In re the Marriage of: Sandra Ann Phillips, f/k/a Sandra Ann LaPlante, petitioner, Appellant, vs. James Craig LaPlante, Respondent.
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This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A12-1382
In re the Marriage of:
Sandra Ann Phillips,
f/k/a Sandra Ann LaPlante, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
James Craig LaPlante,
Respondent.
Filed May 20, 2013
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Carver County District Court
File No. 10-FA-08-440
Gerald W. Von Korff, Keri A. Phillips, Rinke Noonan, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & Bryant, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Chief Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant-wife and respondent-husband entered into a stipulated marriagedissolution judgment and decree under which respondent was to pay appellant temporary
spousal maintenance. Appellant remarried before the expiration of the maintenance term,
so respondent ceased making maintenance payments on the basis that his obligation to
pay future spousal maintenance was “terminated upon . . . the remarriage of the party
receiving maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.39A, subd. 3 (2012). Appellant argues that
the stipulated judgment and decree contained a waiver of respondent’s right to terminate
and a divestiture of the district court’s jurisdiction to terminate maintenance. Because the
stipulated judgment and decree does not contain language that waives respondent’s preexisting statutory right to terminate his maintenance obligation, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sandra Ann Phillips, f/k/a Sandra Ann LaPlante, and respondent James
Craig LaPlante stipulated to the terms of their marriage dissolution, which were approved
and incorporated by the district court into Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree in January 2010. In addition to
dividing the parties’ assets and liabilities, resolving custody and parenting time issues,
and providing for child support through their youngest child’s 18th birthday, the
judgment and decree provides that, “[c]ommencing December 1, 2009 and for 47 months
thereafter, Respondent shall pay to [appellant] the sum of $3,500 as and for spousal
maintenance.” Further, respondent is to pay $25,000 to appellant “immediately following
the final payment of spousal maintenance.”
The stipulated judgment and decree also provides, in a finding of fact:
Following the final payment of temporary spousal
maintenance as set forth herein, the parties have waived all
rights to additional spousal maintenance including rights
2
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 518.552, subd. 5, and agree
that upon entry of the Judgment and Decree, the court shall be
divested of jurisdiction to award spousal maintenance herein,
pursuant to Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989).
In addition to other stated consideration, the final $25,000 lump-sum payment is
designated “as and for additional consideration for the Karon waiver of spousal
maintenance.” In Conclusion of Law No. 14, the stipulated judgment and decree states:
[Appellant] shall pay no temporary or permanent
spousal maintenance to Respondent. The Court is hereby
divested of jurisdiction to award Respondent spousal
maintenance from [appellant] for the past, present[,] or future.
Following the 48th payment of spousal maintenance
by Respondent to [appellant] referenced hereinabove,
Respondent shall pay no further temporary or permanent
spousal maintenance to [appellant]. The Court is hereby
divested of jurisdiction to award either party any additional
spousal maintenance for the past, present[,] or future. The
court shall retain jurisdiction solely to enforce the temporary
award of spousal maintenance payments herein.
Appellant remarried in December 2011. Claiming that appellant’s remarriage
terminated his obligation to make any further monthly spousal-maintenance payments,
respondent made a prorated monthly spousal-maintenance payment to appellant for
December and, in compliance with the requirements of the stipulated judgment and
decree, tendered the final lump-sum payment of $25,000, plus interest, after what
respondent deemed to be the “final” monthly payment of spousal maintenance.1
Appellant moved the district court to enforce the maintenance obligation, arguing
that respondent waived his right to modify or terminate maintenance through the waiver
1
Appellant returned the $25,000 check to respondent, however, to avoid having her
acceptance of the check construed as a waiver of her right to ongoing payments.
3
and divestiture language in the stipulated judgment and decree. The district court denied
appellant’s motion, interpreting the “factual recitation” in the stipulated judgment and
decree to mean that “(1) the divestiture of jurisdiction does not occur until after the final
payment is made; (2) the waiver was for ‘all rights to additional spousal maintenance’;
and (3) the divestiture was pursuant to the requirements set forth in the statute and Karon
case.” (Footnote omitted.) The district court noted that the stipulated judgment and
decree was “silent on the impact [appellant]’s remarriage has upon the maintenance
award.” In concluding that an express waiver was required, the district court held that the
statute terminating spousal maintenance on the remarriage of the obligee applied. This
appeal follows.2
DECISION
Appellant argues that the stipulated judgment and decree divested the district court
of jurisdiction to modify maintenance and included a valid waiver that prohibited either
party from seeking modification of respondent’s spousal-maintenance obligation.
Respondent counters that the stipulated judgment and decree does not evidence a waiver
of his right to seek termination on the basis of appellant’s remarriage, but only precludes
either party from seeking additional maintenance in either amount or duration.
Respondent relies on statutory language that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or
expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated
2
Jurisdictional questions associated with this appeal are discussed in Phillips v. LaPlante,
823 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App. 2012).
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upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3.
Parties to a spousal maintenance order have a statutory right to seek modification.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 1 (2012). However, “[t]he parties may expressly preclude
or limit modification of maintenance through a stipulation, if the court makes specific
findings that the stipulation is fair and equitable, is supported by consideration described
in the findings, and that full disclosure of each party’s financial circumstances has
occurred.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5 (2012).
A waiver of the right to seek
modification of spousal maintenance is known as a Karon waiver. See Karon v. Karon,
435 N.W.2d 501, 503–04 (Minn. 1989) (holding such waivers to be valid), superseded in
part by statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5. Courts encourage stipulations and enforce
them with “the sanctity of binding contracts,” “as a means of simplifying and expediting
litigation” and “bring[ing] resolution” to an “acrimonious relationship.” Shirk v. Shirk,
561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).
“Four requirements must be met before a stipulation precluding or limiting
maintenance modification divests the court of its jurisdiction over maintenance.” Butt v.
Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Minn. 2008).
These requirements are: 1) the stipulation must include a
contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to modify
maintenance; 2) the stipulation must expressly divest the
district court of jurisdiction over maintenance; 3) the
stipulation must be incorporated into the final judgment and
decree; and 4) the court must make specific findings that the
stipulation is fair and equitable, is supported by consideration
described in the findings, and that full disclosure of each
party’s financial circumstances has occurred.
5
Id. at 573 (citations omitted). “If a statutory right is to be waived by the parties, the
waiver must be voluntary and intentional.” Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn.
1994). “Absent an enforceable waiver, the parties may always move for [a modification
of spousal maintenance] based on changed circumstances . . . .” Id. at 743.
A stipulated judgment and decree is a binding contract. Angier v. Angier, 415
N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. App. 1987). “The rules of contract construction apply when
construing a stipulated provision in a dissolution judgment.” Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621
N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). “Because
the interpretation of a written document is a question of law, we do not defer to the
district court’s interpretation of a stipulated provision in a dissolution decree.” Anderson
v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. App. 1993).
The parties do not dispute that the waiver in this case was “incorporated into the
final judgment and decree” or that the district court made “specific findings that the
stipulation is fair and equitable, is supported by consideration described in the findings,
and that full disclosure of each party’s financial circumstances has occurred.” Butt, 747
N.W.2d at 573; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5. Rather, they argue about
whether “the stipulation . . . include[d] a contractual waiver of the parties’ rights to
modify maintenance” and “expressly divest[ed] the district court of jurisdiction over
maintenance.” Butt, 747 N.W.2d at 573. Both parties do so largely with reference to
cases dealing with the effectiveness of waivers of the right to seek modification, but the
specific language at issue in each case varies.
6
In Gunderson v. Gunderson, the supreme court held that, even if the intent of the
parties was that spousal maintenance was to “continue unconditionally,” the statutory
right to termination upon remarriage of the obligee applies if there is not a written
agreement to a waiver of such statutory right of termination. 408 N.W.2d 852, 853–54
(Minn. 1987). Since there was no written waiver, and the stipulation of the parties
regarding spousal maintenance was merely read into the record by the district court and
was not incorporated into the judgment and decree, the statutory right of termination of
spousal maintenance upon the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance was upheld.
Id. at 854.
In Karon, the supreme court held that the parties could waive their right to seek
modification of stipulated maintenance through an express waiver. 435 N.W.2d at 503–
04. The stipulation in Karon stated that, apart from the maintenance agreed upon, “each
party waives and is forever barred from receiving any spousal maintenance whatsoever
from one another, and this court is divested from having any jurisdiction whatsoever to
award temporary or permanent spousal maintenance to either of the parties,” and that the
parties “hereby mutually release each other from all rights, claims and other obligations
arising out of or during the course of their marriage relationship, except as specifically set
forth elsewhere in this Stipulation.”
Id. at 502 (quotation marks omitted).
The
maintenance obligee later requested that the court increase the amount and duration of
maintenance, but the supreme court held that the district court had properly divested itself
of jurisdiction to modify the award in that manner. Id. at 502–04.
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The same year as Karon, this court held in Berens v. Berens that, when the obligee
“expressly waives all rights to modification of the maintenance ordered herein including
but not limited to her rights under [an earlier version of Minn. Stat. § 518A.39] for
modifications of orders and decrees,” the obligee was precluded from seeking a
modification of the maintenance award.
443 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 1989)
(quotation marks omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 1989). In Telma v. Telma, this
court held that a stipulation which provided that the obligor “hereby waives any right he
may have under Minn. Stat. 518 and applicable case law to petition this court for
modification of his obligation to pay maintenance, either as to amount or duration or
termination,” was not sufficient to waive the statutory right to terminate spousal
maintenance upon the obligee’s remarriage because it did not specifically waive that
right. No. C1-90-2373, 1991 WL 42605, at *1–2 (Minn. App. Apr. 2, 1991) (quotation
marks omitted), rev’d, 474 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 1991). However, the supreme court
reversed that decision and enforced the stipulation, characterizing this portion of it as an
“unequivocal waiver of [obligor’s] right to seek a modification of the spousal
maintenance award.” Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323. The supreme court explained that the
stipulation provided that monthly spousal maintenance was to be paid for a period of five
years and that “the termination of the award was limited to the earlier of two stated
contingencies—the expiration of the 5-year period or the time when [the obligee’s]
adjusted gross income exceeded $30,000 per year.” Id. In finding that this language
constituted a sufficient waiver of the obligor’s statutory right to terminate upon the
obligee’s remarriage, the supreme court stated “that portion of the agreement
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authorize[ed] a termination of the award on the occurrence of either of two specific
events, neither of which was [the maintenance obligee’s] remarriage.” Id.
In Loo, the supreme court addressed what the obligor argued was a waiver of the
right to seek modification prior to the termination of a stipulated maintenance award.
520 N.W.2d at 744–46. The applicable provision in the stipulated judgment and decree
stated that, “[a]fter the last of the payments required above, the obligation for spousal
maintenance shall terminate irrevocably.
Thereafter neither of the parties shall be
entitled to alimony then or in the future.” Id. at 745 (quotation marks omitted). The
supreme court held that this language was insufficient to prohibit modification of spousal
maintenance prior to its termination for two reasons: first, “[b]y its own terms, this
waiver could not take effect until completion of the maintenance obligation,” and second,
the “alleged waiver does not contain express words divesting the trial court of jurisdiction
to modify spousal maintenance.” Id. Notably, the supreme court reiterated that a waiver
of the right to seek modification that becomes effective after the conclusion of the
stipulated spousal maintenance “is unnecessary” because, by operation of law, “[o]nce
maintenance payments end, the court is without jurisdiction to modify maintenance.” Id.
These cases make three principles clear. First, in order to be effective, a waiver of
rights to terminate or modify maintenance and divestiture of court authority must be in
writing and incorporated into the judgment and decree. Even if the parties intend for
spousal maintenance to “continue unconditionally,” the statutory right to termination
upon remarriage of the obligee survives because the statute authorizing such termination
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requires that a waiver of that right be “agreed [upon] in writing or expressly provided in
the decree.” Gunderson, 408 N.W.2d at 853 (quotation omitted).
Second, to be an effective waiver of the right to modify or terminate maintenance,
a waiver and divestiture must be clearly effective at the time the waiver is made, not just
upon the completion of the maintenance obligation.
See Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 745;
Keating v. Keating, 444 N.W.2d 605, 606, 607–08 (Minn. App. 1989) (reaching this
conclusion despite language that, “[u]pon fulfilling the obligation of spousal maintenance
as set forth hereinabove, each of the parties waives any claim to additional spousal
maintenance from the other”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 1989).
Third, the stipulation must actually waive a right in order to preclude its assertion.
Thus, when a party seeks to extend the term or increase the amount of maintenance but
the decree states that the party “waives and is forever barred from receiving any spousal
maintenance whatsoever” apart from that already awarded, the obligee’s right to modify
the amount or duration of the maintenance has been effectively waived. Karon, 435
N.W.2d at 502. But when a party who entered a stipulation and decree with exactly the
same waiver language, as well as additional coextensive divestiture language, sought a
statutorily mandated cost of living adjustment, that waiver was held not to preclude the
requested cost of living adjustment. Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 331–33
(Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008).
The waiver does not need to explicitly use the term ‘remarriage,’ because when a
party waives “any right he may have under Minn. Stat. § 518 and applicable case law to
petition this Court for modification,” that party has waived the right, then contained in
10
chapter 518, to terminate because of the obligee’s remarriage. Telma, 474 N.W.2d at
323. However, “[a]bsent the clear divestiture of jurisdiction, such as in Karon or Berens,
we are not at liberty to assume that parties have specifically bargained to supplant the
statutory modification procedures.” Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.
App. 1992). “[I]t is not appropriate to infer waiver in the absence of a clear intent to
waive a statutorily conferred right.” Keating, 444 N.W.2d at 607–08 (quotation and
alteration omitted).
Other cases have applied these principles. In Gessner, this court held that “the
statement in the [judgment and decree] that ‘neither Party is awarded permanent spousal
maintenances, past, present or future,’” merely indicates the parties’ agreement that the
maintenance will be temporary and not permanent. 487 N.W.2d at 923. An additional
“clear divestiture of jurisdiction” would be necessary to preclude the parties from seeking
modification of the award. Id. In Kahn v. Tronnier, this court held that, where “the
parties’ judgment lacks both an ‘express’ statement that maintenance would continue
after mother’s remarriage and a waiver by the obligor of his right to modify maintenance,
the district court correctly terminated maintenance.” 547 N.W.2d 425, 430–31 (Minn.
App. 1996), review denied (Minn. July 10, 1996). The Kahn court also stated that, where
“‘[t]he parties have not waived any rights to seek modification’” and “‘no clear written
expression of the parties’ intentions regarding remarriage appears in the record,’” the
statutory right to terminate based on the obligee’s remarriage applies. Id. at 430−31
(quoting Poehls v. Poehls, 502 N.W.2d 217, 218–19 (Minn. App. 1993)) (alteration in
original).
11
In Grachek, the divorce decree stated that, except for the awarded maintenance,
each party “waives and is forever barred from receiving any additional spousal
maintenance whatsoever from one another, and the Court is divested from having any
jurisdiction whatsoever to award temporary or permanent spousal maintenance to either
of the parties” and “waives the right to seek a change in either the amount or the duration
of the spousal maintenance” set forth elsewhere in the decree. 750 N.W.2d at 330
(quotation marks omitted). When the obligee later sought a statutorily allowed cost of
living adjustment, this court decided that the right to seek modification of the award and
the right to a cost of living adjustment were distinct and independent rights, such that the
waiver language quoted above, in conjunction with the attachment of a standardized
appendix mentioning the possibility of a cost of living adjustment, did not preclude that
adjustment by the district court. Id. at 331–33.
In this case, the stipulated judgment and decree contains the following factual
findings: “[f]ollowing the final payment of temporary spousal maintenance as set forth
herein, the parties have waived all rights to additional spousal maintenance including
rights pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 518.552, subd. 5” and “upon entry of the
Judgment and Decree, the court shall be divested of jurisdiction to award spousal
maintenance herein, pursuant to Karon.” The first statement is inapplicable in this case
because it only waives the parties “rights to additional spousal maintenance” after “the
final payment of temporary spousal maintenance.” Such a waiver is ineffective to waive
a present right to termination or modification. See Keating, 444 N.W.2d at 607–08.
Moreover, this language is limited to waiving the parties’ “rights to additional spousal
12
maintenance” and divesting the district court “of jurisdiction to award spousal
maintenance.”
Thus, neither statement includes a waiver of the right to terminate
maintenance because of appellant’s remarriage. Moreover, the citations to Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 53 and Karon in the stipulated judgment and decree merely indicate the
sources of authority for precluding or limiting modification of the maintenance award
rather than a reference to the specific statutory rights that were waived.
Similarly, the conclusions of law in the stipulated divorce decree do not support
appellant’s claim that respondent waived his statutory right to a termination of his
spousal maintenance obligation upon the remarriage of appellant pursuant to section
518A.39, subdivision 3. The conclusion of law set forth in provision 14 indicates that the
district court “is hereby divested of jurisdiction to award Respondent spousal
maintenance from [appellant] for the past, present[,] or future,” is not applicable to the
current controversy since it merely precludes respondent, the obligor, from seeking
maintenance from appellant.
See Berens, 443 N.W.2d at 563 (declining to address
whether the obligor is barred from modifying the maintenance award when it is clear that
the obligee has waived the right to seek modification).
Another conclusion of law in the same provision provides that “[f]ollowing the
48th payment of spousal maintenance by Respondent to [appellant] referenced
hereinabove, Respondent shall pay no further temporary or permanent spousal
maintenance to [appellant],” and that the district court is “hereby divested of jurisdiction
to award either party any additional spousal maintenance for the past, present[,] or
3
This statute simply recognizes these agreements as valid, subject to some conditions.
13
future.” These conclusions merely reaffirm that appellant’s maintenance is temporary
and precludes her from seeking to increase the duration or amount of the maintenance.
This language does not address the termination of respondent’s maintenance obligation as
a result of appellant’s remarriage as provided by statute. These statements also provide a
divestiture of jurisdiction, but only to the extent that a party seeks “any additional spousal
maintenance for the past, present[,] or future.” Since neither party in this case is seeking
additional maintenance, these statements are also inapplicable in resolving the current
dispute.
The cases reviewed above give several examples of effective agreements to
expressly preclude modification or termination of maintenance in the stipulation and
decree.
These may include specific waivers of the right to modify or terminate
maintenance or divestitures of jurisdiction over the entire issue of maintenance as set
forth in the maintenance statutes. But, because the parties in this case did not include
such express language, they are now limited to the specific language in the divorce
decree. This strict interpretation of the language in a judgment and decree is supported
by the logic underlying the Karon decision, that “stipulations are carefully drawn
compromises” and that giving effect to those compromises encourages the parties to
avoid needless litigation when they could reach a fair result without the involvement of
the courts. 435 N.W.2d at 504. If courts ignored the specific language of a stipulated
judgment and decree in order to infer a broader waiver of rights, parties may be less
willing to engage in such stipulations in order to avoid the preclusion of rights for which
they had not bargained.
14
Because parties must expressly waive a statutory right in writing in order to
preclude it and because the waiver and divestiture language here does not preclude the
termination of the maintenance award upon the remarriage of appellant, the district court
did not err in terminating respondent’s monthly maintenance obligation, thereby
triggering the payment of the $25,000 lump-sum payment by respondent to appellant.
Affirmed.
15
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