The County of Dakota, (C.P. 28-15), petitioner, Respondent, vs. Gopher Smelting and Refining Co., et al., Respondents Below, William Stoerzinger, Appellant Re:  Parcels 4, 4A and 4B, Map 273.

The County of Dakota, (C.P. 28-15), petitioner, Respondent, vs. Gopher Smelting and Refining Co., et al., Respondents Below, William Stoerzinger, Appellant Re:  Parcels 4, 4A and 4B, Map 273. A06-120, Court of Appeals Unpublished, August 29, 2006.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-120

 

The County of Dakota, (C.P. 28-15), petitioner,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Gopher Smelting and Refining Co., et al.,

Respondents Below,

 

William Stoerzinger,

Appellant

Re:  Parcels 4, 4A and 4B, Map 273.

 

Filed August 29, 2006

Affirmed Willis, Judge

 

Dakota County District Court

File No. C0-04-6368

 

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Michael R. Ring, Assistant County Attorney, 1560 Highway 55, Hastings, MN  55033 (for respondent)

 

Robert C. Bell, Jensen, Bell, Converse & Erickson, P.A., 1500 Wells Fargo Place, 30 East Seventh Street, St. Paul, MN  55101 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Forsberg, Judge.*

           
U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

In this appeal from summary judgment, appellant argues that the district court erred by declining to reform a quitclaim deed.  Because appellant failed to provide the clear and consistent, unequivocal and convincing evidence necessary for reformation of a deed, we affirm.

FACTS

            In January 2004, respondent Dakota County (the county) filed a petition to acquire various parcels of real property in the cities of Eagan and Inver Grove Heights by quick-take condemnation for the purpose of constructing a county highway.  Appellant William Stoerzinger was named in the petition as the fee owner of two parcels in the city of Inver Grove Heights that were to be taken.  In July 2004, Stoerzinger moved that the petition be amended to show that he has an ownership interest in "Outlot B, South Delaware Estates," which adjoins Stoerzinger's two parcels.  The county had determined that the city of Inver Grove Heights (the city) owned Outlot B.  In August 2004, the district court ordered that the petition be amended to include Stoerzinger as a party in interest to Outlot B. 

In February 2005, Stoerzinger moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court conclude that Stoerzinger should be the sole recipient of compensation from the county for the taking of Outlot B.  In March 2005, the county, to which the city had conveyed Outlot B, also moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court determine that the county was entitled to Outlot B, free and clear of any encumbrances. 

The relevant facts are not disputed by the parties:  In October 1980, Richard and Mary Ann Parranto sold a parcel of real property to Stoerzinger and his wife, who is not a party in this action.  The purchase agreement provided that "[s]eller shall furnish quit claim deed to Outlot B to assure reversionary rights to this land in the event the City of Inver Grove Heights does not use it for roadway purposes."  The Parrantos then executed a quitclaim deed to Stoerzinger and his wife that conveyed "[t]he reversionary interest if any in Outlot B."  The deed was dated and notarized in November 1980 and recorded in March 2004.  The Parrantos also executed a quitclaim deed to the city for Outlot B that was dated January 1979;[1] notarized in June 1985; and recorded with the county recorder in May 1988.  This deed to the city imposed no conditions on the use of Outlot B.  

Stoerzinger argued in support of his summary-judgment motion that the Parrantos intended that, in the event that the city did not use Outlot B for a road, the city would be divested of its interest in the property, which would trigger the Stoerzingers' reversionary interest.  Stoerzinger requested in his motion that the district court reform the Parrantos' quitclaim deed to the city for Outlot B to express this intent.  In a supporting affidavit, Richard Parranto stated that it "was the intention of all parties and explained to the City Council of Inver Grove Heights when the City approved the plat" that "Outlot B was created to provide a right of way for a public road" and that "in the event it would never be used as a public road it would revert to the owner of Lot 4, Block 2, South Delaware Estates," which is one of the parcels now owned by Stoerzinger. 

The county argued in support of its summary-judgment motion that (1) the city's deed to Outlot B "did not make the City's title a defeasible estate," (2) the deed to the Stoerzingers from the Parrantos conveyed a reversionary interest only if there was such an interest, and (3) there was no reversionary interest to convey.  The county also argued that, to the extent there was a reversionary interest in Outlot B for the Parrantos to convey to the Stoerzingers, under Minn. Stat. § 507.34 (2004), the city had superior title because it recorded its deed in 1988, long before the Stoerzingers recorded their deed in 2004, and that Stoerzinger has no equitable claim of title to Outlot B based on adverse possession or abandonment. 

In May 2005, the district court ordered summary judgment for the county, concluding (1) that the city's "deed contains no language to suggest that its interest was defeasible in any way"; therefore, the city was the fee owner of Outlot B and the county is the current fee owner of Outlot B; (2) that because the city recorded its deed before the Stoerzingers recorded their deed, the city has "a priority of interest" to Outlot B; and (3) that even if the Stoerzingers had a reversionary interest, "[t]he condition upon which the property was to revert . . . can no longer be met, because the land is being used to build a public road."  This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal from summary judgment, this court makes two determinations: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law.  State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).  "A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).  A "reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Id. 

            Stoerzinger does not dispute that there is nothing in the quitclaim deed to the city for Outlot B that makes the city's interest defeasible, and, therefore, the deed conveys Outlot B to the city in fee simple.  Instead, Stoerzinger argues that, by mutual mistake, the quitclaim deed fails to express the real intention of the Parrantos and the city that Outlot B be used by the city for a road or else revert to the owner of one of the parcels that Stoerzinger now owns.  Stoerzinger argues that the district court erred by not reforming the quitclaim deed to the city to include language that would reflect these intentions. 

A district court may reform a written instrument if the party requesting the reformation proves with "clear and consistent, unequivocal and convincing" evidence the following:

(1) there was a valid agreement between the parties expressing their real intentions; (2) the written instrument failed to express the real intentions of the parties; and (3) this failure was due to a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.

 

Nichols v. Shelard Nat'l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980). 

As evidence that the city and the Parrantos actually intended Outlot B to be used by the city for a road or else revert to Stoerzinger, Stoerzinger relies on a provision in his purchase agreement with the Parrantos that states that the Parrantos would "furnish [to the Stoerzingers a] quit claim deed to Outlot B to assure reversionary rights to this land in the event the City of Inver Grove Heights does not use it for roadway purposes."  Because the city was not a party to the Stoerzingers' purchase agreement, the agreement cannot be clear and consistent, unequivocal and convincing evidence of the city's intentions when it received a quitclaim deed to Outlot B.  And because the Parrantos' deeds to the city and to the Stoerzingers for Outlot B were executed after the purchase agreement, the deeds, and not the purchase agreement, are the last expression of the Parrantos' agreement to convey real property to the Stoerzingers and to the city.  See Whitney v. Smith, 33 Minn. 124, 125, 22 N.W. 181, 181 (1885) (providing that a deed is the last expression of an agreement for a real-property conveyance and that "the mere fact that the contract [for real property] and deed [for that property] do not agree, will not authorize the interference of a court to correct the deed").  Therefore, the purchase-agreement provision also is not even clear and consistent, unequivocal and convincing evidence of the Parrantos' intentions when they executed the quitclaim deeds to Outlot B. 

Stoerzinger also relies on the statement in Richard Parranto's affidavit that it was explained to the city when the plat was filed that Outlot B was to be used for a road.  But as the district court found, Parranto describes the trigger for the reversionary interest to be the failure to use Outlot B for a "public road"; Parranto makes no distinction between a road built by the city and a road built by the county.  Parranto's affidavit is not clear and consistent, unequivocal and convincing evidence of the city's intentions when it received a quitclaim deed for Outlot B from the Parrantos.  At most, Parranto's affidavit is evidence that the Parrantos unilaterally were mistaken regarding the terms of their conveyance of Outlot B to the city and that the Parrantos intended that the city's interest in Outlot B would be divested if it were not used for a "public road," regardless of what government entity builds the road.  Such a unilateral mistake is an insufficient basis for reformation of the deed to the city absent evidence of fraud, and Stoerzinger has not claimed any fraud by the city.

Because Stoerzinger did not provide the evidence necessary to reform a written instrument, we affirm the district court's denial of Stoerzinger's request for reformation of the Parrantos' quitclaim deed to the city for Outlot B.  And because the city's quitclaim deed conveys Outlot B to it in fee simple, Stoerzinger has no reversionary interest and, therefore, has no right to be compensated for the taking of Outlot B.  Because we affirm the district court on this ground, we decline to review the district court's alternative grounds for granting summary judgment to the county.

            Affirmed.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

[1] South Delaware Estates was not platted until April 1980.  But the fact that the quitclaim deed to the city predates the plat by a year is irrelevant to the issues on appeal.