss. 1982), in his statement awarding attorney's fees, simply opting to state his conclusion that
"Renee is found to be unable to pay her attorney fees." Nonetheless, where this general statement may be
found insufficient in other cases, we review the remainder of his opinion to find that the chancellor did
review the relative financial status of each party and did have ample evidence to make his conclusion that
Renee was unable to pay her attorney's fees. We find such cumulative evaluation to be sufficient to support
his finding, and we will not disturb.
¶19. Renee points out that Randy should have to pay interest on the judgment for attorney's fees, pursuant
to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-3-23 (1972). We find such penalty appropriate and assess statutory penalties
and interest against Randy on the judgment for attorney's fees.
III. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT HE
ORDERED RANDY TO PAY?
¶20. Randy finally argues that the chancellor erred in calculating the amount of child support he owed.
Section 43-19-101 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev. 2000) provides that Randy should pay
fourteen percent of his adjusted gross income for support of his one minor child. The chancellor found
Randy's adjusted monthly gross income to be $3,763.00 and ordered that Randy pay fourteen percent of
that amount, or $563.00 per month, for Magan's support. Randy argues that the proper amount should
have been $526.82, an amount which is calculated based on deductions for health insurance and a savings
fund. Renee claims these are not mandatory deductions and should not be used in calculating the adjusted
gross monthly income.
¶21. The Mississippi Code finds the following to be legally mandated deductions: "(i) Federal, state and
local taxes. Contributions to the payment of taxes over and beyond the actual liability for the taxable year
shall not be considered a mandatory deduction; (ii) Social security contributions; (iii) Retirement and
disability contributions except any voluntary retirement and disability contributions . . . ." Miss. Code Ann. §
43-19-101(b) (Rev. 2000). In Lee v . Stewart, 724 So. 2d 1093 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998), this Court
pointed out that paycheck deductions for medical insurance, a 401K retirement fund, and a credit union
account were not mandatory deductions. Similarly, we find that the court-ordered medical and dental
insurance for the child and the other means of support Randy was ordered to provide for the child are not
"mandatory" within the meaning of section 43-19-101; therefore, the chancellor did not commit error in
declining to consider these payments when he made his statutory calculation of child support. We find no
error here.
¶22. As described herein, we have found no error in the chancellor's decisions on any issues raised herein.
Accordingly, we affirm on all issues, plus assess statutory damages on the previous award of attorney's
fees.
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PIKE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED.
STATUTORY DAMAGES AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED TO THE APPELLEE. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, MYERS, CHANDLER
AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. BRIDGES, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH A
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J., AND JOINED IN
PART BY BRANTLEY, J. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT A SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.
BRIDGES, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶24. I concur in the analysis and result in Issue I, the distribution of property, Issue II (A), alimony and
Issue III, the amount of child support. However, I disagree with the discussion of Issue II (B), the awarding
of attorney's fees to Renee, and attempt to hereby enlighten the bench as to the need for specific findings in
such matters for the benefit of the appellate courts.
¶25. According to the Mississippi Supreme Court in Overstreet v. Overstreet, 692 So. 2d 88, 93 (Miss.
1997), the spouse requesting an award of payment of his or her attorney's fees must show positive evidence
of his or her own inability to pay. See also Austin v. Austin, 766 So. 2d 86 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000);
Magee v. Magee, 754 So. 2d 1275 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d
770, 778 (Miss. 1997); Smith v. Smith, 614 So. 2d 394, 398 (Miss. 1993); Martin v. Martin, 566 So.
2d 704, 707 (Miss. 1990). I concur with the majority's opinion that Renee Wells made a sufficient showing
that she was unable to pay her attorney for his services connected with this divorce. She submitted thorough
evidence of her financial situation through detailed itemization of her monthly expenses contrasted with her
current monthly salary and supporting affidavit.
¶26. No error may be found by this Court regarding the chancellor's award of attorney's fees to a party
where there is evidence of that party's inability to pay through proof of income and financial status. Austin,
766 So. 2d at (¶15). As such, I would not reverse and remand this case on this point alone. However, I
would like to point out that the case law also provides that the chancellor should record specific findings of
these matters, giving his reasoning as to why he granted the award of attorney's fees. Bullock v. Bullock,
733 So. 2d 292 (¶54) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982). The
Mississippi Supreme Court in McKee, pronounced that:
[I]n addition to the relative financial ability of the parties, [the chancellor is to consider] the skill and
standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at
issue, as well as the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the cause, the time and
labor required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case.
***
[T]he allowance of attorney fees . . . must be fair and just to all concerned after it has been
determined that the legal work being compensated was reasonably required and necessary.
McKee, 418 So. 2d at 767. See Bullock, 733 So. 2d at (¶54).
¶27. In my opinion, the chancellor did not make findings on any of these points. He simply granted the
amount that Renee was asking in attorney's fees with no further specificity noted on the record regarding his
reasoning and his findings on the legitimacy of the fees, the work done to acquire those fees, Renee's
financial hardships, etc. I am convinced that, while the law does not permit this Court to overturn an award
of attorney's fees unless a proper showing of inability to pay has not been made by the party requesting the
award, it is necessary for the chancellor to make specific findings and give specific reasoning for his
decision. As I have stated before in my assessment of the Mississippi Supreme Court decision in Sobieske
v. Preslar, 755 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 2000), regarding the need for specificity in findings dealing with child
custody, I believe that chancellors should be and have been in the past, required to make specific findings
when ruling on matters that are domestic in nature because of the sensitivity of the issues sometimes
discussed in those cases. In family law issues such as divorce, child custody and child support, the courts
are delving into very personal and guarded matters that should be dealt with in the most tactful manner.
Further, because of the personal and delicate nature of these types of cases, the chancellor owes the parties
as much as he can give them in the way of explaining his decision, a decision that will most times affect the
lives of everyone involved.
¶28. I hold true to my position that the chancellor must not take these matters lightly. Findings in domestic
matters, no matter what they be, should be discussed in a very definite and detailed fashion for the utmost
benefit of all parties and participants. The Mississippi Supreme Court has said as much in cases such as
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994), Brabham v. Brabham, 226 Miss. 165, 84 So. 2d
147 (1955) (both speaking about the specificity of findings on issues dealing with alimony), Albright v.
Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) (speaking about the specificity required in issues dealing with child
custody) and Brocato v. Brocato, 731 So. 2d 1138 (Miss. 1999) (echoing the mandate by Miss. Code
Ann. § 43-19-103 (Rev. 2000) that the chancellor must make specific findings on the record on the issue
of awarding child support above the statutory guidelines).
¶29. It stands to reason that the chancellor should then make these type of specific findings on any and all
matters related to issues involving divorce and children, despite the connotation in Sobieske that this Court
may sometimes assume that the chancellor made appropriate findings in certain cases without specific
reasoning provided. Sobieske, 755 So. 2d at 411-12. If Sobieske purports to overrule these other cases
requiring a chancellor to make detailed findings in the area of family law and allowing reviewing courts to
simply presume that the chancellor made those findings even if they are absent from the record, then I was
not made aware of such. If those were the court's intentions, it is my opinion that those intentions should be
unequivocally announced to all chancellors and this Court without any ambiguity. Otherwise, I opine that
specific findings by a chancellor must always be required in cases involving the dissolution of marriages and
awards granted in those dissolutions.
CHANDLER, J., JOINS AND BRANTLEY, J., JOINS IN PART THIS SEPARATE
OPINION.
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