State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Donald Scott Moen, Appellant.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Donald Scott Moen, Appellant. A06-400, Court of Appeals Unpublished, March 27, 2007.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2006).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-400

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Donald Scott Moen,

Appellant.

 

Filed March 27, 2007

Affirmed Worke, Judge

 

Mille Lacs County District Court

File No. 48-K9-04-001029

 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

 

Janice Kolb, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Tara C. Ferguson Lopez, Assistant County Attorney, Courthouse Square, 525 Second Street Southeast, Milaca, MN 56353 (for respondent)

 

Steven V. Grigsby, 2915 South Wayzata Boulevard, Suite 101, Minneapolis, MN 55405 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

On appeal from a conviction for driving while impaired, appellant argues that a tribal police officer unlawfully stopped him for speeding outside the boundaries of the reservation.  Appellant contends that, although the statute gives tribal police concurrent authority to stop persons committing a crime in their presence, speeding constitutes a petty misdemeanor, which is not a crime and therefore does not justify exercise of that authority.  Because the tribal officer was a licensed peace officer acting under an agreement between the Mille Lacs Band Tribal Police Department and the Mille Lacs County Sheriff's Department, we affirm.

D E C I S I O N

            Appellant argues that the tribal officer lacked statutory authority to stop appellant's vehicle outside the tribal reservation for speeding.  Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004).  This case raises a question of jurisdiction, which this court also reviews de novo.  State v. Manypenny, 682 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. 2004).  Further, when a case is decided on stipulated facts, the only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in its application of the law.  Boldt v. Roth, 618 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 2000). 

The undisputed facts here show that appellant was stopped for speeding at a location off the reservation by a licensed peace officer employed by the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Tribal Police Department on routine patrol in an area that was part of a "Safe and Sober" program, a cooperative effort between the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Tribal Police Department and the Mille Lacs County Sheriff's Department to get intoxicated drivers off the road over the 2004 Labor Day weekend.  As a result of the stop, appellant was charged with speeding and driving while impaired.  Appellant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the traffic stop for speeding was unlawful because the officer was outside his jurisdiction when he stopped appellant.  The district court denied the motion, and following the submission of the case pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980), found appellant guilty.  The district court concluded that the tribal officer had two separate bases for lawfully stopping appellant's vehicle: the mutual aid/cooperative agreement between the two police departments under Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(b) (2004), and the course and scope of the tribal officer's employment.

Mutual Aid/Cooperative Agreement

            Under Minnesota law, the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa may exercise the powers of a law enforcement agency if the band agrees to waive its sovereign immunity and be liable for its torts, to file a bond and certificate of insurance, and to comply with the state's data practices for law enforcement agencies.  Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(a) (2004).  Appellant does not dispute that the band has met the requirements to be a "law enforcement agency" and is, therefore, authorized "to grant full powers of arrest and to charge a person with the duties of preventing and detecting crime and enforcing the general criminal laws of the state."  Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(h)(i) (2004).  In order to exercise those powers, however, the band must enter into a mutual aid/cooperative agreement with the Mille Lacs County Sheriff's Department.  Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(b). 

            The district court concluded that Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(b), gave the tribal officer authority to stop appellant.  We agree.  Subdivision 2(b) provides that "[t]he band shall enter into mutual aid/cooperative agreements with the Mille Lacs county sheriff under section 471.59 to define and regulate the provision of law enforcement services under this section.  The agreements must define the trust property involved in the joint powers agreement."  Id.  Appellant also does not dispute that the Mille Lacs Band's tribal police officers have satisfied the state's training and licensing requirements for the band to participate in a joint exercise of police power with the sheriff's department.  Specifically with respect to law enforcement powers, a tribal officer operating pursuant to an agreement that authorizes the Mille Lacs Band Tribal Police Department to exercise police powers within the jurisdiction of the Mille Lacs County Sheriff's Department, "has the full and complete authority of a peace officer" of the sheriff's department.  Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subd. 12 (2004).

The agreement between the two police departments to assist each other through the "Safe and Sober" mutual-aid program was in effect "both on and off reservation land."  The record does not contain specific information regarding the exact geographic area covered by the mutual aid/cooperative agreement that the tribal officer relied on in stopping appellant's vehicle, but appellant does not contend that the location where appellant was stopped was outside the scope of the agreement.  Based on the stipulated record, the district court properly concluded that the agreement gave the tribal officer authority to stop appellant's vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(b).

Course and Scope of Employment

            The district court also concluded that the tribal officer was authorized to stop appellant's vehicle regardless of whether the officer had authority under Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(b).  A licensed peace officer who is acting in the course and scope of employment outside of the person's jurisdiction is serving in the regular line of duty as fully as though the service was within the person's jurisdiction.  Minn. Stat. § 629.40, subd. 3 (2004).  Federally recognized tribes are law-enforcement agencies, subject to statutory limitations.  Minn. Stat. § 626.93 (2004) (setting forth requirement and limitations of federally recognized tribes).  An officer acting in the course and scope of his employment may make an out-of-jurisdiction investigatory stop.  Yoraway v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 669 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. App. 2003).

            It is undisputed that appellant was stopped on Highway 169, at a location outside of the reservation but within Mille Lacs County.  The county sheriff's department is authorized to make investigatory stops in that area.  Therefore, under the applicable statutes, the tribal officer was acting in the course and scope of his employment when, while assisting the Mille Lacs County Sheriff's Department in the Labor Day weekend "Safe and Sober" program, he stopped appellant for speeding.

            Finally, appellant argues that the tribal officer lacked authority to stop his vehicle because of the specific restrictions on a tribal officer's concurrent jurisdictional authority under Minn. Stat. § 626.90, subd. 2(c) (2004).  We agree with the district court that subdivision 2(c) is inapplicable because of the authority conferred upon the tribal officer by the agreement between the sheriff's department and the tribal police department.

            Affirmed.