PEOPLE OF MI V STANLEY FAISON (Per Curiam Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July19, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 298581
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 89-000621-FC
STANLEY FAISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Stanley Faison challenges the May 10, 2010, amended judgment of sentence, which
indicates that he was sentenced in February 1991 to concurrent prison terms of 50 to 100 years
each for plea-based convictions of second-degree murder1 and assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder.2 We remand for correction of the judgment of sentence.
In May 1989, a jury convicted Faison of second-degree murder and assault with intent to
do great bodily harm less than murder. In June 1989, the trial court sentenced him to prison
terms of 40 to 80 years for the murder conviction and 80 months to 10 years’ imprisonment for
the assault conviction, but then immediately vacated those sentences and sentenced Faison to 50
to 100 years’ imprisonment as a fourth habitual offender.3 In an earlier appeal, this Court
determined that the enhanced sentence was improper and remanded the case for resentencing.4
On remand, the trial court resentenced Faison to life in prison. A February 1991 judgment of
sentence indicated that Faison had pleaded guilty to being a fourth habitual offender and was
sentenced to life in prison.
1
MCL 750.317.
2
MCL 750.84.
3
MCL 769.10.
4
People v Faison, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 7,
1990 (Docket No. 120520), citing People v Moore, 432 Mich 311; 439 NW2d 684 (1989);
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
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The judgment of sentence was amended several times between 1993 and 2009. All of the
amended judgments erroneously indicated that Faison had pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and that he had been
sentenced to prison terms of 50 to 100 years for each conviction. An October 2009 amended
judgment indicated that Faison had pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced as a fourth
habitual offender on February 14, 1991, to concurrent prison terms of 50 to 100 years for each
conviction. Under the “Court recommendation” section in the amended judgment, the trial court
added “Amended jail credit, sentence date & date sentence begins 09-11-09.” The Department
of Corrections sought clarification as the recommendation indicated that Faison’s sentence began
on September 11, 2009, which conflicted with the stated sentencing date of February 14, 1991.
Faison was present when the trial court held a hearing in May 2010. The parties agreed that the
trial court simply needed to correct the recommendation to show that Faison’s sentence began on
February 14, 1991. The court entered another amended judgment indicating that Faison had
pleaded guilty to the murder and assault offenses and had been sentenced as a fourth habitual
offender on February 14, 1991, to concurrent prison terms of 50 to 100 years for each conviction.
Faison now contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court did not
provide him with an opportunity for allocution at the May 2010 hearing. Although we disagree
with Faison’s argument that he was entitled to allocution, we find that it is necessary to remand
this case for entry of yet another amended judgment of sentence.
At sentencing, the court must give a defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim
an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances they believe the court should consider in
passing sentence.5 “This directive permits a defendant to speak in mitigation of the sentence,”6
and requires that the court give the defendant an opportunity to allocute if he chooses to do so.7
Strict compliance with this rule is required and the failure to comply requires resentencing.8 The
right of allocation does not arise when a defendant is not actually resentenced.9 When a case is
remanded with instructions to impose a particular sentence and the matter is handled in open
court on the record, the defendant is not actually resentenced. Rather, the trial court is merely
performing a ministerial task and the defendant is not entitled to allocute because nothing he
could say could possibly affect the sentence.10
Faison’s sentence was not at issue at the May 10, 2010, hearing and the trial court never
passed sentence. It merely amended a previously entered judgment to correct any confusion
5
MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c).
6
People v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 119; 665 NW2d 443 (2003).
7
People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 628; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).
8
People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 392; 605 NW2d 374 (1999).
9
People v Strunk, 172 Mich App 208, 211; 431 NW2d 223 (1988).
10
People v Foy, 124 Mich App 107, 112; 333 NW2d 596 (1983). See also Strunk, 172 Mich
App at 211; People v Mouat, 194 Mich App 482, 487; 487 NW2d 494 (1992).
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caused by a recommendation in order to clarify that Faison’s sentence initiated on February 14,
1991, as specified in the sentence portion of the October 2009 judgment. Because the trial court
was not passing sentence and Faison did not contest the decision to amend the judgment of
sentence to clarify the date his sentences began, Faison was not entitled to allocution and his
right of allocution was not violated.
We note, however, that the May 10, 2010, amended judgment of sentence continues to
erroneously indicate Faison’s actual sentences. As conceded by the prosecutor, Faison was
sentenced to life in prison in February 1991, not to 50 to 100 years’ imprisonment. Accordingly,
we remand for entry of an amended judgment of sentence to reflect that on February 14, 1991,
Faison was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to life in prison, not to 50 to 100 years for
each conviction. The amended judgment should reflect that Faison was convicted by a jury, not
by a guilty plea.
Remanded solely for correction of the judgment of sentence in accordance with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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