IN RE K A WEBB MINOR (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
July 26, 2011
In the Matter of K.A.W., Minor.
No. 301470
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 10-491689
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The respondent-mother appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to KAW (DOB 12-22-09) under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (i), and (j).
Respondent’s rights to KAW were terminated based on the 2009 termination of respondent’s
rights to three older children for failure to protect them from physical and sexual abuse. On
appeal, respondent challenges only the factual support for the court’s decision. At least one of
the statutory grounds for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence and the
evidence supported the court’s conclusion that termination was in KAW’s best interest.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2009, the Family Division of the Washtenaw Circuit Court terminated
respondent’s parental rights to her three older children, then aged eight months to 13 years,
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) (failure to prevent physical or sexual abuse to child) and (j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if child returned to the parent). The children were removed from
respondent’s care and her rights were terminated because she failed to protect her children from
a decade-long string of violent, mentally disturbed and sexually abusive live-in boyfriends. As a
result of respondent’s extremely impulsive and poor romantic decisions, her oldest daughter
(AF) was sexually abused by three different men. Respondent’s son (DS) was physically abused
and was forced to consume his own excrement. On one occasion, respondent refused to seek
medical treatment for DS’s burn injury because she did not want to be accused of abusing her
child. The children all witnessed one of respondent’s boyfriends commit atrocious acts of
animal cruelty against the family’s pets. The older two children also witnessed two of
respondent’s boyfriends physically abuse her. AF was severely traumatized by the extensive
abuse and attempted to commit suicide at the age of 11. Respondent apparently minimized the
psychological damage to her children as she prematurely terminated AF’s course of therapy and
continued to enter romantic relationships with dangerous men. This Court affirmed the
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Washtenaw Circuit Court’s termination decision in In re Flores/Schultz Minors, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 13, 2009 (Docket No. 290914).
While the Washtenaw County termination proceedings were pending, respondent
conceived KAW with Jeremy Webb. Webb was dating respondent when her older children were
removed from her care. Webb did not know the atrocity of the allegations involved in that
termination proceeding until after KAW was born, and he promptly ended his relationship with
respondent as a result. The DHS placed KAW in Webb’s care with supervised visitation for
respondent and filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to KAW based on the
termination of her rights to her older children. The DHS removed KAW from Webb’s care when
she was only four months old because she had several fractured bones. Medical experts testified
that KAW’s injuries were consistent with abuse, but it was unclear who caused the injuries.
At the termination trial in the current case, respondent testified at length regarding her
past history with men and her current attempts to improve her life through counseling,
psychiatric treatment and parenting classes. However, neither respondent’s counselor nor
psychiatrist had an opportunity to observe respondent with her children and, therefore, could not
determine whether respondent was ready to parent responsibly. The court also heard testimony
about the Washtenaw County termination proceeding and KAW’s injuries. Ultimately, the court
determined that the DHS had not established by clear and convincing evidence that Webb had
caused KAW’s injuries. Accordingly, the court dismissed the termination petition in relation to
Webb.
In relation to respondent, however, the court terminated her parental rights under the
following provisions of MCL 712A.19b(3):
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
*
*
*
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer
from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
(ii) The parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable
future.
*
*
*
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care and
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
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able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.
*
*
*
(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated
due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts
to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful.
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent.
II. ANALYSIS
Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a trial court “may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a
child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” that at least one statutory ground has
been proven. The petitioner bears the burden of proving that ground. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “If the court finds that there are grounds for
termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests,” the court is required by law to order termination. MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court
reviews for clear error the trial court’s ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been
established and its ruling that termination is in the children’s best interests. MCR 3.977(K); In re
Archer, 277 Mich App 71, 73; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). A decision “is clearly erroneous if, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d
216 (2003). Clear error signifies a decision that strikes us as more than just maybe or probably
wrong. Trejo, 462 Mich at 356.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the DHS established grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) (failure to prevent
abuse of child’s siblings), (g) (without regard to intent unable to provide proper care and custody
within a reasonable time), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm to child if returned to the
parent). Respondent’s parental rights to KAW’s three older siblings were terminated less than a
year before KAW’s birth due to respondent’s failure to protect them from physical and sexual
abuse perpetrated by respondent’s live-in partners. Respondent had the opportunity to prevent
the abuse but either chose to ignore it or was inexplicably unaware of the horrifying events that
occurred in her household. Respondent repeatedly exposed her older children to new dangers by
allowing a succession of men to move into her home and allowing them unsupervised time with
her children. During that time, respondent allowed the children to witness domestic violence
against her, failed to seek proper medical and psychiatric treatment for her children, and failed to
report that one of her boyfriends had sexually abused AF because it involved only “fondling.”
Further, on more than one occasion, respondent handled the criminal mistreatment of her
children by simply admonishing the offending boyfriend. Based on respondent’s decade-long
pattern of choosing romance over her children’s safety, the trial court could determine that
respondent would be unable to provide proper care and custody for KAW within a reasonable
time and that KAW faced a likely chance of harm if returned to her mother’s care. While
respondent underwent significant amounts of therapy to address her parenting issues, neither her
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counselor nor her psychiatrist could form an opinion whether respondent could protect KAW.
Considering the severity of the abuse to her older children and the length of time that respondent
allowed the abuse to continue, the trial court reasonably found that respondent’s “selfimprovements” were insufficient to ensure KAW’s present or future safety.
The trial court erred, however, in terminating respondent’s parental rights based on MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse of a
sibling). There is no evidence that respondent ever personally abused her children in any way,
only that she failed to protect them from the abuse of others. Similarly, there is no evidence that
respondent caused KAW’s injuries.
The trial court also erred in terminating respondent’s rights based on MCL
712A.19b(3)(i). The DHS must establish two prongs to terminate a parent’s rights under this
provision: 1) the parent’s rights to a sibling have been terminated due to “serious and chronic
neglect or physical or sexual abuse,” and 2) “prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been
unsuccessful.” The DHS has made no attempt to rehabilitate respondent in either the current
termination proceedings or the Washtenaw County proceedings related to her older children.
The DHS recommended permanent custody in both actions and, therefore, never prepared a
service plan geared toward reunification. Respondent’s attempts to improve her life through
counseling and parenting classes were completely self-motivated. This Court need not reverse
the termination decision based on these two erroneous grounds. A trial court need only find one
statutory ground for termination to support its judgment, MCL 712A.19b(3), and this trial court
properly found three.
We further affirm the trial court’s determination that terminating respondent’s parental
rights was in KAW’s best interests. MCR 3.977(K); MCL 712A.19b(5). The child was removed
from respondent’s custody when she was only two weeks old. Although respondent’s personal
interaction with the infant was appropriate, respondent’s utter failure to protect her older children
from abuse was too significant to ignore. The brief period of time since respondent lost her right
to parent her older children is also compelling. Given the circumstances, the trial court did not
clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to KAW.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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