Nathaniel E. Walker v. Pines Trailer Limited Partnership
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 96-CC-01307 COA
NATHANIEL E. WALKER
v.
PINES TRAILER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPELLEES
THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED,
PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
9/14/96
HON. WARREN ASHLEY HINES
WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ALBERT B. SMITH III
ANDREW N. ALEXANDER
CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION
REVERSED ORDER OF THE MISSISSIPPI
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FULL
COMMISSION.
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 2/10/98
2/24/98
4/28/98
BEFORE THOMAS, P.J., HERRING, AND HINKEBEIN, JJ.
HERRING, J., FOR THE COURT:
This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi,
which reversed an order of the Workers' Compensation Commission of the State of Mississippi. The
Commission awarded Nathaniel E. Walker, the claimant and appellant herein, temporary total
disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits as a result of an injury which he sustained
during the course of his employment. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission and
Walker now appeals to this Court.
After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find that the circuit court committed reversible
error. Thus, we reverse and remand this action to the Commission for further findings.
A. THE FACTS
Nathaniel Walker was injured on April 28, 1992, during the course and within the scope of his
employment with Pines Trailer Limited Partnership. The injury occurred when Walker bumped his
knee on a metal rail while he was inspecting trailers during the course of his duties. The record
discloses that Walker reported the accident immediately to his supervisor. As a result of the accident,
Walker suffered a dislocated kneecap. According to the deposition of Dr. Richard A. Knutson, an
orthopedic surgeon, Walker continued to work full-time after the accident and participated in a
regimen of conservative treatment and physical therapy for his injury. However, he was taken off
work on August 25, 1992, by Dr. Walter A. Shelton and was first seen by Dr. Knutson on September
11, 1992. Dr. Knutson later performed knee surgery on September 29, 1992, to correct the recurrent
dislocation of Walker's left patella, or kneecap, which had been unresponsive to conservative therapy.
All parties have stipulated that Walker's knee injury was work related and compensable.
Following his surgery, Walker had a continued collection of fluid in his knee that was very persistent,
and he was ordered to perform knee exercises under the supervision of Gene Snipes, a physical
therapist. At some point during the course of his physical therapy exercises, Walker developed
significant back pain. As a result, his physical therapy schedule was modified. The Appellant was later
examined by a neurological surgeon, Dr. Earnest Cashion. Both physicians, Drs. Knutson and
Cashion, were of the opinion that the back pain experienced by Walker resulted from degenerative
bulging in the lumbar area and was caused by the physical therapy exercises engaged in by Walker as
a result of his knee injury. A myelogram was performed on December 10, 1993, by Dr. Robert
Oliver, and the result of that test indicated that Walker had a mild central bulging disc at L5-S1. On
October 14, 1994, Dr. Knutson assigned Walker a permanent eighteen percent (18%) impairment to
his body as a whole as a result of the back injury, and a four percent (4%) permanent disability to the
body as a whole in regard to his knee injury. The record indicates that Walker had no previous
history of knee or back problems
EMPLOYMENT SUBSEQUENT TO INJURY
As stated, Walker's injury occurred on April 28, 1992, but he continued to work with a leg brace
while undergoing outpatient treatment for his knee problem. Thereafter, he was taken off work by his
physician on August 25, 1992, when his kneecap would not stabilize in its normal position. Knee
surgery was performed on September 29, 1992, to correct the chronic dislocation of the kneecap. Dr.
Knutson released Walker for work with no restrictions on March 25, 1993. Walker testified that prior
to that time he attempted to return to light duty at Pines Trailer on several occasions but was unable
to do the work assigned to him. Ultimately, he voluntarily discontinued his employment with Pines
Trailer, without notice, because there were no light duties for him to perform there. He was
terminated by Pines Trailer some time around April 1, 1993. Thereafter, he worked at a series of
jobs, most of which he voluntarily quit, as follows:
(1) He worked for Baxter's Cleaning Service for approximately two weeks for $4.25 per hour
during March, 1993, while he was still on the employment rolls of Pines Trailer. Walker
considered the work at Baxter's Cleaning Service to be light duty compared to his work at Pines
Trailer, although it involved frequent stooping, reaching, and bending. He stated that
reoccurring physical problems caused him to leave Baxter's and seek other employment.
(2) The Appellant left Baxter's and went to work for McDonald's Restaurant in March, 1993,
earning $5.50 per hour. He was eventually promoted to shift manager. This work included
cooking, sweeping, cleaning, and some lifting, as well as meeting the public. Walker testified
that he had great difficulty performing this job because of his physical problems, but he
performed his duties because he needed to work. He also encountered harassment from jealous
co-workers who took offense to the fact that he was promoted to shift manager, even though
he did not and could not perform many of the jobs performed by other employees. As a result of
the stressful environment and reoccurring problems with his knee and back, Walker voluntarily
terminated his employment with McDonald's in August, 1993. He remained unemployed from
August to December, 1993.
(3) Walker was employed by the Cotton Club Casino from December, 1993, until February 28,
1994, with an hourly pay of $6.00.(1)
(4) From the Cotton Club, he went on to work as a floor attendant for the Las Vegas Casino,
where he worked for the sum of $8.50 per hour. It is noteworthy that prior to his injury,
Walker's salary at Pines Trailer was $7.50 per hour. His duties at Las Vegas casino included
filling slot machines with coins, monitoring "change persons" in the slot machine area, and
paying off jackpots. Walker was terminated by Las Vegas Casino on August 21, 1994, because
he failed to show up for work without advising his employer. However, Walker stated that he
left voluntarily, due to increased back pain, to return to the Cotton Club Casino, for a salary of
$5.50 per hour.
(5) Two weeks following his return to the Cotton Club Casino, Walker, along with a huge
number of other employees, was laid off. It is noteworthy that Monica Williams, a shift
supervisor at the Cotton Club, testified that Walker was laid off because of his inability to do
the required work due to his back pain. After a brief period, Walker was asked to return to the
Cotton Club, but declined to do so, stating that he had no transportation to or from work and
that he was unwilling to pay cab fare.
JOB PROSPECTS IN THE FUTURE
Several witnesses presented cumulative testimony that Walker was unable to lift objects or to
perform other types of manual labor. According to the vocational assessment report of Latrice J.
Graves, a rehabilitation consultant of Southern Rehab Resources, Inc., Walker was thirty-two years
old when he injured his knee, was 5'9'' in height, and weighed 125 pounds. He received his GED at
age twenty-four, held a certificate as a nursing assistant, and served on active duty in the U.S. Army
from 1980-83, when he received an honorable discharge. She stated that based upon Walker's
education, previous work skills, and also because of his restriction to sedentary work (according to
the opinion of Dr. Cashion), he should be referred to the Department of Rehabilitation Services for
vocational testing and evaluation for on-the-job training for some sort of clerical work. She estimated
that Walker might be able to perform clerical duties at an entry level rate of pay of $5 per hour, but
such jobs would not readily be available to Walker without further training.
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE AND THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
The administrative judge made the following findings of fact on August 15, 1995:
1. Claimant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of his knee injury from April 28, 1992
through March 25, 1993, the date of his release by Dr. Knutson, the claimant's primary treating
physician, and the date herein relied upon as the date of maximum medical improvement of the
claimant as it relates to his knee.
2. Claimant suffered a further injury to his back after participating in a medically directed course
of physical therapy for his knee injury which created a subsequent period of temporary total
disability to the claimant commencing on March 26, 1993 and concluding on October 14, 1994,
the date herein relied upon as the date of maximum medical improvement related to the
claimant's compensable back injury.
3. It is determined herein that the resultant back injury suffered by the claimant was a natural
consequence flowing from the initial admitted work related injury. This conclusion is based on
the medical testimony of Drs. Knutson and Cashion which supports this claim as well as the
absence of any independent intervening cause attributable to the claimant's own intentional
conduct. Medart Division of Jackes-Evans Mfg. v. Adams, 344 So. 2d 141 (Miss. 1977).
4. Taking into consideration the injuries herein, the claimant has suffered a permanent partial
medical impairment to the body as a whole which translates into a loss of wage-earning capacity
for this individual. The subsequent back condition removes this cause from a scheduled member
designation and transforms same into a body as a whole classification. The assignment by Dr.
Knutson of an 18% medical impairment to the body as a whole was considered as well as all
efforts by the claimant post injuries to secure gainful employment. Clearly the claimant is
capable of working, but the injuries have impacted somewhat his future earning potential. To
what degree this future earnings has been impacted is debatable, and would appear somewhat
minimal in light of the jobs claimant undertook post injury, and voluntarily quit and/or refused.
However, lay and medical testimony combine to create a situation wherein compensability must
lie.
Thereafter the administrative judge granted Walker the following relief:
1. Temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $172.68 from April 28, 1992 through
October 14, 1994 with proper credit to be given for any wages, monies or benefits previously
paid to the claimant during this time period;
2. Permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $59.34 and continuing for the maximum
statutory period as outlined in Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 71-3-17(25) (1972);
3. Penalties and interest, if applicable, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 71-337(5)(1972);
4. Provide medical services and supplies as the nature of the claimant's injury requires and the
process of his recovery therefrom pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 71-3-15
(1972).
In making this award, the judge was apparently mindful of the stipulation of the parties that Walker's
average weekly wage was $259.00. Thus, she arrived at the sum of $172.68 as the award for
temporary total disability, consistent with Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-3-17(a) (Rev. 1990), by
calculating two-thirds of Walker's average weekly wage of $259. The sum of $59.34 as permanent
partial disability benefits was apparently arrived at pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-317(c)(25)(Rev. 1990), by concluding that Walker's current wage earning capacity at the time of the
hearing was $5 per hour, or $200 per week (assuming a forty hour work week). Although the
administrative judge made no explanation as to how she arrived at the award for permanent partial
disability other than by making reference to Section 71-3-17(c)(25), it is probable that she
substantially awarded the difference between Walker's average weekly wage of $259 and his current
wage earning capacity of $200 per week.
The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge by
order of the Full Commission on January 12, 1996. Pines Trailer appealed this decision, citing a lack
of substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The Circuit Court of Washington
County agreed with Pines and reversed, stating that Walker "demonstrated no loss of wage earning
capacity as a result of his on the job injury" and that Walker "has at no time during his post-injury
employment ever left a job because of his on the job injury at Pines Trailer." The circuit court
concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the Mississippi Workers' Compensation
Commission's order. Walker now asks us to reinstate the Commission's order.
B. THE ISSUES
I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI TO FIND THAT THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD
OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS FROM MARCH 26, 1993, THROUGH
OCTOBER 14, 1994.
II. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI TO FIND THAT THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD
OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE AMOUNT OF $59.34 AND
CONTINUING FOR THE MAXIMUM PERIOD AS OUTLINED IN MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 71-3-17(25).
C. ANALYSIS
It is well settled in Mississippi that the Workers' Compensation Commission is the ultimate finder of
fact in cases of this type, and its findings are subject to normal deferential standards of review.
Natchez Equip. Co., Inc. v. Gibbs, 623 So. 2d 270, 273 (Miss. 1993). The findings of the Workers'
Compensation Commission will only be reversed by an appellate court where such findings are clearly
erroneous and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Ray v. Mississippi State Bd. of
Health, 598 So. 2d 760, 764 (Miss. 1992). "If the findings are supported by substantial evidence,
then they are beyond the power of this Court to disturb." Id. Section 71-3-51 of the Mississippi
Code of 1972 (Rev. 1995) addresses the matter of judicial review of the findings of the Commission
by a circuit court. Section 71-3-51 states:
The circuit court shall review all questions of law and fact. If no prejudicial error be found, the
matter shall be affirmed and remanded to the commission for enforcement. If prejudicial error
be found, the same shall be reversed and the circuit court shall enter such judgment or award as
the commission should have entered.
In Walker Mfg. Co. v. Cantrell, 577 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991), the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated:
We have repeatedly read this statute to establish the Circuit Court's function as that of an
intermediate court of appeals. More to the point, we have held repeatedly that the Circuit
Courts must defer in their review to the findings of the Commission.
In a very real sense, all of this is nothing other than a workers' compensation variant on
accepted limitations upon the scope of judicial review of administrative agency decisions, i.e.,
that the courts may interfere only where the agency action is seen as arbitrary or capricious.
Arbitrariness and caprice are in substantial part a function of the presence vel non of credible
evidence supporting the agency decision. Where we find such evidence, we have no more
authority to interfere with the decisions of the Commission than we do in a case of any other
administrative body.
(citations omitted). In keeping with this standard, we will reverse the decision and findings of the
Commission only where the rulings of the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court ruled that the decisions of the administrative law judge and
the Commission were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. As stated above, a circuit
court does not sit as an additional fact finder, and its sole function in relation to the facts of a case is
to determine whether the Commission's decision is based on substantial evidence. This is so even if
the circuit court would have ruled differently if it had heard the case originally. In other words, an
appellate court should not "reweigh" the facts or substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency. Sprouse v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 639 So. 2d 901, 902
(Miss. 1994). See also Mississippi Public Serv. Comm'n v. Merchants Truck Line, Inc., 598 So.
2d 778, 782 (Miss. 1992).
We will now turn to the two issues presented by Walker on appeal with the above stated standard of
review in mind. The two issues will be discussed together since they overlap in their scope.
I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI TO FIND THAT THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD
OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS FROM MARCH 26, 1993 THROUGH
OCTOBER 14, 1994?
II. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI TO FIND THAT THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD
OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE AMOUNT OF $59.34 AND
CONTINUING FOR THE MAXIMUM PERIOD AS OUTLINED IN MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 71-3-17(25)?
On both issues, Walker simply argues that the Commission's order was supported by substantial
evidence and that the circuit court exceeded its scope of review in reversing when it reversed the
decision of the Commission and administrative judge. Pines Trailer counters by pointing out that
Walker was working and earning full wages during the period which the Commission found him to be
disabled. Indeed, at one point he was earning more money than he had been earning prior to his
injury. Thus, Pines Trailer asserts that Walker suffered no loss of wage earning capacity. The
Appellee also asserts that Walker would have been working for the entire time period of his
"disability" had he not voluntarily quit work or been terminated by his employer. More specifically,
Pines Trailer cites Wilcher v. D.D. Ballard Contr. Co., 187 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1966) for the
proposition that post injury earnings which are equal to or in excess of pre-injury earnings give rise to
a presumption that the claimant has not suffered a loss in wage earning capacity. Wilcher, 187 So. 2d
at 310. However, this presumption can be overcome by a showing that, inter alia, post injury
earnings are unreliable due to the temporary and unpredictable nature of such earnings, or by a
showing that the claimant's increase in pay is attributable to his own increase in maturity in training.
Id. at 311. The Commission gave no specific reason for its decision to award temporary total and
permanent partial benefits to Walker. However, we must assume that it took into consideration the
fact that Walker made up to $8.50 per hour working for Las Vegas Casino when he only made $7.50
per hour at the time of his injury. We must also assume that the Commission concluded that the
presumption of no loss of wage-earning capacity was factually overcome by the fact that Walker's
increased wages were temporary or otherwise unreliable because of his knee and back problems.
"Where there are no specific findings of fact, this Court will assume that the trial court made
determinations of fact sufficient to support its judgment." Century 21 Deep South Prop., Ltd. v.
Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 367 (Miss. 1992). Thus, we defer to the Commission in its decision to
adopt the findings of Latricia Graves, who estimated Walker's wage earning capacity at the time of
the hearing to be only $5 per hour.
Pines Trailer also relies on Wilcher to support its argument that Walker is prohibited from receiving
any temporary disability benefits because he returned to full-time employment after the injury. Id. at
311. However, the administrative law judge considered this fact and only awarded benefits to Walker
for the time in which he was actually out of work, and allowed Pines Trailer a credit for any benefits
or wages payed to Walker during the time of his temporary total disability. Thus, we find that Pines
Trailer was adequately protected from duplication of payment or benefits by the Commission's order.
As stated above, an appellate court should not reverse the findings of the Commission that are
supported by substantial evidence. The circuit court ruled that Walker "at no time during his postinjury employment left a job because of his on the job injury at Pines Trailer nor has he shown a loss
of wage earning capacity." We disagree. A review of the record reveals that the Commission's finding
that Walker did suffer a loss of earning capacity is supported by undisputed evidence that both his
original knee injury and the ensuing back injury were work related. This conclusion by the
Commission is supported by the testimony of Dr. Knutson and Dr. Cashion. Dr. Knutson further
testified that he expected Walker to have back problems in the future. Walker testified that he could
not adequately perform the duties of any of his post injury jobs, and that this failure to do so played
at least some part in his departure from each job. Walker further stated that he remained at work,
despite the pain he was suffering, because he had to provide for his family. Moreover, Dr. Knutson's
diagnosis of Walker's physical condition was consistent with Walker's claim that he was unable to
perform various work duties which involved manual labor. In addition, Latricia Graves, the
rehabilitation consultant, estimated Walker's earning capacity after further training to be only $5 per
hour, as opposed to the $7.50 per hour which he was making at the time of his injury. Thus, we rule
that the evidence presented by Walker, while certainly not overwhelming, was substantial.
Furthermore, Pines Trailer put on no proof which indicated that Walker suffered no injury or that he
could, in fact, perform the duties of his job at Pines Trailer.
This is a close case that could have been decided in favor of either party. However, since the
Commission's order was neither clearly erroneous, nor against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence, and because the decision of the Commission was not lacking in substantial evidence, we
must defer to the findings of the Commission in accord with the Mississippi Supreme Court's
guidelines. Thus, we reverse and reinstate the order of the Workers' Compensation Commission with
one exception. We do note one apparent plain error in the Commission's order which has to do with
its calculation of permanent partial disability benefits which were awarded pursuant to Miss. Code
Ann. § 71-3-17(c)(25). This Court may notice plain error not identified or specified by the appellant.
See Rule 28(a)(3). Furthermore, "[m]anifest errors in calculation are subject to modification by this
Court." Shearer v. Shearer, 540 So. 2d 9, 11 (Miss. 1989). Under Section 71-3-17(c)(25), the
proper award of permanent partial disability benefits is to be arrived at by taking two thirds (or sixty
six and two thirds percent) of the difference between the average weekly wage of the claimant before
the injury, and his post injury wage-earning capacity. As stated above, the administrative judge
awarded Walker $59.34, the apparent difference between Walker's pre-injury average weekly wage
and his post-injury wage earning capacity. It is apparent that the Commission did not calculate twothirds of the difference between Walker's pre-injury average weekly wage ($259), and his post-injury
wage earning capacity as required by Section 71-3-17(c)(25). Instead, the Commission appears to
have awarded Walker one hundred percent (100%) of the difference between those two figures.
Thus, we not only reverse the ruling of the circuit court but also remand this proceeding to the
Commission to recalculate the correct amount of permanent partial disability benefits to which
Walker is entitled pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-17(c)(25).
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED TO THE COMMISSION FOR ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO THE APPELLEES.
BRIDGES, C.J., McMILLIN AND THOMAS, P.JJ., COLEMAN, DIAZ, HINKEBEIN,
KING, PAYNE, AND SOUTHWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
1. In December of 1993, Walker also saw Dr. Solomon who stated in his records that Walker
might be suffering from a ruptured disc in the lumbar region of his back.
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