Roger B. Burge v. Richton Municipal Separate School District
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-01844-COA
ROGER B. BURGE AND COURTNEY AMBER BURGE, A MINOR, BY
AND THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND
v.
RICHTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANTS
APPELLEE
09/28/2000
HON. RICHARD W. MCKENZIE
PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
M. MARCIA SMALLEY
THOMAS A. WALLER
ROBERT ELLIOTT BRIGGS III
CIVIL - TORTS - OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED
AND THIS CAUSE OF ACTION IS HEREBY DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE WITH COSTS ASSESSED AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFFS
AFFIRMED - 10/16/2001
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
11/6/2001
BEFORE KING, P.J., BRIDGES, AND IRVING, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1. On or about August 23, 1998, Roger Burge provided written notification to the Richton Municipal
Separate School District that his daughter, Courtney Amber Burge, should not be picked up from school
by her mother and non-custodial parent, Melinda Burge Lea, without a signed court order allowing her to
do so. However, on December 17, 1998, Lea was seen on the school's campus just before she abducted
Courtney from her unsupervised classroom.
¶2. The Burges properly filed a notice of claim in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.
2000), informing the school district of their intent to file a complaint against it for negligence in allowing Lea
to take Courtney from its property. The Burges allege that this incident has caused them severe emotional
and mental distress and they wish to be compensated for such. Because the notice of claim was filed
according to statutory guidelines, an extension of ninety-five days was added to the one-year statute of
limitations in which the Burges had to file a complaint in this matter. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)
(Supp. 2000). The complaint was not filed against the school district, however, until May 23, 2000, after
the one-year plus ninety-five days allowed, which had run on March 21, 2000.
¶3. The school district subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for failure on the Burges' part to file a timely
complaint. A response to this motion was never filed by the Burges, but arguments were heard on this issue
on September 28, 2000. The trial court granted the dismissal in favor of the school district and dismissed
the case with prejudice. Following that ruling, a timely notice of appeal was filed by the Burges.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶4. In their brief before this Court, the Burges tirelessly argue that, because the courts have moved from a
mandatory compliance standard to a substantial compliance standard on the notice of claim requirement
under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp. 2000), we should take the step to consider also applying a
standard of substantial compliance to the subsection of that statute which dictates the limitations period in
which to file a complaint. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp. 2000). That subsection reads as follows:
All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one year next after
the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the
action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by
subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five days
from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the notice of claim . . . . After the
tolling period has expired, the claimant shall then have an additional ninety days to file any action
against the governmental entity served with proper claim notice.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp. 2000).
¶5. The action in this case accrued on December 17, 1998, the day that Lea walked onto school grounds
and removed her daughter without a court order. The one-year statute of limitations in which to file a claim
against the school district for its negligence would have run on December 17, 1999. However, it is
undisputed that a notice of claim was timely and properly filed by the Burges according to Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-46-11(1) (Supp. 2000). Therefore, the statute of limitations on this action would be tolled for ninetyfive days after December 17, 1999, which would have allowed the Burges to filed their claim up until
March 21, 2000. After March 21, 2000, the Burges' claim was lost.
¶6. While it would appear, at first glance, from the amendments to § 11-46-11(3) found in the 2000
supplement, that the Burges would then have had an additional ninety days after March 21, 2000, to file the
action against the school district, thereby giving them until June 19, 2000, this is not the case. Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp. 2000). As well, it is not the case that the Burges could argue that the minors'
savings clause under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(4) (Supp. 2000) would save their action here. Both of
these provisions were not yet in effect at the time the action occurred on December 17, 1998.
¶7. "The legislature shall have no power to revive any remedy which may have become barred by lapse of
time, or by any statute of limitation of this state." Miss. Const., art. 4, § 97. See also Cole v. National Life
Insurance Company, 549 So. 2d 1301, 1307 (Miss. 1989). Applying either the provision in Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp. 2000), allowing for the additional ninety days to file a claim, or the minors'
savings clause found in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(4) (Supp. 2000), to circumvent the March 21, 2000
deadline would therefore be unconstitutional. Cole, 549 So. 2d at 1307.
¶8. The Burges' argument that the statute of limitations here should be reduced to a substantial compliance
standard rather than a strict compliance standard is a far-reaching claim indeed. While they are correct in
pointing out that the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled in recent years that the notice of claim
requirements should be changed to this lower standard, this has no relevance to the statute governing
limitations here. See Ferrer v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors, 741 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1999);
Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261 (Miss. 1999) (both overruling the strict mandatory compliance
standard for the notice of claim requirement set out in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So. 2d 1179
(Miss. 1997)).
¶9. These statutes of limitation set out by our legislature serve very valid purposes. Mississippi Dept. of
Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So. 2d 662, 666 (Miss. 1999); Cole v. State, 608 So. 2d 1313, 1317
(Miss. 1992). According to the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stringer, one important reason for our oneyear statute of limitations under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is to "protect the State's interest in
conserving government funds and protecting the public health and welfare at the earliest possible moment."
Stringer, 748 So. 2d at 666. Furthermore, it has been said that the primary purpose for limitations statutes
in general is to make sure that a right of action is pursued within a "reasonable" amount of time. Cole, 608
So. 2d at 1317.
These statutes are founded upon the general experience of society that valid claims will be promptly
pursued and not allowed to remain neglected. They are designed to suppress assertion of false and
stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts
are incapable of production because of the lapse of time.
Id. The court in Cole goes on to hold that simply because a time-barred claim is an honest and possibly
merited claim, or because it has "the sanction of a moral obligation," it does not become exempt from the
limitation period. Id.
¶10. Additionally, as argued by the school district, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would not work to
avert the Burges' limitations problem here. "Inequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established to apply
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to a statute of limitations." Trosclair v. MDOT, 757 So. 2d 178, 181
(Miss. 2000); Stringer, 748 So. 2d at 665. We find no such conduct to be present on the part of the
school district according to the evidence presented. As such, we are not required to apply the doctrine to
avoid a "serious injustice" in this case. Trosclair, 757 So. 2d at 181.
¶11. Because of the notable purposes served by our statutes of limitation, we decline to relax those
limitations into a standard of substantial compliance simply because the Burges ask us to do so. They would
request that this Court take the moral "high-ground" here, but we are not at liberty to make such a decision
based on whatever our feelings may be about this case. We find that a conclusion predicated on morality
and emotions would not be in the best interest of justice and society. The Burges have not convinced us
that, simply because a lower standard has been applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court to the notice of
claim requirement, the same should be done for our one-year statute of limitations here. It stands to reason
that there would be no need to legislate limitation periods at all if we are simply going to allow plaintiffs to
only "substantially comply" with them. Because the Burges filed a proper and timely notice of claim
according to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp. 2000), they were entitled to ninety-five extra days in
which to file their cause of action past the one-year deadline. They did not do so. That is neither the fault of
this Court nor the school district.
¶12. Because this action was defunct after March 21, 2000, and because it cannot be revived according to
the cited mandates by the Mississippi Constitution, which have been recognized by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, we affirm the decision of the lower court to grant a dismissal with prejudice to the school district for
the reason that the claim was statutorily time-barred at the time it was filed on May 23, 2000.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PERRY COUNTY IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING P.JJ., THOMAS, IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
McMILLIN, C.J. AND BRANTLEY, J. LEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURRING:
¶14. The majority concludes that the time period for filing a claim against a governmental entity could not be
extended by the legislature once the cause of action had accrued, even though the initial filing deadline had
not yet been reached. I disagree. However, I find that even if the statute is interpreted in what I believe is
the correct manner, the suit still was untimely.
¶15. In my view, the majority has found a rule that prevents reviving deceased claims. It then attempts to fit
that rule to the prolonging of existing claims. Certainly, once a cause of action has expired by the running of
a statute of limitations, the legislature is without power to reinstate the claim by creating a longer time period
to sue. But that is not what happened here.
¶16. The cause of action accrued on December 17, 1998. Effective March 25, 1999, or barely three
months later, the legislature permitted claimants against governmental entities to file a notice within one year
of the cause of action of the intent to sue; the statute of limitations was tolled for 120 days from the date that
an entity such as this municipal school district received notice of a claim; suit had to be filed 90 days either
from the end of that period or from any earlier date that the claim was denied. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-4611 (3), as amended by 1999 Miss. Laws ch. 469.
¶17. The statutory change could have been explicitly made effective only as to causes of action accruing
thereafter. Instead, the statute was simply made effective on its date of passage, March 25, 1999. 1999
Miss. Laws ch. 469, § 2.
¶18. Two remaining questions exist once we see that the statute does not by its own terms only apply to
later causes of action. One is whether an immediately effective statute granting an additional period of time
within which to file suit can constitutionally apply to pending claims, and if so, whether this statute is
properly interpreted as having done so.
¶19. The constitutional point is simple. A statute that shortens the time within which to file suit is not to be
applied to pending claims. Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (Miss. 1987). However, a
statute that extends the period within which to file suit can be applied to pending claims. Id. at 1045. Thus, I
disagree with the majority's contrary conclusion.
¶20. The final issue, then, is whether this statute by just stating it becomes effective on a certain date,
actually gives the benefits of its changes to claims that were then pending. In other words, it would be
constitutional to do so, but as a matter of statutory interpretation, should this statute be so read? The
Supreme Court in some cases has said that changes to statutes of limitations are prospective in the absence
of a clear legislative statement directing retroactivity. Cole v. National Life Ins. Co., 549 So. 2d 1301,
1305 (Miss. 1989). Occasionally the court has held otherwise. Christmas v. State, 700 So. 2d 262, 268
(Miss. 1997). We are left with the need to decide how to apply this amendment that has left the one-year
statute of limitations unchanged, but altered the procedural deadlines once notice of a claim has timely been
given to a governmental entity.
¶21. First, I find that the most natural reading of the amendment is that it applied. To prevent the new
processing requirements from applying would likely require positive language from the legislature, since the
1999 amendment was the effective statute well before the claim was filed on October 7, 1999. Such
positive language could include that it would apply only to causes of action accruing after that date, but as
pointed out, no such language is in this enactment.
¶22. Further, the Supreme Court has held that procedural changes are implicitly retroactive. In one case, a
new obligation was imposed by statute before a municipality could exercise the power of eminent domain.
The statute was adopted after the city had commenced condemnation, but the court applied the amendment
anyway. City of Clarksdale v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 556 So. 2d 1056, 1057 (Miss. 1990).
The court held that a weakening of an attorney ethics interpretation would be applied retroactively. Walls
v. Mississippi State Bar, 437 So. 2d 30, 33 (Miss. 1983). These cases have even been used in settings
well beyond procedure and agencies to hold that if "cases are in the bosom of this Court and there is
involved a statute that is modified prior to a final decision of this Court, we take that modification into
consideration." Bell v. Mitchell, 592 So. 2d 528, 533 (Miss. 1991) (probate); Massingill v. Massingill,
594 So. 2d 1173, 1176 (Miss. 1992) (divorce action procedural change). We are addressing a procedural
change that I find should have been applied to claims not yet barred at the time it became effective.
¶23. Since this statute applies to the claim in this case, at least to the extent that it would cause an extension
and not a contraction of the time within which to file, it then becomes necessary to determine just when
Burge had to act under this statute.
¶24. The 1999 changes were adopted specifically for the purpose "to clarify notice of claim requirements
under the Tort Claims Act," and for related purposes. 1999 Miss. Laws ch. 469, caption. This amendment
consisted of a long insert into the statute, which I have underlined. No language was removed or altered
from the previous statute:
(3) All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year
next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability
phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as
required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of
ninety-five (95) days [.] from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the
notice of claim, or for one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the chief executive officer or
other statutorily designated official of a municipality, county or other political subdivision receives the
notice of claim, during which time no action may be maintained by the claimant unless the claimant has
received a notice of denial of claim. After the tolling period has expired, the claimant shall then have
an additional ninety (90) days to file any action against the governmental entity served with proper
claim notice. However, should the governmental entity deny any such claim, then the additional ninety
(90) days during which the claimant may file an action shall begin to run upon the claimant's receipt of
notice of denial of claim from the governmental entity. All notices of denial of claim shall be served by
governmental entities upon claimants by certified mail, return receipt requested, only. For purposes of
determining the running of limitations periods under this chapter, service of any notice of claim or
notice of denial of claim shall be effective upon delivery by the methods statutorily designated in this
chapter. The limitations period provided herein shall control and shall be exclusive in all actions
subject to and brought under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the nature of the claim, the
label or other characterization the claimant may use to describe it, or the provisions of any other
statute of limitations which would otherwise govern the type of claim or legal theory if it were not
subject to or brought under the provisions of this chapter.
1999 Miss. Laws ch. 469, § 1.
¶25. As can be seen, prior to 1999 the statute provided only that the one year statute of limitations was
"tolled" for 95 days by the filing of notice. 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 476, § 5. To "toll" a statute of limitations is
to "suspend or stop temporarily. . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1488 (6th ed. 1990). Thus the one year
period, whether it was interrupted after one day or after eleven months and 29 days, was suspended for 95
days and then resumed at the point that it had earlier been suspended. As a result of the 1999 change, the
filing of a notice now no longer just suspended the one year statute of limitations. The one year limitations
period is still said to be "tolled," but the statute then provides that the 90 day period within which to file suit
begins at the end of the tolling period. True, when the statute provides that the claimant has "an additional
90 days" to file after the tolling period has run, this creates some minimal ambiguity. "Additional" to what? Is
it to the entire tolling period plus the one year or just in addition to the end of the tolling period? What
"additional" means is made clear by the next sentence, which provides that if the governmental entity rejects
the claim in less time than the tolling period would allow, "then the additional ninety (90) days during which
the claimant may file an action shall begin to run upon the claimant's receipt of notice of denial of claim from
the governmental entity." The phrase "additional ninety days" surely means the same in both places.
Therefore, once the 120 days has expired or once the governmental body has rejected the claim if that is
sooner, the claimant has 90 days within which to file suit.
¶26. This means that the statute might better be understood as providing a one year period within which to
file a notice of claim. Once that is filed, a state agency has 95 days and other governmental bodies 120 days
to respond to the claim. Then beginning with the end of those time periods or with an earlier denial, the
claimant has 90 days to file suit.
¶27. This is a reasonable procedure. No matter when a claimant gives timely notice and no matter when or
if a governmental entity timely responds, the claimant will have 90 days either from the date a timely denial is
received or from the end of the period for a response.
¶28. Applying that statute to the claim in this case, we find the following:
1) Burge gave notice to the school district on October 7, 1999, within the one year period from the
accrual of the cause of action on December 17, 1998.
2) The deadline for the school's response was 120 days from October 7, but it never responded. On
February 4, 2000, the 120 days expired.
3) Burge had 90 days from February 4 to file suit, or May 4. Instead, suit was filed on May 23,
2000. By then yet another version of the statute was in existence. That solely added a savings for
minors that did not even apply to a claim until May 15, 2000. 2000 Miss. Laws ch. 315, § 1.
¶29. Under the old statute, Burge would have had one year and 95 days from December 17, 1998, or until
March 21, 2000. So the new statute did not shorten the permitted time.
¶30. What is troubling about any situation such as this is that important rights of a party are being affected
by the need to interpret a less than perfectly clear statute. Yet, I find no other reasonable reading of the
statute. Any suggestion that a claimant has one year plus 95/120 days plus 90 days must overcome both the
natural reading of the overall statute and the specific interpretation barrier that "the additional ninety (90)
days during which the claimant may file an action shall begin to run upon the claimant's receipt of notice of
denial of claim from the governmental entity."
¶31. Erring on the side of early filing is a means to avoid risks arising from interpretation doubts. Indeed, the
claimant did not argue the liberal interpretation that I have suggested and found to be unreasonable. Instead,
the plaintiff unconvincingly sought to apply the open-ended "substantial compliance" caselaw that has
developed under this statute.
¶32. I agree with affirming the dismissal of this suit.
McMILLIN, C.J., AND BRANTLEY, J., JOIN THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
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