IN RE J L GORDON MINOR (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2011
In the Matter of J. L. GORDON, Minor.
No. 301592
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-746988-NA
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and WILDER and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Before terminating a respondent’s parental rights, the trial court must find that at least
one of the statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). The trial court
must order termination of parental rights if it finds that a statutory ground is proven and that
termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews the trial
court’s determinations for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91, 126 n 1;
763 NW2d 587 (2009). To warrant reversal, the trial court’s decisions must be more than maybe
or probably wrong. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) were
established by clear and convincing evidence. The conditions that led to adjudication included
respondent’s unsuitable housing, financial instability, and emotional instability. Respondent had
more than two years to provide a suitable home environment, achieve financial and emotional
stability, and establish or maintain a parental bond with her son. There was sufficient evidence
that petitioner provided respondent with reasonable services to facilitate reunifying the family.
Offered services included psychological evaluations, psychiatric evaluation, individual and
domestic violence counseling, parenting classes, parenting time, and transportation assistance.
The trial court properly concluded that respondent had not substantially complied with
and benefited from her case treatment plan. Specifically, respondent failed to (1) maintain
stable, suitable housing, (2) maintain regular, legal, and verifiable employment, (3) consistently
attend court-ordered parenting time, and (4) establish or maintain a parental bond with the child.
Failure to comply with a court-ordered case service plan is indicative of neglect. In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 360-361 n 16; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A parent must benefit from services in order to
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provide a safe, nurturing home for the child. In re JL, 483 Mich 300, 330-331; 770 NW2d 853
(2009).
Respondent failed to address the issues that led to adjudication. The trial court heard
persuasive testimony from the case worker and the clinical psychologist that, despite support
services, respondent’s behaviors, particularly her poor judgment and decision making, remained
unchanged.
Additionally, the lawyer-guardian ad litem recommended termination of
respondent’s parental rights and told the court that she observed many instances where it seemed
the child was not respondent’s primary focus and interest. Other people and interests
misdirected respondent’s time, money, and attention away from the child, placing him at risk.
There was ample evidence that respondent did not show any insight into what was important for
the child. Rather than taking responsibility for problems, respondent blamed someone else.
These proofs satisfied all three statutory grounds for termination.
Respondent argues that there was insufficient evidence to warrant termination of her
parental rights. Respondent contends that she provided verification of her employment by
producing a tax return showing her income. This assertion is not supported by the court record.
During several of the dispositional review hearings and the termination hearing, petitioner raised
the issue that it had not received written documentation of respondent’s income. The case
worker testified that, despite numerous requests, respondent had not provided any written
verification of her employment with her boyfriend’s family. Respondent testified that she was
paid by personal check and had a bank account. Respondent provided extensive testimony of all
the times that she had purportedly provided petitioner with a copy of her tax returns. Respondent
claimed that she did not give a copy of any payment checks or her bank accounts because
petitioner never asked for them. Respondent’s financial stability was clearly a pivotal issue in
this case. A person of at least average intelligence, as respondent was clinically tested to be,
would understand that employment could be verified by providing copies of personal checks and
bank account statements or even a letter from the employer. Respondent asserts that actual
documentation was provided at the termination hearing. However, that document was merely a
self-report of income by respondent for food stamp eligibility, not a verification of income by a
third party.1 The lack of any such readily accessible documentation in the court record undercuts
respondent’s credibility. The trial court reasonably concluded that such documentation did not
exist because respondent was not gainfully employed and, thus, remained financially unstable.
Respondent argues that she had complied with the treatment plan by obtaining suitable
and stable housing. Respondent admitted that she had moved at least four times within the past
year, explaining that each move was to a better place, except for one which was because of a
foreclosure on the landlord. There was ample evidence that respondent’s housing was unsuitable
for a child. At the time of removal, respondent was living with a known gang member in a
condemned house without electricity and water. The court had ordered that other people and
several pit bull dogs seen in the home were not to be present when the child was visiting.
However, there was credible evidence, including the case worker’s testimony and the lawyer-
1
Respondent did not move to have this document admitted into evidence.
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guardian ad litem’s statements, that the dogs and other people were present, including
respondent’s boyfriend who had a pending charge for attempted murder and respondent’s mother
who had an extensive protective services history. Respondent failed to grasp the risks that
aggressive dogs and people with criminal and protective services histories posed on the child’s
safety and welfare. In the months leading up to the termination hearing, respondent lived in a
dwelling that was infested with raccoons and subsequently condemned. Respondent admitted
that she postponed weekly visits because she did not have enough food in the house. At the time
of the termination hearing, respondent’s newly acquired residence lacked the basic necessities
for a child. Respondent claimed that the child’s belongings were at the previous residence but
that she did not have a way of moving them to the new home. The court noted that she had
found a way to move her own belongings. The clinical psychologist opined that respondent’s
pattern of selecting inappropriate housing would likely continue if the child were returned to her
care. There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that respondent had not
obtained and maintained suitable housing as required in her treatment plan.
Respondent also contends that reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child were not
made. It is well established that petitioner must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to
reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights. See MCL 712A.18f; MCL
712A.19(7); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Respondent claims
that she was not provided with adequate transportation for parenting time. It was undisputed that
the foster parent initially transported the child to respondent’s home for weekly visits. In early
2010, visitation was changed from unsupervised in respondent’s home to supervised visitation at
petitioner’s Flint office. Respondent acknowledged at the termination hearing that the case
worker offered respondent the needed bus passes if she came to the agency. The trial court also
noted that respondent was able to find transportation to go to Cedar Point and travel to Detroit to
get a dog yet claimed she could not get transportation to petitioner’s office. Respondent also
argues that petitioner failed to provide respondent with more aggressive treatment for depression,
pointing to the clinical psychologist’s testimony that respondent would benefit from additional
treatment. However, the psychologist also stated that respondent’s depression symptoms were
not severe at the inception of the case when the psychological evaluation occurred, respondent
had already received counseling, and she was taking antidepressants. The trial court properly
concluded, during seven dispositional review hearings and at the termination hearing, that
petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with her child.
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that termination of her
parental rights was in the minor child’s best interests and improperly relied on highly speculative
testimony. See MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews the trial court’s determination regarding
the child’s best interests for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. A
trial court may consider evidence on the whole record in making its best interest determination.
Id.
The trial court record establishes that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
clearly in the child’s best interests. Respondent’s inability to provide her child with the basic
needs of food, clothing, suitable housing, and medical care led to the adjudication. Respondent’s
behaviors and circumstances, despite reunification services over two years, remained unchanged.
Respondent was still incapable of providing the child with a safe and stable home because of her
limited income and continued poor parental judgment.
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Respondent claims that the foster parent, respondent’s aunt, hated respondent and helped
sabotage respondent’s relationship with the child. This argument is groundless. At the time of
the child’s removal, respondent’s relationship with the child was tenuous at best. Respondent
acknowledged that the foster parent was very cooperative in trying to improve the relationship
between respondent and the child, who had spent nearly all of his first year in the foster parent’s
care. After removal, the child remained in foster care for more than two years, and respondent’s
contact with him consisted of weekly visits, averaging five to six hours, and a brief time when
overnight visitation was permitted. However, in January 2010, respondent began to miss visits
or request shorter weekly visits, and she did not maintain consistent telephone contact with the
child. Further, the child exhibited troubling behavior shortly after the overnight visitations with
respondent began, including fits of rage and urinating and defecating on his toys and around the
house despite being toilet trained. These behaviors nearly ceased when the child was no longer
in contact with respondent and reemerged when contact with respondent resumed. The court
reasonably concluded that the child’s distressing behavior was linked to his contact with
respondent. The clinical psychologist who evaluated respondent before the best interest hearing
concluded that the child and respondent were not bonded and that termination of her parental
rights was in the child’s best interests and would give him needed permanency. The trial court,
weighing the evidence on the whole record and considering the credibility of the witnesses, did
not clearly err in finding that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights.
Respondent asserts that the trial court erred in comparing the foster home to respondent’s
home in violation of Michigan law. Once a statutory ground for termination is established, a
court may consider the advantages of an alternative home for the child in evaluating the child’s
best interests. In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 634-635; 776 NW2d 415 (2009). Nothing in the
lower court record suggests that the trial court inappropriately weighed the advantages of the
foster home against respondent’s home when determining whether the statutory grounds for
termination had been satisfied. The trial court properly considered the foster parent’s testimony
when adjudicating the child’s best interests.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it failed to address respondent’s
claimed Native American heritage pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25
USC 1901 et seq. Issues regarding the interpretation and application of ICWA present questions
of law that this Court reviews de novo. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 538; 702 NW2d 192
(2005). Respondent did not object to the manner in which the ICWA notice was given or to the
insufficiency of documentation in the lower court record until this appeal. This Court has
previously held that substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the ICWA is
sufficient where the trial court record established that the appropriate tribes received actual
notice, and that no tribe came forward to intervene in the proceedings. In re TM (After Remand),
245 Mich App 181, 190-191; 628 NW2d 570 (2001). The record in this case shows that
petitioner complied with ICWA by sending notice to the appropriate tribe and received an
acknowledgment from the tribe that the notice was received. There is ample evidence that the
tribe had actual notice of the proceeding. There is no substantiation for respondent’s position
that the trial court did not adequately adhere to ICWA. Given respondent’s own statement in
court that she received a response that she and her son were not eligible for tribal membership,
the trial court was relieved from embarking on further ICWA tribal notification efforts.
Therefore, respondent has failed to show any error requiring remand for further inquiry or
reversal.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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