James Earl Jones v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-KM-01021-COA
JAMES EARL JONES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
06/22/2000
HON. GEORGE B. READY
DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GWENDOLYN BAPTIST HEWLETT
JOHN KEITH PERRY JR.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEWITT T. ALLRED III
ANN H. LAMAR
CRIMINAL - FELONY
RESISTING ARREST: SENTENCED TO 45 DAYS IN
THE DESOTO COUNTY JAIL
AFFIRMED - 10/30/2001
11/20/2001
BEFORE KING, P.J., THOMAS, AND LEE, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. James Earl Jones was originally indicted for simple assault on a law enforcement officer; however, the
jury found him not guilty of simple assault. Instead, he was found guilty of resisting arrest. Jones was
sentenced to forty-five days in the DeSoto County Jail. Jones has filed a timely appeal from this sentence
and presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to give Jones's requested jury
instruction, (2) whether the alleged assault against Campbell constituted a misdemeanor outside of the
officer's presence which required the officer to obtain a warrant prior to arrest for the arrest to be lawful,
and (3) whether an arrest on an outstanding warrant for a misdemeanor contempt of court charge required
the officer to either possess the warrant at the time of arrest, or tell Jones the cause of his arrest for the
arrest to be lawful. This Court finds these issues without merit and affirms the decision of the trial court.
FACTS
¶2. Several portions of the record were not designated by Jones; the following are facts that were reflected
in the portions that were designated. On the day in question, Jones was initially located by James Campbell,
an Olive Branch code enforcer; Tim Gentry, an Olive Branch staff engineer; and Robert Millette, a
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality employee, on his property where excavating and rubbishdumping activities were occurring. Campbell had been attempting to get Jones to stop the excavating. On
this day, Campbell, Gentry, and Millette wished to serve a cease and desist order to Jones to stop the
excavation. However, they did not possess the order at the time of the confrontation, and orally informed
Jones that he needed to stop the excavation.
¶3. Campbell testified that as a result of the confrontation, Jones picked up a beam and acted as if he was
going to throw it at the truck in which Campbell was driving. In response to Jones's actions, Campbell left
the immediate area; however, he remained in close enough proximity to continue to observe Jones.
¶4. Campbell witnessed Jones leave the property and followed him to a place of business referred to as
Landau. While following Jones, Campbell radioed his secretary, who in turn radioed the police regarding
Jones's location. Once Jones and Campbell arrived at Landau, Jones entered the building, and Campbell
waited for the arrival of the police. Meanwhile, Gentry and Millette arrived to serve Jones with the cease
and desist order.
¶5. Jones refused to accept the order. Thereafter, Jones got into his automobile and proceeded out of his
parking place. While doing so, he "bumped" into the automobile in which Gentry and Millette were located.
Jones then proceeded to drive around the parking lot. Eventually, Jones parked his automobile and reentered Landau. While these events were occurring, police officers were being dispatched to Landau.
¶6. The officers were informed that Jones had committed a hit and run, and that there was an outstanding
warrant for his arrest. There was some testimony that this warrant was the result of a contempt of court
order due to Jones's failure to pay fines related to his excavation of the previously mentioned land. Once the
officers arrived at Landau, they entered the building whereupon they observed Jones. The officers
approached Jones, and attempted to handcuff him. It was at this time that Jones began to resist.
¶7. Jones would not give the officers his hands. Additionally, there was testimony that Jones had attempted
to obtain one of the officer's firearm. The officers placed Jones on the floor where the struggle to handcuff
Jones continued. As a result of Jones's failure to cooperate, one of the officers sprayed mace in Jones's
eyes. Thereafter, they were able to handcuff Jones. Jones was then lifted by the officers and carried out of
the building. The officers then placed Jones on the ground to perform a search for weapons. While on the
ground Jones kicked one of the officers in the arm. Since Jones kicked the officer, leg cuffs were placed on
him. The testimony of Campbell and Gentry confirmed that a struggle occurred between Jones and the
officers outside of the building.
¶8. We are only provided with the direct examination testimony of Jones, who stated that "they (i.e., the
police) just jumped me." He also stated that he was shocked "so [he] pulled back a little bit to see, you
know, what, what was happening, you know."
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE JONES'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION.
¶9. Before we address Jones's argument, we notice that counsel for Jones has cited to Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 51 (b) to support his argument. We are obliged to inform counsel that since this case
is criminal in nature, instead of civil, this rule is not persuasive as authority. See Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 1. Having taken care of this matter, we now look to the substance of Jones's issue.
¶10. Jones contends that he presented sufficient evidence at trial to grant his request for a jury instruction
regarding his right to defend his person by resisting an unlawful arrest. The State counters this argument by
asserting that the issue is procedurally barred from review because it was not presented to the trial judge for
a ruling.
¶11. As noted above, we only have segments of the record; however, the record does contain a written
copy of jury instructions presented to the trial judge, as well as the reading of the granted instructions by the
trial judge to the jury. Neither portion of the record reveals that Jones requested an instruction which stated
that he had the right to defend himself because he was resisting an unlawful arrest. In fact the record
indicates that a jury instruction conference and objections to instructions were reported but not transcribed
per Jones's designation of the record.
¶12. This Court observes that Jones's instruction number twelve was given and stated: "A person may resist
his own . . . arrest in which the police use excessive force." While there is a deletion in the instruction, there
in nothing in the record to reflect what was stated in the missing words. This Court will not speculate.
¶13. "In Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 127 (Miss. 1991), this Court stated: 'It is elementary that a
party seeking reversal of the judgment of a trial court must present this court with a record adequate to
show that an error of reversible proportions has been committed and that the point has been procedurally
preserved.'" Smith v. State, 729 So. 2d 1191, 1201 (¶38) (1998) (citation omitted). Jones failed to
preserve and present an adequate record for this Court's review. Therefore, we find this issue is
procedurally barred.
II. WHETHER THE ALLEGED ASSAULT AGAINST CAMPBELL CONSTITUTED A
MISDEMEANOR OUTSIDE OF THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE WHICH REQUIRED
THE OFFICER TO OBTAIN A WARRANT PRIOR TO ARREST FOR THE ARREST
TO BE LAWFUL.
¶14. Jones argues that the assault against Campbell constituted a misdemeanor outside of the officer's
presence which required the officer to obtain a warrant prior to his arrest for the arrest to be lawful. Once
again, the State asserts that this issue is procedurally barred because the issue was not presented for a
decision by the trial court.
¶15. We agree that the record before this Court does not disclose that an objection made on the
aforementioned basis was presented to the trial judge for a decision. Therefore, the issue is procedurally
barred. See Jones v. State, 606 So. 2d 1051, 1058 (Miss. 1992). However, we note that this issue might
not have been argued in the lower court because it is really a non-issue.
¶16. The officers testified that they were informed that Jones was present at Landau and that he was the
culprit of a "hit-and-run" incident. However, more importantly they testified that the dispatcher informed
them that there was an outstanding warrant for Jones's arrest. The officers had every right to arrest Jones,
not necessarily based on any confrontation with Campbell, but because of the information they received
regarding Jones's outstanding warrant for arrest. See Williams v. Lee County Sheriff's Dept., 744 So. 2d
286, 293-94 (¶17) (Miss. 1999). Therefore, this issue is without merit.
III. WHETHER AN ARREST ON AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT FOR A
MISDEMEANOR CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE REQUIRED THE OFFICER TO
EITHER POSSESS THE WARRANT AT THE TIME OF ARREST, OR TELL JONES
THE CAUSE OF HIS ARREST FOR THE ARREST TO BE LAWFUL.
¶17. Jones asserts that since the officers neither possessed nor informed him of the outstanding warrant, his
arrest was unlawful. However, as mentioned by the State, the record fails to reflect that Jones made an
objection on this ground before the trial court. Since Jones failed to present this argument in the lower court,
it is not properly before our Court and is procedurally barred. See Jones, 606 So. 2d at 1058.
Acknowledging that a procedural bar is in place, we now examine the merits of the issue.
¶18. Similar to the case at bar, we once again find authority in Williams v. Lee County Sheriff's Dept.,
where the Mississippi Supreme Court was presented with the following argument:
Williams also argues that the officers did not inform him of the arrest warrants while he was being
arrested and did not tell him the reason for his arrest. Subject to some exceptions, Miss. Code Ann. §
99-3-7 requires an officer to inform an accused of the "object and cause of the arrest without a
warrant." Williams claims that this omission makes his arrest illegal. This Court has held that the failure
to inform a defendant of the object and cause of the arrest does not invalidate the arrest in certain
incidences. Failing to tell a defendant why he is being arrested simply shifts the burden of proving
probable cause to the state. Thus, assuming that the officers did not tell Williams why he was being
arrested, the question becomes whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him.
Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Williams depends on whether at the time of the
arrest "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing" that Williams had
already committed a crime. This Court has held that "probable cause exists when facts and
circumstances within an officer's knowledge, or of which he has reasonable trustworthy information,
are sufficient themselves to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been
committed and that a particular person committed it."
[I]information provided to arresting officer by law enforcement source provide(s) . . . sufficient
probable cause to make an arrest.
Williams, 744 So. 2d at 294-95 (¶19-21) (citations omitted). As in Williams, the officers in the case at
bar were entitled to rely on the information they received from the law enforcement dispatcher. Since the
simple assault charge was a result of the actions taken by the officers on the outstanding arrest warrant there
was no error. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DESOTO COUNTY OF CONVICTION
OF RESISTING ARREST AND SENTENCE OF FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN THE DESOTO
COUNTY JAIL IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
