Original Jurisdiction In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, a Minnesota

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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A21-0338 Original Jurisdiction In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0191139 Filed: April 26, 2023 Office of Appellate Courts ________________________ Susan M. Humiston, Director, Timothy M. Burke, Senior Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner. Herbert A. Igbanugo, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se. ________________________ SYLLABUS 1. The referee’s findings and conclusions that the attorney committed misconduct in seven matters by neglect, failing to notify clients, failing to explain legal issues, collecting unreasonable fees, collecting improper availability fees, failing to issue or to promptly issue refunds of unearned fees, failing to have measures to ensure lawyers and non-lawyers at his firm conformed with professional obligations, and providing false and misleading information were not clearly erroneous. 2. The referee’s evidentiary decisions were not an abuse of discretion. 3. The attorney failed to establish that the disciplinary process violated his constitutional rights. 1 4. An indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months is the appropriate discipline for the attorney’s misconduct. Suspended. OPINION PER CURIAM. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (the Director) petitioned for disciplinary action against respondent-attorney Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, alleging 54 violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the referee’s factual findings concluded that Igbanugo committed 50 rule violations across 7 client matters. These violations included failing to act with diligence, failing to notify clients of important updates, failing to properly explain legal issues to clients, collecting unreasonable fees (including availability fees when he was already retained to perform legal services), failing to issue prompt refunds of unearned advanced fees, failing to refund unearned advanced fees, failing to take reasonable steps to make sure the firm had measures to ensure all lawyers and non-lawyers complied with professional obligations, and providing false and misleading information. The referee found five aggravating factors, no mitigating factors, and determined Igbanugo’s constitutional rights were not violated during the disciplinary process. The referee recommended that Igbanugo be suspended from the practice of law for 10 months. Igbanugo challenges the referee’s findings, conclusions, and evidentiary decisions and argues the proceedings and investigation violated his constitutional rights. The Director contends that the recommended discipline is too lenient and asks us to suspend 2 Igbanugo for a minimum of 1 year. We conclude that the referee’s findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous, the referee’s evidentiary decisions were not an abuse of discretion, and Igbanugo’s constitutional rights were not violated. We also conclude the appropriate discipline given Igbanugo’s misconduct is an indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months. FACTS Igbanugo was admitted to practice law in July 1988 and has primarily practiced in immigration law. In 2006, Igbanugo started his own firm, Igbanugo Partners International Law Firm. Igbanugo hired Jason Nielson as an associate attorney in 2013, and Nielson became a junior partner in 2014. 1 The misconduct in this case occurred in seven client matters between 2011 and 2019. We begin by briefly summarizing Igbanugo’s misconduct. A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. Matters We address the A.C-G, M.D., and O.O.C. matters together because the facts and Igbanugo’s actions in each case are similar. A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. are Mexican nationals who entered the United States without inspection. They each have U.S.-citizen children. The clients told Igbanugo they did not have legal status but wanted legal residency. Igbanugo told the clients they could obtain legal residency through their U.S.-citizen children. The Director petitioned for disciplinary action against Nielson based, in part, on two client matters that are also included here. We suspended Nielson for a minimum of 30 days in July 2022. In re Nielson, 977 N.W.2d 599, 614–15 (Minn. 2022). 1 3 Each client entered a retainer agreement with Igbanugo’s firm that contemplated form I-130 petitions and form I-601A waivers. 2 Each retainer agreement called for availability-retainer fees. Igbanugo or his employees falsely told each client that their U.S.-citizen children were qualifying relatives for the purposes of the I-601A waiver. 3 Igbanugo filed a form I-130 with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for each client and USCIS approved the forms. After form I-130 approval, Igbanugo or his employees reiterated, falsely, that the clients’ U.S.-citizen children were qualifying relatives for an I-601A waiver. After collecting necessary materials from the clients for the I-601A waivers, Igbanugo notified each client that their children were not qualifying relatives, and as a result they were ineligible for an I-601A waiver. Each client paid Igbanugo large sums of money for services he did not complete; Igbanugo did not refund the unearned retainer money to these clients. In M.D.’s case, the National Visa Center (NVC) invoiced Igbanugo’s firm because more than a year passed without any action on M.D.’s I-130 petition. Because of the inaction, the forms and fees associated with M.D.’s I-130 had to be resubmitted to NVC; Igbanugo never notified M.D. We explained these forms in more detail in Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604. An I-130 Petition for Alien Relative Form is filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) “to establish a qualifying family relationship with a relative (foreign national).” Id. An I-601A Application for Provisional Unlawful Pretense Waiver is used to request a waiver of unlawful presence in the United States based on a substantial hardship to a qualifying relative (I-601A waiver). Id. 2 A “qualifying relative must be a U.S. Citizen or lawful permanent resident who is a parent or spouse of the foreign national. A child may not be a qualifying relative.” Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604–05 (footnote omitted). 3 4 of this invoice. Igbanugo also admitted to O.O.C. that he mistakenly told her she was eligible for an I-601A waiver. In May 2016, A.C-G., M.D., and O.O.C. sued Igbanugo and his firm (joint litigation). The jury found Igbanugo liable for breach of contract, violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, and legal malpractice. The district court awarded each client cumulative damages. Igbanugo appealed, the court of appeals affirmed, and we denied review. I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. Matter In the I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. matter, I.A.D and D.E.F.L. retained Igbanugo in February 2018 because they lacked legal status but wanted to become legal residents. Igbanugo falsely told the couple they could gain permanent residency through their U.S.-citizen child. The couple entered a retainer agreement that called for two I-130/I-485 one-step adjustments based on their child, I-601 forms if necessary, and general immigration counseling. 4 Less than a month after retaining Igbanugo, the couple hired new counsel, Form I-485 is an application to register a permanent resident or adjust status, but foreign nationals must establish they were admitted or paroled, or into the United States to be eligible. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB No. 1615-0023, Form I-485, Instructions for Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status 11 (2023). Being “waved through” means the inspecting immigration officer allowed the foreign national to enter the United States without providing documentation; the foreign national must prove the facts of the wave through to show they were admitted lawfully. Policy Manual, Chapter 2 – Eligibility Requirements, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (last visited Dec. 13, 2022), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume7-part-b-chapter-2 [opinion attachment]. An I-601 waiver can be completed to request waiver of inadmissibility grounds if a foreign national is inadmissible because they previously sought immigration benefits through fraud or misrepresentation. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB No. 1615-0029, Form I-601, 4 5 terminated Igbanugo’s representation, and requested a full refund. Igbanugo agreed to refund the couple some money within 60 days, but his refund calculation included work the firm performed after the couple terminated his representation. Na E.S. Matter In the Na E.S. matter, Na E.S.’s father (A.E.S.) contracted with Igbanugo in March 2016 on Na E.S.’s behalf for an adjustment of status. In July 2016, Igbanugo met with Na E.S. and told her it would take years for her visa to process. By this time, she had paid Igbanugo over half the contract price. Igbanugo issued Na E.S. a partial refund in September 2016. In a 2018 e-mail exchange with A.E.S., Igbanugo claimed he was not obligated to refund the family any money on Na E.S.’s contract, even though rules of professional conduct require unearned fees to be refunded at the end of representation. Nl E.S. Matter Na E.S. (the subject of the previous matter) and Nl E.S (the subject of this matter) are siblings; A.E.S. is also Nl E.S.’s father. During the same March 2016 meeting discussed above between A.E.S. and Igbanugo, the two also discussed Nl E.S.’s immigration status. A.E.S. emphasized that Nl E.S. would turn 21 in June 2016, so they wanted to act quickly to get Nl E.S.’s visa application approved before Nl E.S.’s birthday. A.E.S. also informed Igbanugo that Nl E.S.’s passport was expired. Igbanugo indicated he could adjust Nl E.S.’s status before his birthday, and they entered into a retainer agreement Instructions for Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility 1, 11 (2022) [hereinafter OMB No. 1615-0029]. The applicant must show that refusing their admission to the United States will cause extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. OMB No. 1615-0029, at 7. 6 that called for an advanced parole form I-131 (a visa application), and consular processing or adjustment of status, if eligible. The family knew that Nl E.S. needed to renew his Egyptian passport before the visa application could be submitted. Nl E.S aged out of the preferred visa category in June 2016, but Igbanugo did not notify the family. Igbanugo instead continued to compile information for the visa application for which Nl E.S. was now ineligible. In October 2018, Igbanugo’s firm submitted Nl E.S.’s visa application under the category for which Nl-E.S. was ineligible, and the embassy e-mailed the family explaining that Nl E.S. aged out of that category. In November 2018, A.E.S terminated Igbanugo’s representation and requested a full refund. Igbanugo admitted his firm made a mistake in processing the visa application, explained the documentation gathered would still be useful for a different visa category, informed A.E.S. he was not due any refund, and offered to complete consular processing once Nl E.S’s visa became current. In January 2020, after consulting with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Igbanugo issued the family a partial refund, but the money order was mailed to an outdated address and never reached the family. M.G. and S.M. Matter M.G. and S.M. are Mexican nationals and most recently entered the United States in 1996. The couple has three U.S.-citizen children. When M.G. entered the country at a border checkpoint, an immigration agent stopped the vehicle and asked if they were citizens. The driver said yes, M.G. nodded her head affirmatively, and the agent let them enter the United States. S.M. crossed the border through a river and did not pass through a border checkpoint. 7 In 2012, S.M. received a notice to appear from the Department of Homeland Security claiming that S.M. was in the country illegally. M.G. and her adult child consulted with Nielson in January 2017 and gave him S.M.’s notice to appear letter. Nielson told them he could help them obtain legal status. After the initial meeting, the couple met with Igbanugo, explained how they entered the country, and Igbanugo told them he could help them obtain legal status. The couple entered a contract with Igbanugo for I-130 petitions/I-485 application for wave-through entries, and a birth certificate issue. M.G. terminated Igbanugo’s representation in August 2019 and requested a full refund. Igbanugo had not filed any forms in the couple’s case. Igbanugo replied, explaining that his firm had billed over half of the contract fee, so he would refund the couple the remainder of the contract fee after deducting the firm’s billed hours. Igbanugo stated he would issue the partial refund within 60 days, but the couple did not receive a refund for about 4 months. Disciplinary Proceedings The Director filed a petition for disciplinary action against Igbanugo in March 2021 related to the matters above. Igbanugo filed an answer to the petition and we appointed a referee. Igbanugo moved to exclude all evidence from the joint litigation and argued the Director was estopped from raising any identical issues that were litigated during Nielson’s disciplinary hearings (Nielson matter). Igbanugo moved to dismiss the disciplinary petition, alleging that his constitutional due process, equal protection, free speech, and Fourth Amendment rights were violated. In a prehearing order, the referee determined that both the joint litigation and the Nielson matter would be admitted, that he would 8 independently review those matters, and that he would rule on Igbanugo’s constitutional claims after the evidentiary hearing. The referee held a 2-week evidentiary hearing. The referee heard testimony from Igbanugo’s former clients and their family members, as well as from Igbanugo and Nielson. The referee also heard from four expert witnesses—one called by the Director and three by Igbanugo. The parties admitted hundreds of exhibits. The referee issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation for discipline that was 55 pages long and included a 15-page memorandum. The referee found Igbanugo’s and Nielson’s testimony not credible. The referee concluded Igbanugo violated multiple rules of professional conduct in each client matter. 5 The referee found no mitigating factors and five aggravating factors: (1) lack of remorse, (2) indifference about restitution, (3) the clients’ vulnerability, (4) substantial experience practicing law, and (5) prior discipline. The referee recommended an indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months. The referee also found Igbanugo “offered no specific evidence to support any of [the constitutional] claims.” The referee explained that Igbanugo did not offer “any evidence to support” his due process and equal protections claims of selective enforcement, Specifically, the referee found Igbanugo committed 50 rule violations, including: Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 in five matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(3) in two matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(b) in four matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) in seven matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)(2) in seven matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c)(4) in six matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(d) in three matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.1(a) in three matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3(a) in three matters, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3(b) in three matters, and Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) in seven matters. 5 9 failed to show the Director’s petition was based on protected speech, failed to prove a Fourth Amendment claim, and failed to allege due process violations that the Director’s petition was not sufficiently clear or specific or that the Director fabricated evidence to frame him. Igbanugo challenges many of the referee’s findings and conclusions, challenges some of the referee’s evidentiary rulings, and argues that the disciplinary process violated his constitutional equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights. Both Igbanugo and the Director challenge the recommended discipline. Igbanugo contends no discipline is warranted, and the Director asks us to suspend Igbanugo for at least 1 year. ANALYSIS I. Igbanugo timely ordered a transcript, so the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions are not binding. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). We nevertheless extend “great deference” to the referee’s findings and conclusions. In re MacDonald, 906 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 2018) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review the referee’s findings of fact and application of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to the facts of the case for clear error.” In re Nielson, 977 N.W.2d 599, 608 (Minn. 2022). “A referee’s findings are clearly erroneous when they leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Igbanugo’s challenges to the referee’s findings and conclusions are voluminous. Despite their length and breadth, we reject the majority of Igbanugo’s challenges for the 10 same three reasons. First, many of these challenges are forfeited because they are conclusory statements that Igbanugo did not support with legal citation or record evidence. 6 In re McCloud, 955 N.W.2d 270, 280 n.12 (Minn. 2021) (deeming an argument forfeited because the attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this conclusion”). Second, while Igbanugo attempts to support some of his arguments with record evidence, the evidence he cites either does not support his argument or does not comport with what Igbanugo claims, rendering the arguments unsupported. Third, Igbanugo bases several of his arguments on his or Nielson’s testimony. The referee, however, determined their testimony was not credible, and we defer to the referee’s findings on credibility. In re Kennedy, 946 N.W.2d 568, 578 (Minn. 2020) (“[W]e defer to the referee’s findings when the referee’s findings rest on disputed testimony or in part on credibility, demeanor, and sincerity.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 2009) (holding that a referee may reject testimony). The remainder of Igbanugo’s arguments are challenges to the referee’s findings about (A) immigration law, (B) Igbanugo’s admissions of wrongdoing, and (C) the availability of retainer fees. We will address each of these categories in turn. A. We begin with the referee’s findings and conclusions about immigration law. Igbanugo argues the referee’s findings and conclusions are based on a misunderstanding 6 We have identified at least 18 challenges that fall into this category. 11 and misstatements of immigration law. Igbanugo makes four arguments that fall into this category: (1) because a form I-130 cannot be revoked, any instances of misconduct based on that contention are erroneous; (2) the referee conflated adjustment of status and consular processing; (3) adjustment of status was available to I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.; and (4) Igbanugo did not fail to act with diligence and promptness on Nl E.S.’s case. 1. The referee concluded Igbanugo failed to act with diligence and promptness by allowing M.D.’s and O.O.C.’s I-130 forms to be revoked or rescinded and that he failed to tell these clients that the forms would need to be refiled. Igbanugo argues these findings are erroneous because NVC cannot revoke a form I-130. Igbanugo agrees that noncitizens must resubmit their forms to NVC after a year of inaction but claims this is not the same as being required to submit new forms for approval to USCIS. We recently discussed the same I-130 process in Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604 n.1. We explained how and when NVC terminates registration I-130 petitions: To maintain visa availability when [NVC] receives an approved I-130 petition, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 203(g) has a 1-year contact requirement, providing that the beneficiary and/or counsel must communicate intent to be lawfully admitted to the U.S. with [NVC] yearly. Failure to communicate within 1 year after the I-130 petition is approved means risk of termination of the petition and the beneficiary would lose its benefits, such as a priority date. A beneficiary notified of possible termination may state the preference to continue pursuing the immigrant visa application with the understanding that the beneficiary must resubmit all required fees and documents to continue with immigrant visa processing. 12 Id. 7 Accordingly, NVC terminates registration of approved I-130 petitions if they are inactive for over a year, and this termination has consequences for the beneficiaries, like the loss of priority dates. Id.; see also Immigrant Visa Processing: Step 2 NVC Processing, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/ step-1-submit-a-petition/step-2-begin-nvc-processing.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2023) [opinion attachment]. Igbanugo does not point to evidence that supports his contention the NVC does not terminate I-130s. Accordingly, the referee’s findings that clients’ I-130s were revoked or terminated by NVC and any conclusions based on those findings, are not clearly erroneous. 2. The referee, relying on expert testimony and reports, made detailed findings about the immigration processes involved in this case. The referee explained that “adjusting a person’s status as a qualifying relative in an immigration proceeding involves a three-step process.” The referee stated the first step is filing a form I-130, a petition for alien relative, to show that the client has a citizen relative and that “[a]n approved I-130 simply documents the foreign national’s relationship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent We referenced a number of websites in Nielson that discuss “[t]he full breadth of requirements” for I-130 petitions. 977 N.W.2d at 604 n.1. These websites include: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last visited Mar. 2, 2023); U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/national-visa-center/nvccontact-information.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2023); Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 504.13-2(B), available at https://fam.state.gov/fam/09FAM/09FAM050413.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2023). Copies of these websites are attached to the Nielson opinion. 7 13 resident.” The second step, the referee noted, is filing an I-601A waiver to request that the government waive grounds of inadmissibility or removal because it will create substantial hardship to a qualifying relative—a citizen parent or spouse of the immigrant. After the I-130 petition and I-601A waiver are approved, the referee found the immigrant completes the third step, consular processing, which requires them to leave the country and apply “at the local U.S. consulate for a visa or a green card, and hav[e] an interview.” The referee also separately described that the form I-485, an application to register permanent residence or adjust status, is a one-step adjustment form that a foreign national can pursue if they reside in the United States and hold legal status, but an opening for the foreign national to become a permanent resident must be currently available. Igbanugo claims that the referee conflated adjustment of status and consular processing because the referee labels adjustment of status as a three-step process, rather than a one-step process. Igbanugo’s argument lacks merit. The referee specifically referred to the three-step process as “adjusting a person’s status as a qualifying relative,” which is distinct from the referee’s later description of the form I-485 “one-step adjustment.” The Director’s expert’s testimony and report support the referee’s findings describing the three-step adjustment of status through a relative and one-step permanent resident adjustment of status processes. The referee’s description of the three-step adjustment of status process is consistent with how we described this same process in Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 604. Given the record support and the lack of any evidence from Igbanugo that these explanations are inaccurate, the referee’s findings based on these processes are not erroneous. 14 3. When discussing I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.’s case, the referee explained the I-601 waiver process. Specifically, if a foreign national is inadmissible for permanent residency because they previously sought an immigration benefit through fraud or misrepresentation, they can complete an I-601 waiver to request a waiver of the grounds for their inadmissibility. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., OMB No. 1615-0029, Instructions for Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility 1, 11 (2022) [hereinafter OMB No. 1615 0029], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ default/files/document/forms/i-601instr-pc.pdf [opinion attachment]. The referee explained that the applicant must demonstrate that a refusal of admission would “cause extreme hardship to the applicant’s U.S.-citizen spouse or parent,” which “is the same definition as the definition for the I-601A provisional waiver.” Consequently, the referee concluded that a U.S.-citizen “child will not be considered a qualifying relative for purposes of the I-601.” Based on these findings, the referee concluded that neither I.A.D. nor D.E.F.L. had a qualifying relative for an I-601 waiver and that Igbanugo violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) (requiring fees to be reasonable) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation) by charging the couple to pursue relief “that was unavailable as a matter of law.” Igbanugo argues these findings and conclusions are erroneous because I.A.D. and D.E.F.L. could adjust their status another way under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Igbanugo’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Igbanugo did not explain how 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) would support I.A.D. and D.E.F.L.’s eligibility to adjust status. Second, 15 whether the couple was eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) is irrelevant because their contract with Igbanugo did not cover this route to adjust status and the record does not reflect that Igbanugo discussed this process with them. Instead, I-601 waivers (the route to adjust status that the retainer agreement contemplated) were not available to the couple because they were ineligible. The Director’s expert testimony and report mirror the referee’s findings about the I-601 waiver request, and who can be a qualifying relative. The expert testified that both an I-601 and I-601A require a U.S.-citizen parent or spouse—not a child—to be a qualifying relative. The couple testified that Igbanugo told them they could adjust status through their U.S.-citizen child without any conditions; the couple also testified that they did not have U.S.-citizen parents or spouses. The evidence, therefore, shows that Igbanugo’s contract pursued relief that the couple was ineligible for because they did not have a qualifying relative, and Igbanugo collected payment for these services. Accordingly, the referee’s findings and conclusion that Igbanugo committed misconduct by charging the couple to pursue relief “that was unavailable as a matter of law,” are not clearly erroneous. 4. The referee concluded Igbanugo violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness) because his firm represented Nl E.S. for “over two years,” and the representation resulted only in the filing of a visa application for a visa category that Nl E.S. aged out of 3 months after retaining Igbanugo. Igbanugo argues this conclusion is erroneous and misleading because Nl E.S.’s father was responsible for 16 getting Nl E.S. a passport, which was a requirement to get an F2A visa, and it was the family’s tardiness in obtaining a passport that caused the delay. There are two visa application categories relevant here: F2A and F2B. F2A is the preference category for unmarried children under 21 who have a parent that is a lawful citizen or resident; F2B is a lower preference category for unmarried children over 21 who have a parent that is a lawful citizen or resident. See Green Card for Family Preference Immigrants, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (last visited April 18, 2023) https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligibility/green-card-for-family-preference -immigrants [opinion attachment]. Igbanugo’s argument is unpersuasive. The family sought Igbanugo’s services 3 months before Nl E.S.’s birthday, emphasized that Igbanugo must act quickly to request a visa before Nl E.S.’s birthday, and told Igbanugo that Nl E.S.’s passport had expired. Nl E.S.’s older brother confirmed that the family was tasked with obtaining a new passport. Even knowing Nl E.S. did not have a valid passport, Igbanugo still promised the family that he would adjust Nl E.S.’s status before his birthday. Igbanugo, however, did not file any paperwork or take formal action in the case before Nl E.S.’s 21st birthday. Instead, the firm compiled documentation for the F2A visa application until July 2018—over 2 years after Nl E.S. lost eligibility for the preferred visa category—and then submitted the F2A application in October 2018 even though Nl E.S. was clearly ineligible. Igbanugo, therefore, did not take any formal action in Nl E.S.’s case for over 2 years despite promising the family he would act quickly. Given this record 17 evidence, the referee’s conclusion that Igbanugo failed to act with reasonable diligence is not clearly erroneous. B. We turn now to Igbanugo’s challenge regarding his admissions of wrongdoing. Igbanugo admitted in writing to two clients that he or his firm made a mistake in handling their cases. 8 The referee described these communications and “found it troubling” that Igbanugo made these admissions to the clients and then “attempted to retract the admission[s] at the [disciplinary] hearing.” The referee found Igbanugo’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing “untruthful,” “evasive and misleading,” “self-serving and not credible.” Igbanugo argues the findings about his admissions of wrongdoing are clearly erroneous given his testimony in the Nielson matter. Igbanugo’s testimony about his admissions of wrongdoing at his own evidentiary hearing was similar to the testimony he provided in the Nielson matter. At his own hearing, Igbanugo testified that his admission of wrongdoing to one client occurred because he was “parroting what she said to [him]”; his other admission of wrongdoing was “bedside manner,” and he was trying to “appease the client” by accepting fault. The referee received Igbanugo’s testimony in the Nielson matter as an exhibit in this case and considered it before issuing findings and conclusions. We defer to the referee’s credibility determination To O.O.C., Igbanugo wrote, “It is true that we made a mistake in bringing you in after the form I-130 was approved and stating that you were eligible for an I-601A waiver/consular processing.” To Nl E.S., Igbanugo wrote, “Due to the change of case managers over a lengthy period of time . . . it was lost that the visa category changed from F2A to F2B when [Nl E.S.] turned 21.” 8 18 regarding Igbanugo’s testimony, especially in cases like this, “where the referee’s findings rest on disputed testimony or in part on respondent’s credibility, demeanor, or sincerity.” See Kennedy, 946 N.W.2d at 576 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given Igbanugo’s admissions of wrongdoing and our deference to the referee’s credibility determination, the referee’s findings are not clearly erroneous. C. Finally, we address Igbanugo’s challenges related to his fee agreements. In each of the client matters, the referee found Igbanugo violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)(2) (addressing availability fees) and 1.5(a) (requiring fees to be reasonable) by collecting advanced fees from the clients as an “availability fee” when he was already obligated to be available because he was already retained to perform legal services. Igbanugo argues these conclusions are erroneous because none of the clients actually agreed to an availability fee, and regardless of the contract language, the fee was immediately orally modified to a down payment, which is permissible. 9 Igbanugo supports his argument by claiming that the clients testified that their initial payments were down payments, that the fee was due immediately or very shortly after signing, and that the referee called these fees “advanced fees,” which he posits is another term for down payment. The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct do not use the phrase “down payment” when addressing attorney fees. Those rules, however, do allow lawyers to receive a payment for their legal services in advance of performing those services. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b), 1.15(c)(5). Presumably, that is what Igbanugo means when he refers to a “down payment.” 9 19 Igbanugo’s argument is unpersuasive. First, as the Director points out, all the contracts at issue reference an “availability retainer fee” and do not indicate that the fee is understood as a down payment or as anything other than an availability fee. Second, Nielson testified that there is no writing that confirms the parties modified the contracts. Lastly, Igbanugo’s references to the record mischaracterize his clients’ testimony. While some clients referenced the initial payment they made as a down payment, none of the clients testified that they orally modified the contracts or agreed that the availability fee would be a down payment. Accordingly, the referee’s findings regarding these fee agreements are not clearly erroneous. II. We move now to Igbanugo’s arguments regarding the referee’s evidentiary decisions. “A referee’s evidentiary rulings will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.” In re Butler, 960 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn. 2021). “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Thomas, 891 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Igbanugo argues the referee abused his discretion by (A) not properly reviewing the joint litigation and Nielson matter independently, and (B) admitting evidence about Igbanugo’s finances and refusing Igbanugo’s offer of rebuttal evidence on this topic. The Director argues none of these decisions were an abuse of the referee’s discretion. We consider each claim in turn. 20 A. We first address Igbanugo’s argument about the joint litigation and Nielson matter. Relying on In re Morris, 408 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1987) and In re Murrin, 821 N.W.2d 195, 205 (Minn. 2012), Igbanugo contends that the referee had to independently consider these matters because they concern clients and contracts that are also at issue in his case. Igbanugo claims the referee committed “a manifest error and abuse of discretion” by “ignor[ing] every shred of favorable testimony and evidence” from the Nielson matter, while clearly relying on the joint litigation to make his determination. As support, Igbanugo notes the referee did not quote from or cite to the exhibits from the Nielson matter in the order. The Director argues Igbanugo’s argument “is meritless” because Igbanugo cites no authority (and no authority exists) to support the assertion that the referee ignored the Nielson matter just because the referee did not cite to the exhibits. Murrin and Morris relate to collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters. “Collateral estoppel is the binding effect of a judgment [on] matters actually litigated and determined in one action on later controversies between the parties involving a different claim from that on which the original judgment was based.” Murrin, 821 N.W.2d at 205 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff asserts collateral estoppel to prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue, it is offensive collateral estoppel. Id. In Morris, we held that offensive collateral estoppel is improper in disciplinary proceedings; the Director cannot use collateral estoppel offensively to preclude the attorney who is subject to discipline from relitigating issues. 408 N.W.2d at 862–63. We do, however, 21 permit “a referee to independently consider the transcripts and other documentation from prior proceedings involving the attorney misconduct.” Murrin, 821 N.W.2d at 205. In Murrin, the referee did not give collateral-estoppel effect to judges’ conclusions that Murrin had violated certain rules and court orders in cases they presided over, but agreed to independently review documents related to these proceedings. Id. Murrin litigated the relevant conclusions and contested the admonishments contained in the judicial orders at his disciplinary hearing. Id. (“The hearing transcript is replete with Murrin’s explanations as to why his conduct was proper in the cases giving rise to those orders.”). We concluded that even though the referee cited to “excerpts from the court orders in his findings of fact, there [was] no indication in the record that the referee failed to independently review the facts of [those] cases and the facts presented during the hearing.” Id. Here, the referee issued a pretrial order concluding that because there was no final decision on the merits in the Nielson matter at the time, the elements of collateral estoppel were not met. The referee concluded that based on Morris, Igbanugo could introduce the transcripts and other evidence from the Nielson matter, and the referee would independently review the underlying facts. The referee noted during the hearing that the determinations in the Nielson matter were not binding. The referee admitted the transcripts from the Nielson matter into evidence. Igbanugo points to no evidence, other than the referee’s lack of citation to the Nielson matter, to support his contention that the referee 22 failed to review the matter independently. 10 As there is no evidence that the referee did not properly and independently consider the Nielson matter, the referee did not abuse his discretion. B. Next, Igbanugo claims the referee improperly admitted irrelevant financial evidence about Igbanugo’s post-2013 tax liens and a 2014 contract for deed regarding his home. Igbanugo also argues that because this evidence was not disclosed to him before the hearing, he “lacked time or reasonable opportunity” to rebut the evidence. Igbanugo’s argument is not persuasive. Igbanugo claimed during the evidentiary hearing that he lacked financial motive to be dishonest and charge unreasonable fees of his clients, and the Director offered this contested financial evidence to counter Igbanugo’s assertion. Relevant evidence is evidence with a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence” more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 401. Given that Igbanugo stated he did not have a financial motivation to keep unearned fees, and the financial evidence admitted spanned time that overlapped with the misconduct at issue, the evidence was relevant. And Igbanugo was able to rebut this evidence. In his redirect testimony at the hearing, Igbanugo discussed his finances and gave the referee explanations for the financial evidence submitted by the Director. Notably, the referee found that Igbanugo’s testimony in this case lacked credibility. Igbanugo’s testimony in the Nielson matter was similar to his testimony in this case. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the referee may not have been persuaded by Igbanugo’s testimony in the Nielson matter. Furthermore, if the referee did not find the evidence persuasive or relevant, he would have no reason to cite to the evidence in his findings and conclusions. 10 23 After the hearing, Igbanugo moved to file additional rebuttal evidence, but the referee denied Igbanugo’s request. Igbanugo also claims this denial was an error. Igbanugo does not explain how the referee’s conclusion was against logic and the facts in the record or was based on an erroneous view of the law. As the referee detailed in his robust analysis, Igbanugo’s motion was untimely and did not reasonably explain why the evidence was not submitted at the hearing, and the evidence was relevant only to the collateral issue of motive and allowing the evidence would have been prejudicial to the Director. Accordingly, the referee’s decisions to admit financial evidence and deny Igbanugo’s untimely request to submit additional rebuttal evidence were not an abuse of discretion. III. We next consider Igbanugo’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated throughout the discipline process. 11 The only argument that is not forfeited is Igbanugo’s Igbanugo claims that the referee improperly prejudged his constitutional claims at the start of the evidentiary hearing and excluded all evidence related to these claims, resulting in Igbanugo being unable to make his constitutional arguments before the referee. The record does not support these claims. Igbanugo submitted an 89-page brief on his constitutional claims before the hearing. The referee provided only his “preliminary thoughts” on the constitutional arguments during the hearing. Igbanugo answered questions about these claims at the hearing. Igbanugo admitted that he could not point to any facts showing racial discrimination to the extent his constitutional arguments were grounded in that allegation. In his findings and conclusions, the referee determined that the constitutional claims were meritless after thoroughly analyzing each claim. Igbanugo therefore had an adequate opportunity to develop his constitutional arguments. 11 24 claim that his due process rights were violated. 12 Specifically, Igbanugo claims the charges against him “were not sufficiently and clearly specific to afford him proper notice” because the Director’s petition is “a potpourri of false and misleading statements” of fact and immigration law. 13 Igbanugo further asserts some of the allegations in the petition were too vague. “When we exercise disciplinary jurisdiction, the action . . . is neither criminal nor civil; rather, it is an inquiry . . . to determine if sanctions should be imposed.” In re Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Minn. 2010). “While disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered by technical rules and formal requirements, this court observes due process in exercising disciplinary jurisdiction.” In re Gherity, 673 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2004). The disciplinary charges must “be sufficiently clear and specific and the attorney must be Igbanugo also argues the Director violated his equal protection and First Amendment rights through her selective prosecution of Igbanugo and her failure to prosecute the opposing counsel in the joint litigation. We have never held that an attorney may raise an equal protection or other constitutional defense based on selective prosecution in a disciplinary proceeding and we need not decide that issue here because Igbanugo failed to support his argument with any legal citation or analysis, other than a general reference to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, this argument is forfeited, and we decline to address it. See McCloud, 955 N.W.2d at 280 n.12 (deeming an argument forfeited because the attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this conclusion”). 12 Igbanugo argues in his reply brief that the petition did not charge him with intentionally providing false information to clients for financial gain and that this charge was improperly added during the evidentiary hearing. Because Igbanugo did not raise this argument in his principal brief, it is forfeited. See Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010) (holding that issues not raised or argued in a principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief). Moreover, the petition clearly alleged violations of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) (engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”) in each client matter. 13 25 afforded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare and present a defense” at the disciplinary hearing. Id. The disciplinary charges against Igbanugo were thorough and specific: the 52-page petition identifies the specific rules Igbanugo allegedly violated and the facts supporting those allegations, and Igbanugo filed a 160-page answer. See Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 611 (determining an attorney received due process when a specific and factually-supported 17-page petition was filed, and the attorney filed an answer). Additionally, Igbanugo filed numerous prehearing motions and received a 2-week-long evidentiary hearing, during which Igbanugo offered many exhibits, testified on his own behalf, and called several of his own witnesses. See id. (determining that an attorney received due process when he “had the benefit of an evidentiary hearing before a neutral fact-finder,” “presented witnesses on his own behalf, cross-examined witnesses testifying against him, and admitted exhibits into evidence”). Accordingly, Igbanugo’s procedural due process rights were not violated. 14 Igbanugo also makes a substantive due process argument, though the argument is difficult to decipher. Igbanugo makes arguments that we addressed in the evidentiary section. Because Igbanugo provides no legal citation supporting his contention that these evidentiary decisions amounted to separate, constitutional violations, his substantive due process arguments related to these rulings are forfeited. See McCloud, 955 N.W.2d at 280 n.12 (deeming an argument forfeited because the attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this conclusion”). Igbanugo also claims that when prosecutors misstate the law, it is unfair and violates due process, so the Director’s numerous purportedly false statements about immigration law violated Igbanugo’s substantive due process rights. While Igbanugo does support this argument by citing to federal case law, Igbanugo failed to raise this argument in his principal brief, so the argument is forfeited. See Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 887 (holding that issues not raised or argued in a principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief). Consequently, both of Igbanugo’s substantive due process arguments are forfeited. 14 26 IV. Finally, we consider the appropriate discipline for Igbanugo’s misconduct. The referee recommended an indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months. Igbanugo argued during oral argument that no discipline is warranted. The Director argues an indefinite suspension of at least 12 months is warranted given the nature of the misconduct, the vulnerability of the clients, and the presence of multiple aggravating factors. Although we give great weight to the referee’s recommendation for discipline, we retain the “ultimate responsibility for determining appropriate discipline.” In re Montez, 812 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2012). The purpose of disciplinary sanctions is to protect the public and judicial system and to deter future misconduct by attorneys—not to punish the attorney. In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 2005). We consider four factors when imposing discipline: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the disciplinary violation; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession. Butler, 960 N.W.2d at 552. We also consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. Additionally, we consult similar cases and attempt to impose consistent discipline, but the proper discipline is ultimately determined “based on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A. We begin with the nature of Igbanugo’s misconduct. Igbanugo’s misconduct involves his representation of clients in immigration matters. We have held that such 27 misconduct has “potentially grave consequences” and can put clients at “risk for deportation or removal.” In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379, 388–89 (Minn. 2013). We have suspended and disbarred lawyers for such misconduct. Id. at 388–89. Igbanugo’s misconduct also includes numerous false statements to clients, which “is misconduct of the highest order and warrants severe discipline.” See In re Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (“Honesty and integrity are chief among the virtues the public has a right to expect of lawyers.”). Igbanugo also failed to perform work on client matters and failed to communicate with clients, which constitutes client neglect and “independently warrants discipline.” In re Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d 617, 620–21 (Minn. 2018); see also In re Rymanowski, 809 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Minn. 2012) (“Depending on the severity, client neglect alone may also warrant indefinite suspension or disbarment.”). “We have also recognized that the failure to communicate with clients can be serious misconduct.” Nielson, 977 N.W.2d at 612. B. We next consider the cumulative weight of Igbanugo’s disciplinary violations. We distinguish between “a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident and multiple instances of misconduct occurring over a substantial amount of time.” In re Pearson¸ 888 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The referee found Igbanugo committed 50 rule violations between 2011 and 2018. Igbanugo’s actions, spanning multiple years and multiple client matters, clearly involve multiple instances of misconduct over a substantial amount of time. See Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d at 621 (concluding that while misappropriation only occurred once, the 28 misconduct was neither a “brief lapse in judgment” nor a “single, isolated incident” because other misconduct spanned 2 years). C. Next, we evaluate the harm that Igbanugo’s misconduct caused to the public and to the legal profession. In assessing harm, we consider how many and to what extent clients were harmed. In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011). The Director contends that Igbanugo’s clients paid large sums of money, suffered hardships to make payments, and suffered emotional turmoil based on Igbanugo’s actions. Igbanugo argues that the narrative that his clients suffered financial hardship to pay his fees is not true, and that they would have been required to make these sacrifices regardless of who they obtained as an attorney. Additionally, Igbanugo seems to suggest he did not harm his clients because he did not “afflict false hope”; rather, he gave them the requisite hope given that he is “successful [in] upwards of 90%” of his actions. Igbanugo’s actions resulted in significant harm to his clients. Someone from each client’s family testified about the financial impact Igbanugo’s actions caused on these families, and his clients testified about the emotional distress and turmoil Igbanugo caused them. For example, O.O.C. testified that her family made sacrifices to pay Igbanugo: they never went out to eat, they had to get rid of utilities like cable, and they fell behind on rent payments. O.O.C. also testified that she was shocked when Igbanugo told her she could not adjust her status—she thought she was misunderstanding him and felt “like the building was falling apart and that all [her] hope and all the happiness that [she] had” just dropped 29 away. O.O.C. explained she felt “[g]uilt, sadness, [and] rage,” and it was a “pretty stressful” experience for her entire family. Igbanugo’s misconduct was also detrimental to the public’s respect for the legal profession and the judicial system as a whole. In re Jaeger, 834 N.W.2d 705, 710–11 (Minn. 2013). Igbanugo made numerous false statements to his clients. See In re Sea, 932 N.W.2d 28, 36 (Minn. 2019) (holding that an attorney’s false statements to the court and others undermined public confidence in the judicial system). Additionally, Igbanugo lacked diligence and promptness. Neglect undermines the public’s “confidence in the legal profession, which harms the public, the legal profession and the justice system.” In re Paul, 809 N.W.2d 693, 705 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, harm to Igbanugo’s clients and the legal profession favors more significant discipline. D. To determine the appropriate discipline, we also must examine any mitigating and aggravating factors. The referee found no mitigating factors and Igbanugo does not make any arguments about mitigating factors. The referee found five aggravating factors: (1) lack of remorse, (2) indifference to restitution, (3) client vulnerability, (4) substantial experience in the area of law, and (5) prior discipline. Igbanugo challenges only one of them—lack of remorse. 15 Given that Igbanugo only addresses one aggravating factor, we likely need not consider the remaining factors. Even so, we briefly address them. “[I]ndifference or unwillingness to make restitution” is an aggravating factor, and the referee made multiple 15 30 We consider an attorney’s lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor. In re Winter, 770 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. 2009). Igbanugo claims that he apologized to his clients, but the only “evidence” he points to are his apologies to clients during his cross-examination of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Igbanugo’s statements, however, were not enough to be sincere or to prove that the referee’s finding of this aggravating factor was erroneous. Moreover, Igbanugo’s clients testified that he never apologized to them. The referee’s finding that Igbanugo lacked remorse therefore is not clearly erroneous. E. Finally, we consider similar cases “to ensure that our disciplinary decision is consistent with prior sanctions.” In re Nathanson, 812 N.W.2d 70, 80 (Minn. 2012). Many cases provide insight in determining the appropriate discipline for Igbanugo. findings that Igbanugo failed to refund his clients promptly or accurately after termination of representation. In re Udeani, 945 N.W.2d 389, 398–99 (Minn. 2020). We have held that the vulnerability of immigration clients is an aggravating factor. See Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 390 (explaining that “[w]e are particularly troubled by the fact that Fru’s misconduct threatened the immigration status of many of his clients,” and that those “clients were vulnerable and depended on him to guide them through the complex—and often punitive—maze of federal immigration law” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Substantial experience practicing law is also an aggravating factor. In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424, 432 (Minn. 2017). Igbanugo’s 34-years of experience as an attorney is substantial and particularly noteworthy because much of his experience was practicing immigration law. See In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 802 (Minn. 2011) (finding 6 years after admission to practice law and 2 years of full-time practice at the time of his first act of misconduct was an aggravating factor); In re Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 2001) (holding that 15 years of practice aggravated the sanction). Finally, prior discipline is an aggravating factor. See, e.g., Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d at 622 (finding that previous discipline “weighs heavily” because it was for similar conduct). Igbanugo has four instances of prior discipline. 31 In Fru, an immigration attorney committed misconduct across eight client matters by engaging in a pattern of neglect, incompetence, and noncommunication; lying to several clients and the court; disobeying court rules; failing to properly handle client funds; engaging in the unauthorized practice of law; and failing to cooperate with discipline investigations. 829 N.W.2d at 381–87, 389. The selfish nature of the misconduct, the attorney’s lack of remorse, and the vulnerability of clients aggravated the misconduct. Id. at 389–90. We imposed a 2-year suspension. Id. at 391. Igbanugo’s misconduct spanned a similar amount of client matters and encompassed some of the same forms of misconduct. Igbanugo, however, did not disobey court rules, fail to properly handle client funds, engage in the unauthorized practice of law, nor fail to cooperate with discipline investigations. In In re Walsh, the attorney committed misconduct in five client matters over the span of 8 years by lacking diligence, acting in bad faith, chronically violating court orders and rules, and making a false statement to opposing counsel. 872 N.W.2d 741, 749–50 (Minn. 2015). The attorney’s continued misconduct during disciplinary proceedings, lack of remorse, and substantial experience aggravated the misconduct. Id. We imposed a 6-month suspension. Id. Igbanugo’s actions affected a similar number of clients over a similar course of years, but Igbanugo’s rule violations are more voluminous, and Igbanugo’s case involves more aggravating factors. In Udeani, an immigration attorney committed various forms of misconduct across 16 client matters by providing incompetent representation, neglecting clients, failing to communicate with clients, failing to return unearned fees, failing to properly supervise nonlawyers, failing to safeguard funds and maintain trust-account related records, ignoring 32 a conflict of interest, and failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigations. 945 N.W.2d at 396–97. The attorney’s misconduct was aggravated by his history of prior discipline, the similarity of current and prior misconduct, committing misconduct while on probation, the vulnerability of clients, a lack of remorse, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 398. We imposed a 3-year suspension. Id. at 399–400. Igbanugo’s actions did not rise to the level of this case; Igbanugo’s case involves fewer clients, fewer rule violations, and fewer aggravating factors. In Nielson, a lawyer from Igbanugo’s firm committed multiple rule violations in two client matters by failing to keep the clients informed, failing to explain matters to clients, failing to ensure non-lawyers acted in a manner compatible with professional obligations, and giving clients false and misleading information. 977 N.W.2d at 607. The attorney’s misconduct was aggravated by the clients’ particular vulnerability and a lack of remorse. Id. at 613. We imposed a 30–day suspension. Id. at 614. Igbanugo’s case is more severe than Nielson; Igbanugo committed many more rule violations across more client matters, and Igbanugo’s case involves more aggravating factors. We believe that a suspension is appropriate based on the facts and circumstances of this case. In addition, significant aggravating factors are present and there are no mitigating factors. We therefore agree with the referee that the appropriate discipline is an indefinite suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months. 33 Accordingly, we order that: 1. Respondent Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo is suspended from the practice of law, effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 10 months. 2. Respondent may petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on successful completion of the written examination required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility, see Rule 18(e)(2), RLPR; Rule 4.A.(5), Rules for Admission to the Bar (requiring evidence that an applicant has successfully completed the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination), and satisfaction of continuing legal education requirements, see Rule 18(e)(4), RLPR. 3. Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR. Suspended. 34

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