Nathaniel Stokes Watson v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-KA-01405-COA
NATHANIEL STOKES WATSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
08/13/2000
HON. GEORGE C. CARLSON JR.
PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DAVID CLAY VANDERBURG
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
ANN H. LAMAR
CRIMINAL - FELONY
COUNT I: BURGLARY OF A DWELLING - SENTENCED
TO SERVE 25 YEARS IN MDOC TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE IN CAUSE
#CR 99-155-B(T); COUNT II GRAND LARCENY:
SENTENCED TO 5 YEARS IN MDOC TO RUN
CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I.
AFFIRMED - 09/18/2001
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/9/2001
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, AND MYERS, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Nathaniel Stokes Watson has appealed his conviction for burglary and grand larceny in the Circuit
Court of the Second Judicial District of Panola County. He alleges that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to sustain the convictions and asks this Court to reverse both convictions and render verdicts
of not guilty. Alternatively, he urges this Court to conclude that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial
when his defense counsel's cross-examination of a State's witness was arbitrarily curtailed by a ruling of the
trial court. We find no merit in either claim and affirm Watson's convictions.
I.
Facts
¶2. As a result of a law enforcement investigation, Watson and Antonio Readus became suspects in the
June 24, 1999, burglary of the residence of Billy Baker. Readus ultimately confessed to his role in the
burglary, telling police he and Watson had sold certain items of the stolen merchandise to Shawn White. He
assisted police in recovering said merchandise from the home of White. At trial, Readus testified for the
State and told the jury that he and Watson had acted in concert in committing the burglary. Readus's
testimony was the principal evidence directly implicating Watson in the crime.
II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶3. The State seeks to raise a procedural bar to consideration of Watson's attack on the sufficiency of the
evidence, saying that, though Watson moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case in chief
(which the trial court denied), he failed to renew the motion after putting on evidence in his defense. It is, in
fact, correct that the decision to put on evidence in defense of a criminal charge after a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of the State's case has been denied acts as a waiver of error as to that ruling. Harrell v.
State, 583 So. 2d 963, 965 (Miss. 1991). However, while Watson did not verbally renew his motion for a
directed verdict after the defense rested, the record shows that, among the jury instructions he submitted,
was one asking the court to direct a verdict of acquittal. The record further shows that this requested
instruction was refused. After the guilty verdict was returned, Watson filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and, as one ground in support of the motion, alleged that "[n]o reasonable juror
could find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ." This motion was denied by written order
of the trial court. We conclude that this was sufficient to preserve for review on appeal a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence and we, therefore, proceed to the merits of Watson's claim of error.
¶4. In his brief, Watson states in general principles the considerations that must be taken into account in
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt of a criminal charge. However, he fails to speak with any
particularity as to what essential element or elements of the crime were not shown to have been committed
by Watson by the proof. Our independent review of the record leaves us convinced that the State put on
competent evidence as to each of the essential elements of the charged crimes. Though the primary
evidence implicating Watson in the crimes came from his co-indictee, Antonio Readus, the law of this State
is clear that such testimony is sufficient to uphold a conviction. Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 904, 910 (¶17)
(Miss. 1994). We find Watson's rather nebulous assertions regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to be
without merit.
III.
Objections to Hearsay
¶5. Secondly, Watson claims that he was prevented from vigorously cross-examining his co-indictee,
Antonio Readus, in an attempt to impeach Readus's testimony implicating Watson in the crimes. Because
Readus's testimony was a critical part of the State's case, Watson contends that his inability to pursue
legitimate impeachment of the witness denied him a fundamentally fair trial, citing Sayles v. State, 552 So.
2d 1383 (Miss. 1989). In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction on the
ground, among others, that the defense was improperly cut off from attempting to show a witness's bias
based on the fact that the defendant had previously been romantically involved with the witness's wife.
Sayles, 552 So. 2d at 1386. The Sayles case does, in fact, stand for the proposition that a defendant is
entitled to fully test the witnesses against him through a vigorous cross-examination and it may constitute
reversible error if that right is arbitrarily denied. Id. However, the case also stands for the proposition that
the cross-examination must be about some issue relevant to the case. Id. at 1385. In the case now before
us, defense counsel was trying to force Readus to concede that Shawn White, the person from whom the
stolen goods were recovered, had told police that Readus was alone when the goods were delivered to him
and that Watson was not present at the time as Readus had testified at trial. The trial court sustained a
hearsay objection to that testimony. Trial counsel then asked the witness whether he had read White's
statement given to the police. The trial court sustained an objection to that question as both irrelevant and as
hearsay, since it seemed to be an attempt to get information in White's statement before the jury.
¶6. On appeal, Watson advances the proposition that the question concerning whether Readus had read
White's statement was capable of a "yes or no" answer that did not involve an issue of hearsay, so the trial
court erred in sustaining an objection on that ground. While this may technically be correct, it is also true
that the fact of whether or not Readus had read White's statement was, standing alone, irrelevant to the
issue being tried. Only if Readus could be subjected to further inquiry about the statement's contents was
there any possibility that matters relating to the crime could be brought out. It is evident from reviewing the
record that defense counsel's aim was to have Readus reveal matters of fact about the case as contained in
White's statement for the purpose of contrasting White's version with that offered by Readus. It would have
been impossible to pursue such a course without running afoul of the evidentiary rules against admitting
hearsay. Murphy v. State, 453 So. 2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1984). The fact that the trial court may have
been slightly premature in sustaining a hearsay objection one question too early, when the direction of
defense counsel's line of inquiry was so evident, does not constitute reversible error.
¶7. Certainly, a witness may be impeached by a demonstration that other potentially more credible
witnesses have given a different version of critical events. However, the facts as related by others must be
proven to the jury in some way other than a hearsay declaration from the witness sought to be impeached.
The trial court did not commit reversible error in his evidentiary rulings regarding this attempt by the defense
to impeach the testimony of Antonio Readus.
¶8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PANOLA COUNTY OF CONVICTION
OF COUNT I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE IN CAUSE #CR99-155-B(T); AND
COUNT II, GRAND LARCENY, AND SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS TO RUN
CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, TO BE SERVED IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO PANOLA COUNTY.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, AND
CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. BRANTLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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