Carolyn R. McAdoo, Relator, vs. Midwest Patrol, Respondent, Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.

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This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2002).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A03-1439

 

Carolyn R. McAdoo,

Relator,

 

vs.

 

Midwest Patrol,

Respondent,

 

Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development,

Respondent.

 

Filed June 15, 2004

Affirmed

Kalitowski, Judge

 

Department of Employment and Economic Development

File No. 7870 03

 

Carolyn R. McAdoo, 3514  220th Street East, Hampton, MN 55031-9689 (pro se relator)

 

Midwest Patrol, General Security Services Corporation, 9110 Meadowview Road, Minneapolis, MN 55425-2458 (respondent)

 

Lee B. Nelson, Katrina I. Gulstad, Department of Employment and Economic Development, 390 North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development)

 

            Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Wright, Judge.

 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

            Relator Carolyn McAdoo challenges the determination of the representative of the Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development that she voluntarily quit her employment.  We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

            Decisions of the commissioner's representative are accorded particular deference.  Tuff v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995).  Appellate courts review the commissioner's factual findings in the light most favorable to the commissioner's decision and will not disturb them as long as there is evidence that reasonably tends to sustain those findings.  Schmidgall v. Filmtec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).  Whether an employee has voluntarily quit or been discharged is a question of fact.  Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. App. 1985).  Where witness credibility and conflicting evidence are at issue, this court defers to the commissioner's representative's ability to weigh evidence and make those determinations.  Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995). 

Relator argues that the commissioner's representative erred by concluding that she voluntarily quit her employment, contending that she was discharged after she failed to attend a training session.  We disagree.  An employee who quits without good reason caused by the employer is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2002).  "A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee's."  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2002).  "A discharge from employment occurs when any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for the employer in any capacity."  Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a) (2002).

It is undisputed that the employer, a security services provider, told relator to attend a training session on January 13, 2003.  The employer's contract with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) required relator and others working as security officers at the FAA facility to attend training.  It is also undisputed that relator did not attend the training session on January 13, 2003, and did not return to work after that date.  The employer testified that it called relator during the afternoon of January 13, 2003, and advised her to attend the second day of the training session the following day, but relator declined.  This phone call clearly indicates that relator was not discharged for failing to attend the training session on January 13.  Although relator denies receiving this phone call, this court defers to the commissioner's representative's ability to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations. 

In addition, relator claims that she believed she was fired because the employer told her that if she did not attend the training she could not work for the employer.  But the employer testified that it told relator that she could not work at the FAA facility without completing the training because of a contractual obligation.  Relator essentially concedes this point in her brief by stating that the employer told her she could not work at the FAA facility.  Therefore, even if relator would have been unable to work at the FAA facility because she failed to complete the training, she was not unable to work for the employer in any capacity.   

As additional evidence that relator was not discharged, the record indicates that the employer subsequently offered relator other employment opportunities.  Indeed, relator admitted this at the hearing and in her brief, but erroneously believes that she properly refused these opportunities because the employer was unwilling to come to a location more convenient to her to discuss them. 

The commissioner's representative also determined that even if the employer discharged relator, she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because her failure to attend the mandatory training, contact the employer, and/or discuss further assignments constituted misconduct.  We agree.  See Minn. Stat. § 269.095, subd. 4(1) (2002) (disqualifying an employee from receiving unemployment benefits if the employer discharged the employee for misconduct); Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2002) (defining employment misconduct as any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct that disregards the standards of behavior an employer has a right to expect, or demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for the employment).  We thus conclude that the commissioner's representative properly determined that relator was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

Affirmed.

 

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