State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Donnel Alexander Thompson, Respondent.

State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Donnel Alexander Thompson, Respondent. A06-1891, Court of Appeals Unpublished, May 22, 2007.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2006).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-1891

 

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

 

vs.

 

Donnel Alexander Thompson,

Respondent.

 

Filed May 22, 2007

Reversed and remanded Willis, Judge

 

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 06046385

 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN  55101-2134; and

 

Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, Gretchen A. G. Zettler, Assistant City Attorney, 333 South Seventh Street, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN  55402 (for appellant)

 

Derek A. Patrin, Ethan P. Meaney, Meaney & Patrin, P.A., 6225 Ginger Drive, Eden Prairie, MN  55346 (for respondent)

 

            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Shumaker, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

            The state appeals from the district court's pretrial ruling suppressing evidence on the ground that Minneapolis police officers lacked the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to stop respondent's vehicle because respondent did not violate a Minneapolis ordinance that prohibits the needless obstruction of traffic.  Because we conclude that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that respondent violated the ordinance, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

 

            On July 8, 2006, Minneapolis police officers Roderic Weber and Timothy Merkel were driving eastbound on Laurel Avenue in downtown Minneapolis.  Traffic was very heavy that night because the "Basilica Block Party" had recently ended.  Although the traffic light at Laurel Avenue and Hennepin Avenue was green for Laurel Avenue traffic, traffic was blocked by a vehicle in the middle of the intersection.  Officer Weber sounded the squad car's horn, but the driver of the vehicle did not respond.  As the light for traffic on Laurel Avenue was turning red, the vehicle moved into another lane on Hennepin Avenue and cleared the intersection, although it was then too late for traffic on Laurel Avenue to proceed through the intersection.  The officers stopped the vehicle, identified the driver as respondent Donnel Thompson, and ultimately administered a preliminary breath test, which Thompson failed.

Thompson was charged with driving while impaired, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169 A. 20 (2004).  He moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional because the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  After a hearing, the district court granted Thompson's motion.  The district court found that Thompson had entered the intersection on a green light but that he was unable to clear the intersection because traffic was stopped in front of him; because traffic remained stopped as the light turned red for the traffic moving in Thompson's direction, Thompson's vehicle obstructed traffic on Laurel Avenue, which, consequently, could not enter the intersection.

The district court then turned to the Minneapolis ordinance that prohibits operating a vehicle in such a manner as to "needlessly, unnecessarily, and unwarrantedly block, obstruct or interfere with the orderly flow of traffic."  The district court determined that the qualifiers "needlessly, unnecessarily, and unwarrantedly" indicate that the state must establish something more than the fact that traffic was obstructed to prove that the ordinance was violated.  Because Thompson entered the intersection lawfully, the district court reasoned, there was nothing more than mere obstruction here.  Noting that a mistaken interpretation of the law cannot provide the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop, the district court suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of the stop.  This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

            The state argues that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the stop of Thompson's vehicle.  On appeal from a pretrial ruling, the state must establish both that the district court erred and that the error had a "critical impact" on the state's case.  State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998).  Whether an officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make a traffic stop is a question of law.  State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003).  But the district court's factual findings are entitled to deference and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.  State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006).  Here, the district court suppressed all evidence obtained as the result of the traffic stop and dismissed the complaint; the "critical impact" requirement is therefore established.  See Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 416.

            A limited investigatory stop of a vehicle is permissible if the police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, which is a suspicion grounded in a particularized and objective basis.  State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996).  But a reasonable, articulable suspicion is something more than a mere hunch, and the facts giving rise to an officer's suspicion are evaluated in the aggregate.  State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850, 852 (Minn. 1998).

The state argues that Thompson violated a Minneapolis ordinance when he entered an intersection even though he could not clear the intersection because the traffic ahead of him was stopped.  A violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, objectively justifies a limited investigatory stop.  State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).  But an officer's good-faith, although mistaken, interpretation of the law is not a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop."  State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (Minn. 2004).

            The Minneapolis ordinance at issue reads in full:

It shall be unlawful for any person to so drive and operate or park a vehicle upon the streets or highways in the city as to needlessly, unnecessarily and unwarrantedly block, obstruct or interfere with the orderly flow of traffic on said streets.  Proof that such traffic was blocked, obstructed or interfered with shall be prima facie evidence that such blocking, obstructing and interference was needless, unnecessary and unwarranted.

 

Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 466.230 (1991).  The construction of an ordinance is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980).  The rules that govern the construction of statutes apply to the construction of ordinances.  Smith v. Barry, 219 Minn. 182, 187, 17 N.W.2d 324, 327 (1944).  Thus, we must first determine if the ordinance is ambiguous on its face, that is, whether the ordinance is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation.  See Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).  If the plain text of the ordinance is not ambiguous, then we must apply that text.  See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004).

            The district court determined that because Thompson entered the intersection legally, he did not needlessly, unnecessarily, or unwarrantedly obstruct traffic.  We disagree.  Regardless of whether Thompson entered the intersection on a green light, it is uncontested that his vehicle obstructed traffic on Laurel Avenue.  The text of the ordinance is not ambiguous: the ordinance is not limited to circumstances in which traffic is obstructed because the driver committed an illegal act separate from a violation of the ordinance itself; rather, the ordinance applies in all circumstances in which a vehicle obstructs traffic needlessly.  Indeed, the ordinance would be superfluous if a driver were required to commit some other illegal act to satisfy the ordinance's requirement that the obstruction of traffic be needless, unnecessary, or unwarranted.

            We note that the ordinance provides that evidence that traffic was obstructed "shall be prima facie evidence that such blocking, obstructing and interference was needless, unnecessary and unwarranted."  Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 466.230.  Prima facie evidence that the ordinance was violated is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."  See Pike, 551 N.W.2d at 921 (quotation omitted).  Thus, we conclude that the uncontested fact that Thompson's vehicle obstructed traffic on Laurel Avenue was alone a sufficient basis for the officers to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Thompson violated the ordinance.

            But Thompson argues that the officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop because he did not in fact violate the ordinance.  Thompson argues that the ordinance refers to Minn. Stat. § 169.15 (2006), which prohibits operating a vehicle "at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic," and claims that the ordinance, therefore, must be read to prohibit only what section 169.15 prohibits, namely, driving a vehicle too slowly.  Thompson argues further that reading the ordinance in conjunction with section 169.15 is necessary to prevent the ordinance from conflicting with state law, which would render the ordinance void.  See Minn. Stat. § 169.022 (2006) (providing that local governments may enact ordinances to govern traffic that are not in conflict with state law).

As an initial matter, although the ordinance does refer to section 169.15, that reference is only a comment to the ordinance that section 169.15 is a "[s]imilar provision[]."  Further, an ordinance is not in conflict with state law if it is complementary to those laws.  See State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn. 2007).  The parties have not identified a Minnesota statute that specifically prohibits obstructing traffic needlessly, and we have found none.  But in addition to the prohibition in section 169.15, Minn. Stat. § 169.34(a)(3) (2006) generally prohibits stopping a vehicle in an intersection.  The ordinance and those statutes, therefore, all prohibit operating a motor vehicle in a manner that needlessly impedes the flow of traffic through an intersection.[1] Thus, when the ordinance is read in conjunction with sections 169.15 and 169.34(a)(3), it is complementary to those statutes, and it is therefore not in conflict with state law.

            The ordinance prohibits obstructing traffic needlessly. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 466.230.  It is uncontested that Thompson obstructed traffic on Laurel Avenue by entering the intersection when he could not clear it.  Thus, Thompson's obstruction of traffic was needless, unnecessary, and unwarranted, and, therefore, in violation of the ordinance.

We conclude that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Thompson violated the ordinance, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

            Reversed and remanded.

           

[1] Because it is uncontested that Thompson's vehicle was stopped in the intersection, we need not determine whether the ordinance would conflict with state law in a context other than when a vehicle blocks an intersection.