State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Leroy McGee, Jr., Respondent.
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This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-0133
State of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs.
Leroy McGee, Jr.,
Respondent.
Filed July 15, 2013
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-11-9446
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Willis, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s sentencing order that
continued respondent Leroy McGee, Jr.’s probation following a probation violation. The
state argues that (1) the district court failed to make findings pursuant to State v. Austin,
295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980), and (2) revocation is required because the
evidence establishes the third Austin factor. Because these arguments are without merit,
we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2011, McGee was convicted of driving while impaired, received a
stayed prison sentence, and was placed on probation. In November 2012, the probation
department filed a violation report and arrest warrant, alleging that McGee violated the
conditions of his probation by using alcohol, failing to remain law-abiding, possessing a
firearm, and failing to notify probation of police contact.
At his probation-revocation hearing, McGee admitted the alleged violations and
pleaded guilty to a gross-misdemeanor charge of being in possession of a pistol without a
permit. The state argued that McGee’s probation should be revoked in light of his
extensive criminal history. But the probation department recommended that the district
court continue McGee’s probation, impose an intermediate sanction of 365 days in the
county workhouse, and order an in-custody chemical-use assessment. Defense counsel
requested that the district court follow probation’s recommendation, reasoning that it is
probation’s duty to make recommendations based on its assessments of amenability and
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because that department would work most closely with McGee during his supervision.
McGee asked the district court for “one more opportunity to prove [himself]” and vowed
to make a commitment to treatment.
The district court found that McGee violated probation and that his violations were
intentional or inexcusable. The district court continued McGee’s probation, sentenced
him to 365 days in the county workhouse, and ordered an in-custody rule 25 chemicaluse assessment. The state appeals that sentencing decision.
DECISION
The state challenges the district court’s decision to continue rather than revoke
McGee’s probation. The district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is
sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear
abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50.
Before revoking probation, Austin requires that the district court (1) specifically
designate the probationary conditions violated, (2) find that the violation was intentional
or inexcusable, and (3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation. Id. at 250. The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to make findings pursuant to the third Austin factor. But findings under Austin are
not required “before the imposition of any incarceration as a consequence for a probation
violation”; they are necessary only when “a defendant’s probation is revoked and the
underlying sentence is executed.” State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. 2008).
Because McGee’s probation was not revoked, the district court was not required to make
findings pursuant to Austin.
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The state also argues that revocation was required because the third Austin factor
was met—that is, the need for McGee’s confinement outweighs the policies favoring his
probation. But revocation is merely permissive when the Austin factors exist. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1(a), 3 (2010) (providing that the district court “may” revoke a
stayed sentence upon a probation violation); see also Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50
(recognizing the district court’s “broad discretion” to determine whether to revoke
probation). Consequently, the decision to continue probation even if the Austin factors
are present, alone, would not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
As a related matter, the state accuses the district court of “setting aside” or
refusing to consider the relevance of McGee’s criminal history in determining whether to
revoke probation. The record belies that assertion. At the probation-revocation hearing,
the district court heard extensive argument from the state concerning McGee’s criminal
background.
The district court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the state’s
lengthy recitation of that criminal history and allowed the state to continue on the topic.
The district court also noted that the state’s sentencing argument was “compelling”
because of McGee’s criminal history, commenting that “it’s really hard to set that aside.”
The district court nonetheless decided to give McGee the opportunity “to start all over
again” and “chang[e] [his] life.”
The district court’s reference to this potential for
“change” would be superfluous, if not illogical, had it, in fact, ignored McGee’s past
conduct. Rather than revealing the district court’s refusal to consider McGee’s criminal
background, the record instead demonstrates that the district court considered McGee’s
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criminal history alongside the competing recommendation and arguments in favor of
continued probation.
Finally, the state asserts that there is “no evidence” to support continued probation.
But the record includes evidence that the probation department wanted to continue
“working with” McGee on probation. And McGee admitted the violations, showed
remorse, and expressed a desire for treatment and continued supervision. The ultimate
determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to revoke or continue probation lies
within the district court’s broad discretion. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50.
Because the district court was not required to make findings under Austin before
revoking probation and because the district court acted within its discretion by continuing
McGee’s probation, reversal is not warranted.
Affirmed.
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