Jack M. Singer, Appellant, vs. City of Minneapolis, Respondent.

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C5-97-1265

Jack M. Singer,

Appellant,

vs.

City of Minneapolis,

Respondent.

 Filed November 10, 1997

 Affirmed

 Short, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 969671

Jack M. Singer, 3026 Irving Avenue North, Minneapolis, MN 55411 (pro se appellant)

Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, William C. Dunning, Assistant City Attorney, 300 Metropolitan Centre, 333 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.** Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 10.

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 SHORT, Judge

By paying the minimum bid, Jack Singer purchased five parcels of tax-forfeited property from the state at a public auction. The minimum bid included the assessed value of the property and special assessments charged prior to the sale. As part of the sale, Singer signed a document in which he agreed to assume the special assessments attached to the properties, including those assessments that may be reassessed. After purchasing the property, Singer filed a lawsuit that challenged the validity of the assessments. On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, Singer argues the city acted without authority and his due process rights were violated when he was denied a hearing on the special assessments. We affirm.

 D E C I S I O N

On appeal from summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in its application of the law and whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). We review legal questions de novo, but give the nonmovant the benefit of any doubt regarding the existence of genuine material fact issues. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (noting court reviews questions of law de novo); Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974) (concluding court resolves all doubt in favor of finding issues of fact for trial).

Singer argues a municipality cannot specially assess property owned by the state. See Minn. Stat. § 645.27 (1996) (providing state not bound by passage of law unless statute expressly names state or there is no doubt statute applies to state). But Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 3 (1996) permits municipalities to levy special assessments against state-owned, tax-forfeited land. In addition, Minn. Stat. §§ 429.101 and 435.19, subd. 2 (1996) both provide a procedure for municipalities to assess and charge special assessments against the state. The record demonstrates: (1) the city complied with its valid ordinances; (2) the property owner had an opportunity to challenge the special assessments at a hearing; and (3) Singer voluntarily chose to purchase the properties subject to the assessments. Singer failed to offer any evidence that his property taxes included additional post-forfeiture, pre-sale special assessments. Under these circumstances, the city had authority to levy special assessments against the state-owned property and Singer's rights were not violated.

Singer also argues: (1) Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 3, violates the uniformity requirement of Article X of the Minnesota Constitution; (2) the city and the county did not follow the procedures in Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 3; and (3) special assessments on other properties are invalid. Because these issues were not raised before the trial court, the matters are not properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding issues not raised at trial court not properly before reviewing court). Under these circumstances, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against Singer.

  Affirmed.