IN RE B SCHAU MINOR (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2011
In the Matter of B. SCHAU, Minor.
No. 300740
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2004-000216-NA
In the Matter of WASHINGTON/JONES/SCHAU,
Minors.
No. 300791
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2004-000216-NA
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and O’CONNELL and OWENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 300740, respondent M. Schau appeals as of right from the trial court’s
order terminating his parental rights to BS pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). In
Docket No. 300791, respondent J. Washington appeals as of right from the same order, which
terminated her parental rights to her four children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and
(j). The appeals have been consolidated and we affirm in both appeals.
Both respondents challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the existence of a statutory
ground for termination and the children’s best interests. “In a termination of parental rights
proceeding, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for
termination exist and that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App
444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). An appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for
clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A finding is
clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id. at 209-210. Due deference is given to
the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the weight of evidence and the credibility of
witnesses who appear before it. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Although respondent Washington argues that the trial court erred in finding that
§§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were each established by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court
also terminated her parental rights under § 19b(3)(j), and she has not challenged that decision on
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appeal. Because only one statutory ground for termination is necessary for a court to terminate
parental rights, In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 461, respondent Washington’s failure to address the
termination of her parental rights under § 19b(3)(j) could alone preclude appellate relief. See
City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone, 270 Mich App 627, 638; 716 NW2d 615 (2006), and In re
JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998). Nonetheless, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were also both established by clear and
convincing evidence.
With respect to § 19b(3)(c)(i), the record does not support respondent Washington’s
contention that the conditions that led to the adjudication were limited to her cocaine and
marijuana use. Although the trial court’s jurisdiction over the children was based in part on
respondent Washington’s 2007 plea of admission to allegations of illegal drug use, respondent
Washington’s admissions also called into question her emotional stability and ability to handle
parenting responsibilities. Respondent Washington admitted that she was not protecting her
children from domestic violence situations. Further, the recommendations following a
psychological evaluation in August 2008 included both total abstinence from illegal drugs and
resolution of respondent Washington’s mood disorder. A court may apprise itself of all relevant
circumstances when evaluating the conditions that led to the adjudication. In re Jackson, 199
Mich App 22, 26; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
The evidence indicated that respondent Washington was prescribed medication for a
bipolar disorder, but continued to use illegal drugs. At the time of the trial court’s March 2010
decision regarding the statutory grounds for termination, respondent Washington was continuing
to either test positive for illegal drugs or fail to submit to scheduled drug screens. Earlier, she
informed the caseworker that she would not show up for a scheduled drug screen if she knew
that the results would be positive. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions
that led to the adjudication continued to exist. Further, considering the lack of progress in
addressing respondent Washington’s drug use, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that
the conditions were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time considering the
children’s ages. Therefore, the court did not err in finding that § 19b(3)(c)(i) was established by
clear and convincing evidence.
The same evidence also supports the trial court’s determination that § 19b(3)(g) was
established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent Washington’s failure to benefit from
services establishes that the children would be at continuing risk in her care. In re Gazella, 264
Mich App 668, 677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Indeed, the testimony made clear that Washington
was not following through with available services. The foster care worker testified that, after the
June 10 hearing, respondent Washington asked about parenting classes. The worker looked into
parenting classes and located a nine-week program at the YMCA that respondent Washington
could attend. The worker mailed, emailed, and telephoned the information to respondent
Washington to make certain she received it. After the referral, respondent Washington attended
only one class in the nine-week program. Respondent Washington also expressed interest in
domestic violence classes, but, as with the parenting classes, never followed through.
We also disagree with respondent Washington’s argument that the trial court erred in
finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Contrary to
what respondent Washington argues, the record does not indicate that she was punished for not
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participating in a family drug court program. The trial court’s order entered after its March 2010
decision regarding the statutory grounds for termination directed that she participate in the drug
court program only if she was eligible to do so; otherwise, she was to participate in another
suitable program. Further, it is clear from the record that the trial court ordered the additional
drug treatment for the benefit of the children. The fact that the trial court decided to proceed
with an evaluation of the children’s best interests after being informed that respondent
Washington was rejected by the drug court program does not establish that its purpose was
punitive, particularly where respondent did not seek alternative treatment.
In addition, considering the record as whole, we are not persuaded that the trial court
clearly erred in its assessment of the children’s best interests. While the court remarked that
respondent Washington was a “wonderful mother,” that remark was qualified by the court’s
observation and concerns regarding respondent Washington’s continued use of illegal drugs.
Given respondent Washington’s failure to show that she could refrain from using illegal drugs
and place her children’s needs first, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination
of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
In Docket No. 300740, respondent Schau argues that the trial court erred in finding that
§§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) were both clearly established. Respondent Schau asserts that he should
have been given more time to benefit from services and that he should have been permitted to
obtain a recommended medical examination before proceeding to termination.
Respondent Schau’s circumstances differed from respondent Washington because he was
not the subject of the original adjudication in 2007 with respect to his child. Therefore, legally
admissible evidence was required to establish statutory grounds for terminating his parental
rights. MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b); In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 205; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). Further,
because respondent Schau was not the subject of the adjudication, we conclude § 19b(3)(c)(i)
was not applicable to him. See MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b)(ii).1 Nonetheless, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(j) was established by clear and convincing evidence. The
evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that
respondent Schau’s relationship with respondent Washington would provide her with
unsupervised access to respondent Schau’s child and, in light of her active drug addiction, it was
reasonably likely that the child would be harmed if returned to respondent Schau.
Contrary to what respondent Schau argues, his testimony at the August 2010 hearing that
“I have noticed when [BS] leaves he don’t want to leave. That’s what he’s upset about, I’ve
seen. I think [respondent Washington] said the same things during the visits,” supports the trial
court’s finding that respondent Schau alluded to respondent Washington’s presence during
respondent Schau’s parenting time. Further, the trial court could reasonably infer from the
evidence, including respondent Schau’s testimony regarding his ongoing relationship with
1
Although respondent Schau failed to raise this specific issue, we have elected to consider it in
the interests of justice. See LME v ARS, 261 Mich App 273, 287; 680 NW2d 902 (2004); see
also In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272-273; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
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respondent Washington in the face of his drug case manager’s testimony that he needed to
refrain from relationships with individuals who use drugs, that respondent Schau did not have the
capacity to protect his child from respondent Washington.
We also reject respondent Schau’s argument that the trial court erred in finding that
petitioner complied with its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with
his child. See MCL 712A.18f. The reasonableness of services offered to a respondent may
affect the sufficiency of evidence to establish the statutory grounds for termination. In re Fried,
266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Here, the fact that changes were made to the
case-service plan during the proceedings or that the caseworker came up with new ideas for
addressing the issues in the case does not establish that petitioner’s efforts at reunification were
unreasonable. In addition, although a petitioner’s failure to take into account a parent’s
limitations and disabilities and make reasonable accommodations for those limitations could
render its efforts unreasonable, In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000),
respondent Schau has failed to establish any area in which more assistance was necessary to
enable him to work on what was expected of him under the case-service plan. The fact that a
psychological evaluation conducted shortly before the August 2010 hearing contained a
recommendation for a medical examination to determine any effects from past head injuries or
alcohol use did not preclude the trial court from finding that reasonable efforts at reunification
were made, or that § 19b(3)(j) was established. Further, the trial court’s failure to specifically
address the recommended medical examination in its decision does not warrant relief. The trial
court was not required to comment on every item of evidence. Rather, “[b]rief, definite, and
pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient.” MCR 3.977(I)(1).
Respondent Schau also challenges the trial court’s assessment of his child’s best interests.
Considering that the child had essentially spent his entire life as a temporary court ward and the
trial court’s justifiable concerns regarding the risk of harm to the child because of the continuing
relationship between respondent Washington and respondent Schau, the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that termination of respondent Schau’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Lastly, we consider respondent Schau’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel by applying by analogy principles of ineffective assistance of counsel developed in
criminal cases. In re CR, 250 Mich App at 197-198. Because this issue was not raised below,
our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31,
38; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Respondent Schau bears the burden of showing both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. In re CR, 250 Mich App at 198; see also People v Carbin,
463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
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Here, it is not apparent from the record that counsel performed deficiently by failing to
conduct redirect examination of respondent Schau, or object to the trial court’s findings, with
respect to the issue of respondent Schau’s parenting time with his child. In any event,
considering that counsel for the children elicited respondent Schau’s denial that respondent
Washington was present during his parenting time, and respondent Schau’s pro se argument to
the trial court regarding its finding that he had contradicted himself, respondent Schau has failed
to show any resulting prejudice. Therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot
succeed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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