State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Brian K. Jackson, Appellant.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Brian K. Jackson, Appellant. A05-2404, Court of Appeals Unpublished, October 31, 2006.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-2404

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Brian K. Jackson,

Appellant.

 

 

Filed October 31, 2006

Affirmed Worke, Judge

 

Becker County District Court

File No. K2-04-941

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

 

Joseph Evans, Becker County Attorney, P. O. Box 476, Detroit Lakes, MN 56502 (for respondent)

 

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue SE, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Shumaker, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

On appeal from conviction of first-degree DWI, appellant argues that the police officer who saw appellant's vehicle proceed through an intersection with its turn signal on without turning, and then followed the car and found it parked with two of its tires up on the curb did not have articulable suspicion to stop him.  We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

            Appellant Brian Keith Jackson argues that the evidence against him should have been suppressed because the officer who stopped him did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion.  When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the facts independently to determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred by suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.  State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999).  In the absence of a factual dispute, whether the officer articulated an adequate basis for the stop is a question of law subject to de novo review.  State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 2003). 

An officer may conduct an investigatory stop and temporarily seize a person if the officer has a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."  State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).  The officer's suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts that, along with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion of a stop."  State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).  Specific, articulable facts are those "that, by their nature, quality, repetition, or pattern become so unusual and suspicious that they support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity."  State v. Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001).   

            Here, the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop appellant.  The officer observed a vehicle traveling through an intersection with its turn signal on without turning.  It was approximately 11:15 p.m. and the vehicle was traveling from the area where a bar is located.  The officer followed the vehicle and found it parked with its right-side tires up on the curb.  As appellant exited the vehicle, the officer pulled up, rolled down his window, and asked appellant to stop.  Appellant stopped momentarily, but then fled on foot.  After appellant was apprehended, the officer noticed an odor of an alcoholic beverage and marijuana coming from appellant, and observed that appellant's eyes were bloodshot and watery.

            The fact that appellant was driving from the direction of a bar is relevant in establishing a reasonable suspicion.  See Paulson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that it was relevant that the driver was traveling on a route commonly used by patrons of a particular bar, at a time shortly after bar closing).  And an actual traffic violation is not required in order for an officer to conduct a stop; thus, the officer was able to articulate a reasonable suspicion after observing appellant driving with his turn signal on, but not turning and parking his vehicle with two tires on the curb.  See Engwer v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 383 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Berge v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1985) (stating that the determinative issue is not whether an officer saw a violation but whether his "belief" that a violation occurred was reasonably inferable from what was observed).  Moreover, "suspicion is all that is required, if the officer can sufficiently articulate the factual basis for his suspicion."  Berge, 374 N.W.2d at 733; see also Thomeczek v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 364 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1985) (upholding stop where police officer saw legally parked car with lights on and motor running, late at night, in vacant lot near construction area where crime "might occur"); State v. Barber, 308 Minn. 204, 206-07, 241 N.W.2d 476, 477 (1976) (holding that lawfully, but unusually displayed license plates justified stop).

            Affirmed.