In Re the Marriage of: Phudhiphorn Thienprasit, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Darat Thienprasit, Appellant.

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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1994) State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C3-96-492 In Re the Marriage of: Phudhiphorn Thienprasit, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Darat Thienprasit, Appellant. Filed October 15, 1996 Affirmed Harten, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. F1-93-357 Robert H. Zalk, Sonja Trom Eayrs, Zalk & Eayrs, P.A., 5861 Cedar Lake Road, Minneapolis, MN 55416 (for Respondent) William E. Haugh, Jr., Sarah J. Batzli, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, P.L.L.P., West 1100 First National Bank Bldg., 332 Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55101-1379 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.(*) [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. Unpublished Opinion HARTEN, Judge (Hon. Paulette K. Flynn, District Court Trial Judge) Wife challenges dissolution judgment denying her maintenance and contends that the district court erred in its valuation of certain marital property and in its award of attorney fees. We affirm. Facts On January 9, 1970, Phudhiphorn Thienprasit (husband) and Darat Thienprasit (wife) were married in Bangkok, Thailand. Shortly thereafter, they moved to the United States to complete their advanced medical training. Husband specialized in neurosurgery and developed a highly successful medical practice in the Twin Cities. Wife specialized in anesthesiology and practiced until 1980, when she left to raise the parties' children. Wife returned to medical practice from 1986 until 1989 when, following a protracted contract renegotiation period, she left her anesthesiology practice complaining of memory problems and the high stress level. Wife's gross income for her last year of practice (1989) was approximately $160,000 plus an additional $35,068 received in 1990 for services rendered in 1989. Wife retains her medical license in California and believes she is licensed in Thailand; she has not maintained her medical license in Minnesota. After leaving her medical practice, wife discussed opening a jewelry business in Thailand with her sisters. Wife studied at a gemological institute between 1990 and 1992. Subsequently, wife traveled to Thailand to organize a jewelry business and obtained a 24-year lease at a new shopping mall in Chiangmai, Thailand. During this time, wife also acquired equipment for the jewelry store and improved the premises to prepare for the store's opening. Wife did not open the jewelry store as planned, but instead returned to the United States. Husband petitioned for marriage dissolution. The parties stipulated to most dissolution matters including distribution of marital assets. At trial, the primary issue was spousal maintenance. Judgment was entered dissolving the parties' marriage and denying wife maintenance. Wife brought a post-trial motion for amended findings or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the district court denied. This appeal followed. Decision 1. Spousal Maintenance Wife's primary contention is that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request for maintenance. Wife claims that the evidence does not support several of the district court's findings. She also argues that the court erred by failing to balance wife's needs and ability to meet those needs against husband's ability to provide financial support. a. Findings of Fact Wife argues that the evidence does not support several of the district court's findings.(1) [Footnote] (1)Besides the findings described below, wife also challenges any finding that implies she acted in bad faith or was less than forthcoming. These are issues involving the credibility of witnesses and are based on the district court's personal observation of witnesses and the court's conclusions therefrom. We must give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of witnesses. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Sefkaw v. Sefkaw, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). A district court's findings of fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992). First, wife asserts that there was no support for the district court's finding that wife left her medical practice in 1989 because of a contract dispute. Wife maintains that she had a number of reasons for leaving her anesthesiology practice, including memory problems and the high level of stress. In her brief, however, wife recognizes that there was evidence to support the district court's finding (wife stated that the contract problems she was having with Surgicare were a factor). Our review of the record reveals ample evidence to support the district court's finding, even though wife desires a different finding (i.e., a number of factors contributed to her leaving practice). Therefore, we conclude that her argument is unpersuasive given the clearly erroneous standard of review for findings of fact. Second, wife contends that there was no support for the district court's finding that she could return to her medical practice, which resulted in the court mistakenly attributing to her potential income of over $100,000. Wife argues that her memory problems and the high professional stress level prevented her from continuing her practice. Wife, however, had practiced medicine for a number of years. The district court noted that wife submitted no medical testimony to substantiate her memory problems. Moreover, the district court considered wife's claim of memory problems undercut by her ability to complete training successfully at a gemological institute. Wife continues to be licensed to practice medicine in California and apparently also Thailand, although she is no longer licensed in Minnesota. Therefore, there was ample evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that wife could return to the practice of medicine. Third, wife claims the district court's finding that she has sufficient potential income from the Thailand assets to meet her reasonable needs is unsupported by the evidence. Wife argues that the district court's decision places her in the untenable position of having to return to medicine (which she claims she cannot do because of her memory problems) or open the jewelry store in Thailand (which she claims she cannot do because she has no capital liquidity). As discussed above, however, there was evidence to support the district court's finding that wife could return to medicine. Therefore, regardless of the jewelry business, wife has her earning capacity as a physician to meet her needs. Notwithstanding, wife contends that the amount of income, if any, that could be generated by the jewelry store is entirely speculative. The parties testified, however, that the jewelry store was ready to open by December 1992, but wife delayed the opening. Thus, by delaying the opening of the jewelry store, wife prevented the district court from ascertaining the potential income from the store. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. b. Maintenance Determination A district court's determination as to spousal maintenance will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district court's decision must be clearly erroneous and against logic and the facts in the record before an abuse of discretion will be found. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). Wife contends that the district court did not consider her financial needs and ability to support herself in conjunction with husband's ability to pay maintenance. The district court's findings of fact, however, indicate otherwise. The district court appears to have reviewed wife's claimed monthly expenses. The district court specifically found some of wife's projected needs were non-recurring (e.g., shopping mall lease, attorney fees) and thus should not be considered in its maintenance determination. The district court also found several of her claimed needs were ``far too extravagant for this court to consider reasonable.'' These comments indicate a review of wife's financial needs. The district court then provided a table describing and detailing all of wife's monthly living expenses.(2) [Footnote] (2)The district court reduced wife's claimed monthly expenses from $13,050 to $5,450 by excluding $3,100 as lease payments for the Thai jewelry business and $1,600 in attorney fees and by limiting many of her proposed expenses as unsubstantiated or extravagant, while mindful of the parties' high marital standard of living. The district court further considered wife's ability to meet her needs and found wife's income from her medical practice for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989 to be approximately $120,000, $150,000 and $195,000 respectively. It is apparent from the extensive findings that the district court considered wife's financial needs. The district court then considered husband's ability to pay maintenance. The district court listed husband's gross annual income from his neurosurgery practice for the six preceding years and noted his monthly expenses.(3) [Footnote] (3)Husband's gross annual income from 1989 to 1994 ranged from a high of $584,868 to a low of $358,682 earned in the year of the dissolution proceedings. The district court's findings of fact indicate that the court considered husband's ability to pay maintenance before reaching its conclusion. In addition, the district court's findings cited Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552, subd. 1 (1994), which contains the threshold maintenance considerations, and stated it had weighed that standard. The district court listed specific reasons for its denial of maintenance including the large amount of assets awarded to wife by stipulation. The district court further commented that the ``evidence suggests that [wife] has additional assets she has failed to disclose in the dissolution proceeding.'' The district court also specifically found that wife had voluntarily left her medical position, from which she derived a six-figure income, complaining of ``unsubstantiated'' memory problems.(4) [Footnote] (4)Wife attaches significance to husband's tacit support of her decision to leave her medical practice. Husband's approval, however, does not negate wife's potential earning capacity. In addition, the district court considered in its maintenance decision the proceeds from the sale of the parties' two Florida condominiums and the sale of wife's jewelry. Therefore, we conclude that the district court appropriately evaluated wife's financial needs and ability to support herself against husband's ability to pay maintenance. Finally, the district court concluded its analysis of the maintenance issue by considering the statutory factors regarding maintenance contained in Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552, subd. 2 (1994). The district court considered not only the threshold issues of subdivision 1, but also the subdivision 2 factors utilized in determining the amount and duration of maintenance before denying wife's request for maintenance. Our review of the record and the parties' testimony reveals ample evidence to support the district court's findings concerning wife's financial resources, education and training, standard of living, absence from employment, age, physical and emotional condition, and husband's ability to pay maintenance. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying maintenance. c. Maintenance: Thai Courts Wife argues the district court abused its discretion when it declined to award temporary maintenance pending further consideration of the maintenance issue by Thai courts. Wife cites Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552, subd. 3 (1994). This provision, however, applies only after the district court has determined that a maintenance award is appropriate and the court is uncertain whether to make the maintenance temporary or permanent. Here, the district court decided the threshold maintenance issue against wife. Thus, the district court did not have occasion to consider whether an award of temporary maintenance during the interim period was appropriate. We see no abuse of discretion on this issue. 2. Valuation of Boats Wife argues that the district court erred in determining the value of several boats belonging to the parties. We will not reverse a district court's valuation of an asset unless it is ``clearly erroneous on the record as a whole.'' Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1975). Moreover, we do not require that district courts be exact in their valuations of assets; ``it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.'' Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979) (quoting Hertz, 304 Minn. at 145, 229 N.W.2d at 44). Wife contends that the district court erred in adopting husband's testimony as to boat value ($5,300) instead of a purported appraisal submitted by wife ($12,010). The district court faulted wife's appraisal because it was ``unsigned, undated, cryptic, difficult to decipher and was not totalled.''(5) [Footnote] (5)Wife argues that the district court adopted this language verbatim from husband's proposed findings on this issue. The practice of adopting one party's findings is acceptable, particularly if the findings are detailed, specific, and sufficient enough to enable meaningful review by the appellate court. Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). Nonetheless, the district court's adoption of one party's proposed findings raises the question of whether the court independently evaluated each party's testimony and evidence. Id. Based on the limited incorporation of proposed language in its findings, we conclude that the district court independently evaluated the testimony and evidence. Further, the district court did not consider the appraisal credible because wife did not attach an affidavit identifying and authenticating the appraisal. Wife asserts that the business card attached to the appraisal was sufficient identification for authentication purposes. But weighing the credibility of the evidence is within realm of the factfinder and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Reviewing the entire record, we do not see the district court's valuation of the boats as clearly erroneous. Moreover, the figure of $5,300 does not appear to be so far outside the range of reasonable prices as to be clearly erroneous. 3. Attorney Fees Finally, wife asserts that the district court abused its discretion in her award of attorney fees. ``Generally, the award for attorney fees [based on Minn. Stat. 𨹞.14] lies in the discretion of the court.'' Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987). An award of attorney fees will not be upset absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding her the total amount of her attorney fees incurred in the dissolution proceedings. Wife contends the property distribution of American assets favors husband ($1,127,372 to husband and $613,310 to wife). These figures, however, do not take into account the parties' Thai assets and the mechanism established by the district court to equalize its property distribution. The district court ordered the sale of the parties' two Florida condominiums and wife's jewelry. The proceeds from these sales are to be held in escrow and divided between the parties to equalize any disproportionality after the Thai courts render a decision as to the Thai assets. Wife also asserts that she is unemployed and her income is speculative, thus, she will need to deplete her marital property to pay attorney fees. The district court, however, considered wife's financial needs before fixing the amount of any attorney fees, by noting, ``This court finds [wife] does not have the ability to pay all of her attorney fees without substantially diminishing her liquid financial resources.'' Based on this, the district court ordered husband pay $20,000 of wife's attorney fees. The district court's decision to award wife only a portion of her fees instead of the entire amount is within the court's discretion. Considering wife's financial resources, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.

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